Research › Browse › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

1958 DIGILAW 13 (PAT)

Indian Copper Corporation Ltd. v. State Of Bihar

1958-01-16

CHOUDHARY, V.RAMASWAMI

body1958
Judgment Ramaswami, J. 1. In this case the petitioner is a limited company called the Indian Copper Corporation Limited, having its office and place of business at Moubhandar, Police Station, Ghatsilla, District Singhbhum. It is alleged that the petitioner is carrying on business in copper and various mineral products and large volume of the business consists of the sale of these minerals beyond the State of Bihar. By an order dated the 13th of November, 1950, the petitioner was assessed to pay sales tax for the year ending 31st of March, 1950, to the extent of Rs. 3,60,703-4-0. The order of assessment was made by opposite party No. 5, the Superintendent of Sales Tax at Jamshedpur and the petitioner was directed to deposit the amount by the 20th December, 1950. It appears that the petitioner had already paid an advance of a sum of Rs, 3,00,000 towards the payment of sales tax, and on the 16th of December, 1950, the petitioner paid the additional amount of Rs. 60,703-4-0. On the 30th of March, 1953, the Supreme Court pronounced its judgment in The State of Bombay V/s. The United Motors (India) Limited [1953] S.C.R. 1069 holding that Article 286(1) of the Constitution, read with the Explanation thereto, prohibited the taxation of sales or purchases involving inter-State elements by all States except the State in which the goods were delivered for the purpose of consumption therein. The effect of this decision was that the petitioner was not liable to pay sales tax with regard to sales outside Bihar for consumption in other States with regard to the period from the 26th of January, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1950. On the 6th of October, 1953, the petitioner accordingly applied for a review of the assessment under Sec.24(5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, praying that there should be a review of the assessment and there should be an order for refund of the tax illegally collected. This application was rejected by the Superintendent of Sales Tax on the 25th of February, 1954. There was a revision application taken by the petitioner to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, but that application was also dismissed on the 4th of January, 1957. This application was rejected by the Superintendent of Sales Tax on the 25th of February, 1954. There was a revision application taken by the petitioner to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax, but that application was also dismissed on the 4th of January, 1957. In these circumstances the petitioner has applied to the High Court for grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of assessment of sales tax made on the 13th of November, 1950, by the Superintendent of Sales Tax, and also for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to refund the amount illegally realised as sales tax. 2. Cause has been shown by the learned Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents to whom notices of the application had been ordered to be given. 3. The argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that for the period of assessment, namely, 1st of April, 1949, to 31st of March, 1950, the petitioner is not liable to pay tax on sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar. The order of assessment shows that the amount of tax was Rs. 3,60,703-4-0 and the case of the petitioner is that for the period from the 1st of April, 1949, to the 25th of January, 1950, the taxable turnover with regard to sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar was Rs.1,81,36,442-5-5 and for the period from the 26th of January, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1950, the taxable turnover was Rs.34,39,360-8-0. We do not find these figures in the order of assessment; but in the application of the petitioner for revision under Sec.24 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act these figures have been mentioned. In that application the claim made by the petitioner was that he was entitled to a refund of Rs.3,36,482-15-0, which was the amount of tax paid under a mistake of law. This amount covers both the periods, that is, the period from the 1st of April, 1949, to the the 25th of January, 1950, and the period from the 26th of January, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1950. With regard to the first period we are of opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to a refund of sales tax paid upon sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar. With regard to the first period we are of opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to a refund of sales tax paid upon sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar. The question of law with regard to the pre-Constitution period has been elaborately discussed by a Division Bench of this High Court in Messrs. Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1956 Pat. 92 where it was held that the provisions of Sec.2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, as amended by Bihar Act 6 of 1949, are constitutionally valid. In view of the principle laid down in that decision we hold that the imposition of sales tax by the revenue authorities for the period from the 1st of April, 1949, to the 25th of January, 1950, with regard to the sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar is constitutionally valid and the petitioner is not entitled to a refund of the tax paid on these transactions. 