Reference:—These are two connected appeals filed by Sri Navaneethaswaraswami Devasthanam, represented by its Executive Officer, against the judgment and decrees of the District Judge of East Tanjore in O.S. Nos. 24 and 25 of 1949. O.S. No. 24 of 1949 was a suit filed by the Devasthanam against one Srinivasa Naidu for recovery of possession of the suit lands, measuring 39 acres, 55 cents of wet, along with arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 1,694. The allegations in the plaint was that the lands were leased out to the defendant under a registered lease deed, the original of Exhibit A-9, dated 31st July, 1946, for a period of three years. The defendant was bound to pay rent at the rates specified in that lease and to surrender possession of the suit lands on 15th April, 1949. He not only failed to pay a portion of the rent of 280 kalams of paddy and Rs. 30 for straw per year but also refused to surrender possession on 15th April, 1949, despite a notice dated 29th March, 1949, calling upon him to pay up the arrears and surrender possession. He set up frivolous contentions that he was entitled to permanent rights of occupancy in the suit lands, under section 6(1) of the Estates Land Act as amended in 1936. The plaintiff contended that section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act would not help the defendant, in view of the concession given to landholders under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act. The plaintiff contended that section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act would not help the defendant, in view of the concession given to landholders under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act. His contention was that under section 8 (5) he could lease out, as he pleased, these lands regarding which he had got, in 1917, a final decree of a competent Civil Court establishing that the tenant had no occupancy rights in the lands, as no tenant had acquired any occupancy rights in the lands before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act of 1936, he urged that even if the village of Sellur, in which the lands were situated was an estate and the lands were not private lands, as he contended, but ryoti lands, still he could, for a period of twelve years from the commencement of Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment)Act of 1936 that is till 31st October, 1948, as specifically mentioned in section 8 (5) lease out the lands to any one he liked, on any terms he liked, for 99 years or any other period he liked, and that during the period of such lease for 99 years, or any other period he liked, he would be entitled to collect the rent stipulated in the lease, and would not be bound by section 25 of the Estates Land Act restricting the rent to the rate prevailing for similar lands with similar advantages in the neighbourhood, or such rate as the Collector might on application decide to be fair and equitable. The learned District Judge held, after discussing the evidence, that the village of Sellur was an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, as amended in 1936, that the lands in the village, including the suit lands, were ryoti lands, that the defendant, who had been let into possession of the suit lands under Exhibit A-9, a lease which extended upto 31st July, 1949, that is for a period beyond 1st November, 1948, had acquired permanent rights of occupancy in the suit lands, and could not be evicted or directed to deliver back possession ; and that even a suit for the arrears of rent would lie only in the revenue Court. In that view, he dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff has filed A.S. No. 559 of 1950 against that dismissal. In that view, he dismissed the suit with costs. The plaintiff has filed A.S. No. 559 of 1950 against that dismissal. O.S. No. 25 of 1949 was filed by the very same plaintiff against another tenant, called Swaminatha Pillai, for recovery of possession of the suit lands, consisting of 20 acres, 20 cents of wet, granted to him under a registered lease, the original of Exhibit A-10, dated 29th July, 1946, for a period of three years, the defendant being required to surrender possession of the lands on 15th April, 1949. The defendant not only did not pay in full the rent stipulated, but also refused to surrender possession on 15th April, 1949, despite a notice by the plaintiff on 29th March, 1949, calling upon him to surrender possession. The defendant set up frivolous claims of permanent rights of occupancy in the suit lands under section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act as amended in 1936. The plaintiff contended that, under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act, he could let out the lands to anybody he liked, on whatever terms he liked, not only during the period of 12 years mentioned in section 8 (5), which ended admittedly on 31st October, 1948, but could also during that period, give any lease to any one for 99 years, or any other period he liked, stipulating for any rent he liked, even if the village of Sellur in which the suit lands were situated was an estate under the Estates Land Act and the suit lands were not private lands but ryoti lands. The learned District Judge, after discussing the entire evidence, held that the village of Sellur was an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, as amended in 1936, that the suit lands were ryoti lands, and that the defendant, who had been let into possession on 29th July, 1946, under the original of Exhibit A-10, and had continued in possession as a tenant under the lease till 29th July, 1949, beyond the 12 years’ period mentioned in section 8 (5), had acquired occupancy rights in the suit lands, and could not be evicted or directed to surrender possession ; and that even the arrears of rent, due from him, could only be sued for in a revenue Court. In that view, he dismissed that suit with costs. In that view, he dismissed that suit with costs. A.S. No. 558 of 1950 has been filed against that dismissal. I have perused the entire records, and heard Mr. G.R. Jagadisan, for the appellant in both the appeals, and Messrs. T. S. Kuppuswami Ayyar and S. Thyagarajan for the respondent in these appeals. During the course of the arguments on both sides, two very important points, vital to the success or failure of these appeals, arose for decision, and two Benches, to one of which I was a party, have taken different views regarding these two vital and decisive matters. The learned counsel on both sides have requested me therefore, to refer these two questions to a Full Bench so that a final decision might be obtained, especially as many landholders and tenants will be interested in the decision of these questions and not merely the parties to these appeals. So, I have decided to refer these questions to a Full Bench and to defer my finding on the other matters in controversy in these appeals till the decision of the Full Bench is received, as requested by the counsel on both sides. The First question is whether, under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act, a landholder has a right, in the case of a land covered by a final decree as contemplated therein not only to admit any person to the possession of such lands on such terms as may be agreed upon between them for a period of 12 years, that is till 1st November, 1948, but whether he has got a further right during that period of 12 years, to lease out the lands to any person he likes, on any terms he likes, for 99 years or for any other period he likes, and snap his fingers at section 25, etc., of Estates Land Act. Mr. Jagadisan asserted it and relied on the unreported ruling of a Bench of this Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in