JUDGMENT 1. THE petitioner Yakub Molla was a resident of Jahangirpur within Kotwali Police Station in the district of Nadia. In the early part of 1950 he along with the members of his family consisting of his wife, sons, etc. went to Eastern Pakistan. According to the petitioner, he was compelled to do so because his properties in Jahangirpur were forcibly occupied by the refugees and he was forced out of his house and native village Jahangirpur along with other Muslims. He began to reside at Damurhada in the district of Kusthia in Eastern Pakistan. According to him he came for some time to India in 1951, but this is not admitted. Any how, the visit must have been a short one. The Passport Act (XXXIV of 1920) came into operation on the 15th October, 1952. This purported to amend the existing Passport Rules and made it compulsory to have a passport for persons belonging to Pakistan, if they intend to come to India. On the 21st February, 1953 the petitioner took out a Pakistani passport. On the 3rd March, 1953 he applied for a visa for visit to India. In that application he stated that he was a Pakistan citizen. The application form requires the date of migration to be given and this has been as the 16th Chaitra, 1362 B. S. The application was verified by a declaration stating that the statements and information given therein were true to the best of the petitioner's knowledge and also there was a declaration that he was aware of the fact that any false statement therein would make the visa liable to cancellation and subject him to penalty prescribed by law. On the 16th March, 1953 on the strength of this application, an Indian visa was granted. It is thereafter that the petitioner came to India with the intent of staying there. On the 15th September, 1954 he purported to surrender his passport to the Pakistan authorities in India and made an affidavit before the Magistrate, Krishnagar, Nadia, to the effect that he was a citizen of the Indian Union, that he had gone to East Pakistan for temporary shelter and that he would never claim Pakistan citizenship and so forth. This affidavit is dated the 5th September, 1954. This affidavit is dated the 5th September, 1954. On the 21st September, 1954 the petitioner made an application for the issue of an Indian passport, to be accurate, an India-Pakistan passport. In that application he declared that he was a citizen of India and that he wished to visit Pakistan for seeing his daughter at Goswami Durgapur, Kusthia, in Eastern Pakistan. On the 27th October, 1954 on the strength of this application and the declarations contained therein, verified by a solemn declaration that all facts stated therein were true, an Indian passport was issued to him on the 27th October, 1954, On the 13th December, 1954 the assistant sub-inspector. Kotwalli Police Station, District Nadia, seized the passport. On the 21st December, 1954 the passport was cancelled. On the 29th November, 1954 the Additional District Magistrate of Nadia lodged a complaint before the S. D. O. Sadar Krishnagar, against the petitioner for having committed an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. It is alleged that several statements made in the application for the issue of an India-Pakistan passport made by the petitioner on the 21st September, 1954 were false. The statements are that the petitioner had not voluntarily acquired the citizenship of any foreign State, that he had not otherwise lost Indian citizenship and that he had not previously held or applied for any passport whatever for himself. Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code lays down that whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, etc. shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. It is after this complaint was filed that the petitioner came up to this court and this Rule was issued on the 16th February, 1955 calling upon the opposite parties to show cause why a writ in the nature of certiorari should not be issued and why the order of seizure of the passport should not be cancelled and why the passport of the petitioner should not be restored. It will be noted that in the Rule as issued, there is no relief asked for to set aside and//or quash the criminal proceedings. The Rule is entirely directed towards quashing the seizure, although in the petition there is a prayer for an interim order for stay of the prosecution, coming to the application for the passport, a copy whereof is annexed to the petition and marked as annexure "c," we find that the application itself contains a clause, namely, clause 17, the relevant part thereof being as follows: "should any of the declaration made or facts stated in this application be found to be untrue, I. render myself liable to prosecution, and any passport that may be granted to me in pursuance of this application shall at the discretion of the Government of India be liable to be revoked and impounded. " 2. THE argument that has been made before mc by Mr. Dutt is however based on the assumption that the petitioner continues to be a citizen of India and therefore the passport has been validly issued to him and could not be impounded and that the criminal prosecution is misconceived. Mr. Dutt argued that his client is a citizen of India as a result of the provisions of Article 5 of the Constitution. He was born in the territory of India, his parents were born in the territory of India and he has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India ever since his birth. Consequently, under Article 10 the petitioner must be deemed to be a citizen. The first difficulty that the petitioner is faced with, is his own application for in Indian visa made in March, 1953, wherein he has solemnly declared that he was on that date a Pakistan citizen. Mr. Consequently, under Article 10 the petitioner must be deemed to be a citizen. The first difficulty that the petitioner is faced with, is his own application for in Indian visa made in March, 1953, wherein he has solemnly declared that he was on that date a Pakistan citizen. Mr. Dutt argues that a passport is no conclusive evidence of the citizenship of any person. He has quoted several Indian and American authorities. It is laid down there that a passport is by itself not a conclusive evidence of the nationality of a person but it is taken as evidence because of the comity of nations and as a matter of fact, and according to international practice. It may not be conclusive evidence, but a man's admission which he makes upon a solemn declaration cannot be lightly brushed aside and it must constitute prima-facie evidence of his nationality. To take a lenient view of the solemn declaration in this case would mean putting a premium upon a deliberate falsehood made, because the person making it states that at the time he made it, it suited his convenience. This is a position which it is impossible to countenance in a court of equity. Besides the admission being there, a heavy onus lies upon the petitioner to disprove the fact, and that can only be done upon the faking of evidence, and I do not see how that can be done in this jurisdiction. If the statement made in the petition of March, 1953 and the solemn declaration made therein be true, then indeed the criminal action that has been commenced was inevitable. In that action, the petitioner might adduce evidence about his nationality, but I do not see how and in what way it is possible for me to consider such evidence in this application. Since however there has been an argument raised, I shall briefly deal with the law upon the subject. Reference has been made to Article 5 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, so far as Article 5 is concerned, the petitioner would be an Indian citizen. But, as has been held in the Supreme Court case to which I shall presently refer, Article 5 is subject to the provisions of Article 7. Reference has been made to Article 5 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, so far as Article 5 is concerned, the petitioner would be an Indian citizen. But, as has been held in the Supreme Court case to which I shall presently refer, Article 5 is subject to the provisions of Article 7. That Article runs as follows: "notwithstanding anything in Articles 5 and 6, a person who has after the first day of March, 1947, migrated from the territory of India to the territory now included in Pakistan shall not be deemed to be a citizen of India: provided that nothing in this Article shall apply to a person who, after having so migrated to the territory now included in Pakistan has returned to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law and every such person shall for the purposes of clause (b) or Article 6 be deemed to have migrated to the territory of India after the nineteenth day of July, 1948." 3. THEREFORE under the provisions of Article 7 a person who may be domiciled in India and who may come within any of the categories mentioned therein, would, if he has migrated to Pakistan after the first day of March, 1947, cease to be a citizen of India The only way that he can regain his citizenship is by returning to the territory of India under a permit for resettlement or permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law. That this is the position in law is quite evident from a Supreme Court case which has been cited by Mr. Dutt himself, viz., State of Bihar v. Kumar Amar Singh and ors. (1) (1955) S. C. A. 376: A. I. R, (1955) S,C, 282. In that case, Kumar Rani Sayeeda Khatun, who was the wedded wife of Captain Maharaj Kumar Gopal Saran Narayan Singh of Gaya was born in the territory of India and was the wife of a person who is still an Indian citizen. The Kumar Rani went to Karachi in July, 1948. Her story was that she went there temporarily for medical treatment of a Hakim but this was doubted by the High Court and their lordships of the Supreme Court thought it unfounded. The Kumar Rani went to Karachi in July, 1948. Her story was that she went there temporarily for medical treatment of a Hakim but this was doubted by the High Court and their lordships of the Supreme Court thought it unfounded. When she came to India in December, 1948 she did so on a temporary permit stating in her application for the permit that she was domiciled in Pakistan and accordingly representing herself to be a Pakistan national. She then went back to Pakistan in April, 1949 on the expiry of the temporary permit. She made an attempt to obtain a permit for permanent return to India only after steps had been taken to vest her Wakf property in India in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. She then managed somehow to procure a permit but this was cancelled on the ground that the State Government concerned had not consented to the issue thereof. The Supreme Court held that upon the above facts there could be no doubt that the petitioner had migrated from the territory of India after the first March, 1947. It was held that even if Article 5 could be said to be applicable to her, on the assumption that Captain Gopal Narayan Singh was her husband, and that her domicile was that of her husband, the facts brought her case under Article 7 of the Constitution. It was further held that Article 7 overrides Article 