Judgment V.Ramaswami, J. 1. In this case the petitioner has obtained a rule from the High Court asking the respondents to show cause why a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be issued for quashing the order of the Union Government dated the 1st August, 1957, made under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules 1949, and why a writ in the nature of mandamus should not be issued commanding the respondents Nos. 1 to 5 not to give effect to the order of the Union Government and not to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the mining areas leased out to it. Cause has been shown by the learned Government Advocate on behalf of respondent No. 6, the Union of India, and by the Government Pleader on behalf of the State of Bihar and other respondents, namely, respondents Nos. 1 to 5. 2. The petitioner is a private limited company, incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and having its registered office at Calcutta. The petitioner carries on the business of manufacture of refractories, including Silica bricks for melting iron. The petitioner alleges that it has exploited in the past the quartzite (silica) rocks of Pirpahar and Ashanagar hills of Biharshariff area after obtaining leave and licence from the proprietors within whose estate the silica rocks are located. After the vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar by a notification issued under the Bihar Land Reforms Act (Bihar Act XXX of 1950), the petitioner made an application to the State Government, who sanctioned the grant of a lease on the 23rd September, 1955, of an area of 56.70 acres in Pirpahari hills and of 1.25 acres in Ashanagar hills for a term of twenty years with an option of renewal for another term of twenty years. In pursuance of this order of the State Government two indentures of lease were executed and registered in favour of the petitioner on the 31st August, 1956, and 24th October, 1956. The indentures of the lease are annexures A and A1 to the affidavit of the petitioner. The petitioner claims to have taken possession of the leasehold area and to have been quarrying the silica rocks after the execution and registration of the indentures of the lease. The indentures of the lease are annexures A and A1 to the affidavit of the petitioner. The petitioner claims to have taken possession of the leasehold area and to have been quarrying the silica rocks after the execution and registration of the indentures of the lease. It is alleged by the petitioner that on the 26th November, 1957, the Additional Collector of Patna informed the petitioner that the Government of India cancelled the lease granted by the State Government and the petitioner was called upon to vacate possession of the leasehold properties. The order of the Additional Collector is annexure marked B to the petitioners affidavit. On the 17th December, 1957, the Collector of Patna wrote to the petitioner threatening that legal action would be taken against him if the petitioner failed to vacate possession on the 3rd January, 1958. The case of the petitioner is that the Union Government has no authority under the Mineral Concession Rules to cancel the orders made by the State Government granting lease to the petitioner. The petitioner therefore, prayed for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the Central Government cancelling the lease of the petitioner and also for a writ in the nature of mandamus against the respondent commanding them not to interfere with the possession of the petitioner over the leasehold areas. 3. It appears that the petitioner bad applied to the High Court of Punjab on the 5th December, 1957, for grant of a writ against the respondent, Union of India, under Article 226 of the Constitution. The application of the petitioner was dismissed by the Punjab High Court on the 6th December, 1957. On the same date the Punjab High Court refused leave to the petitioner to appeal to the Supreme Court against the said order of dismissal. Thereafter the petitioner moved the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal against the order of the High Court of Punjab. But on the 14th January, 1958, the petitioner filed an affidavit in this Court stating that the special leave application before the Supreme Court had been withdrawn. On the 7th February, 1958, the petitioner made an application that all the documents and correspondence in possession of the respondents should be disclosed to the Court and the petitioner should be given an opportunity to inspect all the documents so produced. On the 7th February, 1958, the petitioner made an application that all the documents and correspondence in possession of the respondents should be disclosed to the Court and the petitioner should be given an opportunity to inspect all the documents so produced. On the 4th July, 1958, respondents Nos. 1 to 5 swore an affidavit containing annexures of the correspondence between the State Government and Union Government relating to the cancellation of the lease. The documents are annexures A to E to the affidavit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 5, dated the 14th July, 1958. It appears from annexure B to this affidavit that the petitioner and Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited had applied for grant of mining lease of quartzite in Pirpahari and Ashanagar hills on the 14th June, 1955, and the 30th May, 1955, respectively, through the Collector of Patna. The State Government, however, preferred to grant the lease to the petitioner on the ground mat the petitioner had a prior claim in the light of the provisions of Sec.10 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The