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1958 DIGILAW 140 (MP)

Hemendar Rai Dave v. Municipal Committee, Champa

1958-05-31

R.D.SHUKLA

body1958
ORDER R.S. Shukla The applicant is an employee of the Firm Mulji Sicca & Co. and lives in a part of a building which belongs to the Company. The Municipal Committee, Champa, has already assessed the prescribed maximum Haisiyat-tax of Rs. 240 on Mulji Sicca & Co. A further sum of Rs. 10 has now been assessed on the applicant as Haisiyat-tax under section 66 (1) of the C. P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter called the Act). The question that has been raised for determination is whether the applicant is also liable to Haisiyat-tax, and whether the fact that the owner of the building, Mulji Sicca & Co., has already been assessed to the maximum Haisiyat-tax, has any bearing on the present issue. The contention of the applicant is that once the Haisiyat-tax has been assessed on the owner of the house no further Haisiyat-tax can be imposed on other occupiers of the same building. It was argued that the Haisiyat or the circumstances of the applicant had merged into the Haisiyat of the Company in which he was employed and who was the real owner and occupier of the building in question. To allow the tax in question would confer the advantage of double taxation on the Committee. I am afraid, the contention of the applicant is unsupportable by the law on the subject. The Haisiyat-tax is defined in the Act as follows: 66 (1) (n). A tax payable by the occupiers of buildings or lands within the limits of the municipality, according to their circumstances and property within those limits. The term "occupier" is also defined in section 3 (j) as below: 3 (i). "Occupier" means any person in actual possession of any land or building, and includes an owner in actual possession, and a tenant or licensee, whether such tenant or licensee is liable to pay rent or not. (underlining mine.) It would be seen that the real test of occupation is the actual possession by the licensee etc. of the land or building, as the case may be. This definition would, therefore, exclude from the ambit of taxation such persons as may come to reside temporarily with an occupier of a building. They may occupy the land or the building as a guest or by way of permissive use but they cannot be said to be in actual possession of the land or the building. This definition would, therefore, exclude from the ambit of taxation such persons as may come to reside temporarily with an occupier of a building. They may occupy the land or the building as a guest or by way of permissive use but they cannot be said to be in actual possession of the land or the building. It is clear from the facts of the present case that the applicant is a paid servant of Mulji Sicca & Co. and has been allowed to occupy a part of the building exclusively for his own use without payment of rent. He is, therefore, a tenant or a licensee of Mulji Sicca & Co., and if his circumstances and property within the municipality make him liable to pay Haisiyat-tax, he cannot escape the same on the ground that he is sharing the occupation of the building with Mulji Sicca & Co. The amount of Rs. 240 which has been assessed on the owner is not the house-tax of the building but a tax in personam, related to his individual circumstances and property. If it were a house-tax, the argument of the applicant would be understandable as the same house may not, perhaps, be liable for taxation twice. The Haisiyat-tax is a quite different matter; its incidence has nothing to do with the gross or rental value of the house which factors are relevant only in assessing the house-tax. The learned counsel, therefore, seems to be in error when he thinks that since the maximum Haisiyat-tax of Rs. 240 has already been assessed and paid, no further Haisiyat-tax can be levied on the applicant. This 'maximum' payment cannot operate as a bar against the realization of Haisiyat-tax from a person who has his independent sources of income and is occupying a part of the building exclusively for his own use. I, therefore, see no force in the contention raised before me. The view taken by the lower Court is correct. The application is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.