A.S. No. 241 of 1949 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949 relating to some other lands in this very village of Sellur in the possession of a different tenant. Mr. Jagadisan asserted it and relied on the unreported ruling of a Bench of this Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in A.S. No. 241 of 1949 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949 relating to some other lands in this very village of Sellur in the possession of a different tenant. One of the leases which arose for consideration in these appeals extended beyond 1st November, 1948 and expired only on 27th July, 1949, though the other lease, considered in those appeals, expired on 11th September, 1948. The learned Judges held, in their judgment in those cases, that there were only two methods under which a person could acquire permanent rights of occupancy in a land situated in an estate, under section 6(1) viz., (1) possession of ryoti land at the commencement of the Act, which in the case of inam villages like Sellur would be 30th June, 1934, and (2) admission to possession after the coming into force of the Act, which in the case of inam villages, like Sellur, affected by the amendment of 1936, would be on or after 31st October, 1936. They held that there was no third method of acquiring statutory rights of occupancy as contended before them, viz., by mere possession of the suit lands on 1st November, 1948, without admission to possession expressly under a valid lease. They held further that mere possession under a contract before 1st November, 1948, that is, within the 12 years’ period, would not help a person to acquire permanent rights of occupancy in the lands, even if the lease under that contract extended beyond 1st November, 1948. Mr. Jagadisan urged that that Bench ruling would directly apply to the point now under consideration. He conceded however, that there was another unreported Bench ruling, to which I too was a party, in S.A. Nos. 269, 295 to 307 and 646 of 1950, wherein there are observations holding a contrary view, but said that this Bench decision had been considered by the Bench, which decided A.S. No. 241 of 1949 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949 and held not to conflict with the view they had adopted, and not to help the tenant in cases like these, and to have left the question res Integra for them to decide. I cannot agree. I cannot agree. I was a party to the Bench which decided those second appeals, along with my learned brother, Subba Rao, J., at present the Chief Justice of the Andhra High Court, and I can say that we held a different view from the view adopted by the Bench in A.S. No. 241 of 1949 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949 regarding these questions. We were of the opinion that the lease of the landholder, under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act, leasing out such lands, to any person he liked, on such terms as might be agreed upon between them, would only enure and be valid for the period of 12 years mentioned therein, that is, till 31st October, 1948, after which date, sections 25 and all other sections of the Estates Land Act would come into operation and govern the rights of the parties. That would mean that any lease for 99 years, etc., on any terms regarding rent, etc., the landholder had entered into even without the period of 12 years would cease to have operation after 1st November, 1948 beyond which date the landholder could claim only the rent allowable under section 25 of the Estates Land Act, and not any higher rent stipulated in any such lease for 99 years, etc., entered into within the twelve years’ period. We were also of opinion that if any tenant was actually having the ryoti land in the estate in his possession as tenant under a lease from the landholder on 1st November, 1948, or thereafter, he would acquire permanent rights of occupancy under section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act, having been impliedly admitted by the landlord on or after to possession of the ryoti land situated in an estate. It is because of this view that we stated, under point 3, “the plaintiffs could rely on the judgment and decree in Exhibits A-1 and A-2, and prevent the occupancy rights” in these lands accruing to the tenants till 31st October, 1948. It is also because of this view that we raised points 4 (a), 4 (b) and 4 (c) in those second appeals and dismissed them even after calling for the further records and other information. It is also because of this view that we raised points 4 (a), 4 (b) and 4 (c) in those second appeals and dismissed them even after calling for the further records and other information. Ultimately, of course, it turned out that the tenants in those cases were not holding the lands on or after 1st November, 1948, on valid lease on the landholder’s express or implied admission to possession, and therefore, they were held not to have acquired permanent occupancy rights in those lands. Se we did not have to state the opinion we held regarding the scope of section 8 (5), but, none the less, that was the opinion which we held and on which we acted. I may add that, in those second appeals, a contention was raised before us that the discrimination between landlords who had obtained final decrees, as contemplated in section 8 (5), and landlords who had not obtained such final decrees would offend Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India and would therefore be ultra vires and null and void as amounting to unjust discrimination and to a denial of equality before the law or equal protection of the laws. We rejected this contention, and observed as follows: “Here, there was ample ground in sense and commonsense, law and equity, to justify the enactment of section 8 (5) and the conferment of the limited privileges therein on landholders who had obtained decrees against tenants before 1st November, 1933 regarding their having no occupancy rights in the land. No question of denial of equality before the law or equal protection of the laws can ever arise because of the provision. The lahndholders who had spent much time, money and energy in obtaining such decrees, and fighting out their cases, deserved such small concessions in law and equity, and the denial of these concessions would have led to grave discontent which a State is bound to guard against. The lahndholders who had spent much time, money and energy in obtaining such decrees, and fighting out their cases, deserved such small concessions in law and equity, and the denial of these concessions would have led to grave discontent which a State is bound to guard against. It was a legitimate and intelligible classification of landholders who had obtained decrees at great expense of time, money and energy, and landholders who had not obtained such decrees, and the privileges conferred on the landholders who had obtained decrees did not extend to complete denial of occupancy rights to the tenants for ever and for ever, but only for a limited period of 12 years entitling the landholder to admit any persons to the possession of that land within that period on such terms as might be agreed upon between them. It was, therefore, a very limited and reasonable concession not offending Article 14 of the Constitution at all.” “Nor was Article 15 of the Constitution offended by unjust and unlawful discrimination against tenants regarding whom there were decrees and land holders in favour of whom there were no decrees. Here too, it was a reasonable and intelligible classification. In The State of Bombay and another v. F. N. Balsara1, the Supreme Court has laid down the principles to be applied when