4. With regard to the period from the 26th of January, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1950, the legal position is different. The contention of the petitioner is that he is entitled to a refund of the sales tax paid on sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar for this period also. Precisely a similar constitutional question was at stake in the decision of a Division Bench of this High Court in Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd., Jamshedpur V/s. Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Singhbhum I.L.R. 35 Pat. 1055. It was held in that case by the Division Bench, for the reasons elaborately given, that Article 286 (1) (a) of the Constitution, read with the Explanation thereto, prohibited imposition of tax on sales or purchases involving inter-State elements by all States except the State in which the goods were delivered for the purpose of consumption therein. The Explanation clearly determined by means of a legal fiction the situs of the sale in the case of the transaction falling under the category, and when a transaction was determined to be inside a particular State, it necessarily became a transaction outside that State. It was also held in that case that the promulgation of the Presidents Sales Tax Continuance Order had no effect so far as inter-State transactions are covered by the Explanation to Article 286(1) (a) of the Constitution. It was also held in that case that the promulgation of the Presidents Sales Tax Continuance Order had no effect so far as inter-State transactions are covered by the Explanation to Article 286(1) (a) of the Constitution. It was further explained in that case that the bans imposed by several clauses of Article 286 of the Constitution with regard to the taxing powers of the States were independent and separate, and each and every one of the bans has to be surmounted and overcome before the State Legislature can impose a tax on the transaction of sale or purchase of goods. These bans under the article have been imposed from different standpoints ; and even though the transaction of sale or purchase may overlap the different clauses of Article 286, each one of these bans is operative and has to be enforced. It was also pointed out in that case that the Presidents Sales Tax Continuance Order had lifted the ban so far as Article 286(2) was concerned, but it could not be projected into the sphere of any other ban, and the imposition of sales tax continued to be illegal so far as inter-State transactions were covered by the Explanation to Article 286(1) (a) of the Constitution. The conclusion reached by the Division Bench was that the assessee was exempt from the payment of tax only if there was proof that the goods were delivered and consumed in the State of first destination, and the sales would not be exempted if the goods were not consumed in the State of first destination but they were re-exported from the State of first destination to other States. In this case the claim of the petitioner is that for the period from the 26th of January, 1950, to the 31st of March, 1950, there was sale of goods delivered outside the State of Bihar to the extent of Rs. 34,39,360-8-0. There is no finding of the Sales Tax Authorities as to whether the petitioner has offered proof as to how much of these goods were delivered and consumed in the State of first destination and how much of the goods were re-exported from the State of first destination to other States. In view of the principle laid down in Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd., Jamshedpur V/s. Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Singhbhum I.L.R. 35 Pat. In view of the principle laid down in Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd., Jamshedpur V/s. Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Singhbhum I.L.R. 35 Pat. 1055 the petitioner would be entitled to an exemption from the payment of tax only if there is proof that the goods were delivered and consumed in the State of first destination. We are further of opinion that in view of the decision in Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd., Jamshedpur V/s. Superintendent of Commercial Taxes, Singhbhum I.L.R. 35 Pat. 1055 the petitioner would not be entitled to exemption if the goods were not consumed in the State of first destination but were re-exported from the State of first destination to other States. In our opinion the proper directions in this case under Article 226 of the Constitution would be that the order of the Superintendent of Sales Tax, Singhbhum, making the assessment on the 13th of November, 1950. should be set aside and that the matter should go back to the Superintendent of Sales Tax, Singhbhum, to make re-assessment of sales tax upon the petitioner according to law for the period in question. We think that there should also be a direction upon the respondents calling upon them to refund to the petitioner so much of the tax as has been paid by the petitioner in excess of the amount of reassessment to be now made by the Superintendent of Sales Tax. We accordingly allow this application. There will be no order as to costs.