application of the Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited, was prior in point of time to that of the petitioner but the application of Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited was rejected by the State Government. The Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited took the matter in review to the Union Government under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The Union Government took the view that the mandatory provisions of Rule 67 of the Mineral Concession Rules had been violated by the State Government and no lease should have been granted of the mining area to the petitioner without throwing open the area for re-grant under Rule 67 and without notifying in the official gazette under Rule 67 the date from which the area should be treated as available for re-grant. The Central Government accordingly made the following order on the 1st October, 1957 : -- "I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter No. L. R. Mining-3041/57-5380R. The Central Government accordingly made the following order on the 1st October, 1957 : -- "I am directed to refer to the correspondence ending with your letter No. L. R. Mining-3041/57-5380R. dated the 17th July, 1957 on the above subject, and to say that the Central Government in exercise of their revisional powers under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 , and of all other powers enabling in that behalf hereby cancel the orders passed by the State Government in their letter No. L. R. Mining-3083/55-6868R, dated the 23rd September, 1955, granting a mining lease to M/s. Kumardhubi Firaclay and Silica Works Ltd. and direct the State Government to follow the provisions of Rule 67 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 . A copy of the orders passed by the State Government in the matter in pursuance of this decision may kindly be sent to this Ministry at the earliest. Yours faithfully, Sd. B. N. Raman. Under Secretary to Government of India." 4. On behalf of respondent No. 6, the Union Government, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned Government Advocate to the maintainability of the application. It was submitted by the learned Government Advocate that the petitioner was asking, in substance, for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Union of India. It was contended that the High Court of Patna had no jurisdiction to issue such a writ against the Union of India, respondent No. 6, which has no location or residence within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court. It was submitted by the Government Advocate that the Union Government was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court and it was not open to the High Court to examine the validity of the order of the Union Government, dated the 1st August, 1957, or to grant any writ in the nature of certiorari or mandamus against the Union Government. In my opinion, the argument is correct and the objection of the Government Advocate must be upheld and no writ under Article 226 of the Constitution can be issued by the High Court against the Union Government in this case. This view is supported by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Election Commission, India V/s. Venkata Rao, 1953 SCR 1144 : (AIR 1953 SC E10). This view is supported by the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Election Commission, India V/s. Venkata Rao, 1953 SCR 1144 : (AIR 1953 SC E10). The respondent in that case had applied to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 for a writ restraining the Election Commission, a statutory authority, constituted by the President and having its office permanently located at New Delhi, from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership of the Assembly. The Madras High Court had issued a writ of prohibition restraining the Election Commission from enquiring into the alleged disqualification of the respondent. The Election Commission took the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court and contended that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 against it. In dealing with this question Patanjali Sastri C. J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, stated as follows: "But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, that as to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subjected to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be within those territories, which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories." The learned Chief Justice also traced the origin and development of prerogative writs in English Law and observed as follows; "Such limitation is indeed a logical consequence of the origin and development of the power to issue prerogative writs as a special remedy in England. Such power formed no part of the original or the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Kings Bench. As pointed out by Prof. Holdsworth (History of English Law Vol. Such power formed no part of the original or the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Kings Bench. As pointed out by Prof. Holdsworth (History of English Law Vol. I. P. 212 et seq.) these writs had their origin in the exercise of the Kings prerogative power of superintendence over the due observance of the law by his officials and tribunals, and were issued by the Court of Kings Bench -- hebeas corpus, that the King may know whether his subjects were lawfully imprisoned or not; certiorari, that he may know whether any proceedings commenced against them are conformable to the law: mandamus, to ensure that his officials did such acts as they were bound to do under the law, and