Per Ranawat, J.—This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of an order of dismissal of the election petition of Dr. Mangal Singh by the Election Tribunal of Bharatpur, dated 22nd August, 1957, for a writ of certiorari quashing the said order and remanding the case for full trial according to law. 2. The petitioner is Dr. Mangal Singh, a defeated candidate at the General Election, held in the year 1957 from the Rajakhera Constituency. He filed an election petition against Seth Mahendra Singh, who was declared elected to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly from the said Constituency, before the Election Commission who referred the same to the Election Tribunal at Bharatpur. The Election Tribunal, after scrutinising the election petition, directed, on the 4th August, 1957, the petitioner to furnish further and better particulars of his case. The petitioner filed a comprehensive petition purporting to comply with the direction of the Tribunal on the 22nd of August, 1957. The learned Judge of the Tribunal held that the comprehensive petition filed by the petitioner did not fully comply with the direction of the Tribunal and consequently dismissed the election petition by his order dated 22nd August, 1957. The learned Judge has principally stated the following reasons for his order of dismissal : — (1) The petition was not for amendment of the election petition, but was an amended petition. (2) The petition, as it contained facts, which were not included in the original petition, could not be regarded as a petition for amendment. It could only amount to a new election petition which could not be entertained at that stage. 3. After the election petition was dismissed, the petitioner filed this writ petition on the 16th of September, 1957, It is urged on his behalf that the order of the Election Tribunal is not in accordance with law, for the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to dismiss the election petition merely for the reason of non-compliance of the direction of the Tribunal for filing an amendment application. It is contended that the Tribunal could not have dismissed the election petition so as to penalise the petitioner for not filing an amendment application in accordance with the direction of the Tribunal. It is contended that the Tribunal could not have dismissed the election petition so as to penalise the petitioner for not filing an amendment application in accordance with the direction of the Tribunal. As an illegality is said to have been committed by the Election Tribunal, the petitioner has claimed a writ of certiorari for setting aside the order, and for a direction to try the case according to law. 4. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. C.B. Bhargava on behalf of Seth Mahendra Singh. It is urged that the petitioner had his remedy by way of an appeal under sec. 116-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act No. XLIII of 1951) (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act"), and having failed to prefer an appeal, he cannot be granted relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Abdul Karim vs. Deputy Custodian, Jaipur (1). Observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in G. Veerappa Pillai vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. (2) have also been referred to in this connection. 5. Replying to the preliminary objection, Mr. Tyagi has taken his stand on the language of sec. 116-A read with sec. 98 and 99 of the Act. His argument is that an order under sec. 98 of the Act, which is passed at the conclusion of the trial alone is appealable under sec. 116-A, and an order which is made not at the conclusion of the trial cannot be regarded as an order under sec. 98 of the Act, and for this reason no appeal lies under sec. 116-A from such orders. It is further added that the order of the Election Tribunal in this case c<i>u!d not be considered to be an order at the conclusion of the trial, as it was passed, in the first place, not in accordance with the provisions of law, and secondly, it was made at a preliminary stage when it could not be considered that the trial had commenced in substance. 6. Mr. Bhargava has also cited a Division Bench authority of this Court, Shah Alimuddin vs. Shri Satish Chandra Agarwal (1). In that case an appeal was filed from an order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an election petition for failure on the part of the petitioner to join necessary parties. 6. Mr. Bhargava has also cited a Division Bench authority of this Court, Shah Alimuddin vs. Shri Satish Chandra Agarwal (1). In that case an appeal was filed from an order of an Election Tribunal dismissing an election petition for failure on the part of the petitioner to join necessary parties. It was held by this Court that such an order came within the scope of sec. 98 of the Act, and was appealable. The relevant observations of this Court in that case are as follows:— "Sec. 20 directs how the trial is to proceed, and authorises the Tribunal to pass certain orders in certain circumstances, but the decision would nevertheless be under sec. 98 when the order purports to be the dismissal of the election petition, and thereby the trial is concluded." 