Judgement K. N. WANCHOO, C.J. :- This is an appeal by Jesa and Taru defendants against the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Ganganagar, by which the suit brought by Kumbha plaintiff was decreed. 2. The case of the plaintiff was briefly this. He claimed to be the descendant of one Sheoram and set out the pedigree in the plaint which was not in dispute. The relevant portion of that pedigree for our purposes is as below: - 3. The suit is with respect to property left by Lachhman and Pusa who are both dead. The case of the plaintiff is that when Jesa was adopted by Narsas widow, Jesas son Taru also went along with his father and must be deemed to have been taken out of the family of Pusa and gone into the family of Narsa. It was said that this was due to custom prevalent in the former State of Bikaner, according to which when a father was adopted, his sons, who had been born before the adoption, also went along with the father into the adoptive family and therefore, lost all rights in their original family. Consequently, the plaintiff claimed that when Pusa and Lachhman died, they must be held to have died without issue. Their property, therefore, would go to the descendants of Sheoram. The plaintiff claimed that he and Jesa were the two nearest heirs of Pusa and Lachhman on this basis and therefore, he was entitled to 1/2 share in the property left by Pusa and Lachhman along with Jesa. The plaintiff therefore, prayed for a declaration to that effect and as he was out of possession, he claimed joint possession with Jesa. 4. The suit was resisted by both Jesa and Taru. Their case was that there was no such custom as was pleaded by the plaintiff and that according to Hindu Law, Taru remained in the family of Pusa after the adoption of his father Jesa and was thus entitled to succeed to the property of Pusa and Lachhman, being the nearest descendant of both. 5. The main issue, therefore, in the case was:- "Whether according to custom and law Taru defendant went to the family of Narsa when his father was adopted by Narsas widow and lost his rights in the family of Pusa." 6. 5. The main issue, therefore, in the case was:- "Whether according to custom and law Taru defendant went to the family of Narsa when his father was adopted by Narsas widow and lost his rights in the family of Pusa." 6. The court below came to the conclusion, that the custom had been proved and decreed the suit. Hence the present appeal. 7. The main question, therefore, that falls for consideration beEore us is whether the custom set up by the plaintiff has been proved. So far as the law is concerned, there is no dispute between the parties. The law is to be found in Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (11th Edn.), Para. 495 (5), p. 594. Mulla has summarised the Hindu Law on this point in these words : "Where a married person is given in adoption and such person has a son at the date of adoption, the son does not like his father lose the gotra and right of inheritance in the family of his birth, and does not acquire the gotra and right of inheritance in the family into which his father is adopted." 8. This, being the Hindu law, would normally apply to Hindus in the former State of Bikaner also unless it is proved that a custom derogating from such law prevailed in that area. We have, therefore, to see whether the evidence produced by the plaintiff has proved the custom, so that the Hindu Law set out above would not apply to this case. 9. In this connection the plaintiff relied on the evidence of six witnesses and we shall deal with each of them briefly. The first witness is Shri Shikarchand Kochar. He stated that his father was adopted by his grandfathers brother. At that time, he and his two brothers were alive and on the adoption of his father, he and his brothers also went to the line of their adoptive grandfather. He, however, admitted in cross-examination that the custom mentioned by him applied to Kochars. His evidence, therefore, does not prove any custom applicable to the whole area. It may be mentioned that the parties to this suit are Jats and not Kochars. 10. The next witness is Ramlal P. W. 2. He, however, admitted in cross-examination that the custom mentioned by him applied to Kochars. His evidence, therefore, does not prove any custom applicable to the whole area. It may be mentioned that the parties to this suit are Jats and not Kochars. 10. The next witness is Ramlal P. W. 2. He also said that he was adopted by his uncle and his son Patram, who was alive at the time of adoption, came with him into the family of his uncle. His real father Chhoga had another son Sahiram and the property of Chhoga went to Sahiram only and that he and his son Patram had no share in the property of Chhoga. He however, admitted that after the death of Chhoga, the property was mutated in his name as well as in the name of Sahiram and that mutation still stood in the names of both of them. He, further said that Moola, who had adopted him, was still alive, so that we do not know whether Patram would be inheriting the property of Moola or not. In any case, his evidence, in the face of his admission that his name also appears on the property left by Chhoga, can hardly be sufficient to displace the law and prove the custom for which the plaintiff contends. It may be mentioned that Ramlal is a Vishnoi and not a Jat. 11. The next witness is Hariram P. W, 3. He is a Jat. He said that he was also adopted and at that time had a son aged 5 or 6 years. On his adoption, this boy went with him into the family of his adoptive father, Hukmaram. He said that among the Jats there was a custom that on an adoption, the sons born before the adoption also went away to the new family with their father and had no connection left with their original family. But his cross-examination shows that the succession in this case has not yet opened. His real father Tulsaram is still alive. What he says is that when his real father dies, his other brothers will get the property. His evidence is, therefore, useless at this stage to prove the custom contended for by the plaintiff. 12. The next witness is Ganesha P. W. 4. He is also a Jat. He said that he was adopted by his uncle Jeesukh. What he says is that when his real father dies, his other brothers will get the property. His evidence is, therefore, useless at this stage to prove the custom contended for by the plaintiff. 12. The next witness is Ganesha P. W. 4. He is also a Jat. He said that he was adopted by his uncle Jeesukh. His father Tiku had another son Kesu and according to him, his father Tikus property is in the possession of Kesu. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that Tikus property had been mutated in the revenue papers in his name as well as in the name of his brother and that this entry was still continuing. In these circumstances, in the face of this entry in the revenue papers, it cannot be said that this man proves the custom set up by the plaintiff. 