ORDER R.S. Shukla This order will govern appeals Nos. 15 to 29/VI-B-2 /56 and 9, 10, 12 and 14/VI-B-2/56. In all these appeals the appellant is the same person and the points for consideration are similar. An enquiry by revenue authorities disclosed that the appellant resorted to large scale forest-cutting, partly from Big Tree Forest, and partly from unoccupied areas lying in a number of villages in tahsil Dongargarh, district Drug, which then formed part of the merged territories of the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh. The Additional Deputy Commissioner, Drug, acting under section 218-A of the Land Revenue Act read with section 233 of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, by his order dated 23-8-56 imposed various amounts as fine for different areas totalling a sum of Rs. 3,500. The order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner has now been challenged in a number of appeals which were beard together. The main contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Additional Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order inasmuch as section 218-A is wholly inapplicable to the present cases. Section 218-A is applicable "to the forest growth on the lands vested in the State Government by virtue of the provisions contained in the M. P. A. P. R. Act." The forest growth standing on unoccupied land in the merged territories, according to the local Wajib-ul-arzs, was the property of the then States. In these cases it was the property of Khairagarh State. These forests vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh on 1-1-48 when the State of Khairagarh merged with the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh. As such, it cannot be said that the forest in dispute merged in the State of Madhya Pradesh 'as a result of the passing of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act.' In fact, they were already the property of the State before Khairagarh State merged in the Madhya Pradesh. According to the learned counsel, section 202, Land Revenue Act, would also not be applicable because the forest growth referred to in that section, has to be 'on the lands of any estate or mahal'. The terms 'estate' or 'mahal' have been defined under section 2 (3) and (8) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act as an area which is separately assessed to land revenue. The terms 'estate' or 'mahal' have been defined under section 2 (3) and (8) of the C. P. Land Revenue Act as an area which is separately assessed to land revenue. The unoccupied land or B.T.F. not being assessed to land revenue cannot constitute "lands in an estate or mahal". Thus section 202 will also have to be ruled out. After careful consideration of the lengthy arguments advanced by the learned counsel from both sides, I am of opinion that there is not much force in the appellant's contention. It is not necessary for me to deal at length with all that was stated before me. Suffice it to say that although it is true that section 218-A would not apply, the provisions of section 202 are very clear and there is no escape from the fact that the appellant is liable under the latter section. The learned counsel for the appellant seems to have taken a very limited meaning of the words "estate or mahal" in reading the provisions of section 202. A mahal is a unit for the purpose of assessment; it is not necessary that every inch of the land included in a mahal must bear an assessment. The use of the words "estate or mahal" under section 202 ibid seems to be intended only to locate the forest growth and does not necessarily mean that the forest growth must stand on assessed land before its cutting can be regulated by the rules framed under section 202. Forest growths do not bear identifiable names of their own and for the purpose of identification have to be indicated with reference to their existence in a particular mahal or estate. In my opinion interpretation of these words in the sense in which the learned counsel for the appellant attempted to do, would unreasonably restrict the scope of section 202. In fact rule 1 of the rules framed under section 202 confirms my view inasmuch as it clearly states that the said rules would not apply "to forest growths standing on the occupied area or trees planted on the village site". Thus what is exempt from the operation of section 202 is only the forest growth on occupied area and village sites and the rest of the forest growth is subject to the provisions of section 202 ibid. Thus what is exempt from the operation of section 202 is only the forest growth on occupied area and village sites and the rest of the forest growth is subject to the provisions of section 202 ibid. The appellant's learned counsel made a reference to the Land Tenure Order and the State Wajib-ul-arz, to show that the provisions of the Wajib-ul-arz of Khairagarh would still be applicable where the maximum penalty for the violation of Khairagarh State Wajib-ul-arz is Rs. 50 only. It appears to me that in advancing the view the provisions of M. P. Merged Territories Laws Act were lost sight of. According to this Act, the whole of the C. P. Land Revenue Act, 1917, was made applicable, as early as April 1950, to the Merged Territories, as is clear from the first Schedule (Part B) of the said Act. It is, therefore, obvious that the Additional Deputy Commissioner had jurisdiction to deal with the forest cutting in question in accordance with the provisions of section 202 of the Land Revenue Act, 1917. As already stated, although section 218-A is not applicable the appellant cannot escape punishment simply because a wrong section had been cited by the lower Court provided, of course, that by a change of the section no prejudice is caused to the offender. In the instant case, I see absolutely no reason to think that any prejudice is likely to be caused to the appellant. Looking to the evidence on record and the circumstances in which the cutting was done, I am satisfied that the findings of facts arrived at by the lower Court are well-founded. The learned counsel for the appellant did not disclose anything new to take a contrary view. The fine imposed can also not be called severe in view of the ruthless and indiscriminate cutting resorted to by the appellant. I, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. All the appeals are, therefore, dismissed accordingly. A copy of this order be placed on the record of each case. Appeal dismissed.