construing Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India.” After stating these principles, we went on: “We are satisfied that section 8 (5), in giving some limited privileges for a limited period to the landholders who have obtained decrees before 1st November, 1933, has acted on a classification based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and that the classification cannot be called arbitrary or without any substantial basis and must be upheld as perfectly valid and not impinging in the least on Article 14 or 15 of the Constitution of India. We may add that tenants who have been given new occupany rights under the third Amendment, where they had none before cannot reasonably complain of the restrictions put on the acquisition of such new occupany rights in a few cases where justice requires such restrictions, as in section 8(5). The tenants acquired the right only under those conditions and cannot very well complain about them”. Mr. The tenants acquired the right only under those conditions and cannot very well complain about them”. Mr. Jagadisan urged that our view in the second appeal would not apply to the wording of section 8 (5) as aptly as the view adopted by the Bench in A.S. No. 241 of 1949 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949. I cannot see why: Indeed, I think personally, perhaps because I was a party to the Bench which decided the second appeals, that our view is more in consonance with the wording of section 8 (5) and the principles adumbrated above for discriminating between landholders who had got decrees and landholders who had not got decrees, than the view adopted by the other Bench. But, of course, that is only a matter of opinion. Whenever two Benches have taken different views, it is only the Full Bench that can resolve the tangle and give the correct interpretation to section 8 (5), with its all important clause ‘for a period of 12 years’ and set the matter at rest, as urged by the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. Jagadisan urged that it was possible for a landholder not to admit any tenant into possession at all in cases of ryoti lands coming within the scope of section 8 (5) and that he could have his own cultivation of those lands for ever and for ever, though the ryoti right will not merge in the melwaram and so, he saw no real reasons why a lease for 99 years or any other period, on any terms the landlord pleased, granted during the 12 years, should not be valid. The reasoning is not very convincing. The landholder has got a right to cultivate for ever even the ryoti lands bought in by him in Court auction for arrears of rent. But it is not alleged that he could lease out those lands for 99 years, or any other period, on any terms he likes, and prevent the lessee from acquiring the ryots rights and snap his fingers at section 25 of the Estates Land Act. But it is not alleged that he could lease out those lands for 99 years, or any other period, on any terms he likes, and prevent the lessee from acquiring the ryots rights and snap his fingers at section 25 of the Estates Land Act. Nor is it even alleged by Jagadisan that on 1st November, 1948, on the expiry of the 12 years’ period, the landholder has got a right to lease out the lands which fall within the scope of section 8 (5) for 99 years, or any other period, on any terms he likes, and escape the acquisition of ryoti rights by the lease or the operation of section 25 of the Estates Land Act. Then Mr. Jagadisan urged that a landholder can, if he likes, even keep ryoti lands in his possession fallow and uncultivated however fertile they may be, for years and years, and that this would imply a right to lease out the lands for 99 years, or any other period, on any terms the landholder pleases, during the 12 years. I cannot agree. Of course, a landholder has now the legal right to keep ryots’ lands in his possession fallow for years and years, however fertile they may be. But if many landholders begin to do that, especially in a season of food scarcity, a draconian ordinance is sure to be passed by the Government or an Act by the Legislature, to get all those lands cultivated so that the people may not die out of starvation. Many legislative enactments, like the Estates Land (Amendment) Act of 1936, and the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, are intended to bring about a peaceful evolution and bring into existence a classless Society where justice, liberty, equality and fraternity may obtain, and to prevent a violent revolution. If the landholders act recklessly, as envisaged above, I am sure the Union Government and the State Governments will soon come forth with some drastic ordinance or legislation which will give a deathblow to such anti-social acts. Mr. Jagadisan had to concede that the ryoti lands, though cultivated by a landholder personally, whether falling under the category of lands in section 8 (5) or in the category of private lands, have to be kept separate, and that the ryoti rights will not be merged with the landholder’s melwaram rights. Mr. Jagadisan had to concede that the ryoti lands, though cultivated by a landholder personally, whether falling under the category of lands in section 8 (5) or in the category of private lands, have to be kept separate, and that the ryoti rights will not be merged with the landholder’s melwaram rights. That will show the anxiety of the legislature to keep the ryoti lands as ryoti lands, subject to section 25 and all other provisions of the Estates Land Act, except for the limited concessions given to landholders for very limited purposes, as under section 8 (5). Mr. Jagadisan has not convinced me that the view taken by the Bench in A.S. No. 241 of 1949 and S.A. No. 2083 of 194.9 is the only possible correct view regarding the interpretation of section 8 (5). As already stated, another Bench to which I too was a party, took a different view. Even if that view is erroneous, it must be held to be so by a Full Bench, and not by any lesser authority as Mr. Kuppuswami Iyer rightly contends. Mr. Kuppuswami Iyer, for the tenants, set up another extreme contention, namely, that any tenant in possession of a ryoti land on 30th June, 1934 or thereafter, whether by violence or non-violence, lease or no lease,would be automatically entitled to permanent occupancy rights in that land. That was not the opinion of either of the Benches. I have no doubt in my mind that such a person will not acquire any permanent occupancy right under section 6(1), where only two kinds of persons acquire such permanent occupancy right as already mentioned, and not this third kind of heterogeneous individual. Such extreme contentions by landholders and tenants are becoming very common nowadays. The only authority cited in favour of this contention by Mr. Kuppuswami Iyer is the Privy Council ruling in Y. Mallikarajuna Prasada Naidu v. Somayya1. That ruling will not be of much use for deciding this question, as section 8 (5) was enacted only in the Amending Act of 1936, long after that decision and the effect of that section could not of course, have been considered by the Privy Council. Kuppuswami Iyer is the Privy Council ruling in Y. Mallikarajuna Prasada Naidu v. Somayya1. That ruling will not be of much use for deciding this question, as section 8 (5) was enacted only in the Amending Act of 1936, long after that decision and the effect of that section could not of course, have been considered by the Privy Council. Section 8 (5) distinctly says ‘no tenant has acquired any occupancy right in such land’ meaning that the acquisition of occupancy right is under section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act, and the occupancy right claimed by the tenant is only under the Amendment Act of 