13. The next witness is Sahiram Vishnoi. He was also adopted and said that he had a son at the time of adoption, who went with him into the new family. But in cross-examination he admitted that when his real father died, he made a claim on behalf of that son named Banwari for a share in the property of his real father. His brothers, however, did not give him a share. The very fact, therefore, that this man made a claim on behalf of his son in the property of his real father shows that his evidence is of no use in proving the custom set up by the plaintiff. He also cited another instance of one Govind and said that there was some litigation about in that connection between Govinds sons, but the judgment in that case has not been produced and we attach no importance on this part of the evidence. 14. The last witness of the plaintiff is Nanu Jat. He said that when he was adopted, he had a son Maniram who came into the new family with him and that he and his son Maniram had nothing to do with the property of his real father Lachhman. This property, according to him, had gone to his brother Ramrakh. But he also admitted in cross-examination that after the death of Lachhman, his name as well as that of Ramrakh was entered in the revenue papers and that that entry is still there. This property, according to him, had gone to his brother Ramrakh. But he also admitted in cross-examination that after the death of Lachhman, his name as well as that of Ramrakh was entered in the revenue papers and that that entry is still there. In the circumstances, his evidence also is of very little value in proving the custom. 15. This is all the oral evidence which has been produced by the plaintiff. Taking all this evidence together, we must say that it falls very far short of proving a custom in derogation of the law. The learned Judge seems to have thought that the evidence of these witnesses was of great value, particularly as they were deposing against their own interests. It is enough to say that except for Shri Shikhar Chand, none of these witnesses were really deposing against their own interest. It would have been a different matter if the sons of these witnesses had come and stated that they had lost all their rights in their original family. But these sons have not been produced and they may not be bound by what their fathers stated in this case and may still fight for their rights in the original family. We cannot agree, therefore, with the Court below that this evidence proves that there is a custom in the area of the former State of Bikaner, according to which, when a father is adopted and there is a son living at the time of adoption the son also goes to the adoptive family and inherits there and loses all rights in the original family. 16. The trial Court relied on another piece of evidence, namely the decision of the Judicial Committee of the former State of Bikaner in Baluram v. Sagarmal, 17 Bikaner LR 4 (A). This case seems to be of Joshi Brahmins. It was undoubtedly held by the Judicial Committee that there was a custom in the Bikaner State according to which on the adoption of the father, the pre-existing son also went to the new family of the adoptive father and lost his rights in the original family. But when we examine the judgment, by which of course we are not bound, We find with all respect that it is not based on any evidence worth the name. But when we examine the judgment, by which of course we are not bound, We find with all respect that it is not based on any evidence worth the name. The learned Judges themselves said that the examples produced in that case were insufficient to displace the Hindu Law. But they went on to add that the custom set up by the defendant in that case was supported by the well known custom of the State of which the learned Judges themselves had knowledge. We must say that the learned Judges could not take judicial notice of the existence of a custom and inasmuch as they imported their own knowledge, their judgment based on such knowledge of their own can have no value. It may be mentioned that this judgment was given on an appeal from a decision of the High Court, which had held that the Hindu Law applied and that the custom had not been proved. We may also refer to an earlier case from the former State of Bikaner Uda v. Likhma, 10 Bikaner L R 23 (B). That was a case of Jats and it was held therein that the Hindu Law applied and on the adoption of the father, the pre-existing son did not lose his status in the original family. No custom seems to have been set up in that case and we have little doubt that if there was a custom such as has now been contended for by the plaintiff, it would have been set up then. In any case, it does seem that up to the time the Judicial Committee decided Balurams case (A) in March 1943, the law in Bikaner, which was being followed even by the High Court, was the same as Hindu Law so far as this matter was concerned. As we have already said, we are not bound by the decision of the Judicial Committee of the former State of Bikaner. We have also analysed the reasons behind that judgment and the reasons do not commend themselves to us. The whole of that judgment is really based on the personal knowledge of the Judges and this was, in our opinion, what they should never have done. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the decision in Balurams case (A) as of any value at all so far as this question is concerned. The whole of that judgment is really based on the personal knowledge of the Judges and this was, in our opinion, what they should never have done. In these circumstances, we are not prepared to accept the decision in Balurams case (A) as of any value at all so far as this question is concerned. We are, therefore, left only with the evidence of the six witnesses of the plaintiff and we have already said that that evidence falls very short of proving a custom in derogation of the Hindu Law. 17. The defendants examined 14 witnesses in defence. We do not think it necessary to go into the evidence of these witnesses in detail; for many of them are not of much value. But we should like to refer to the statements of two witnesses, namely Ramjas Jat and Nanu Jat. Their evidence shows that on the adoption of the father, the pre-existing son did not go into the adoptive family, but remained in the original family. The only weakness in their evidence is that that evidence could and should have been supported by documentary evidence and that was not done. We may also refer to the evidence of Jagmal D. W. 8. This has been supported by two documents on the record. His evidence shows that the pre-existing sons did not go to the adoptive family and inherited in the original family. It is supported by Ex. 1/D. W. 12 and Ex 2/D. W. 12. But this is a case of 1953 after the suit had been filed. The burden, however, lay on the plaintiff to prove the custom in derogation of the law. He has completely failed to prove it by the evidence that is produced. In these circumstances the Hindu Law must prevail and it must be held that when Jesa went in adoption to Narsa, it did not affect the rights of his pre-existing son Taru in the original family of Pusa. 18. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below and dismiss the suit; but in view of the Judicial Committees decision of the Bikaner State, we order parties to bear their own costs throughout. Appeal allowed.