7. Mr. Tyagi has tried to distinguish the observations in Shah Alimuddins case by urging that in that case the order of the Tribunal was in accordance with Sec. 90(3) of the Act, and the trial, therefore, could be regarded to have been concluded by that order, and the order in that) case could thus be taken to be at the conclusion of the trial. He has pointed out that in the present case the Tribunal not having followed the procedure prescribed by law has abruptly put an end to the case before reaching the stage at which it could be concluded. 8. The relevant portion of sec. 98. of the Act is as follows :— "At the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Tribunal shall make an order— (a) dismissing the election petition; or (b) ... ... ... (c) ... ... ... Sec. 116 A(l) of the Act provides. "An appeal shall He from every order made by a Tribunal under sec. 98 or sec. 99 to the High Court of the State in which the Tribunal is situated." 9. In view of the language of sec. 116 A, appeal lies from all orders made under sec. 98. The question is whether the order of the nature that has been passed by the Election Tribunal in the case comes within the scope of sec. 98 of the Act. The contention is that the order of the Tribunal was not passed in this case at a stage where the trial could be regarded as having been concluded. 98. The question is whether the order of the nature that has been passed by the Election Tribunal in the case comes within the scope of sec. 98 of the Act. The contention is that the order of the Tribunal was not passed in this case at a stage where the trial could be regarded as having been concluded. A comprehensive meaning of the term "trial" has been adopted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Harish Chandar Bajpai vs. Triloki Singh (4). Their Lordships have observed that— In our opinion, the provisions of Chapter III read as a whole, clearly show that trial is used as meaning the entire proceedings before the Tribunal from the time when the petition is transferred to it under sec. 86 until the pronouncement of the award." Taking the meaning of the term "trial" as adopted in Harish Chandras case (4) it has to be found out as to when a trial can be regarded as coming at the stage of conclusion. 10. By sec. 90(1) of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the trial of election petitions as nearly as may be, as they are applicable to suits. We would, therefore, refer to the Code of Civil Procedure in order to find out an answer to the question at issue. According to sec. 33 and Order XX, r.1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court has to pronounce judgment after the case has been heard. The language of sec. 33 and O. XX, r. 1, is not the same as that of sec. 98, in so far as hearing is necessary under the Code of Civil Procedure, whereas under sec. 98 it can only be at the conclusion of the trial that an order under that section can be passed. In view of the language of sec. 98, the underlying principle appears to be that an order under sec. 98 can be passed at the stage of the conclusion of the trial only. According to the Code of Civil Procedure a suit can be dismissed under O. X, r. 4(2), O. XI, r. 21, O. XV, r. 4, and O. XVII. r. 3 for reasons stated in those provisions of the law, before a stage for decision of the case under sec. 33 is reached. According to the Code of Civil Procedure a suit can be dismissed under O. X, r. 4(2), O. XI, r. 21, O. XV, r. 4, and O. XVII. r. 3 for reasons stated in those provisions of the law, before a stage for decision of the case under sec. 33 is reached. In view of the fact that the provisions of the Code are applicable mutatis mutandis to the trial of cases before the Election Tribunal, dismissal of an election petition under the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure can take place unless there is some other provision contained in the Act contrary to those provisions, and in such cases where an election petition is dismissed at a preliminary stage under the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it can be regard to be a case of dismissal of the petition under sec. 98 of the Act, as discussed in the judgment of this Court in Shah Alimuddins case, referred to above, because in such cases the trial cannot proceed further because of default or failure on the part of the petitioner or a party to the case to perform acts for the further progress of the proceeding. If suppose a Tribunal arbitrarily and without following the procedure provided by law dismisses an election petition, the question arises whether such an order can be taken to be an order at the conclusion of the trial. Mr. Bhargava has gone to the length of saying that all orders of dismissal should be taken to be orders passed at the conclusion of the trial, because thereby the trial is put to an end. If the argument addressed by Mr. Bhargava is accepted, the words "at the conclusion of the trial" in sec. 98 would be rendered redundant. The Legislature cannot be taken to have introduced these words in the Act without some purpose. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that an order of dismissal even when passed before a stage is reached which can be regarded to be the stage according to the procedure at which the trial could conclude, can be taken to be an order of dismissal under sec. 98. The distinction is fine, but it is there. In order to attract the application of sec. 98. The distinction is fine, but it is there. In order to attract the application of sec. 98 of the Act, it is necessary that a stage should be reached in the trial where in accordance with law the trial should conclude, and it cannot proceed further. An order passed at such a stage alone can be taken to be an order under sec. 98 of the Act, even though it may have been passed at a stage before the close of the evidence of the parties and the hearing of the argument thereafter. We have, therefore, to examine the circumstances under which the order of the lower court was passed in order to find out whether a stage was reached at which the trial should be taken to have come to its conclusion. 