1936 which, of course, could not have been considered by the Privy Council. The Privy Council did not give occupancy rights to persons who got possession of lands by violence, or by deceit. Mr. Kuppuswamy Iyer urged that the tenants, who were holding over on 1st November, 1948 under expired lease, could acquire permanent occupancy rights. I do not think so. That question does not arise in these two appeals where the tenants were not “ holding over” on 1st November, 1948 after expiry of their leases, but were holding the suit lands under leases which had not expired. A subsidiary question, which arises out of the first question, which I want to refer to a Full Bench, as desired by the parties, is whether a tenant in possession of land on 1st November, 1948 and for months thereafter, under a lease granted by a landholder within 12 years under section 8 (5) as in these two cases, is bound to pay after 1st November, 1948, the rent stipulated in the lease, or only the rent claimable under section 25 of the Estates Land Act. Mr. Jagadisan urged that a landholder could recover the rents stipulated under a lease granted within the 12 years’ period, even if that was a lease granted within the 12 years’ period, even if that was a lease of ryoti lands for 99 years and even if the rents stipulated were 10 times the rents claimable under section 25. He relied on some observations of the Bench in A.S. No. 241 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949. He relied on some observations of the Bench in A.S. No. 241 and S.A. No. 2083 of 1949. I do not think that those observations have conclusively decided the matter, as another Bench, to which I was a party, was of opinion that the rents claimable after 1st November, 1948 could only be rents claimable under section 25, as freedom of contract regarding the rents, etc., was restricted under section 8 (5), to a period of 12 years, a temporary small tunnel in the ocean of the Estates Land Act. The question is, can a landholder by -pass section 25 and other sections of the Estates Land Act by granting a lease for 99 years, etc., within the 12 years’ period specifically mentioned in section 8 (5), stipulating rents 10 times or 20 times of those claimable under section 25, and putting in other clauses repugnant to the Estates Land Act like payment of illegal cess, etc.? In other words, can he by-pass the provisions of the Estates Land Act as the Germans by-passed the Maginot Lines in World War 2 ? Taking the wording of section 8 (5), I agree with Messrs. Kuppuswami Iyer and Thyagarajan that the view of the Bench which heard the second appeals is on the whole, the better view, considering the scheme of the Estates Land Act, as another Bench has taken a contrary view, and Mr. Jagadisan urges that that is the later and better view, it is only proper that these questions should be referred to a Full Bench, as requested by the learned counsel on all sides. The two questions referred to a Full Bench are these: (1) (a) Under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act, has a landholder, admitting any person to the possession of ryoti lands on such terms as may be agreed upon between them for the period of 12 years from the commencement of the Estates Land Act (Third Amendment) Act 1936 as specifically mentioned in section 8 (5) the right within the period of those 12 years to lease out the lands to any person for 99 years, or any other longer period, on such terms as may be agreed between them, or will such lease operate only till 1st November, 1948, regarding its terms, and then be automatically replaced by the Estates Land Act No. (1) (b). If such a lease for 99 years, etc., entered into between them within the 12 years’ period, is held to be valid, as conferring on the lessee a right to continue for the term mentioned, can the landholder claim rents in respect of the holding after 1st November, 1948, as per the lease, if the rents stipulated are higher than those claimable under section 25 of the Estates Land Act, in spite of the lands continuing to be ryoti lands? If a landholder, within the 12 years’ period, admits any person to the possession of such ryoti lands, on such terms as may be agreed upon between them, but the lease extends beyond 1st November, 1948, can the lessee continuing in possession on 1st November. 1948, claim a permanent right of occupancy in the holding, under section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act, on the ground that he had been impliedly admitted into possession of ryoti lands situated in an estate, and he has continued to be a tenant under the landholder on 1st November, 1948, after the expiry of the 12 years’ period mentioned in section 8(5)? The papers will be placed before the Honourable the Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench to decide the above two questions. The other matters in controversy in these two appeals will be heard and decided after the opinion of the Full Bench on the two questions is received. In pursuance of the above order of reference these appeals came on for hearing before a Full Bench (Rajagopalan, Balakrishna Ayyar and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ.) K. Rajah Aiyar and G. R. Jagadisan, for Appellant. V. Vedantachari, T. S. Kuppuswami Ayyar, R. G. Rajan and S. Thyagaraja Ayyar, for Respondent. The Opinion of the Court was delivered by Balakrishna Ayyar, J.— The village of Sellur belongs to the Navaneethaswaraswami Devasthanam, Sikkil, as Ekabogam Mirasdar or sole proprietor. The village was not an estate within the meaning of Madras Act I of 1908 as that Act originally stood, but became one by virtue of Madras Act XVIII of 1936. The lands which form the subject-matter of this litigation are not private lands. On 29th November, 1917, this Court decided in A.S. Nos. 146, 228 and 230 of 1916 that the village was not an estate, from which it follows that no ryots had any permanent rights of occupancy in the lands. The lands which form the subject-matter of this litigation are not private lands. On 29th November, 1917, this Court decided in A.S. Nos. 146, 228 and 230 of 1916 that the village was not an estate, from which it follows that no ryots had any permanent rights of occupancy in the lands. By a lease deed dated 31st July, 1946, the Executive Officer of the Devasthanam leased some of the lands situated in the village to Srinivasa Naidu for a period of three years. Similarly, by another lease deed dated 29th July, 1946, the Devasthanam leased some other lands to one Swaminatha Pillai, also for a period of three years. After 31st December, 1948, the lessees refused to pay rent at the contract rate. They also refused to surrender possession. They claimed that they had acquired permanent rights of occupancy in the lands and that they were liable to pay only at rates to be ascertained in the manner provided by the Madras Estates Land Act. The District Judge, East Tanjore, upheld the claim of the lessees. Thereupon the Devasthanam came to this Court in Appeal Nos. 558 and 559 of 1950. In Navaneetheswaraswami Devasthanam v. Ganapathi1, a Bench of this Court consisting of the Chief Justice and Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., held in circumstances similar to those present here, but in respect of other lands in the village, that the ryots were not entitled to permanent rights of occupancy, and, that they were bound by the terms of the lease. A different view, however was expressed by Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., in Seshayya v. Narasimhacharyulu2. In view of this conflict of opinion, Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., before whom Appeal Nos. 558 and 559 of 1950 came up for decision, referred the following question to a Full