JUDGMENT - M. C. CHAGLA C. J. : An interesting and important question with regard to the question of limitation under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 arises in this Full Bench. The facts giving rise to this-Full Bench are these. The petitioner is a registered dealer and his chargeable accounting year is from the 1st July to the 30th June. He made his return and paid the tax which according to him was due for the years 1-7-1951 to 30-6-1952, 1-7-1952 to 30-6-1953 and 1-7-1953 to 30-6-1954. On 31-12-1956 the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued a notice under S. 11 (2). This notice was served upon the assessee with regard to the first year on 4-1-1957 and with regard to the second year on 8-1-1957. The contention of the assessee was that this notice was bad because it was served three years after the end of the chargeable accounting year, and this petition was filed in this Court chalwati; that, on the admitted facts, Saraswati was the sole heir of Malkappa, and, therefore, she was entitled to the whole property in suit. In the previous litigation, Parvatis husband acted as the next friend of Saraswati. It was, therefore, contended that the person who was representing the interest of Saraswati in the previous litigation was one whose interest was adverse to her interest inasmuch as he was interested in claiming that Parvati had a half share in the suit property whereas in fact she had none. The learned District Judge has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff Saraswati was en titled to get over the effect of the aforesaid decision in suit No. 54/50, on this ground also. I do not propose to express any opinion on this subject. In my opinion, even if it is held that Saraswati was not properly represented in the previous litigation, it does not necessarily follow that she is entitled to bring a second suit and to have it tried on merits. In that contingency, the only and the proper remedy of the plaintiff is to institute a suit for a declaration that the decree passed in the previous suit was not binding on her. In the subsequent litigation, it is not proper to try afresh on the aforesaid ground, the issues which had already been tried in the previous litigation. In that contingency, the only and the proper remedy of the plaintiff is to institute a suit for a declaration that the decree passed in the previous suit was not binding on her. In the subsequent litigation, it is not proper to try afresh on the aforesaid ground, the issues which had already been tried in the previous litigation. Her proper remedy is only to pray for a decree for setting aside the decree in the previous suit and for revival of that suit. However, this particular point was not raised in the trial Court and it was raised for the first time in the appellate Court. Therefore, I do not propose to express any opinion on this decision reached by the learned District Judge. (10) For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs in favour of respondent No. 1. The appellant and respondent No. 2 to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.