Judgment N.Untwalia, J. 1. This case raises an interesting point of law in regard to the interpretation of Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. The case came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court and was referred to a Division Bench. 2. The petitioner, Moti Lal, has been convicted under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500.00 or in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months. One Lakhan Lal, who is a close agnatic relation of the petitioner and lives in the same premises where the petitioner lives, was also convicted under the same section along with the petitioner. Both the convicts filed an appeal before the lower appellate court and their appeal was dismissed. Only Moti Lal has come up to this court in revision. 3. On the night between the 14th and 15th of July, 1955, there was a theft in the house of one Bhagwan Das (P. W. 1) in village Hasua, district Gaya. There was an alarm and the thieves were running away with valuables and articles from the house of Bhagwan Das but they could not be caught. Information was lodged at the police station Hasua at 8 a.m. on the 15th July. A list of properties stolen was also given along with the written information. A formal first information report was drawn up and investigation started. During the course of the investigation, the Sub-Inspector of Police got some information against Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal about their complicity in the crime. He made a requisition to the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, R. N. Singh (P. W. 2) to search the house which was jointly occupied by the said two persons. The Assistant Sub-Inspector went to the house the same day, that is, on 15-7-55 and in presence of the search witnesses he is said to have recovered from the roof of the southern verandah upstairs a gold tabiz and 12 Government Currency notes of Rs. 10.00 each. The tabiz was found wrapped up within the notes and kept concealed in the olti of the verandah which is in common use of both Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal. He also recovered 9 Government Currency notes of Rs. 10.00 each. The tabiz was found wrapped up within the notes and kept concealed in the olti of the verandah which is in common use of both Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal. He also recovered 9 Government Currency notes of Rs. 10.00 each from a tin dibba which was on a takha of a western room upstairs occupied by petitioner Moti Lal. He seized the recovered articles and prepared their search list in presence of the accused and the search witnesses, who attested the document. Thereafter, the prosecution case further is, the two accused were questioned and both of them are said to have given out that they had kept some utensils in a sota, (stream) which was close to their house. On getting such information from the accused, the Assistant Sub-Inspector went to that sota and both the accused are said to have pointed out the place. Thereafter the part which is ascribed to the petitioner Moti Lal is that he took out the utensils from the said sota in presence of the Assistant Sub-Inspector. The utensils were kept concealed in the sota and on their being taken out a search list (Ext. 4) was prepared in presence of both the accused and the search witnesses. After that, the two accused are said to have pointed out a well in their house as a place where some ornaments had been concealed, but, by that time, there was sufficient darkness and nobody could be found out to go into the well that night. The well was kept under guard by the police and on the following day, i.e. on 16-7-55, one Shree Charan Dusadh entered the well at the instance of the Sub-Inspector (P. W. 9) and brought out some ornaments. A search list was prepared about this recovery of the ornaments also. A test identification parade of the recovered articles was arranged and the articles were identified by P. W. 1, the informant. The two accused were put on trial and were convicted and sentenced under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The accused denied their connection with the theft in question and also denied possession of the stolen articles. A test identification parade of the recovered articles was arranged and the articles were identified by P. W. 1, the informant. The two accused were put on trial and were convicted and sentenced under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. The accused denied their connection with the theft in question and also denied possession of the stolen articles. It may be mentioned here that the articles which were identified in the test identification parade were the gold tabiz, the utensils and the silver ornaments, respectively recovered from the olti of the verandah, the sota and the well. The Government Currency notes were not identified as there was no special mark on them. 5. On appeal, the learned 2nd Additional Sessions judge or Gaya maintained the conviction of both the accused and the sentences imposed upon them. The finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is that there is absolutely no doubt about the theft committed in the house of the informant, Bhagwan Das. The evidence of identifica-tion of the stolen articles was also believed and it has been held that Bhagwan Das (P. W. 1) identified the gold tabiz (Ext. 1), 7 thalis, (Exts. XXIV to XXX), 4 katoras, (Exts. XXXI to XXXIV), 2 tashta-ris (Exts. XXXV and XXXVI) and silver hasulis (Exts. XXXVII and XXXVIII). The recovered and the identified articles were held to be in possession of the two accused like this. The tabiz was recovered from the olti of the verandah upstairs and the verandah was in joint use of both the accused. It was, therefore, held that the tabiz was in conscious possession of both the accused. The articles from the sota were recovered in consequence of the information given by both the accused and so they were held to be in possession of the same. The ornaments were also recovered from the well upon information given by the two accused and therefore they were also held to be in conscious possession of both the accused. 