11. The election petition in this case was filed on the ground of corrupt practices, and in para 3 of the petition the following 9 types of corrupt practice have been stated to have been committed by the opposite party :— (1) That the returned candidate engaged vehicles for the transport of voters from their respective villages to the polling station details whereof were given in Schedule A filed with the petition. (2) That the returned candidate himself and through his agents offered bribery at various places for procuring votes for himself, details whereof were given in Schedule B filed with the petition. (3) That the returned candidate by making a systematic appeal to the electorates of Lodha and Gujar communities and administering oath in the name of the sacred Ganges, persuaded them to cast their votes in favour of the returned candidate, and the facts in this behalf were specified in the petition. (4) That on the 2nd of March, 1957, in the afternoon, a meeting of the Lodha community was convened at the instance of the returned candidate at village Pathora Khurd, and Narain Singh Lodha in the company of the returned candidate administered oath in the name of the Ganges to cast their votes in favour of the returned candidate on the ground that their community would thereby be benefited. (5) That on the; 3rd of March, 1957, a meeting of the Gujar community was called at village Jetpura in the afternoon where an oath was administered to all the Gujars attending the meeting to refrain from voting to the Congress candidate, and to cast their vote to the returned candidate. (6) That on 8th March, 1957, 50 Harijan voters of village Maniya, who were going to cast their votes in favour of the Congress candidate at the polling station were prevented from doing so by threats and intimidation by the returned candidate. (7) That the returned candidate gave a threat to the wife of one Chhotu Koli at Fakir-ka-Takia, when she was being accompanied by a few other lady voters, not to cast their votes in favour of the Congress candidate, and in case they did so, they would meet serious consequences. (8) That on the 8th of March, 1957, 50 Chamar ladies, who wanted to go to the polling station Inchhapura for casting their votes in favour of the Congress candidate were abused and threatened by Thakur Churamani, Pitiram, Vijai Singh and Dharjeet, and they thus prevented them from exercising their right of vote. (9) That the returned candidate took the help of Government servants for furthering his election campaign, details whereof were given in Schedule C appended to the petition. 12. A reply was filed by the returned candidate to the election petition, and it was stated by him that the allegations of the petitioner contained in the election petition were vague and not sufficient to enable the opposite party to place his full case before the Tribunal. The learned Judge of the Tribunal accepted the plea of the opposite party, and ordered the petitioner to furnish further particulars of the corrupt practices alleged by him. The petitioned filed a comprehensive petition in which he reproduced the plea-dings that were stated in the election petition with further details that were required by the Tribunal. The learned Judge after hearing the arguments of the parties regarding the comprehensive petition of the petitioner come to the conclusion that it contained certain new facts which were foreign to his original election petition, and for this reason that petition was regarded as one for amendment of the election petition, and not in accordance with the direction of the court. It was also observed that the petition was not amendment petition but it was an amended petition. The Tribunal desired that the petitioner should have filed an application for leave to amend the petition giving such changes as were desired to be made by him, and after such application had been accepted by the Tribunal, the amendments could be introduced in the election petition. The filing of an application containing the details required by the Tribunal was not considered a proper compliance of the direction given by the Tribunal. The petitioner thus faced the displeasure of the Tribunal, and his election petition was dismissed for the reason that he did not comply strictly with the direction of the Tribunal. 13. We have carefully examined the direction issued by the Tribunal for furnishing further details of the pleadings contained in the election petition, and also the petition filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal on 22nd August, 1957. The Tribunal in its order of 4th August, 1957, stated as regards clause 3(i) of the petition as follows .