JUDGMENT M. Hidayatullah, C.J. 1. This appeal is by the plaintiff in a mortgage suit which has been partly decreed in his favour. By Exh. P. 3 dated 17 September 1950 the respondent Supyarsingh mortgaged a plot and a house situated in village Mahragaon, settlement No. 250 (Surajganj, Itarsi), tahsil and district Hoshangabad to the present appellant for Rs. 16,000/- . On foot of this mortgage, a preliminary decree has been passed excluding the occupancy land and foreclosing the superstructure giving to the decree-holder the option to recover the entire debt by sale of the superstructure and also by attachment and sale of the defendant's other property. No interest has been awarded. In other words, the learned Judge has passed a decree for foreclosure against the superstructure, has given the option to the mortgagee to sell the super structure and a right to recover the balance, if any, by a personal decree against the mortgagor. 2. The appeal filed by the mortgagor in which he had questioned the preliminary decree failed for want of prosecution and we have passed a separate order dismissing that appeal 3. In the present appeal, the mortgagee contends at the land which has been kept out of the decree could not be excluded. The learned Advocate General, who appeared for the mortgager, contends that the decree ought to have embraced the land on which the house stands. His contention is that in view of the definition of "land" in the C.P. Tenancy Act and the provisions of sections 25, 30 and 63-A ibit, the land has ceased to be agricultural land and the foreclosure decree could be passed against it notwithstanding the prohibition contained in Section 12 of the Tenancy Act. The learned Advocate-General contends that "land" is defined for the purposes of the Tenancy. Act as land which is let or occupied for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient thereto. He refers to the definition of "agriculture" and the preamble of the act and says that whenever land is diverted to non- agricultural purposes, it ceases to be land as defined in the C.P. Tenancy Act He refers to section 63-A of the Tenancy Apt and contends that in view of the diversion of land to non-agricultural purposes the rent of the holding has to be revised on the enhanced value and on the basis of the non-agricultural use to which it is put. From this he infers that such land ceases to be governed by section 12 of the Tenancy Act. 4. In our opinion, this submission is without substance. Land which is the subject-matter of the C.P. Tenancy Act is agricultural land. Once land has been so designated and is either occupancy or absolute occupancy, the nature of land does not change according to the use to which it is put. The tenure which fastens on such land continues even though the rent may be increased or decreased as the case may be. It is an erroneous assumption to think that tenants by their own action can render agricultural land into non-agricultural land. Indeed, the very sections to which the learned Advocate-General referred clearly show that the landlord can bring the land within agriculture by having the tenant ejected if he is guilty of diverting it to non-agricultural purposes. Where the landlord does not take this action, he may apply for enhancement of rent and the revenue officer can also suo motu enhance the rent after causing notice to be served upon the tenant. Even agricultural land so diverted can become agricultural laud again by being used for pure agricultural purposes and the enhanced rent can again be revised and reduced. The character of land, however, continues to be the same and does not alter according as land is used for one purpose or another. It is fallacious to assume that the tenant can by his action convert all agricultural land into something else. There was no doubt that this land was agricultural to start with. It was shown as Khudkasht in Exh. D-8 when it was leased out to the respondent. From that time it became occupancy land. It was described as occupancy in Exh. D-121. There is nothing to show that it changed its character in the hands of the mortgagor at any time even though it may have been put to non-agricultural use. The exemption of Section 12 of the Tenancy Act was therefore rightly applied to it and the land was excluded from the mortgage decree. 5. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the appellant therefore is unacceptable and the appeal must fail. 6. We, however, think that the preliminary decree has been wrongly drawn up. The exemption of Section 12 of the Tenancy Act was therefore rightly applied to it and the land was excluded from the mortgage decree. 5. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the appellant therefore is unacceptable and the appeal must fail. 6. We, however, think that the preliminary decree has been wrongly drawn up. There is no question of fore-closing the superstructure giving an option to the mortgagee to sell the house or its materials to realise his decree. In our opinion, the preliminary decree ought to have been only for sale of the superstructure. We therefore modify the decree by converting it into a decree for sale of the superstructure with a right to recover the balance of the mortgage amount, if any, by personal decree as already directed by the lower court. 7. The question of interest was not raised before us and that part of the appeal also fails. 8. We fix 24-10-1958 as the date fur redemption. If the mortgagor fails to redeem the mortgage before that date, the mortgagee shall be entitled to apply for a final decree. 9. With these modifications the appeal is dismissed There shall be no order as to costs since none appeared for the mortgagor before us. Appeal dismissed.