ORDER R.S. Shukla For misapplication of the loan granted under the Land Improvement Loans Act, the Collector ordered the recovery of the loan from the appellant in a lump sum. An application for review was also rejected by him. The order of the Collector passed in review has now been sought to be challenged before the Board in appeal. Under section 13 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code (hereinafter called the Code) the Collector is appointed to exercise powers and to discharge duties conferred and imposed upon him by the Code or by any other enactment for the time being in force. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Collector, while acting under an enactment other than the Code, is a revenue officer and any order passed by him is both appeal able and revisable as if it were passed under the Code itself. This issue is an old one and has been fully dealt with in the marginally noted decisions of the High Court and the Board of Revenue. In particular the decision of the Board in Mirza Rashid Baig v. State 1955 NLJ 496. is in all fours with the instant case. In that case it was held "that unless the process of recovery is actually started and the appeal is in respect of an order pertaining to the process of recovery, the mere fact that the Collector ordered recovery of loan in a lump sum would not be any order under the Land Revenue Act" (now Code). As in Mirza Rashid Baig's case, the stage of actual recovery under the Code has not been reached in the present case and no part of the impugned order can be said to have been passed under any of the provisions of the Code. As such, neither appeal nor revision would lie to the Board. 1. Amrit Nagoji v. Machanlal Wardhoa (XIII R. R. 31). Gopala v. Purshottam ( 1952 N.L.J. 135). Narayan Gopal v. Narayan Balkrishna ( 1953 N.L.J. 245 ). Mirza Rashid Baig v. State ( 1955 N. L. J. 496). It was, however, submitted that the "Explanation" under section 46 of the Code is an innovation which did not appear in section 39 of the old Land Revenue Act, which governed Mirza Rashid Begs case. Narayan Gopal v. Narayan Balkrishna ( 1953 N.L.J. 245 ). Mirza Rashid Baig v. State ( 1955 N. L. J. 496). It was, however, submitted that the "Explanation" under section 46 of the Code is an innovation which did not appear in section 39 of the old Land Revenue Act, which governed Mirza Rashid Begs case. This 'Explanation' reads as follows: Explanation:-For the purpose of this section all Revenue Officers shall be deemed subordinate to the Board. It was sought to be argued that although an appeal could not lie to the Board against the impugned order, a revision was permissible because all the revenue officers enumerated under section 10 of the Code have, by virtue of the 'Explanation', been made subordinate to the Board of Revenue. The use of the words "any order" in section 46 would, therefore, give the necessary revisional jurisdiction to the Board even if the impugned order were passed under the Land Improvement Loans Act. The learned counsel repeated all the arguments that were advanced in the cases noted above, and I see no need to reiterate the discussion. Suffice it to say, that the 'Explanation' has not, in any way, altered the position that existed under the provision of section 39, Land Revenue Act. Section 39 did not contain the word 'Board' as the Board had not been constituted when the Land Revenue Act of 1917 came to be passed. The word 'Board' appears now in section 46 of the Code and is followed by the enumeration of other authorities like Commissioner, Settlement Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner etc. It was, therefore, necessary to define the relationship, in-terse, between the Board and the various other authorities mentioned therein. The 'Explanation' does no more than to define this relationship by saying that the Board would be the superior-most authority and, for the purpose of revision, other authorities would be deemed subordinate to it. The 'Explanation' does not give any new or additional powers to the Board as the language of section 46 of the Code is otherwise identical with that of section 39 of the Land Revenue Act. The decisions of the High Court and the Board referred to above would, therefore, be as much applicable today as they were at the time of their pronouncement. The decisions of the High Court and the Board referred to above would, therefore, be as much applicable today as they were at the time of their pronouncement. As per decisions, just cited, the criterion to determine as to when a revenue officer acts qua revenue-officer, so as to make his order amenable to correction by the Board of Revenue in appeal or revision, seems to be to find out whether the impugned action can be given effect to otherwise than by resorting to some provision of the Land Revenue Act (now the Code). If the answer is in the negative the impugned action or order will attract the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue. The order directing a lump sum recovery of the loan in question not being based on any provision of the Code (or Land Revenue Act) and the legal position having not been changed there is no escape from the conclusion that no appeal or revision is entertain able in the present case. The appeal is, therefore, summarily dismissed as untenable. Appeal dismissed.