— "Taking up clause 3(i) of the petition wherein it is alleged that the respondent engaged vehicles for the transport of voters from their respective villages to the polling stations details whereof are given in schedule A annexed to the petition, it is urged on behalf of the respondent that this clause 3(i) read with schedule (A) does not give full particulars in regard to the fact as to from whom the jeeps and buses were hired or procured and the names of voters so transported on the same and further as to at what time they were so transported...In my opinion the names and particulars of parties not being privy to the corrupt practice need be given in the petition in respect of such cases. Hence in my opinion the petitioner need not amend his petition in this regard. However, in regard to the names of voters so transported, I think, full particulars in this respect are necessary to enable the respondent to meet the charge". In compliance with the direction of the Tribunal, the petitioner added the names of the voters alleged to have been transported in the vehicles procured or hired by the returned candidate in Schedule, A appended to his petition. In compliance with the direction of the Tribunal, the petitioner added the names of the voters alleged to have been transported in the vehicles procured or hired by the returned candidate in Schedule, A appended to his petition. Thus it is evident that the petitioner did in fact carry out the direction given by the Tribunal, and there was nothing more to be done by him in this respect. The Tribunal was wrong in thinking that the petitioner failed to carry out the direction of the Tribunal as regards his plea contained in para 3 (i) of the petition. 14. It may be pointed out that in Dasai Bosawaraj vs. Dasankop Hasansab (5) where a similar allegation of corrupt practice was made it was rightly observed : — "In the case of a corrupt practice of procuring motor trucks, for conveying electors to and from polling stations, it is sufficient in an election petition to state the date of procuring the motor trucks and the motor trucks procured but it is not necessary to state at what polling stations electors had been conveyed. This is because the corrupt practice defined in sec. 123 (6) is the procuring of trucks and not the conveying of electors". In that view what was constained in this behalf in the first petition was sufficient to call for an enquiry by the Election Tribunal and the petition was not liable to be dismissed even when it was not amended in this respect or even when further particulars required by the Tribunal for some reason or the other could not be placed on the record. 15. Similarly we have examined each one of the directions given by the Tribunal and the particulars stated by the petitioner in his petition of 22nd August, 1957. Except for the form that was insisted upon by the Tribunal, there appears no default on the part of the petitioner. 16. As regards certain facts said to have been added in the amended petition filed by the petitioner, the Tribunal could easily strike off such additional facts from the record, in case it came to the conclusion that by adding those further facts the petitioner was trying to introduce a new case in the election petition. 16. As regards certain facts said to have been added in the amended petition filed by the petitioner, the Tribunal could easily strike off such additional facts from the record, in case it came to the conclusion that by adding those further facts the petitioner was trying to introduce a new case in the election petition. There is no provision either in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Act authorising the Tribunal to dismiss an election petition by way of penalty for the displeasure of the court incurred by a party by not adhering to a particular form of the petition. It is difficult under these circumstances to assume that the Tribunal was at the conclusion of the trial in making an order of dismissal. At that stage the trial of the election petition should have continued and should not have come to an end. The Tribunal, therefore, cannot be considered to have passed the order of dismissal at the conclusion of the trial, and its order cannot, therefor*-, be taken to be one under sec. 98 of the Act. The petitioner under these circumstances was not wrong in coming to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and in not taking recourse to the filing of an appeal. We may observe that the intention of the observarious in Shah Alimuddins case is also in line with the principle discussed above. Where a stage in reached in the trial of an election petition in accordance with the procedure at which the Tribunal cannot proceed further, but has to dismiss the petition, such an order of dismissal can be regarded as having been passed at the conclusion of the trial; but where an order has been made irrespective of the stage of the conclusion of the trial dismissing the petition in contravention of the rules of procedure, such an order cannot be taken to be one passed at the conclusion of the trial. The petitioner in this case, therefore, cannot be regarded to have failed to take recourse to a remedy provided by the statute. For this reason this petition cannot be thrown out. The preliminary objection fails and is rejected. 17. In examining the preliminary objection we have also examined the merits of the case, and we have already discussed above how the order of the Tribunal is improper. For this reason this petition cannot be thrown out. The preliminary objection fails and is rejected. 17. In examining the preliminary objection we have also examined the merits of the case, and we have already discussed above how the order of the Tribunal is improper. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to dismiss the petition merely by way of punishment for displeasure of the court for not adhering to a certain technical mode of filing further particulars. Whatever particulars were required by the court to be given were furnished by the petitioner, and the Tribunal should have proceeded further with the trial and it could not have thrown out the case of the petitioner so as to punish him for a mere technicality insisted upon by the Tribunal. It may be noted that the petitioner was also prepared to follow the direction of the Tribunal for filing further particulars in the manner in which they were insisted upon by the Tribunal. He only wanted some time to enable him to do that, but the Tribunal did not give him sufficient time to comply with its requirements. On the face of it the order passed by the Tribunal is illegal, and is liable to be set aside in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by issue of a writ of certiorari. The Tribunal has failed to exercise its jurisdiction by refusing to proceed further with trial of the case, when according to law it should have done so, and has thus committed illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction. 18. The petition is allowed and the order of the Election Tribunal is set aside. The petitioner will get his costs from respondent No. 2 19. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the Election Commission for such action as may be called for) Per Bapna, J.—I agree with the order proposed, but would like to add a few words. 2. It has been held in Harish Chandra Bajpai vs. Triloki Singh (4) by the Supreme Court that the provisions of Chapter III read as a whole clearly show that trial is used as meaning the entire proceedings before the Tribunal from the time when the petition is transferred to it under sec. 86 until the pronouncement of the award. Under sec. 86 until the pronouncement of the award. Under sec. 98 of the Representation of the People Act it is directed that at the conclusion of the trial of an election petition the Tribunal shall make an order dismissing the election petition, or declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void, or declaring the election of all or any of the returned candidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidate to have been duly elected. Keeping in view the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the trial starts when the petition is sent to the Tribunal and continues till the order is made under sec. 98, when the stage comes for pronouncing the award That stage is the conclusion of the trial also. The observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court, therefore, lead support to the view which was taken in the case of Shah Alimuddin vs. S.C. Agrawal (1). That was a case where the award of dismissal had to be given because of the non-compliance of sec. 82 of the Representation of the People Act. 3. I would also like to add that the order of 4th August, 1957, while directing the petitioner to give particulars in respect of the nine allegations of corrupt practices finally said that "the petitioner will amend his petition in accordance with law through an amendment application by the next date of hearing, i.e. 22nd August, 1957." The petitioner instead of filing first of all an application asking for amendment in a particular manner produced an amended application. The Tribunal did not consider that this was an application for amendment, and rejected it, and also rejected the main petition because of failure to put in an amend d application. As pointed out by my learned brother, the application which was presented on the 22nd of August, 1957, contained all the additional particulars which were required of the petitioner. There is no particular form in which an amendment of the petition can be made. There is one form where certain words are required to be deleted or certain words are required to be added. This may be so where only a few words are to be added or deleted. There is no particular form in which an amendment of the petition can be made. There is one form where certain words are required to be deleted or certain words are required to be added. This may be so where only a few words are to be added or deleted. But the other method of asking amendment by substituting one paragraph for another is also equally possible, and the present was a case of that nature, because a large number of particulars had to be supplied according to the orders of the court to remove any misgiving. However, the petitioner, after submitting a covering that it was the amended petition as required by the Tribunal submitted another application that the comprehensive petition which he produced may be treated as an amendment application or else time be granted to file an amendment application as required by the Tribunal. The learned Tribunal committed serious error in not taking the comprehensive application to be an application for amendment which was in accordance with the orders of the Tribunal of 4th August, 1957. The subsequent order of dismissing the main petition was, as pointed out by my learned brother, wholly unjustified. There is no provision in the Act for that kind of order, and if we look to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order can only be construed as one of dismissal of the plaint for failure to supply better particulars, when as a matter of fact better particulars had been supplied. I agree that that kind of order is not appealable, and on the merits was wholly unjustified.