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1958 DIGILAW 149 (MAD)

K. A. Achuthan Nair v. V. M. Kuppa Sah

1958-04-28

RAJAGOPALAN

body1958
Judgment.- The only question for determination in this application to revise the order of the appellate Court in proceedings under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949) is whether section 5 of the Limitation Act can be invoked to condone the delay in the presentation of an appeal preferred under section 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949 after the expiry of the period of 15 days prescribed by that statutory provision. That question was answered in the negative by the lower Appellate Court, which followed the decision of Ramaswami Gounder, J., in Murugesan v. Hajee M.M.S. Hameed Maracayar1. The main endeavour of the learned counsel for the petitioner was to obtain a reference to a Division Bench to consider the decision of Ramaswami Goundar, J. The answer to the question I have set out above depends on the scope of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. That Act XXV of 1949 is a special or local law within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, and that section 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949 prescribed a period of limitation for the appeal permitted by that provision could not admit of any doubt. It was equally obvious that no period of limitation was prescribed by section 1 of the Limitation Act for such an appeal. In Mittoor Moideen Hajee,In re2, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Oldfield and Ramesam, JJ., observed: “Mr. Kurup.... urged that the delay should be excused by this Court. The difficulty is that section 5 of the Limitation Act under which the Court can excuse delay is not one of the provisions the application of which is extended by Act X of 1922 to proceedings under special or local law.” The learned Judges treated it as a self-evident proposition. There was no further discussion. It was the same principle that was reiterated in Chedda Lal v. Commanding Officer, Meerut Cantonment3. There was no further discussion. It was the same principle that was reiterated in Chedda Lal v. Commanding Officer, Meerut Cantonment3. The learned Judges pointed out: “The expression ‘the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply’ in the amended section 29 (Limitation Act) simply means that they are not to apply proprio vigore, that is, merely by virtue of the Limitation Act itself, and that if they are to apply, the grounds for supplying them must be found in the special or local Act itself.” The learned Judges pointed out that the special law they had to consider, the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, did not provide for the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned Judges relied on the observations of Rankin,C.J., in Neelratan Ganguli v. Emperor1 . There was a fuller discussion on the scope of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act in The Canara Bank Ltd. v. Warden Insurance Co., Ltd.2, where Chagla, C.J., and Gajendragadkar, J., held that section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to an appeal provided under section 8 (3) of the Bombay Land Requisition Act. I find myself in respectful agreement with the reasoning of Chagla, C.J., and with his conclusions even as Ramaswami Goundar, J., did in Murugesan v. Hajee M.M.S. Hameed Maracayar3 . The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to Venkata v. Duvvuru4, the principle laid down in which was followed by Ramaswami, J., in Coimbatore Municipality v. Narayanan5, that section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to applications for leave to prefer appeals against acquittals under section 417 (4), Criminal Procedure Code. These decisions were, however, rested mainly on the basis, that the Criminal Procedure Code was not a special or local law within the meaning of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. I am unable therefore to see any scope for extending the principle laid down in these cases to the appeals permitted by section 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949, which undoubtedly is a local or special law which prescribes its own period of limitation, and which failed to extend the application of section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals. No doubt Ramaswami Gounder, J., referred to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Venkataramayya v. Venkatasubbayya6, which was a case dealt with under Madras Act IV of 1938. No doubt Ramaswami Gounder, J., referred to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Venkataramayya v. Venkatasubbayya6, which was a case dealt with under Madras Act IV of 1938. The scope of that decision was examined in State v. C. N. Raman7 . As pointed out by the learned Judges, Act IV of 1938 itself did not prescribe any period of limitation. The statutory provision was that the order appealed against should be deemed to be an order passed under section 47, Criminal Procedure Code. That principle cannot be extended to an appeal preferred under section 12 (1) (b) of Act XXV of 1949. If I may say so with respect, it was a well-settled principle of law that was explained and applied in the The Canara Bank Ltd. v. Warden Insurance Co. Ltd.,8after an elaborate discussion, and I see no justification to refer the question at issue in this revision petition to a Division Bench. The view taken by the lower Appellate Court was correct. The petition is dismissed with costs. R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.