Bench. A different view, however was expressed by Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., in Seshayya v. Narasimhacharyulu2. In view of this conflict of opinion, Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., before whom Appeal Nos. 558 and 559 of 1950 came up for decision, referred the following question to a Full Bench. “(1) (a) Under section 8 (5) of the Estates Land Act, has a landholder admitting any person in the possession of ryoti lands on such terms as may be agreed upon between them for the period of 12 years from the commencement of the Estates Land Act (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, as specifically mentioned in section 8 (5)the right within the period of those 12 years to lease out the lands to any person for 99 years, or any other long period,on such terms as may be agreed between them, or will such lease operate only till 1st November, 1948, regarding its terms, and then be automatically replaced by the Estates Land Act? (b) If such a lease for 99 years, etc., entered into between them within the 12 years’ period, is held to be valid, as conferring on the lessee a right to continue for the term mentioned, can the landholder claim rents in respect of the holding after 1st November, 1948, as per the lease, if the rents stipulated are higher than those claimable under section 25 of the Estates Land Act, in spite of the lands continuing to be ryoti lands? (2) If a landholder, within the 12 years’ period, admits any person to the possession of such ryoti lands, on such terms as may be agreed upon between them, but the lease extends beyond 1st November, 1948, can the lessee continuing in possession on 1st November, 1948, claim a permanent right of occupancy in the holding, under section 6 (1) of the Estates Land Act, on the ground that he had been impliedly admitted into possession of ryoti lands situated in an estate, and he has continued to be a tenant under the landholder on 1st November, 1948, after the expiry of the 12 years’ period mentioned in section 8(5)?” The questions raised by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., may perhaps be restated in a shorter form as follows: Where before 31st October, 1946, a landholder has granted a lease of land situated in village, referred to in section 8 (5) of the Madras Estates Land Act, for a term which runs beyond 31st October, 1948, do the terms of the lease remain in force after 31st October, 1948, or, does the lease stand determined by reason of section 8(5), and does the lessee become a ryot with permanent rights of occupancy in the land on and after 31st October, 1948, with the further consequence that he is bound to pay only the rent to be ascertained in the manner provided by section 25? The answer to these questions depends upon the true interpretation of section 6(1) and section 8 (5) of the Act which runs as follows: — “6. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding”. “8. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act,every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate of such landholder shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding”. “8. (5) If before the first day of November, 1933, the landholder has obtained in respect of any land in an estate within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of section 3 a final decree or order of a competent civil Court establishing that the tenant has no occupancy right in such land, and no tenant has acquired any occupancy right in such land before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, the landholder shall, if the land is not private land within the meaning of this Act, have the right, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, for a period of twelve years from the commencement of the Madras Estats Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, of admitting any person to the possession of such land on such terms as may be agreed upon between them: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall be deemed during the said period of twelve years or any part thereof to affect the validity of any agreement between the landholder and the tenant subsisting at the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.” Let us start with section 8(5). When we break it up into its component parts we get this result. First, it applies only to lands situated inside an estate within the meaning of sub-clause (d) of clause (2) of section 3. Secondly before 1st November, 1933, the landholder must have obtained a final adjudication from a competent civil Court in respect of any land in the estate that the tenant has no occupancy right in such land. Thirdly, no tenant must have acquired occupancy rights in the land before 31st October, 1936. Fourthly, the land must not be private land. Fifthly, and here arises the controversy, for a period of twelve years commencing from 31st October, 1936, the landholder gets the right to admit persons to possession of any land in the estate on such terms as may be agreed upon between them (Agreements entered into prior to 30th June, 1936, are not affected by this sub-section: a separate proviso takes care of them). The question is, what is the extent and scope of the right that the landholder obtains. According to the contention of the Devasthanam what the landholder gets is the “ right” to enter into agreement in relation to the land: so long as the agreement itself is entered into within twelve years, it does not matter what the period, is during which the agreement is to remain in force. According to Mr. Vedantacharis the learned advocate for the lessees, the terms of the agreement cannot remain in force for more than twelve years. If we read the section again and try to interpret it according to the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax, it will be found that the phrase “for a period of twelve years” can apply only to the word “right” and not to the words “ on such terms as may be agreed upon” by the parties. The Act says that the landholder shall have something. What is that something ? The object of the verb “ have” is “ right” . How long is this right to last ? That is specified by the words which follow, viz., “ for a period of twelve years” . As the words stand the sub-section only requires that the agreements must have been entered into during the period of twelve years commencing from 31st October, 1936. The words are not sufficient to support or convey the notion, that the agreement works itself out within that period of twelve years. If the intention of the legislature had been that the period of twelve years should qualify not the “ right” conferred on the landholder by the sub-section but the terms of the agreement entered into between the landholder and the lessee, then the phrase “for a period of twelve years” would be clearly wrongly placed in the sub-section. To get the result contended for by Mr. Vedantachari, there must be a proviso at the end. of the sub-section to this effect: “Provided that the terms of such agreement shall stand determined and cease to have effect on the expiration of twelve years from the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.” Alternatively, the expression “to be in force for a period not exceeding twelve years” must follow the word “ terms” . of the sub-section to this effect: “Provided that the terms of such agreement shall stand determined and cease to have effect on the expiration of twelve years from the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936.” Alternatively, the expression “to be in force for a period not exceeding twelve years” must follow the word “ terms” . Therefore as we said before, purely as a matter of syntax and grammatical construction, the view expressed in