JUDGMENT Roy, J. - This is an appeal by Government against the acquittal of the accused who was charged with infringement of the provisions of S. 10 of the United Provinces Shops and Commercial Establishments Act of 1947 and Rr. 5 and 6 of the Rules made under the Act. 2. The accused is the owner of a commercial establishment engaged in Calico printing at Farrukhabad and his business is, to quote his own words, confined to entirely as an exporter abroad. On 20-12-1953, which was a Sunday, and a close day for the purposes of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments 'Act, the establishment was found open and working. The prosecution contended that thereby the accused infringed S. 10 of the Act and read with Rr. 5 and 6 of the Rules, and the infringement was punishable u/s 27 of the Act. The accused pleaded on the basis of a letter dated 18-12-1948, from the Chief Inspector of Shops and Commercial Establishments, UP, to the Secretary of the Calico and Silk printers, Farrukhabad that the labour employed by him in the establishment was employed on contract or piece rate system and therefore such an establishment was outside the purview of the Act. That plea found favour with the learned Magistrate; and the learned Magistrate, accordingly, acquitted the accused. In our opinion the view taken by the learned Magistrate was incorrect. 3. The preamble of the Act recites that it is expedient to make provision for the regulation of hours of work and certain other conditions of employment in shops and commercial establishments. S. 2 (3) provides that "commercial establishment" means any premises other than a factory or a shop wherein any trade or business is carried on for profit and includes journalistic and printing establishments and premises in which the business of banking, insurance, dealing in stocks and shares, brokerage or produce exchange is carried on or which are used as theatres, cinemas or for other public amusement or entertainment; and includes the clerical and other establishment of a factory whom the provisions of the Factories Act, 1934, do not apply. That this was a "commercial establishment" besides having been alleged and proved by the prosecution in this summary trial, was in effect admitted by the accused himself when he said that it is a shop where he carried on business of the export of Calico printing abroad. That this was a "commercial establishment" besides having been alleged and proved by the prosecution in this summary trial, was in effect admitted by the accused himself when he said that it is a shop where he carried on business of the export of Calico printing abroad. The accused no doubt used the word "factory" for this business, but the mere use of the word "factory" by him will not convert this concern from something other than a "commercial establishment" as contained in the Act. In any event, even if the contention were to prevail that this was a "shop" where trade or business of export abroad was carried on, it will come under the disability stated in S. 10 of the Act. That section lays down that every employer shall close his "shop" or "commercial establishment" not included in the Schedule on one day of the week, and such day shall be referred to as the close day. Sub-section (2) of that section provides: Except as provided in the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, or any other enactment applying to a shop or a commercial establishment, the choice of a close day shall, subject to the approval of such authority as may be appointed in this behalf, rest with the employer and shall be specified by him in a notice permanently exhibited in a conspicuous place in the shop or commercial establishment. Provided that where a close day is prescribed in or under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, or other enactment applying to a shop or commercial establishment, such day shall be specified in the notice above referred to. 4. Sub-Cl. (3) of the section, however, says that the close day specified under Sub-section (2) shall not be altered by the employer except once in a year and any alteration shall take effect only as from 1st January in any year and shall be subject to the approval of such authority as may be appointed u/s 10(2). 5. Provided that the employer shall by affixing a notice in a conspicuous place in the shop or commercial establishment not later than December 15th next preceding give previous intimation of his intention so to alter the close day. 6. 5. Provided that the employer shall by affixing a notice in a conspicuous place in the shop or commercial establishment not later than December 15th next preceding give previous intimation of his intention so to alter the close day. 6. It is therefore evident that this section requires that every employer shall close his shop or commercial establishment on one day of the week which shall be called the close day and the choice of a close day shall rest with the employer, subject to the approval of such authority as may be appointed in this behalf and shall be specified by him in a notice permanently exhibited in a conspicuous place in the shop or commercial establishment which shall also exhibit a close day prescribed under the Negotiable Instruments Act or any other enactment applicable to the shop or commercial establishment. 7. The term "employer" used in S. 10 has been defined in S. 2(6) of the Act as meaning a person having charge of or owning the business of a shop or commercial establishment and includes the manager or any other person acting in the general management or control of such shop or commercial establishment. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the accused in this case was an "employer" as defined in the Act and the establishment was a "commercial establishment" or a "shop" as envisaged in the Act. 8. It was urged on behalf of the accused that it is implicit in the word "employer" that somebody should be employed and since no person was employed and those who were found there were only employed on contract or piece rate system, the accused cannot be held to be employer. This argument completely loses sight of the definition of the term "employer" contained in the Act. Undoubtedly the word "employer" according to its ordinary meaning in the English language signifies a person who employs somebody else. But it is competent for the Legislature to enact that in a particular Act the word shall include the owner of a business, whether or not anybody is employed therein and that seems to be the effect of the present definition. If one were to read into the definition, the provision that an employer must employ somebody then we think undoubtedly S. 10 would not apply. If one were to read into the definition, the provision that an employer must employ somebody then we think undoubtedly S. 10 would not apply. But we have no doubt whatsoever from the terms of the whole Act that the section was intended to include such a commercial establishment or shop. 9. In Shankar Hari Deshpande Vs. Damodar Vyankoji Kulkarni, (1941) 43 BOMLR 883 the word "employer" under the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1939, was considered. In that Act the word was defined just in the same terms as under the act which we have got to deal with. In that case also the argument was advanced that it is implicit in the word "employer" that somebody should be employed. But that argument was repelled and it was held that tt was competent for the Legislature no enact that in a particular Act the word shall include the owner of a business whether or not anybody is employed therein. We are in respectful agreement with that view. 10. It was admitted by the accused in the present case that this commercial establishment or shop was open on Sunday 20-12-1953. It was not pretended that this commercial establishment or shop observed as close day any day other than Sunday. It was therefore obvious that the accused infringed the provisions of S. 10 of the Act read with Rr. 5 and 6 of the Rules framed under the Act and such an infringement was punishable u/s 27 of the Act. 11. As we have already said, the learned Magistrate was of the view that this establishment came under an exemption because of something having been said by the Chief Inspector of shops and Commercial Establishments in his euer(sic) dated 18-12-1948, to the Secretary of the Calico and Silk Printers, Farrukhabad. That letter incidentally mentioned that the labour employed on contract or piece rate system is outside the purview of the Act. If advantage of what was ex-pressed there could be extended to anybody, it could only be extended to the labour employed on contract or piece rate system. What was said in that letter will not be interpreted as meaning that a commercial establishment or shop of this nature will not be governed by the Act and that S. 10 of that Act and Rr. 5 and 6 of the Rules framed under the Act can be violated with impunity. 12. What was said in that letter will not be interpreted as meaning that a commercial establishment or shop of this nature will not be governed by the Act and that S. 10 of that Act and Rr. 5 and 6 of the Rules framed under the Act can be violated with impunity. 12. For reasons stated above we allow this appeal and convict the accused Respondent u/s 27 of the UP Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1947, for infringement of S. 10 of the Act read with Rr. 5 and 6 of the Rules framed under the Act. We think this is not a case for a heavy sentence and we sentence the accused to a fine of Rs. 5 only, in default of payment of which he shall undergo one week's simple imprisonment.