SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. : The petitioner has moved this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate writ direct­ing the respondents to refrain from stopping clearance and disposal of tea manufactured and stocked in the Topia Tea Estate. (2) The petitioner claims to be the managing pro­prietor and co-sharer of the tea estate in question, and he alleges that since 1935 he has been managing the same and was doing so even during the life time of his father under a regular power of attorney. On the death of his father in March, 1956, he continued to manage the tea estate as the managing proprietor and co-sharer on behalf of the other heirs of his father, and, according to him, with their consent and approval. In pursuance of a letter, dated 23/24th April, 1956, from the Collector of Centra] Excise, the petitioner also submitted a declaration, signed by all the heirs of his deceased father then available, from which it was clear that the said heirs had no objection to the management of the tea estate continuing in the hands of the petitioner. It is further stated by the petitioner that the license for manufacturing tea in the said tea estate was extended from time to time for short periods only and, as such, he continued to manufacture tea on the strength of the permission granted by the Cen­tral Excise authorities. The petitioner again applied for renewal of the licence in order to carry on the business, as required by law. The Central Excise Superintendent, by his order, dated 10-9-1957, di­rected that the petitioner might be allowed to manu­facture tea in the Topia Factory, but there could be no clearance until further orders. In a letter from the authority concerned, it was stated that clearance could not be allowed until dispute was settled bet­ween the petitioner and the other co-sharers. This was with reference to an objection at one stage raised by Musstt. Zabeda Khatun, the peti­tioner's sister and one of the co-shares, to the grant of a licence to the petitioner, but the fact is that subsequently this objection was withdrawn, both by a telegram and a confirmatory letter, dated 26-8-57. The result was that the objection having been with­drawn, there was no other objection to the peti­tioner's carrying on the business as before. The result was that the objection having been with­drawn, there was no other objection to the peti­tioner's carrying on the business as before. The petitioner complains that the said order of the Superintendent of Central Excise, Tezpur, permitting him to manufacture tea in the Topia Factory but ad-, ding a direction that he would riot be allowed to clear the same until some so-called dispute was set­tled between the parties, was without jurisdiction. He has stated that, as a result of the clearance being stopped, the tea stacked in the godown could not be removed and disposed of, much to the pre­judice of the petitioner and other co-sharers of the estate. He also avers that, for the clearance of the tea stacked, he was prepared to pay the excise duty and to go through the other formalities, but the Excise authorities were not prepared to accept the offer. The order of the Superintendent, Central Ex­cise," stopping clearance of the goods, is attacked as being without jurisdiction. (3) We have, therefore, to see whether, having granted the permit to manufacture tea, the autho­rities had any jurisdiction, under the law, to stop clearance of the goods manufactured. It is relevant to consider, in this connection, certain rules and provisions of the statute on the point. Under S. 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it is provi­ded that duties of Excise on all excisable goods shall be levied and collected in the manner prescribed. Section 6 of the Act further provides that no person shall, except under the authority and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted under the Act, engage in the production or manu­facture or any process of the production or manu­facture of any specified excisable goods. Section 7 of the Act empowers the authorities concerned to grant a licence subject to such restric­tions and conditions, and in such form and contain­ing such particulars, as may be prescribed under the rules. Then, under S. 37 of the Act, the Central Government has been given powers to frame rules in order to carry into effect the purposes of the Act. It is on this authority that the rules have been Iramed, and our attention has been Srawn particu­larly to sub-rule (3-A) of rule 178, which hag an important bearing on the point. Then, under S. 37 of the Act, the Central Government has been given powers to frame rules in order to carry into effect the purposes of the Act. It is on this authority that the rules have been Iramed, and our attention has been Srawn particu­larly to sub-rule (3-A) of rule 178, which hag an important bearing on the point. (4) The said rule provides that where a licensee dies, the original licence shall be deemed to have been terminated, and, if more than one person claim­ing to be the heirs to the deceased, apply for. the grant of a fresh licence for the same premises, the licence shall be granted to the person who, in the opinion of the licensing authority, is in actual posses­sion of the said premises. There is also a proviso incorporated in the rule which says that the grant of the licence to such person shall not prejudice the rights of any other person over the licensed business or the licensed premises, to which such person may be lawfully entitled. In this case, the licence was originally in the name of the father, though it does not appear to be seriously disputed that even in the life time of the father, the petitioner had been managing the tea estate. After