M/s. Bissesar House, a dissolved firm v. State of Bombay and others
1958-07-23
B.N.GOKHALE, G.B.BADKAS, M.C.CHAGLA
body1958
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - M. C. CHAGLA C. J. : An interesting and important question with regard to the question of limitation under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 arises in this Full Bench. The facts giving rise to this-Full Bench are these. The petitioner is a registered dealer and his chargeable accounting year is from the 1st July to the 30th June. He made his return and paid the tax which according to him was due for the years 1-7-1951 to 30-6-1952, 1-7-1952 to 30-6-1953 and 1-7-1953 to 30-6-1954. On 31-12-1956 the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued a notice under S. 11 (2). This notice was served upon the assessee with regard to the first year on 4-1-1957 and with regard to the second year on 8-1-1957. The contention of the assessee was that this notice was bad because it was served three years after the end of the chargeable accounting year, and this petition was filed in this Court chalcally proceeds to assess the dealer. It is only in the case of his not being satisfied that the Act re quires a notice to be served under S. 11 (2). When we turn to the rules, the heading of R. 31 is: "Notice under Sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S. 11. On receipt of a return or returns required under Rr. .19, 20 or 22 from any dealer, the assessing authority shall serve on him a notice in Form XI." When we turn to Form XI, that Form also has the heading: "Notice under sub-ss. (1) and (2) of S., 11". But when we look at the contents of that Form, it really is intended to be a notice under subs. (2) rather than a notice under sub-s. (1). We fail to understand why any notice is necessary under S. 11 (1) if the Commissioner is satisfied with the re-turn. It was suggested by Mr. Phadke (who appeared for the intervener) that the Commissioner should intimate to the assessee the fact of his having made the order of assessment., We fail to appreciate why such an intimation is necessary. The assessee haying paid the) tax and no notice having been served upon him under S. 11 (2), it would necessarily follow that the tax that he paid was the proper tax and the assessing authority did not wish to initiate any further proceedings against him.
The assessee haying paid the) tax and no notice having been served upon him under S. 11 (2), it would necessarily follow that the tax that he paid was the proper tax and the assessing authority did not wish to initiate any further proceedings against him. Therefore, in our opinion, the only necessary notice which is requisite and which has to be served by the Commissioner is under S. 11 (2) in the case of his not being satisfied with the return made by the assessee. (5) On the point of limitation, what has been urged before us is that we must import into S. 11. (2) the limitation prescribed under S. 11 (5) and S. 11-A. It is said that if the Commissioner can not proceed against a dealer, who has not registered himself, beyond a period of three years and if the Commissioner cannot proceed with regard to an escaped assessment beyond the period of three years, it is inconceivable that the Commissioner could have the power to postpone the assessment of a dealer under S. 11 (1) beyond the period of 3 years or that he could have the power to issue a notice under S. 11 (2) beyond a period of three years, and for the purpose of this contention strong reliance is placed on a judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax Bom bay City v. Narsee Nagsee and Co-, Bombay, (1957) 81 ITR 164. In that case a Division Bench of this High Court was dealing with the Business Profits Tax Act and to a certain extent the position that arose there was similar to the position that arises here. Section 11 of the Business Profits Tax Act dealt with the issue of a notice for furnishing a return of business profits. That section did not prescribe any period of limitation. S..
Section 11 of the Business Profits Tax Act dealt with the issue of a notice for furnishing a return of business profits. That section did not prescribe any period of limitation. S.. 14 dealt with escaped assessment that prescribed a period of limitation which was four years, and what the Court held was that looking to the scheme of the Act as a whole and reading the Act as a whole, the Court must import into S. 11 the period of limitation prescribed in S. 14, and in the course of the judgment it was pointed out at page 169 (of ITR): (at p. 2 of AIR): "In our opinion, every Act must be construed as a whole and the duty of the Court must be as far as possible to reconcile the various provisions of a statute." Then further on on that page: "Therefore, it is clear from S. 14 that the Legislature did not intend to put an assessee to the peril of an indefinite apprehension with regard to the payment of tax in respect of profits made under the Business Profits Tax Act. The intention of the Legislature was clear that after four years of the end of the chargeable accounting period the assessee should not be proceeded against even if profits had escaped assessment or his profits had been under-assessed or he had obtained a relief to which he was not entitled. Inasmuch as S. 11 does not indicate any period of time with regard to the issuing of a notice, would it or would it not be right for us to import into S. 11 the consideration which led the Legislature to fix a limitation of time for the purpose of issuing a notice under S. 14? If we were not to do that, we would arrive at this rather extraordinary conclusion that the Legislature, while saving the subject from harassment of proceedings with regard to escaped assessment or under-assessment, permitted that harassment with regard to the very initiation of proceedings after the lapse of four years. It is contended that the period of four years mentioned in S, 14 supplies an important indication of what the period of limitation should be with regard to the issue of a notice under S. 11.