5. It is peremptory in its scope and makes no exception for a case of the wife migrating to Pakistan leaving her husband in India. Even such a wife must be deemed not to be a citizen of India unless the particular facts brought her case within the proviso to Article 7. That proviso has been set out above. In the Supreme Court case, the Rani actually had a permit which eventually was cancelled In the present case, the petitioner never had any permit, and in no way can he be said to have complied with the proviso to Article 7. Mr. Dutt then argued that so far as a permit is concerned, the matter was governed by the 'influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949' and the relative rules made thereunder. Mr. Dutt then argued that so far as a permit is concerned, the matter was governed by the 'influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949' and the relative rules made thereunder. Sometime on the 19th April, 1950, Rule 31 of the said Rules was amended and substituted by the new Rule 31 which provides that a person entering India from any place in East Pakistan shall be exempt from the requirement of being in possession of a permit except in the cases specifically mentioned therein, which mainly relate to persons coming from or residing in, West Pakistan. It is argued that this Rule shows that no permit was necessary and therefore the provisions of Article 7 are complied with. In my opinion, this argument is not sound. So far as influx of people from East Pakistan is concerned, at first, the matter was on a friendly basis and no permit was necessary. This kind of mutual friendship however did not last long, and ultimately matters were tightened up and a passport became necessary for travel between the two countries. Rule 31 does not in any event speak about the kind of permit which is mentioned in the proviso to Article 7. The permit that is mentioned in Rule 7 is a permit to travel from one country to another, and not a permit for permanent resettlement in India. Assuming that the Act or the Rules were applicable at the relevant time, and that the interpretation of Mr. Dutt is correct, still, the Constitution must have overriding force. If the Constitution says that citizenship cannot be regained without a permit, then any Act or Rules which lay down to the contrary would be void. In my opinion, however, there is no inconsistency, and since Article 7 is overriding, the provisions must be given effect to, and in the case of people who have migrated to Eastern Pakistan after the 1st day of March, 1947 citizenship cannot be regained without a permit for resettlement as mentioned in the proviso. That is an absolute condition precedent. So far as the Rules relating to influx from Pakistan are concerned, they do not specifically deal with such a situation, that is to say, they do not deal specifically with persons who have migrated from India to Pakistan before the 1st of March, 1947 and who wish to come back and resettle in India. So far as the Rules relating to influx from Pakistan are concerned, they do not specifically deal with such a situation, that is to say, they do not deal specifically with persons who have migrated from India to Pakistan before the 1st of March, 1947 and who wish to come back and resettle in India. Those Rules were meant to deal with ordinary movement between the two countries. 4. THE next point made by Mr. Dutt is that under section 10 of the Citizenship Act, 1955, a citizen of India shall cease to be a citizen of India only if he is deprived of that citizenship by an order of the Central Government under section 10. Again, I do not think that this section has anything to do with the facts of this case. There is no question of deprivation of the petitioner's Indian citizenship, because what is alleged is that the petitioner has long ago lost his Indian citizenship by virtue of migration. It is not conceded that he is a citizen of India and no attempt is being made to deprive him of such citizenship under any of the provisions of the Citizenship Act, 1955. It is alleged that he is a citizen of Pakistan and as such he is not entitled to an Indian passport and he is being sought to be made liable for having committed an offence under the Indian laws for having given false information to the authorities in terms of section 182 of the Indian Penal Code. Whether he has committed that offence or not is not a matter which I should decide here, because it will prejudice the criminal proceedings. All that I have to decide here is whether a case has been made out for interference by this court. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not see why I should interfere. In my opinion the question raised cannot in any event be adequately decided in this jurisdiction where no evidence can be taken. Treated however as an abstract principle of law, i cannot see why the petitioner should be considered as a "citizen of India" and/or why his passport should not be cancelled and seized. In my opinion the question raised cannot in any event be adequately decided in this jurisdiction where no evidence can be taken. Treated however as an abstract principle of law, i cannot see why the petitioner should be considered as a "citizen of India" and/or why his passport should not be cancelled and seized. In my opinion nothing unlawful has been done in this case and the petitioner is not entitled to come to this Court for any relief and further has not made out any ground for interference by this Court. The result is that this application fails. The Rule is discharged. Interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.