6. Mr. The ornaments were also recovered from the well upon information given by the two accused and therefore they were also held to be in conscious possession of both the accused. 6. Mr. K. B. N. Singh, who first started the argument on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the evidence of identification about the ornaments was only of Bhagwan Das (P.W. 1) who claimed to identify the ornaments as belonging to his wife and at the same time he said that his wife would not be able to identify these ornaments and therefore the evidence of identification ought to have been rejected. I may shortly dispose of this point here. Bhagwan Das surely was in a position to identify the ornaments and his evidence of identification has been believed by the Courts below. Whether his wife could identify them or not is not a matter of any substance an this revision. There is no illegality or impropriety pointed out in the finding of the Court of appeal below on this question. 7. The point which has been strenuously argued by Mr. K. B. N. Singh who was later followed by Mr. Nageshwar Prasad is that it has not been legally proved that any of the articles said to have been recovered from the possession of the petitioner was in his conscious possession. The point was developed like this. The gold tabiz was recovered from the verandah which was in common use of Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal and only on this material it could not be held that it was in conscious possession of Moti Lal also; it might be in possession of only Lakhan Lal. He might have kept the gold tabiz there. As respects the recovery from the sota, the evidence of the Assistant Sub-Inspector was that both Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal gave the information in consequence of which the discovery of the fact that the stolen utensils were kept concealed in the sota was made. This sort of evidence was attacked as being vague and indefinite and not specifying as to on whose in formation the discovery of the fact was made. In that view of the matter, the evidence was not admissible under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act against either of them. This sort of evidence was attacked as being vague and indefinite and not specifying as to on whose in formation the discovery of the fact was made. In that view of the matter, the evidence was not admissible under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act against either of them. The evidence of Assistant Sub-Inspector regarding the recovery from the well was that both the accused told him that the ornaments bad been kept concealed in the well. The Assistant Sub-Inspector did not depose that the accused persons or either of them told him that they or any of them had kept the ornaments in the well. The information to this extent, therefore, that the ornaments were kept in the well did not prove that they were so kept by the accused persons or either of them. In that view of the matter, it could not be held that the petitioner was in conscious possession of the ornaments recovered from the well. It was further argued that there is a lane intervening between the house of the accused and the well. 8. I shall first take up the fact of recovery of the utensils lying concealed in the sota. The evidence of P.W 2 which has been relied upon by the Courts below on this point is as follows : "Both, Motilal and Lakhan told me that they had kept the utensils in a sota and they both pointed out the place. Motilal took out the utensils from the sota in my presence and that of the two aforesaid search witnesses. He brought out seven thalis, two tashtaries and four katoras, which I seized." On this point the evidence of search witness, Damo-dar Prasad (P.W. 5), which evidence has also been relied upon by the Courts below is as follows : "Moti and Lakhan had told the A. S. I. that some articles would be available in a sota. Moti took the accused to the sota. I and Lakhan also went there. Moti brought out these seven thalis, four katoras and two tashtaries ..... from the sota." (Note -- "Accused" in the above quotation seems to be an accidental mistake for the words A. S. I.). In cross-examination this witness said -- "The A. S. I. had asked the Choukidar and some other to find out the utensils in the sota. When they failed, Motilal brought them out himself". 9. from the sota." (Note -- "Accused" in the above quotation seems to be an accidental mistake for the words A. S. I.). In cross-examination this witness said -- "The A. S. I. had asked the Choukidar and some other to find out the utensils in the sota. When they failed, Motilal brought them out himself". 9. Sec.27 of the Indian Evidence Act runs as follows -- "Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved." It is well established now that provisions of Sec.27 of the Evidence Act are by way of exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility of confessional statements of an accused in custody of a police officer as provided in Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. It is also well established that the section should be strictly construed and the prosecution is to bring the statements of the accused leading to the discovery strictly within the four corners of the 27th section. It is further beyond doubt that only so much of the evidence of the accused is admissible as leads to the discovery and not the past account or the past history (vide Pulukuri Kottaya V/s. Emperor, AIR 1947 PC 67, Rama Shidappa V/s. State, AIR 1952 Bom 299 , Pershadi V/s. State of Utter Pradesh, (S) AIR 1957 SC 211 , and an unreported decision of my learned brother, Sahai, J., given on the 3rd of August, 1954, in Pagla Majhi V/s. State, Criminal Appeals Nos. 244 and 318 of 1953. The point was not disputed by Mr. Nageshwar Prasad that the statement of the accused that he had kept a particular article in such and such place and/or that the articles were placed in such and such place was admissible under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. But what has been strenuously contended before