It is contended that the period of four years mentioned in S, 14 supplies an important indication of what the period of limitation should be with regard to the issue of a notice under S. 11. If income which has escaped assessment can only be taxed within four years by reason of S. 14, then it must inferentially follow that income must escape assessment at some point of time anterior to the period of four years mentioned in S. 14." What is urged by Mr. Kolah is that this ratio applies in. terms to the facts of this case. But there is an important distinguishing feature to which Mr. Abhyankar has rightly drawn our attention. In the case just referred to, assessment proceedings had to be initiated by a notice under S. 11 and what we in effect held was that after the period mention ed in S. 14 with regard to escaped assessment no proceedings for assessment can be initiated. Under the Sales Tax Act which we are considering, proceedings have not to be initiated in the sense in which they had to be initiated under the Business Profits Tax Act. S. 10, as we have already pointed out, casts a statutory obligation upon a registered dealer to furnish a return and also casts a statutory obligation under S. 12 (2) to pay the tax. The re turn and the payment of tax have already been done within the period mentioned in S. 11-A. Can it be said that the passing of the assessment order under S. 11 puts the assessee to the peril of the apprehension that he would be liable to pay tax or additional tax? The peril to which we referred in the case of Narsee Nagsee, 1957-31 ITR 164 and which we said it was our duty to save the assessee from, does not exist in this case. An order of assessment made under S. 11 at any time cannot possibly prejudice the assessee in any sense whatsoever. That order would not make him liable to pay any additional tax. That order will not put any further liability upon him.
An order of assessment made under S. 11 at any time cannot possibly prejudice the assessee in any sense whatsoever. That order would not make him liable to pay any additional tax. That order will not put any further liability upon him. It would be merely a formal acceptance by the authority of the tax which the assessee has already paid, and there is no reason why in construing S. 11 (1) we should import into it the period of limitation which the Legislature has incorporated in S. 11-A. The compelling necessity which drove us to do it in Narsee Nagsees case 1957-31 ITR 164 does not exist. But the position is different with regard to S. 11 (2). S. 11 (2) is in the substantial sense an initiation of fresh proceedings by the Commissioner. It is open to the Commissioner to be satisfied with what the assessee has done and pass an order under S. 11(1). But if he is not satisfied, then he initiates fresh proceedings under S. 11 (2) by issuing a notice. That undoubtedly is putting the assessee to the peril of the apprehension that as a result of the notice his tax might be enhanced. If the principle we have laid down in Narsee Nagsees case 1957-31 ITR 164 is correct, then that principle would undoubtedly apply to the issuing of a notice under S. 11 (2). A notice under S. 11 (2), as we have indicated, would never be issued unless the Commissioner wished to initiate proceedings as a result of his dissatisfaction with the return made by the assessee, and the initiation of those proceedings and the issuing of that notice might, and in all probability would, have serious consequences for the assessee. (6) The matter may be looked at from a different point of view.
(6) The matter may be looked at from a different point of view. Our attention has been drawn to various authorities which have taken the view that if no assessment has been made for any reason, even the inadvertence on the part of the as sessing authority or omission on the part of the assessing authority, it would constitute escaped as sessment or under-assessment under S. 11-A, and what has been urged before us is that if the assessing authority fails to make the order of assessment, within three years under S. 11 (1), then the income has escaped assessment and proceedings can only be taken under S. 11-A, which proceedings would be barred by limitation. In our opinion, it is impossible to accept the contention that when an assessee has made a return and has paid tax and all that remains to be done is the appropriation of that tax to revenue, it could be said of that return which bears the tax that that income has escaped assessment. Not only it is not escaped assessment, but it has actually borne tax and the tax has been paid. It would be stretching the language of S. 11-A beyond the breaking point to suggest that in face of that return the income has escaped assessment. But the position is different with regard to S. 11 (2). The very object of issuing a notice, we take it, is to try and see whether the assessee is not liable to pay increased tax or to make sure that the assessee has paid tax on the transactions which are liable to tax and that he has paid tax according to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, if the Commissioner as a result of the notice comes to the conclusion that the assessee is liable to pay a larger amount of tax than his return shows or which he has already paid, to that extent he would be seeking to assess and tax the turnover which has escaped assessment. Turnovers escape assessment in the sense that for three years they have not been assessed to tax and after three years the taxing authority is seeking to tax them.
