Judgement ORDER: This civil revision petition raises a question of limitation which is not directly covered by authority. It arises out of a suit filed in the court of Small Causes at Madras by the Corporation of Madras, the petitioner before me, against the respondent for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 248 representing the cost of a lamp post which had been damaged by the defendants lorry on 4-11-1950. The suit was filed on 1-8-1953. One of the pleas raised by the defendant was that the suit was barred by limitation because it had not been brought within two years from the date on which the damage was caused, under Art. 36 of schedule 1 to the Indian Limitation Act. It was contended on behalf of the Corporation that Art. 36 did not apply, but Art. 49 was applicable to the case and the suit was in time, having been filed within 3 years of the date of the injury. The learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes who tried the suit held that Art. 49 was applicable and therefore the suit was in time. He decreed the suit for Rs. 234-10-3 and proportionate costs. There was an application for a New Trial filed by the defendant. The New Trial application was allowed by the two learned Judges who heard it on the ground that the suit was barred by time. In the opinion of the learned Judges Art. 36 applied. In the result the suit was dismissed. Hence this civil revision petition filed by the Corporation. 2. Art. 36 runs thus: For compensation for any malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance independent of contract and not herein specially provided for- Two years When the malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance takes place. This article has generally been understood as the article dealing with suits for compensation for torts committed by the defendant. Undoubtedly the present suit is founded on a tort committed by the defendant, namely, causing damage to the plaintiffs property. 3. Art. 49 is in these terms: "For other specific moveable property or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same. Undoubtedly the present suit is founded on a tort committed by the defendant, namely, causing damage to the plaintiffs property. 3. Art. 49 is in these terms: "For other specific moveable property or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same. Three years When the property is wrong-fully taken or injured, or when the detainers possession becomes unlawful This Article is in the nature of a residuary article and has to be read with Art. 48 which provides for recovery of specific moveable property lost or acquired by theft or dishonest misappropriation or conversion or for compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same. There can be no doubt that if Art. 49 applied, Art. 36 will not apply because it expressly excludes cases which have been specially provided for. The question for decision therefore is whether Art. 49 has application to the present case. Having referred to decided cases dealing with Art. 49 and after giving the matter my full consideration I have come to the conclusion that Art. 49 has no application to the present case. The language of the first column of this Article was discussed in a very early decision of the Bombay High Court in Essoo Bhavaji v. S. S. Savitri, ILR II Bom 133 (A). It was there held by Farran J. that a suit to recover damages for the loss of a ship caused by collusion at sea is an action for tort founded upon the negligence of the defendant or his servants in the management of his vessel and must be brought within two years under the provisions of Art. 36. It was contended before the learned Judge that Art. 49 would apply; but that contention was rejected. Construing the language of the first clause, the learned Judge thought that Art. 49 applied only in respect of moveable property which was in the possession of some third party. With respect I am in entire agreement with this construction of Art. 49. In Sithambaram Chetti v. U Kha Gyi, 17 Ind Cas 906 (LB) (B), a Division Bench of the Lower Burma Chief Court dissented from this view. But lam not impressed with the reasoning of the learned Judges in that case. 4.There are decisions which support the view that Art. 36 applies to a case like the present. In Sithambaram Chetti v. U Kha Gyi, 17 Ind Cas 906 (LB) (B), a Division Bench of the Lower Burma Chief Court dissented from this view. But lam not impressed with the reasoning of the learned Judges in that case. 4.There are decisions which support the view that Art. 36 applies to a case like the present. In Sivachidambara Mudaly v. Kamakshi Ammal, ILR 83 Mad 71 (C), it was held that a suit for possession brought by the mortgagor for a damage which occurred to the mortgaged property in the possession of the mortgagee was held to be governed by this Article. The tort consisted in the cutting away of certain trees on the mortgaged land. The learned Judges took the view that Art. 36 is a general article relating to suits for compensation in tort. In Albert Bonnan v. Imperial Tobacco Co., (India) Ltd., 30 Cal WN 465: (AIR 1926 Cal 757) (D), a suit was brought for damage caused by the detention of certain goods belonging to the plaintiff with the customs authority on account of false representations made by the defendant. It was held that Art. 36 applied. In Mavaram v. Municipal Committee, Lahore, AIR 1929 Lah 730 (E), Art. 36 was applied to a suit by a private owner against the Municipal Committee, Lahore, for recovery of damages for the loss sustained by the plaintiff by the breaking down of connection pipes etc., attached to the subterranean system of water supply. 5. In my view the decision of the learned Judges who heard the New Trial application was right and the suit was barred. The civil revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.