JUDGMENT 1. This Rule is directed against an appellate order for possession passed against the thika tenant. The petitioner and one Bhuban Chandra Porel, father of opposite party No. 2, were thika tenants under one Chancharkeshi Dasi, now deceased, in respect of about 6 cottahs of lands, bearing No. 22/1, Kaibarta Para Lane within, Police Station Malipanchghora, District Howrah. 2. By a notice to quit the said Chancharkeshi Dasi terminated the tenancy of the petitioner and the said Bhuban Chandra Porel with the expiry of the month of Chaitra, 1358 B. S. On the failure of the said tenants to quit, in terms of the notice, the said Chancharkeshi Dasi started proceedings under section 5 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act for ejectment of the tenants. The case made by the then landlord Chancharkeshi Dasi was that the tenants were defaulters and that she required the land for personal requirement of herself and of persons living with her in her family. On the evidence adduced on behalf of the landlord, the Controller came to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord for her own occupation and occupation of her daughter and grandchildren was established. In that view of the matter, the Controller allowed the claim for eviction of the tenants. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the appellate authority below. 3. During the pendency of the case, Chancharkeshi Dasi died on September 8, 1955, and her daughter Hari Priya Dasi. (Opposite Party No. 1) was substituted in her place, by an order, dated November 22, 1955. On February 25, 1956, the date fixed for hearing of the appeal, the present petitioner filed an application for amendment of the memorandum of appeal by incorporation of additional grounds to the effect following: (i) For that with the death of Chancharkeshi the requirement for her own occupation ceased and the original suit abated. (ii) For that the requirement of the respondent (meaning Chancharkeshi's daughter Hari Priya) also ceased due to the fact that Chancharkeshi got sufficient land in her khas possession after evicting one Manmatha Nath Porel during the pendency of the appeal. 4. On the aforesaid application the learned Additional Subordinate Judge passed the following order: "25th February, 1956. The appellant files a verified petition praying for amendment of the memorandum of appeal. The other side has objection to the said prayer. 4. On the aforesaid application the learned Additional Subordinate Judge passed the following order: "25th February, 1956. The appellant files a verified petition praying for amendment of the memorandum of appeal. The other side has objection to the said prayer. Heard argument for both sides in full. To 29th February, 1956 for delivery of judgment. Let the petition for amendment by the appellant be made part of the memorandum of appeal. These grounds will be considered and discussed in the body of the judgment. " In dealing with the new grounds, the appellate authority observed as follows : (a) "it is doubtful whether the death of Chancharkeshi in the appellate stage will make any change in the situation. Moreover, the original application is wide enough to include the plea of requirement of both Chancharkeshi and her daughter and daughter's sons living with her. That daughter has now been the owner of the premises by inheritance and the requirement has now been her requirement which was already pleaded in the original application itself. (b) As regards the other point relating to the eviction of one Monmatha Porel the position is not yet clear. It is not known from how much land he has been evicted or whether the space available to the landlord by such eviction will be enough for the construction of a new residential house on that tend. It is admitted that the land occupied by Monmatha Porel is to the contiguous south of the suit premises. The fact that the landlord has taken steps to evict that tenant rather goes to prove her anxiety to secure more land for the purpose of building a commodious house on the suit promises probably along with that land. This fact only goes to support the element of need and to support the further fact that the landlord is taking steps towards fulfillment of that need. " 5. Mr. Salil Kumar Dutt, learned advocate for the petitioner urged before me that the new ground urged before the appellate authority below had not been properly considered. He invited my attention to the provision of section 27 (4) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and argued that the court of appeal functioning as a court of special jurisdiction was invested with power to take further evidence or to make personal enquiry, if necessary, in the circumstances of the case. He invited my attention to the provision of section 27 (4) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and argued that the court of appeal functioning as a court of special jurisdiction was invested with power to take further evidence or to make personal enquiry, if necessary, in the circumstances of the case. That necessity, he argued, was apparent on the face of the judgment because the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge himself found it difficult to pronounce his views on the question whether the land, possession whereof had been obtained from Manmatha Porel, was sufficiently large for construction of a house according to the requirement of the landlord opposite party. He argued further that the requirement for possession was that of Chancharkeshi Dasi, now deceased, and with her death the retirement came to an end. In support of the last contention. Mr. Dutt relied on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in (1) (1948),2 Dominion Law Reporter, 436 (Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim v. Rahim Khan and four others ). 6. Mr. Apurbadhan Mukherjee, learned advocate for the opposite party argued that there was no substance in the grievance made by Mr. Dutt, became if the petitioner wanted to bring new facts or changed circumstances to the notice of the appellate authority, he should have made a prayer for leading evidence on the point and should not have been content with only amending the memorandum of appeal. He argued further that the necessity for taking evidence or making personal enquiry by the appellate authority would arise if on perusing the records of the Controller, the appellate authority thought it necessary so to do and not otherwise. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that on the findings arrived at by the Controller, there was no necessity for taking further evidence or making further enquiry in the matter. Having heard the learned advocates for both the parties, I am of opinion, that there has been some confusion made in deciding the appeal. Hearing of an appeal under the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act is in the nature of re-hearing and that is why power has been given to the court of appeal, functioning as a court of special jurisdiction, to take further evidence or to make personal enquiries, if necessary. The authority to hear appeal is, therefore, required to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. The authority to hear appeal is, therefore, required to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice requires the appellate authority is bound to consider any change either in fact or in law which supervened since the judgment was entered. In the above view, I am fortified with the observation of Kapur, J. in the judgment of Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, (2) reported in 1958 S. C. A. 412, which is to the following effect: "the hearing of the appeal is under the processual law of this country in the nature of re-hearing and therefore in moulding the relief to be granted in an appeal the appellate court is entitled to take into account even facts and events that have come into existence since the decree appealed from was passed. " Similar view was also expressed in the case of Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul and others v, Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri and others,, (3) 1940 F. C. R. 84. 7. The death of Chancharkeshi and the recovery of possession of an adjoining piece of land from another tenant are important facts in connection with the instant case. Whether those facts brought about any change in the requirement of the landlord was worthy of consideration. In coming to its conclusion about the requirement of a landlord under section 3 (iv) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, a court must take a broad common sense view of the matter and come to its conclusions giving such weight as it thinks right to the various factors in the situation. Some factors may have little or no weight, others may be decisive, but it is quite wrong for a court to exclude from its consideration matters which it ought to have taken into account. 8. In this particular case, the appellate authority took into account the death of Chancharkeshi and, in my opinion, came to the correct conclusion, namely, that the death of Chancharkeshi did not minimise the requirement of her daughter, the present landlord, who was substituted in place of Chancharkeshi. As observed by the learned Subordinate Judge the original application was wide enough to include the plea of requirement of both Chancharkeshi and her daughter and her daughter's sons living with her. Therefore, the present landlord has the same requirement for which the proceedings were started and is entitled to proceed with the same. As observed by the learned Subordinate Judge the original application was wide enough to include the plea of requirement of both Chancharkeshi and her daughter and her daughter's sons living with her. Therefore, the present landlord has the same requirement for which the proceedings were started and is entitled to proceed with the same. The decision reported in (1) (1948), 2 Dominion Law Reporter, 436, (Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim v. Rahim Khan and jour others) is distinguishable because in that case the order for eviction of the tenant was intended to enure to the benefit of the owner petitioner who required the premises for her own occupation only. In those circumstances, it was held by Tyagarajan, J. that the decree in favour of the widow to reside in the house was purely personal and become unenforceable after her death. In the present case, the requirement was for Chancharkeshi as well as for her daughter and grandchildren and this makes all the difference. But, so far as the change in circumstance by reason of recovery of possession of a piece of adjoining land is concerned, the matter has not been properly considered. The petitioner was ill-advised in remaining satisfied after only amending the memorandum of appeal. The new circumstance, in respect of which a ground was taken was required to be established by evidence. It was, therefore, necessary to adduce further evidence before the Appellate authority to show that the recovery of the aforesaid piece of land from Manmatha Porel satisfied, if at all, the requirement of the present landlord. The tenant petitioner, however, did not lead any such evidence. At the same time it was wrong on the part of the Appellate authority below merely to amend the memorandum of appeal and forthwith to decide and take the allegation into consideration without any evidence for and against such allegation. The result of this sort of hastiness is apparent on the face of the judgment, inasmuch as the learned Subordinate Judge could not decide whether the space available to the landlord was sufficient for construction of a new residential house for the landlord. I am of opinion, therefore that the appeal has not been properly decided. 9. The result of this sort of hastiness is apparent on the face of the judgment, inasmuch as the learned Subordinate Judge could not decide whether the space available to the landlord was sufficient for construction of a new residential house for the landlord. I am of opinion, therefore that the appeal has not been properly decided. 9. I, therefore, set aside the judgment of the appellate authority below and remand the case back to that authority below with direction to it to exercise its powers under section 27 (4) of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act and to take such further evidence or to make such personal enquiry, as may be necessary, in considering the second additional ground, namely, that the requirement of the present landlord was satisfied with the other plot of land, the possession of which was recovered by her during the pendency of the appeal. Such further evidence, if taken, and the result of personal enquiry, if any, shall be considered by the learned Subordinate Judge along with the other evidence on record. After considering the matter in the manner indicated, the learned Subordinate Judge shall come to his own conclusions. I make it perfectly clear that I have not pronounced any opinion on the merits of the new ground raised by the petitioner. A landlord is, however, not compelled to build on the first plot of land available to him, provided he has good reason not to do so. This Rule is accordingly made absolute and the matter is remanded to the court below for hearing in the light of my observations herein contained. I make no order as to costs in this Rule.