Navaneethaswaraswami Devasthanam v. Ganapathi1, must prevail. Some arguments were based on the proviso to sub-section (5). It was said that there is no discernible reason for treating agreements in force on 31st October, 1936 differently from agreements entered into after that date, and that since the legislature has expressly stated that the former class of agreements shall be in force only for twelve years, it could not have intended to lay down a different rule in respect of the latter class of agreements. There are at least two answers to this. One is that no common principle appears to govern the various provisions made in respect of ryoti lands which have vested in a landholder. For example section 8(4) deals with cases of vesting by inheritance after 1936. It will be difficult to say that vesting by inheritance is analogous to cases provided for in sub-section (5) of section 8. But the language used in sub-section (4) in relation to the questions we have to answer is practically identical with the language used in sub-section (5). Sub-section (1) of section 8 deals with all forms of vesting including inheritance. But, vesting by inheritance prior to 1936 which is comprehended in sub-section (1) is treated differently from vesting by inheritance subsequent to 31st October, 1936. Next it is possible to say in respect of the proviso and that with a fair measure of persuasiveness that since in respect of lands covered by agreements in force on 31st October, 1936, the legislature has made express provision that the terms of such agreements shall be in force for twelve years, but has made no such provision in respect of agreements subsequent to 31st October, 1936, its intention was to treat the two classes of agreement differently. Mr. Vedantachari then said that a key to the problem is to be found in subsection (4) of section 8 as it stood before it was amended in 1936. Mr. Vedantachari then said that a key to the problem is to be found in subsection (4) of section 8 as it stood before it was amended in 1936. That sub-section then ran as follows: “In cases where the interest of the ryot in the holding has passed to the landholder by transfer for valuable consideration before the passing of this Act otherwise than at a sale for arrears of rent, or has passed by inheritance, the landholder shall have the right for a period of twelve years from the passing of this Act of admitting any person to the possession of such land on such terms as may be agreed upon between them and the person so admitted shall not be entitled during such period to the benefit of the provisions of section 46. In cases where such interest passes to the landholder by inheritance after the passing of this Act, the landholder shall have the same right for a period of twelve years from the date of succession. Exception. — Notwithstanding anything contained in this section where before or after the commencement of this Act, the Kudivaram interest in any land comprised in an estate falling within clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 3 has been or is acquired by the inamdar such land shall cease to be part of the estate.” Mr. Vedantachari’s argument was this: the old sub-section first provided that where the Kudivaram interest had vested in the landholder by purchase, otherwise than at a sale for arrears of rent, or by inheritance the landholder was to have the right for a period of twelve years of admitting any person to the possession of the land on such terms as might be agreed upon, and then it went on to add very specifically that a person so admitted would not have the right during such period to apply to the Collector under section 46 of the Act. This implied that on the expiration of the twelve years he could so apply, notwithstanding whatever covenants may have been incorporated in the agreement he entered into with the landholder. This is clear evidence, said Mr. Vedantachari, that the legislature intended that in the case also of the leases provided for by section 8(5) the terms or covenants contained in the lease or agreement between the parties should remain in force only for twelve years. This is clear evidence, said Mr. Vedantachari, that the legislature intended that in the case also of the leases provided for by section 8(5) the terms or covenants contained in the lease or agreement between the parties should remain in force only for twelve years. We are unable to accept this argument. The present sub-section (5) of section 8 was not in the Act either when it was passed in 1908 or even when section 8 was amended in 1934. Section 8(5) was a wholly new provision to deal with a special class of estates, the inam villages that became estates after the amendment of 1936. Section 8(5) cannot therefore be construed in the light of sub-section (4) as it stood in 1908. Section 46 itself to which the rights of the ryots secured by the old section 8(4) were correlated, was repealed in 1934. Besides the language of the old section 8 (4) was different from that of the new section 8 (5). We shall set out the relevant passages in the two sub-sections. Section 8 (4): “The landholder shall have the right for a period of twelve years........of admitting any person to possession............and the person so admitted shall not be entitled during such period to the benefit .” Section 8 (5) runs: “........the landholder shall............have the right...........for a period of twelve years............of admitting any person to the possession of such land.. ..” The argument of Mr. Vedantachari further assumes that the legislature intended to treat the cases that fell under section 8(5) in the same way as all the different classes that were clubbed together in the old section 8 (4) an assumption for which we see no basis or justification. We are unable to see any unity of purpose or identity of objective among the several classes dealt with in section 8 as it now stands. The next argument of Mr. Vedantachari may be summarised in this form. Section 3(16) of the Act defines “ ryoti land” as including all cultivable land in an estate other than private land and certain other categories which are not relevant here. The agreements envisaged in section 8(5) are leases of ryoti lands. By virtue of section 6, every ryot admitted to possession of ryoti land would acquire permanent rights of occupancy. Section 3(16) of the Act defines “ ryoti land” as including all cultivable land in an estate other than private land and certain other categories which are not relevant here. The agreements envisaged in section 8(5) are leases of ryoti lands. By virtue of section 6, every ryot admitted to possession of ryoti land would acquire permanent rights of occupancy. What sub-section (5) of section 8 does is to suspend for a period of twelve years the right of the person admitted to the possession of such ryoti lands to acquire permanent occupancy rights. This theory, assuming for a moment that it has any foundation at all, runs at once into serious difficulties. During the period of twelve years between 1936 and 1948 more than one person may have been admitted to possession of the same ryoti land — one lessee being admitted on the termination of the lease of his predecessor- — How are we to determine which person in the series of lessees is to have permanent rights of occupancy ? Mr. Vedantachari suggested that it would be the last lessee who would acquire permanent rights of occupancy. The question at once arises, why should that be so ? How is his claim superior to that of his predecessors ? Why should not the rights be conferred on the first or any intermediary lessee instead of the last. It was suggested that one process by which it can be said that the earlier lessees acquired no