prohibition, to oblige the inferior tribunals in his realm to function within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. See also the introductory remarks in the judgment in Ryots of Garabandho V/s. Zamindar of Parla-kimedi, 70 Ind App 129 at p. 140: (AIR 1943 PC 164 at p. 166). These writs were thus specifically directed to the persons or authorities against whom redress was sought and were made returnable in the court issuing them and in case of disobedience, were enforceable by attachment for contempt. These characteristics of the special form of remedy rendered it necessary for its effective use that the persons or authorities to whom the court was asked to issue these writs should be within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. We are unable to agree with the learned Judge below that if a tribunal or authority permanently located and normally carrying on its activities elsewhere exercises jurisdiction within those territorial limits so as to affect the rights of parties therein, such tribunal or authority must be regarded as "functioning1 within the territorial limits of the High Court and being therefore amenable to its jurisdiction under Article 226." It was, therefore, held by the Supreme Court in that case that the mere functioning of the tribunal or authority permanently located elsewhere within the territorial limits of the High Court was not sufficient to invest the High Court with jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a writ. Nor is the accrual of the cause of action within the territorial limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court sufficient for investing the High Court with jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a writ. Nor is the accrual of the cause of action within the territorial limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court sufficient for investing the High Court with jurisdiction under Article 226 to issue a writ. It was necessary that the person or authority should be a resident within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and that is the condition precedent to the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ against such a person or authority under Article 226. 5. This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in another case, K.S. Rashid and Son V/s. Income-tax Investigation Commission, 1954 SCR 738 ( AIR 1954 SC 207 ). In that case the assessees who were within the State of Uttar Pradesh and whose original assessments were made by the Income-tax authorities of that State had made applications in the Punjab High Court for the issue of writs under Article 226 to the Income-tax Investigation Commission permanently located in Delhi which had investigated their cases under Sec. 5 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act of 1947. The Punjab High Court held that they had no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the assessees belonged to the State of Uttar Pradesh that the assessment was to be made by the Income-tax Commissioner of that State and that the mere fact that the location of the Investigation Commission was in Delhi did not confer jurisdiction upon the Punjab High Court to issue writs under Article 226. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Punjab High Court, and the Supreme Court reiterated the principle of law laid down in 1953 SCR 1144 : ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ), and after distinguishing the decision in 70 Ind App 129: (AIR 1943 PC 164), held that the Punjab High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 to the Investigation Commission which was located in Delhi, in spite of the fact that the assessees were residents within the State of Uttar Pradesh and their original assessments had been made by the income-tax authorities of the Uttar Pradesh. In view of the principle laid down by these authorities my concluded portion is that the High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution against the Union of India, respondent No. 6, in the circumstances of this case. 6. But the argument was presented on behalf of the petitioner that the High Court could issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution restraining respondents Nos. 1 to 5 from interfering with the possession of the petitioner and that respondents Nos. 1 to 5 are the agents of respondent No. 6 and they could, therefore, be prohibited by the High Court by grant of a writ in the nature of mandamus from carrying out the impugned order of the Union Government, who is respondent No. 6. I do not accept this argument as right. The reason is that a writ to be issued to respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in this case would be really tantamount to a writ quashing the order of respondent No. 6 dated 1-8-1957. To put it differently, it would be circumventing the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in 1953 SCR 1144 : ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ), and 1954 SCR 738 : ( AIR 1954 SC 207 ) with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the High Court cannot issue a writ against the Union Government under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot achieve that object indirectly by the issue of a writ against respondents Nos. 1 to 5 commanding them not to carry out the order of the Union Government. You cannot do that indirectly which you are prohibited from doing directly, and the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in 1953 SCR 1144 : ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) and 1954 SCR 738 : ( AIR 1954 SC 207 ), cannot be circumvented in the manner asked for by the petitioner. You cannot do that indirectly which you are prohibited from doing directly, and the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in 1953 SCR 1144 : ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) and 1954 SCR 738 : ( AIR 1954 SC 207 ), cannot be circumvented in the manner asked for by the petitioner. This view is supported by the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Azmat Ullah V/s. The Custodian of Evacuee Property, U. P., Lucknow (S) AIR 1955 All 435, the decision of the Nagpur High Court in Burhanpur National Textile Workers Union V/s. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 148, and the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Surajmal Arjundas V/s. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1958 Madh Pra 103. I would also refer in this connection to a decision of the Supreme Court in Janardhan Reddy V/s. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 , in which the petitioners had been convicted of certain offences, including murder, and sentenced to death by a special Tribunal constituted under the Special Tribunals Regulation. The convictions and sentences were subsequently confirmed by the Hyderabad High Court, and after the Constitution came into force the petitioners filed applications under Order 32 in the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of their convictions. The argument on their behalf was that their detention was illegal from day to day as it was based on an order made without jurisdiction and that that order, even if it could not be quashed, could be ignored as a nullity. The Supreme Court refused to grant the writs and one of the grounds on which it did so was that the judgment of the High Court affirming the convictions of the petitioners having acquired finality before the coming into force of the Constitution on 26-1-1950, the question of the validity of the convictions could not thereafter be challenged. At p. 225 of the report Fazli Ali J., said in the course of the judgment- "Can then a new law or a change in the old law entitle us to reopen a transaction which has become closed and final? At p. 225 of the report Fazli Ali J., said in the course of the judgment- "Can then a new law or a change in the old law entitle us to reopen a transaction which has become closed and final? It is common ground that the provisions of the Constitution which are invoked here were not intended to operate retrospectively, and therefore something which was legally good on 25-1-1950, cannot be held to have become bad on 26-1-1950. If we had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the judgment of the Hyderabad High Court, can we now reinvestigate the cases and pass orders which cannot be passed without virtually setting aside the judgments of the High Court which have become final? Can we, in other words, do indirectly what we refused to a directly? It is argued that we are asked not to reopen a past transaction but to deal with the present detention of the petitioners, i.e., their detention at this moment. But, how can we hold the present detention to be invalid, unless we reopen what could not be reopened prior to 26-1-1950? This is, in our opinion, one of the greatest difficulties which the petitioners have to face, and it rests not merely on technical grounds but on sound legal principles which have always been, and should be respected." 7. In support of his argument learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar V/s. M. Venkitachalam Potti, 1955-2 SCR 1196: ((S) AIR 1956 SC 246 ), and made the submission that a writ could be issued by the High Court against respondents Nos. 1 to 5 who were acting as agents of respondent No. 6 in this case. I do not accept this argument, because the ratio of the decision in 1955-2 SCR 1196: ((S) AIR 1956 SC 246 ) has no application to the present case where the material facts are different. 1 to 5 who were acting as agents of respondent No. 6 in this case. I do not accept this argument, because the ratio of the decision in 1955-2 SCR 1196: ((S) AIR 1956 SC 246 ) has no application to the present case where the material facts are different. In 1955-2 SCR 1196: ((S) AIR 1956 SC 246 ), it was held by the Supreme Court that the authorised official under Sec. 6 of the Travancore Act XIV of 1124 had considerable powers independently conferred upon him for the conduct of the investigation and even though he could be called a mere arm of the Commission or an authorised agent of the Commission, he had independent functions to discharge and was not merely a mouth-piece of the Commission or a conduit-pipe transmitting the orders and directions of the Commission. It was, therefore, held that the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ against respondent No. 1, namely, the authorised official, who was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court if he happened to do anything which was not authorised by law or which violated the fundamental right of the petitioner. In the present case the material facts are different. The order granting a lease of the mineral areas to the petitioner by the State Government is in the nature of a quasi judicial order, and the order passed by the Union Government upon review under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules is also a quasi judicial order and it is manifest that there is a merger of the order of the State Government in the order of the Union Government which is a superior authority and which is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. It is necessary in this context to refer to Rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules which is in the following terms: "57. It is necessary in this