Turnovers escape assessment in the sense that for three years they have not been assessed to tax and after three years the taxing authority is seeking to tax them. In that sense we agree with the contention that it could be said that the failure on the part of the assessing authority to tax these turnovers would constitute an escaped assessment, within the meaning of S. 11-A. (7) Therefore, the decision which we propose to come to fits in with the scheme of the Act and also with Narsee Nagsees case, 1957-31 ITR 164 to which reference has been made. With regard to S. 11 (1) the Legislature has provided no period of limitation and it would be wrong on our part to add to that section or to rewrite that section by providing something which the Legislature advisedly has not done. Therefore, once the return has been made and tax paid, there is no period of limitation for making the formal order under S. 11 .(1). We need hardly say that we expect of our public officers a sense of duty and responsibility. The Sales Tax Act is intended to tax business men who are busy doing business and not waiting at the beck and call of Sales Tax Officers. It is, therefore, essential that assessment orders under the Sales Tax Act should be made as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, although we say that no period of limitation is prescribed under S. 11 (1), we expect of Sales Tax Commissioners a realisation that they should make the order, if they are satisfied, long before the period of three years and if they are not satisfied issue a notice under S. 11 (2). If, on the other hand, a case arises for the issue of notice under S. 11 (2), then it is clear that that notice must be issued within three years, because if the: notice is issued after three years ii would infringe the provision of S. 11-A because the Commissioner would be indirectly doing, if not doing directly, what the law prohibits him from doing, viz., to bring to assessment an escaped turn over which he could not do beyond the period of three years. (8) Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which seems to have taken a different view.
(8) Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which seems to have taken a different view. It is our duty to look at that judgment, with respect, and indicate why we are not in a position to agree with the views taken by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Choudburi in Regional Assistant Commissioner v. Ghanshamdas, AIR 1958 MP 148 . In the first place, we find that the attention of the learned Judges was not drawn to the decision of the Bom bay High Court in Narsee Nagsees case 1957-31 ITR 164. The other reason why the learned Judges came to the conclusion is that in their opinion the question of escaped assessment under S. 11-A only arises after the first assessment has been made. In their opinion there could not be a case of escaped assessment unless there is an initial or ordinary assessment under the Act. With respect, this view is entirely contrary to the view of the Bombay High Court in Com missioner of Income-tax, Bombay v. Pirojbai N. Contractor, (1937) 5 ITR 338. There Sir John Beaumont, Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Rangnekar held that S. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act is wide enough to include cases where no notice under S. 22 (2) had been issued to the assessee and his income had not been assess ed at all under S. 23. Therefore, in order that S. 34 or S. 11-A should apply, it is not necessary that there should be an initial assessment and after that a discovery should be made that some income has escaped assessment. These sections would equally apply if, in the first place, there was no assessment at all and it would be found that the assessee was liable to tax. (9) We will therefore answer the questions which have been submitted to us by the Division Bench of this Court. We will reframe the first question as follows: "Whether a notice can be issued under sub section (2) of S. 11 of the Act more than three years after the expiry of the period for which it is proposed to make the assessment?" and answer the question in the negative.
We will reframe the first question as follows: "Whether a notice can be issued under sub section (2) of S. 11 of the Act more than three years after the expiry of the period for which it is proposed to make the assessment?" and answer the question in the negative. We will also reframe the second question as follows: "Whether the assessment under sub-s. (1) of S. 11 can be made more than three years after the] expiry of such period?" and answer the question in the affirmative. (10) We will therefore quash the two notices, Exs. C and F to the petition, issued by the Com missioner and also issue a writ of prohibition against the Sales Tax Commissioner prohibiting him from taking any proceedings pursuant to or under these notices. Petitioner to get the costs. Application allowed.