occupancy rights would be to hold that during the time they were in occupation, the land was not ryoti land. But then this destroys the theory of Mr. Vedantachari, that the ryoti character of the land was only “suspended” or held in abeyance. Besides, it necessarily implies that at the time the last tenant, that is to say, the tenant in occupation on 31st October, 1948, was inducted into the land it was not ryoti land. If that were so, section 6(1) will not apply to him at all, and it is only under that sub-section that occupancy rights can be claimed. There was another line of argument, but it was equally unhelpful. Mr. If that were so, section 6(1) will not apply to him at all, and it is only under that sub-section that occupancy rights can be claimed. There was another line of argument, but it was equally unhelpful. Mr. Vedantachari urged that it was the tenant in possession on the date of the expiry of the twelve year period that acquired permanent rights of occupancy because, having been admitted, he alone held the land, while the others who had been admitted during the twelve year period had ceased to hold the land or holding. That ignores the fact that under section 6(1) the admission itself secured the right to hold the land thereafter; if the right to hold the land remained ‘suspended ‘and was not abrogated by any subsequent admission of another person, no claim of permanent rights of occupancy could be founded on the subsequent admission. The next objection to this theory of “ suspension” is that it lacks any foundation whatever. Sub-section (5) of section 8 is intended to apply to lands in respect of which a competent Court has finally found that no ryot had permanent rights of occupancy. When we start with that finding, where is the scope for any theory of suspension? The theory of suspension assumes that the right was previously there but was being held in abeyance. When we start with the finding that there was no permanent right of occupancy at all the theory of suspension becomes wholly inapplicable. Mr. T.S. Kuppuswami Ayyar, who intervened at one stage when Mr. Vedantachari was developing his theory of “suspension”, suggested that the true theory would be not one of suspension but of postponement ; according to him, the proper way of looking at the matter would be to say that the date on which the occupancy rights could be acquired in the lands referred to in sub-section (5) would be only deferred. This modification of Mr. Vedantachari’s theory does not take any one out of the wood: because the question still arises, “deferred” till when? And that question takes us back to the actual words of section 8(5). Finally, if all that the legislature intended to say was — and that is the substance of the theory of both Mr. Vedantachari and Mr. Vedantachari’s theory does not take any one out of the wood: because the question still arises, “deferred” till when? And that question takes us back to the actual words of section 8(5). Finally, if all that the legislature intended to say was — and that is the substance of the theory of both Mr. Vedantachari and Mr. Kuppuswami Ayyar — that in respect of the lands referred to in sub-section (5) of section 8 permanent rights of occupancy could not be acquired till 1st November, 1948, why did it not use a simpler set of words ? It would have been quite sufficient for the legislature to have said that in those lands no permanent rights of occupancy could be acquired till 1st November, 1948. Mr. Vedantachari next addressed to us a very interesting and elaborate argument based on the history of the legislation and remarked that the legislature showed a constant desire to enlarge and extend the interest of the ryots in the land and to curtail those of the landholder ; it was always extremely reluctant to permit a landholder to enlarge his rights in relation to ryoti land ; therefore, one would be justified in construing the words used in the sub-section in a manner which would enlarge the interests of the cultivator. On this reasoning two observations may be made. In Narayanaraju v. Suryanarayudu1, the Privy Council had to deal with a case under the Estates Land Act. The report of that case indicates that an argument similar to the one urged before us was advanced before the Privy Council, and on that their Lordships observed: “They discard all argument from the presumed general intention of the Act as treacherous and inconclusive.” The other observation is that the history of the legislation as narrated even by Mr. Vedantachari, shows that at various points the legislature merely enacted a compromise between the conflicting interests of the landholder and the ryot. Adjustments of competing and conflicting interests are not always based on inflexible principles or abstract logic. There is a giving in at one point and a taking in at another. To ascertain what the final result reached was we must examine the actual language employed in recording the compromise. That is to say, we must go back to the words of the statute and read them again. There is a giving in at one point and a taking in at another. To ascertain what the final result reached was we must examine the actual language employed in recording the compromise. That is to say, we must go back to the words of the statute and read them again. It is no doubt true that in Seshayya v. Narasimhacharyulu2, Subba Rao and Panchapakesa Ayyar, JJ., expressed the view, for which, Mr. Vedantachari contended. But, an examination of the case shows that the question did not really arise for determination. The facts there were as follows: The village containing the suit lands became an “ estate” by virtue of Madras Act XVIII of 1936, and the suit lands became ryoti lands therein. The plaintiffs had obtained decrees against the tenants before 1933 to the effect that the tenants had no occupancy rights in the lands. The landholders leased the properties to the tenants for five years to terminate in 1946. After the expiry of that lease, they granted a fresh lease for another year. That lease expired in March, 1947. Thereafter, the tenants held over without any lease in their favour and did not surrender the lands in spite of notices to quit. Hence the landholders filed suits for ejectment and arrears of rent and for mesne profits. The suits were filed before 31st October, 1948, and on 27th October, 1948, that is to say, before the expiration of the twelve years specified in section 8 (5), the tenants themselves were appointed receivers of the properties. It is, therefore, clear that on 31st October, 1948 the “ tenants” were not as such in possession of the properties. So, the quest on did not really arise for determination, whether a lessee continuing in possession after 31st October, 1948 would have acquired permanent rights of occupancy in the land. The observations in that case, were therefore, obiter. The decision in Ramachandrayya v. Ranganayakamma3, which was cited before us, does not advance the argument of Mr. Vedantachari any further. The learned Judges here merely followed Seshayya v. Narasimhacharyulu1, observing that they were bound by it. But, as we have explained above, the observations in that case were really obiter. The observations in that case, were therefore, obiter. The decision in Ramachandrayya v. Ranganayakamma3, which was cited before us, does not advance the argument of Mr. Vedantachari any further. The learned Judges here merely followed Seshayya v. Narasimhacharyulu1, observing that they were bound by it. But, as we have explained above, the observations in that case were really obiter. In the order of reference which he made, Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., posed the question, whether a lessee continuing in possession