context to refer to Rule 57 of the Mineral Concession Rules which is in the following terms: "57. Application for Review-- (1) Where a State Government passes as under- (i) refusing to grant a certificate of approval, prospecting license or mining lease; (ii) refusing to renew a certificate of approval, prospecting license or mining lease; (iii) cancelling a prospecting license or mining lease; (iv) refusing to permit transfer of a prospecting license or any right, title or interest therein under Clause (iv) of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 23 or a mining lease or any right, title or interest therein under Rule 37; it shall communicate in writing the reasons for such order to the person against whom the order is passed and any person aggrieved by such order may, within two months of the date of receipt of such order, apply to the Central Government for reviewing the same. (2) Where a State Government has failed to dispose of an application for the grant or renewal of a certificate of approval or prospecting license or a mining lease within the period prescribed therefor in these Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose of these rules, be deemed to be a refusal to grant or renew such certificate, license or lease, as the case may be, and any person aggrieved by such failure may, within two months of the expiry of the period aforesaid, apply to the Central Government for reviewing the case. (3) An application for review under this rule may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed under this rule, if the applicant satisfies the Central Government that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period." Rule 59 is important and must also be reproduced; "59. Review-- Upon receipt of such application, the Central Government may, if it thinks fit, call for the relevant records and other information from the State Government, and after considering any explanation that may be offered by the State Government cancel or revise the order of the State Government or pass such order as the Central Government may deem just and proper." Rule 60 of the Mineral Concession Rules is in the following terms: "60. Finality of order-- The order of the Central Government under Rule 59 and subject only to such order, any order of a State Government under these rules, shall be final". I am of opinion that an order of the State Government refusing to grant a certificate of approval, prospecting license or mining lease under Chapters II, III and IV of the Mineral Concession Rules is an order of quasi judicial nature, and similarly an order of review of the Union Government under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules is an order of quasi judicial nature, and it follows, therefore, that in the present case the order of the State Government granting a lease in favour of the petitioner must Be deemed to have merged in the order of the Central Government made under Rule 59 of the Mineral Concession Rules. If this is the correct position, the case comes within the principle laid down by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in (S) AIR 1955 All 435, the Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in AIR 1958 Madh Pra 103 and the Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in (S) AIR 1955 Nag 148. These decisions were expressly approved by the Supreme Court in its judgment in 1955-2 SCR 1196: ((S) AIR 1956 SC 246 ), and it was pointed out that where the order passed by the authority within the jurisdiction of the High Court had merged in the order of the superior authority which was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court, a writ cannot be granted by the High Court against the inferior authority which is within its territorial jurisdiction and such a writ would be infructuous because no writ could be issued to quash the order outside the authority of the High Court concerned. At p. 1213 (of SCR): (at p. 255 of AIR) of the report Bhagwati J., states as follows: "Our attention was drawn by the learned Attorney-General in this connection to three recent decisions of the High Courts of Allahabad, Nagpur and Pensu, which according to him supported his contention, viz., (S) AIR 1955 All 435 (FB); (S) AIR 1955 Nag 148 and Joginder Singh Waryam Singh V/s. Director, Rural Rehabilitation, Pepsu. AIR 1955 Pepsu 91. AIR 1955 Pepsu 91. These decisions, however, are clearly not in point for, in each of them, the order passed by the authority within the territories and accordingly within the jurisdiction of the High Court concerned had merged in the order of the superior authority which was located outside the territories and was therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of that High Court. In that situation, a writ against the inferior authority within the territories could be of no avail to the petitioner concerned and could give him no relief for the order of the superior authority outside the territories would remain outstanding and operative against him. As, therefore, no writ could be issued against that outside authority and as the orders against the authority within the territories would, in view of the orders of the superior authority, have been infructuous, the High Court concerned had, of necessity, to dismiss the petition. Such, however, was not the position in the present petition before the High Court of Travancore-Cochin." 8. For the reasons expressed by me I hold that the preliminary objection put forward on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 6 must prevail. I would accordingly dismiss the application with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 200/-. R.K.Choudhary, J. 9 I agree.