Judgment :- 1. This revision is by the plaintiff against an order of the trial court staying the suit under Act I of 1957. 2. The suit was laid as for redemption of Ext. A "nadappupanayam" dated 1-7-1100 and of Ext. B Puravaippa dated 2-7-1116 by the plaintiff who was the melottidar under Ext. C dated 19-5-1119. The defendant admittedly first came into possession under Ext. III lease deed dated 18-6-1095. Under that document there was an annual pattom of Rs. 60 as also certain other perquisites payable to the landlord and the defendant was to surrender at the end of three years without any claim for improvements. On 20-7-1096, even before the expiry of the term under Ext III, but after settling accounts thereunder, the lessor executed Ext XVI nadappupanayam in favour of the defendant for a sum of Rs. 400 and with a term of three years commencing its date. Under this document, the defendant was allowed to appropriate the pattern payable as per the lease deed Ext. III and also the income from the property towards the interest on the mortgage amount and pay certain michavaram to the mortgagor. And just as in Ext III he was to surrender the property after the term was over on payment of panaya-arthom alone without any claim for improvements. It was subsequent to this that Ext A mortgage deed was executed to the defendant and in respect of the same property for a panaya-artham of Rs. 875/- inclusive of the sum of Rs. 400/- covered by Ext. XVI. There were also other properties secured for the amount. The defendant-mortgagee was directed under this document to "enjoy the property as before" for a term of 12 years and appropriate the entire usufruct towards the interest on the mortgage amount and differing from the previous document he was authorised to effect improvements on the property. Exhibit B puravaippa followed on 2-7-1116 with an additional consideration of Rs. 294 but without separate provision for interest thereon. 3. Exhibit B puravaippa followed on 2-7-1116 with an additional consideration of Rs. 294 but without separate provision for interest thereon. 3. The short question is whether a holding within the meaning of Act I of 1957 is constituted under Ext A. 'Holding' is defined as follows: S. 2(1) "'Holding' means any immovable property held under a single transaction by which a lease-hold right in the property is created and possession of the property is transferred by one person in favour of another and includes Kanapattom." There is a proviso which it is unnecessary to refer, In the opinion of the court below the lease under Ext. III with which the 1st defendant commenced and which was continued under Ext. XVI subsisted under Ext A also by virtue of the provision in it for enjoyment of property as before. Learned counsel for the plaintiff says that the provision was not intended to keep alive the lease but on the other hand the lease must be held to have some to an end when Ext. A came into existence. This question of surrender when the lessee takes a mortgage of the lease-hold property came up for consideration in Lekshmi v. Velu,1956 K. L. T. 410. It was held by the learned judges following Markose v. Goda Nambudiripad, 39 Cochin L. R.400 and Columbus v. Kasi, 40 Cochin L. R.430 that "It was primarily one of intention of the parties to be gathered from a reading of the document as a whole". In that case, the property mortgaged was specifically described as the landlord's share of improvements in the properties. Item 1 was expressly stated to be in the possession of the mortgagee on lease and the mortgagee was directed to appropriate the rent due from him under the lease towards interest due to him on the mortgage amount. Item 2 was stated to be outstanding on lease with Makkotha and the mortgagee was directed to realise from him pattom for that property or to recover possession of the property on payment of the value of improvements. In the opinion of the learned judges the parties, in executing the mortgage, had no intention to terminate the prior lease and they held accordingly. 4. In the opinion of the learned judges the parties, in executing the mortgage, had no intention to terminate the prior lease and they held accordingly. 4. In Markose v. Goda Nambudiripad, 39 Cochin L. R.400 referred to in 1956 K.L.T. 410 just cited, Koshi, J., as he then was in delivering the judgment of the Bench laid down the test, "the entire interest of the lessee and the entire interest of the lessor must vest in the same person in the same right before it can be said that a lease of immovable property has determined. The union of the estate cannot occur if there is any intervening estate." And because the lessee or rather the assignee of the lease-hold interest in that case obtained only a mortgage of the lessor's reversion, the learned judge went on to hold that by the mere execution of the mortgage, no determination of the lease was brought about. Dealing then with the aspect of implied surrender, the question according to the learned judge depended on the intention of the parties as discernible from the terms of the mortgage deed. It was found on an analysis that the parties did not intend to determine the lease. For under the terms of the document the mortgagee was to appropriate part of the pattom fixed for the property in lieu of the interest on the mortgage money and the balance was to be paid to the Jenmi (the mortgagor-lessor) towards pattom due from the original tenant. 5. The next case of Varkey v. Untamman, 40 Cochin L. R.280 referred to in 1956 K.L.T. 410 was a converse one. There also a lease was followed by a mortgage. However the premium or kattakanom under the lease was paid off from the consideration of the mortgage. The premium did not carry any interest whereas after it was taken as part of the mortgage amount it carried interest. Besides other differences there was finally the provision that the properties could be redeemed at any time the parties liked. Ananthakrishna Iyer, C. J., with whom other learned judge agreed, held that in these circumstances it was clear that the relationship between the parties in future was to be that of a mortgagor and mortgagee and not that of lessor and lessee. 6. Learned counsel referred to Kunjan Menon v. Raghavan,1957 K. L. T 678. Ananthakrishna Iyer, C. J., with whom other learned judge agreed, held that in these circumstances it was clear that the relationship between the parties in future was to be that of a mortgagor and mortgagee and not that of lessor and lessee. 6. Learned counsel referred to Kunjan Menon v. Raghavan,1957 K. L. T 678. But that case was concerned in ascertaining how far a'Kannapattom' following a lease was, still a holding for purpose of Act VIII of 1950 and it was held that though the new document partook of the characteristics of both lease and mortgage the aspect of lease predominated. On the facts of this case it is perfectly clear that there is under Ext A no obligation as between the parties, either in present operation or reserved for the future, and referable to the lessor-lessee relationships under Ext. III or Ext. XVI. The position of the defendant under Ext. A is purely that of a usufructuary mortgagee and no question of 'holding' can therefore arise in the circumstances. 7. It follows that the order of the court below cannot be sustained. It is therefore reversed. The court below will take the suit back on the file and proceed with it in due course of law. Allowed.