Judgment :- 1. In this application, under Art.227 of the Constitution, arising out of proceedings before the Rent Court of Perintalmanna, two points alone were urged by the counsel for the petitioner, landlord. 2. The first related to the expenses for putting up a fence in the property, taken into account by the Rent Court in arriving at the total expenses for cultivation. The cost of the fence allowed is 4 paras of paddy per acre, the total extent of the property being 1 acre 92 cents. The contention of the petitioner's counsel was that this is not an item of expenditure which can be taken into account by the Rent Court under R.3-B of the Malabar Tenancy (Determination of Fair Rent) Rules, 1954. That Rule reads as follows: - "3-B. In fixing any quantity of paddy other than twenty five Palghat paras of paddy as cultivation expenses the Rent Court may also take into account factors like the unhealthiness of localities, the scantiness of labour, the possibility of ravages by wild beasts, and any unusual difficulty in protecting the land from inundation, and (a) the extent of land that can be ordinarily cultivated with a plough and a pair of oxen, (b) the period for which the cattle and the plough and other agricultural implements will be serviceable, and (c) the cost of ploughing, weeding, transporting, manuring and the like. The rates of cultivation expenses adopted for each class or sort of soil shall as far as possible be uniform for each taluk or groups of taluks". From the portion of the Rule underlined by us it is clear that the factors mentioned therein are not exhaustive and that it is open to the court to take into consideration other similar factors. Cost of constructing fence for a paddy field into which cattle are likely to stray is a legitimate expense of cultivation, and from the Revenue Inspector's report we are satisfied that, in this case, a fence is a necessity for the proper cultivation of the field. Both the Rent Court and the Appellate Court had allowed this item of expenditure. Therefore, there is no point in this objection. 3. The second point urged by the petitioner's counsel was that the Rent Court had acted wrongly in reducing the Revenue Inspector's estimate of the gross produce. Both the Rent Court and the Appellate Court had allowed this item of expenditure. Therefore, there is no point in this objection. 3. The second point urged by the petitioner's counsel was that the Rent Court had acted wrongly in reducing the Revenue Inspector's estimate of the gross produce. Good reasons have been given by the Rent Court for differing from the Revenue Inspector's report, and the Rent Court has acted on the strength of the settlement estimate. The Rent Court is entitled to differ from the Revenue Inspector's, report if there are adequate grounds for doing so, and in this case there was not only adequate grounds but the finding of the Rent Court has also been confirmed by the Appellate Court. 4. For these reasons we hold the petition to be groundless and dismiss the same. Parties will bear their costs. Dismissed.