the death of the father, it is also not disputed that the petitioner has been managing the tea estate and is in actual possession of the premises. It is, therefore, contended that, on the terms of the rule, even if more than one person claiming to be heir to the deceased, had applied for the grant of a fresh licence for the said premises, the authorities concerned had to grant a licence to the person in ac­tual possession. The direction to grant the license to the person in actual possession is mandatory. That being so, the petitioner was, as a matter of course, entitled to the grant of the licence in question and, in fact, the authorities have allowed the petitioner, as such, to carry on the business of manufacturing tea. In fact, under the order in question before us, the per­mission to manufacture has already been granted; but the question is, whether the authorities had juris­diction to stop clearance until the so-called dispute between the heirs was settled. In fact, under the order in question before us, the per­mission to manufacture has already been granted; but the question is, whether the authorities had juris­diction to stop clearance until the so-called dispute between the heirs was settled. The rules nowhere provide that, under the law, they can stop the sale of the goods or the clearance thereof so long as the petitioner is prepared to pay the Excise duties which are payable to the Excise authorities. Rule 52 of the Act, which is the relevant rule in respect of clearance of the goods, provides that when the manu­facturer desires to remove goods on payment of duty, from the specified premises, he shall be allowed to do so after the excise duties have been paid to the satisfaction of the authorities. Therefore, under the law and the rules framed, there seems to be no justification for the direction given by the Superintendent of Excise that although the petitioner could manufacture tea in the tea fac­tory, he should not be allowed to clear the same in spite of the fact that he is prepared to pay the excise duties in question. The illegal condition stop­ping clearance is, therefore, unwarranted by law. (5) On behalf of the Excise Department, reliance has been placed upon the proviso, and it is argued that because at some stage an objection had been raised, by one of the heirs, to the business being carried on by the petitioner, it is open to the autho­rities concerned, on the strength of the proviso in­corporated in sub-rule (3A) of S. 178, to put such a condition on the permission to manufacture the goods. In -the first place1, the objection, if any, has, in fact, been withdrawn by the objector, and that position is not disputed now; but it is only suggested that there is some other heir who has given no specific declaration authorising the petitioner to carry on the manufacturing business. The clear answer to the contention is, as pro­vided in the rule itself, that the petitioner being 'in actual possession', even though there may have been other applications for the grant of a licence, he should be entitled to the grant subject, of course, to his fulfil­ling other legal requisites, e. g., the execution of the? security bond, payment of fees, etc. security bond, payment of fees, etc. The proviso does not suggest that although, as a person in actual possession, the licence for manufacturing tea should be given to the petitioner, yet it may be open to the Excise authorities to put the condition that he shall not be allowed to clear the same for the so called purpose of safeguarding the interest of the other heirs interested in the property, if any. All that the proviso means is that the grant of a licence by the licensing authorities to the person in actual possession of the said premises, will not in any manner affect prejudicially the rights of the person who may be ultimately found to be entitled to the premises. The Excise authorities have nothing to do with any dispute between the heirs o£ a de­ceased licensee inter se, so long as they grant the license to the heir in 'actual possession' of the pre­mises. This is so for obvious reasons, because, ii1 these authorities were to embark upon an enquiry into such disputes between the heirs or were to hold up the manufacturing or clearance processes of the goods manufactured until disputes between them were settled, they will have to wait in many cases for almost an indefinite period to the utter detriment of the business and the incidental public revenue. It would spell almost a calamity to the Excise revenue. Any other interpretation of the above rule;; will not be, therefore, in consonance with the main avowed objects of the Excise Act, which are to levy and realise excise duty from excisable commodities and to prohibit manufacture of excisable articles ex­cept under a lawful permit. The order, therefore, is clearly illegal and cannot be upheld. (6) It has been .argued by the learned senior Government Advocate that the petitioner had a re­medy open to him under the law itself by way of an appeal under S. 35 of the Act, or by way of re­vision by the Central Government under S. 36 of the Act. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that apart from the fact that these remedies were in­effective remedies, the order in question was in vio­lation of his fundamental right to carry on business and, therefore, it was open to him to move this Court directly for obtaining a Rule on the point. The petitioner, on the other hand, contends that apart from the fact that these remedies were in­effective remedies, the order in question was in vio­lation of his fundamental right to carry on business and, therefore, it was open to him to move this Court directly for obtaining a Rule on the point. We would not, of course, encourage the practice of filing applications for writs before us even though specific remedies may be available under the law; but the facts in this case are undisputed, and any further delay in the matter is not only likely to cause serious loss to the petitioner but also result in loss of public revenue. A Rule nisi has already been granted to the petitioner, and now that we find that the condition imposed is illegal and without jurisdiction, we cannot possibly allow that condition | to stand. We, therefore, set aside the condition' imposed and direct that, subject to the conditions provided under R. 52, the Superintendent of Excise or the other Excise Authorities have no jurisdiction to stop the clearance of the tea manufactured. In the circumstances, there will be no order for costs. DEKA J. : (7) I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice. I would, however, like to add a few words in answer to an argument advanced by Mr. Medhi, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Superintendent of Central Excise. The text of sub-rule (3A) of rule 178 has been already alluded to and what Mr, Medhi contends is that the issue of a licence or the granting of a licence shall be subject to the condi­tion that it shall not prejudice the rights of any other person over the licenced business, or, in other words', he contends that the issue of a licence, as contem­plated by the said sub-rule, is permissible only when it does not affect adversely the interest of any other person interested in the licenced business. My Lord the Chief Justice has given an in­terpretation as to what this proviso is for, and I fully agree that it only means that the interest of other persons will remain intact or will not be ad­versely affected by the issue of a license in favour of one of the persons who is found to be in actual possession of the business or the premises. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that Mr. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that Mr. Medhi's con­tention is correct that the issue of a licence shall be subject to the examination of this aspect, namely, as to whether anybody else would be adversely af­fected by the issue of the licence, this contention cannot be entertained at a stage after the licence has been issued. Therefore, this contention is wrong on two grounds, namely, (i) that the proviso does not really mean that under no circumstance licence can be issued when there is dispute between inter­ested parties over the concern that needs a licence, and (ii) that the licence being issued, there could be no restriction on the rights of the person concerned as to carrying on the business, like clearance of the stock or sale of the same, unless there be any other rule providing for such restriction. In the circumstances of the present case, on the facts, practically there is no dispute, and the licence was issued basically on the Department holding that the petitioner was in actual possession of the tea garden or the premises where the tea was permitted to be manufactured. (8) Further, there is no substance in Mr. Medhi's contention that the Department may be liable to compensation, as they were threatened by one of the contending parties who had some interest in the tea garden. We find from the Act itself that S. 40 there­of guarantees full immunity to the Department if any act is done in good faith or is ordered to be done in good faith under this Act. Here, there is no imputation that the act of the Department is not bona fide and, therefore, there can be no real ap­prehension of any claim for compensation by any of the parties interested. (9) In regard to the other contention of Mr. Medhi that when an appeal is competent, it is not for this Court to issue a writ, - there are decisions of this Court which would support Mr. Choudhuri's contention that under certain circumstances, we can issue a writ even though an appeal or revision 5s provided under the statute. (9) In regard to the other contention of Mr. Medhi that when an appeal is competent, it is not for this Court to issue a writ, - there are decisions of this Court which would support Mr. Choudhuri's contention that under certain circumstances, we can issue a writ even though an appeal or revision 5s provided under the statute. This is really a matter which would depend on the merits and circumstances of each case, namely, as to whether this Court should exercise its extraordinary powers or should leave the parties to take recourse to other remedies as provid­ed under the statute; more particularly, when facts are in dispute and facts have to be found on evi­dence or otherwise, we consider it more desirable that the parties should be left to seek their remedies either in the Civil Court or by taking recourse to other provisions under the Act. But, in this case, the facts are very patent, and we see no reason to leave the parties or the peti­tioner to go in appeal under the Act itself. It would mean not only delay, but loss both to the Depart­ment as well as to the parties concerned, and, in the circumstances of the present case, we feel quite competent to deal with the subject-matter of the dis­pute. The order complained of is, in our opinion, illegal to the extent that there has been restriction on the right of clearance inherent in the licence issued by the Department. We accordingly order that the order be modified to the extent that, on the basis of the licence, the petitioner will have the necessary right of clearance, subject to the payment of taxes, as provided under rule 52 framed under the Act. The order will be modified to the extent, as prayed for, and the Rule is made absolute as proposed by my Lord the Chief Justice. HD/V.B.B. Rule made absolute; Order modified.