on 1st November, 1948 could not claim permanent rights of occupancy on the ground that he had been impliedly admitted into possession of ryoti land. Now, when we say that one person has admitted another into possession of his property, we necessarily postulate a conscious and deliberate act. It may be that the person admitting another into possession does not visualise all the legal consequences that follow from his act, but the act itself is consciously and knowingly done. Section 6(1) speaks of " every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land ". The admission referred to in the section is a conscious and deliberate one and not something which was not intended. There is nothing in Explanation (3) to this sub-section which is inconsistent with this view. That Explanation provides for the case of persons who trespass into ryoti land and from whom the landholder receives or recovers payment under section 163 of the Act, and enacts that in such cases the landholder shall be deemed to have admitted such persons into possession of such land. In other words, even to cover cases of what may be called ratification, the statute has made express provision by enacting that in such cases the landholder shall be considered on the basis of a conscious act of his to have admitted the ryot into possession. That question was considered in Rajendramani Devi Garu v. Yellappa Ramu Naidu2, where it was observed: "That there is a distinction between admission of a ryot to possession and a ryot being in possession is not only clear from the ordinary meaning of the two phrases but the Legislature itself observes the distinction in various sections of the Act.....That explanation supports Mr. Narayanamurthi’s suggestion that the phrase ‘a person admitted to possession’ does not ordinarily mean a person in possession." A Bench of this Court went fully into this matter in Navaneetheswaraswami Devasthanam v. Ganapati3, and pointed out that there are only two modes by which statutory occupancy rights could be obtained. The Court observed: "It would also be noticed that the above construction accords with the principle and language of section 6 (1) also. Under this provision there are only two methods by which statutory occupancy rights are obtained: (1) Possession of ryoti land at the commencement of the Act which in the case of inams of the suit category is fixed as 30th June, 1934 (vide Explanation 2). (2) Admission to possession after the coming into force of the Act in the case of inams which became estates by virtue of Madras Act XVIII of 1936 this would be 31st October, 1936. Under section 8 (5) the landlord is given a right for a period of twelve years from 31st October, 1936, i.e., till 31st October, 1948 to admit tenants to possession without the latter obtaining statutory occupancy rights. If there is any admission at a later date, it would not be protected by section 8 (5) and would therefore fall within section 6(1) and confer on the tenants so admitted statutory rights". Earlier in the judgment they repelled the identical contention which Mr. Vedantachari pressed before us in these words: "This interpretation of the section appears to us to be forced and as not giving effect to the actual words of the provision in section 8 (5) which is clearly designed to save from the operation of section 6(1) the terms of contracts entered into within a particular period, namely, between 31st October, 1936 and 31st October, 1948. If the contract admitting a tenant into possession is saved under section 8 (5), it is difficult to see how that contract itself is exhausted or superseded merely by the twleve years’ period prescribed for entering into contract expiring. The learned District Judge appreciated this difficulty and that was why he thought that while all the other terms of the lease would be binding upon the tenant, the only term which ceased to be operative after 31st October, 1948 was the covenant to surrender possession. This reasoning itself shows the illegality of the construction adopted by the learned District Judge". This reasoning itself shows the illegality of the construction adopted by the learned District Judge". We are in respectful agreement with this reasoning. The result, therefore, is this: Where before 31st October, 1946, the landholder has granted a lease of lands situate in a village referred to in section 8(5) of the Madras Estates Land Act for a term which runs beyond 31st October, 1948, the terms of the lease remain in force even after 31st October, 1948, and the lease does not stand determined by reason of section 8(5), and the lessee does not become a ryot and get occupancy rights. After the decision of the Full Bench the appeal came on for final hearing before Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., who delivered the following Judgment†: — These two appeals came up before me on 24th February, 1955, against the dismissal of O.S.Nos. 24 and 25 of 1949, District Court, East Tanjore. The lands were situated in the inam village of Sellur which became an estate under the 1936 amendment. The vital question decided by the lower Court, and agitated before me, was regarding the occupancy rights claimed to have been acquired in the holdings by the defendants, under section 8(5) of the Estates Land Act, after 31st October, 1948, as they continued in possession. As there were conflicting Bench decisions (Seshayya v. Narasimhacharyulu1 and Navaneetheswaraswami Devasthanam v. Ganapathi Thevar2), on this point, I heard the arguments on both sides regarding the alleged acquisition of occupancy rights under section 8(5) by the defendants, which point had been decided in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff-temple by the lower Court, which had also held that it had no jurisdiction to hear the suits regarding the arrears of rent, etc., and had left those issues undecided, and I referred the matter to a Full Bench. The Full Bench has, by its judgment, dated 15th March, 1958, held that under section 8(5) of the Estates Land Act a lease granted by a landlord running beyond 31st October, 1948 remains in force even after 31st October, 1948, and the learned Judges have therefore, held that the defendants are not ryots and have not, by virtue of their remaining in possession of the lands after 31st October, 1948, acquired any occupancy rights. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that the defendants are ryots entitled to occupancy rights, and could not be evicted, and that the suits for arrears of rent should also be filed in the revenue Court, cannot be sustained and is vacated, and the dismissal of both the suits with costs is set aside, and the suits remanded for fresh disposal after giving its findings on the other issues in the suits (like the arrears due, etc., only the issues regarding occupancy rights and jurisdiction having been decided) and also on the new points raised in C.M.Ps. Nos. 2350 and 2351 of 1958 filed here and any new points raised and allowed there. The plaintiff will of course, be free to oppose the above two petitions by filing’ counters and adducing arguments and other evidence. All parties can adduce relevant oral and documentary evidence at the remanded hearing. The appellant will get half the costs of these appeals from the respondents, the other half being disallowed in view of the fact that the Full Bench decision resolving the conflict in the view between the Benches was delivered only long after the filing of the appeals, and the lower Court’s decision in favour of the occupancy rights was based on a decision of this Court now held to be erroneous. The appellant will be granted a refund of the Court-fees paid in both the appeals. R.M. -------- Appeals allowed. Suits remanded.