JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a petition, in revision, against the appellate judgment of the Sessions Judge of Berhampur; maintaining the conviction of the Petitioner u/s 304-A I.P.C. and the sentence of three months rigorous imprisonment passed by a First Class Magistrate of Parlakhimedi. 2. On the 6th August 1954 the Petitioner was driving motor bus No. MDV-2614, from Varanasi to Parlakhimedi. He reached Parlakhimedi bus stand in due course and while proceeding to the Police Station from the stand he took a short cut, through a lane known as Gundichabadi lane, and there he ran over a woman who was walking on the lane ahead of the bus and killed her outright. An Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (P. W. 5) on leave who travelled in that bus on the same day and was sitting in the front seat by the side of the Petitioner immediately reported the incident at Parlakhimedi Police Station vide Ext. 3. The time of occurrence was given as 11 A.M. After holding the post-mortem examination on the corpse and after inspection of the bus and the place of the accident by the Motor Vehicle Inspector (P. W. 4) Sri B.C. Mukherji, the Police completed the investigation and submitted charge-sheet. 3. The Petitioner took the plea that the accident took place because the woman who was proceeding all along on the left side of the lane suddenly got confused and ran towards the right Bide when the bus was almost upon her; and that notwithstanding his desperate efforts to avert the accident by turning to the extreme right the collision could not be a voided. 4. The two lower courts, however, have rejected the plea of the Petitioner and held that the death of the woman was caused by the rashness and negligence of the Petitioner. As regards the circumstances under which the accident took place, they relied mainly on the evidence of the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police (P.W.5). As a court of revision, I see no reason to disturb their finding on this point. Some of the other eye-witnesses have however given a slightly different version but that has not been accepted by the two courts of fact. 5. As a court of revision, I see no reason to disturb their finding on this point. Some of the other eye-witnesses have however given a slightly different version but that has not been accepted by the two courts of fact. 5. From the evidence of P.W. 5 the following facts emerge: The Petitioner's bus left Varanasi on the day only at 9 a.m. though, according to the schedule timing, it ought to have left that place at 6 a.m. Another bus No. ADS-143 left Varanasi just before the Petitioner's bus and reached Parlakhimedi bus stand a little earlier. During the journey from Varanasi to Parlakhimedi the Petitioner was trying his best to overtake the other bus and P.W. 5 has to caution him not to compete with the first bus. After both the buses had reached Parlakhimedi bus stand, the bus ADS. 143 left a few minutes earlier and proceeded to the Police Station along the scheduled route. The Petitioner instead of taking the same route suddenly swerved and took his vehicle through Gundichabadi lane which was not the prescribed route for the motor vehicle. The surface of the road in that lane was very rough and uneven. The Petitioner did not blow the horn while proceeding through the lane though the woman was seen by him walking on the left side of the road, at a distance of 30 yards ahead of the bus. The lane was about 20 feet wide and when the bus came very near to the woman she got frightened and deviated from the path along which she was walking and Petitioner turned to the extreme right side but the bumper of the vehicle struck the woman from behind and caused her death. 6. As regards the speed of the vehicle P.W. 5 estimated it to be about 30 miles per hour, but from the evidence of the Motor Vehicles Expert (P. W. 4) it would appear that the bus was travelling at about 25 miles per hour at the time of the accident. The Petitioner was medically examined by the Assistant Surgeon of Parlakhimedi. Dr. Mohapatra (P. W. 10) at about 1. 15 p.m. that day and his breath was found to be faintly smelling of liquor, but the Medical Officer stated that he was not in a drunken state and was not likely to prove dangerous to the public. The Petitioner was medically examined by the Assistant Surgeon of Parlakhimedi. Dr. Mohapatra (P. W. 10) at about 1. 15 p.m. that day and his breath was found to be faintly smelling of liquor, but the Medical Officer stated that he was not in a drunken state and was not likely to prove dangerous to the public. The accident had taken place about two hours prior to the medical examination and the Medical Officer was not questioned as to what would have been the condition of the Petitioner at the time of the accident. 7. The Petitioner's explanation to the effect that he took the shorter route along the Gundichabadi lane on account of petrol shortage was disbelieved by both the courts who held that his main aim in taking the shorter route was to reach Parlakhimedi Police Station earlier than the other bus. The vehicle was found to be in proper condition by the Motor vehicle Expert (P. W. 4). It also appears that the lane in question was sloping downwards in the direction in which the vehicle was moving. 8. The main question of law argued by Mr. Ramdas, on behalf of the Petitioner, was that on the facts found, criminal rashness or negligence was not established. It is true that there is a fundamental distinction between criminal rashness and negligence on the one hand, and mere negligence or rashness which may involve civil liability, on the other. As pointed out in H.W. Smith Vs. Emperor, : Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequence. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. To a similar affect is the following observation in Russel on Crime, 1950 Edition, page 64.1, as to what constitutes culpable negligence: In order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime. In judging whether the driver of a motor vehicle was guilty of rashness or negligence no abstract standard can be laid down, and the Court has to judge what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient having regard to all the circumstances of the case Subba Rao v. State AIR 1953 Hyd. 123. 9. In the instant case the circumstances are all against the Petitioner. For some reason or other he left the starting station nearly three hours after the scheduled time of departure. During the journey from Varanasi to Parlakhimedi he tried to overtake the other bus several times inspite of the fact that P.W. 5 who was sitting by his side in the vehicle cautioned him not to compete with that bus. After reaching the bus stand at Parlakhimedi, he drove through Gundichabadi lane-though it was not the authorised route-mainly for the purpose of reaching the Police Station earlier than the other bus which took the main route. The surface of the road in the lane was rough and uneven and the road was also sloping downwards in the direction in which the Petitioner's bus was proceeding. The Petitioner did not blow the horn though the woman first noticed by the person sitting by the side of the Petitioner namely P.W. 5, when she was at a distance of thirty yards from the bus. The Petitioner did not blow the horn though the woman first noticed by the person sitting by the side of the Petitioner namely P.W. 5, when she was at a distance of thirty yards from the bus. If the Petitioner, as soon as he entered the lane and saw the woman, had slowed down the vehicle and blown the horn, anticipating-as a prudent driver-that the woman (who would not be expecting such a heavy motor vehicle to pass through the lane) may not be sufficiently careful, he could easily have averted the accident. The vehicle according to the evidence of the Motor Vehicle Expert (P. W. 4) was then being driven at about 25 miles per hour which, having regard to the condition of the road in the lane and its gradient, must be held to the excessive. His failure to blow the horn shows gross negligence on his part. The fact that he had taken liquor that morning also betrays some amount of recklessness and indifference as to the consequence which might ensue while driving the vehicle. 10. In my opinion the lower courts were justified in holding that there was criminal rashness and negligence on the part of the Petitioner. It is true that the accident took place because of the fact that the woman got confused, when the bus was almost upon her, and perhaps swerved towards the right, but as a prudent driver the Petitioner: (i) should not have taken that route which was not the authorised route for the bus; and (ii) having taken that route he should have proceeded at a slow speed, blown the horn when he first noticed the woman walking ahead, and kept the vehicle under such control as to be able to stop it within a very short distance. The wrong turn to the right which the woman took at last moment would not exonerate the Petitioner from guilty in view of his conduct immediately before the accident. 11. The Petitioner was rightly convicted and the sentence is not excessive. I would therefore dismiss this revision petition. Petition dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed