Judgment :- 1. The only question in this civil revision petition filed by the 1st defendant is whether the court below was wrong in having refused stay under the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act I of 1957. 2. The suit was laid as for redemption of a possessory panayam deed executed by the 2nd plaintiff in favour of the 1st defendant and dated 2-4-1944 corresponding to 20-3-1119. It was in renewal of a prior deed dated 10-5-1918 as between the families of the parties and of the same type but limited to some only of the items and for portion alone of the consideration. Under the provisions of his deed, the 1st defendant was to adjust the interest due to him on the consideration under the deed and also pay sirkar tax from out of pattom of 240 paras and pay the balance of 106 paras of paddy as annual purappad to the 2nd plaintiff. There was also a provision for redemption at the end of the term of six years reserved and similarly for recovery of the consideration by sale of the property. The court below held that the document evidenced a usufructuary mortgage rather than a kanom and so refused stay. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner says that the court below has failed to take into account the amended definition of'Kanom' in the Malabar Tenancy Act governing the parties and missed the point in consequence. 3. Now a 'holding', with reference to which the Stay of Eviction Proceedings is provided for, is defined in S.2 (1) of the Act as follows: "S. 2 (1)1 'holding' means any immovable property held under a single transaction by which a leasehold right in the property is created and possession of the property is transferred by one person in favour of another and includes Kanapattom." Provided that in relation to the case of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 and the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 'holding' shall have the meaning respectively assigned to it in those Acts. S.3 (14) of the Malabar Tenancy Act 1929 (Madras Act 14 of 1930) defines kanom as follows: "'Kanom' means the transfer for consideration in money or in kind or in both by the landlord of an interest in specific immovable property to another (called the 'kanomdar') for the latter's enjoyment, the incidents of which transfer include - (a) a right in the transferee to hold the said property liable for the consideration paid by him or due to him which consideration is called 'Kanartham'. (b) the liability of the transferor to pay to the transferee interest on the kanartham, and (c) the payment of 'michavaram'by the transferee" Section 22 (1) says: "Notwithstanding anything in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, or in any other law for the time being in force, any person interested in any land may plead, adduce evidence, and prove that a transaction entered into on or after the 1st January 1916 and purporting to be a mortgage of that land is not in fact a mortgage, but a transaction by way of kanom, kanom-kuzhikanam, kuzhikanam, verumpattom or other lease, under which the transferee is entitled to fixity of tenure in accordance with the provisions of S.2". 4. It follows, therefore, that it is open to the 1st defendant to contend that notwithstanding the name 'possessory panayam' ascribed to it, the document of 2-4-1944 sued on amounts only to a kanom within the meaning of S.3 (14) of the Malabar Tenancy Act. It is not denied on the respondent plaintiff's, side that the definition in S.3 (14) is satisfied in the case. But the contention is raised that the customary incidents of a kanom as known in Malabar, viz. a minimum term of 12 years and a provision for periodical renewal at the end of every 12 years are wanting here and much more than this the provision for sale at the instance of the transferee not associated with a kanom, is found here. a minimum term of 12 years and a provision for periodical renewal at the end of every 12 years are wanting here and much more than this the provision for sale at the instance of the transferee not associated with a kanom, is found here. This argument however overlooks the deliberate omission by the Amending Act 33 of 1951 of the clauses (4) and (5) to S.3 (14) which followed the present clauses a, b and c and ran as follows: "(4) the right of the transferee to enjoy the said property for twelve years or any other period, and (5) the liability of the transferee to pay a renewal fee to the transferor, if the transferee is permitted to enjoy the said property for a further period after the termination of the original period." The fact therefore that the document here does not contain the incidents of renewal fee and the 12 years' period does not matter. Indeed no particular period need now be fixed in a kanom demise for no kanom tenant can be evicted excepting at intervals of 12 years and again the period fixed in the kanom deed is immaterial when eviction is sought on grounds other than grounds 4 to 6 of S.25. 5. Nor again is the reservation in the document of a right of sale in the transferee, of any consequence. It is only one incident in addition. If the document is a kanom otherwise, it will be still so with this further incident. As observed by Subba Rao, J., in Madhavi Amma v. Kalathi Sucheela, A. I. R, 1950 Mad. 612, "the fact that the document partakes the character of a mortgage and contains some terms other than those found in the definition of kanom does not make it anytheless a kanom. If it is kanom, the kanomdar certainly Comes under the definition of a tenant under the Malabar Tenancy Act." Learned counsel for the respondent referred to Kunhayadru v. Ali Kutty, A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 559, where the question was whether the petitioner was an'intermediary' besides being a usufructuary mortgagee. That decision contains no discussion of the present aspect. The next decision in Muhammad v. Akkiraman, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 248 referred to, was concerned with ascertaining whether the 'kaivasa panayam' in the case was a usufructuary mortgage or a lease. 559, where the question was whether the petitioner was an'intermediary' besides being a usufructuary mortgagee. That decision contains no discussion of the present aspect. The next decision in Muhammad v. Akkiraman, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 248 referred to, was concerned with ascertaining whether the 'kaivasa panayam' in the case was a usufructuary mortgage or a lease. This citation is not of much use for our purpose and similarly also the further one in Vasudevan Nambudiri v. Raman Nambudiri, A.I.R. 1940 Mad. 939. That case only decided that the surplus reserved as payable to the mortgagor under a possessory mortgage after appropriating part of the usufruct in lieu of interest due on the mortgage money is not'rent' in the proper sense of the term and does not fall within the mischief of S.15 of the Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act. 6. I therefore hold that the transaction in the case amounts to a'kanom' and the suit should have been stayed in consequence. Accordingly and in reversal of the order of the court below, I direct the stay of the suit. No order as to costs however. Allowed.