us is that the prosecution evidence that both the accused Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal--stated that they had kept the utensils in the sota and pointed out the sota should be rejected as being vague and indefinite, it not being clear as to on whose statement--whether of Moti or of Lakhan the discovery was made. The evidence, therefore, ought to have been rejected against both. In any event, the conviction of the petitioner is bad on that account. Reliance was placed upon Gurubaru Praja V/s. The King, AIR 1949 Orissa 67. Durlav Namasudra V/s. Emperor, ILR 59 Cal 1040 : AIR 1932 Cal 297; In re Sheik Mahaboob, AIR 1942 Mad 532 , Emperor V/s. Shivputraya Baslingaya AIR 1930 Bom 244, Puttu V/s. Emperor, AIR 1945 Oudh 235 and Kudaon V/s. Emperor, AIR 1925 Nag 407. Reference was also made to Athappa Goundan V/s. Emperor, AIR 1937 Mad 618 (FB). Mr. K. P. Verma, learned Additional Standing Counsel, placed reliance upon Abdul Kader V/s. Emperor AIR 1946 Cal 452, and submitted that it may well be that a simultaneous statement by two or more accused leading to the discovery may be very rare but it could not be laid down as a matter of law that, if the evidence was that two or more accused made the same statement simultaneously before the police officer which led to the discovery of the fact in issue, the evidence of all should be rejected as being inadmissible. According to his submission, the evidence in this connection was that both the accused made that statement and that must mean that both of them made the statement simultaneously, and therefore it was admissible against both under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. Learned counsel also submitted that the evidence of P.W. 2 could be interpreted to indicate that Moti Lal gave the information first and so the evidence was surely admissible as against him. In any event, he having brought out the utensils from the sota, must be deemed to be in possession of them. 10. Having carefully considered the cases cited at the Bar as also some other cases on the point, which I shall be presently referring to and discussing, I have arrived at a somewhat different conclusion as to the meaning and interpretation of Sec.27 of the Evidence Act in regard to the joint statements or joint information of more than one accused. My view is that information received from more than one person accused of an offence, whether it amounts to a confession or not, may relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered and may be proved under Sec.27 of the Act. My view is that information received from more than one person accused of an offence, whether it amounts to a confession or not, may relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered and may be proved under Sec.27 of the Act. What is not desirable to admit is a vague and indefinite statement like saying -- two or more persons said this and said that. What should be insisted upon by the Courts is that the statements should be recorded as precisely as possible attributing the respective words to each accused, whether they made the statements simultaneously or immediately one after the other before the discovery of the fact was made. As a rule of prudence, vagueness in such statements of information leading to the discovery of a fact should be avoided. I shall illustrate my point. Suppose A.B.C. and D. are accused of murder of E. Let us further suppose that after murder all the four accused took the dead body of E and concealed it in a solitary place, say under a bush. It may well be that during the course of investigation, all the four accused made the statement before the investigating officer that all the four have taken part in concealing the dead body of E beneath a bush at such and such place. If the statements by all the four are made before the fact is discovered that the dead body was kept concealed under the bush, I fail to appreciate why the informations given by all the four should not be treated as relating distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, irrespective of the question whether all the four simultaneously spoke the same words of information or they spoke one after the other but before the discovery was made. The accused A makes the statement first that he and the other three accused had concealed the dead body beneath the bush. B also may say so. And so may C and D. It will be difficult to conceive as a probability that all the four would make the statement simultaneously. The accused A makes the statement first that he and the other three accused had concealed the dead body beneath the bush. B also may say so. And so may C and D. It will be difficult to conceive as a probability that all the four would make the statement simultaneously. From the practical point of view, it would be advisable for the investigating officer, when all the four start speaking, to note down their statements of information one after the other, and if their statements are very much similar and if all the four accused take upon themselves the responsibility of concealing the dead body beneath the bush, it does not stand to reason why the statement of one, who per chance happened to speak first before the investigating officer, should only be considered as the information leading to the discovery and should be made admissible as only against him and why the statements of the other three should be excluded as being inadmissible under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. Of course, the matter would be quite different if only one accused gives the information to the investigating officer as a result of which the discovery is made and thereafter the other three also say that they had also taken part in concealing the dead body. It would be clear in such a situation that the discovery of the fact of the dead body lying concealed beneath the bush would not be related to the statements of the other three accused made after the discovery of the fact. 11. I may first refer in this connection to Queen V/s. Ram Churn Chung, 24 Suth W. R. 36 (Cri) and Queen Empress V/s. Babu Lal, ILR 6 All 509 (FB). Jackson, J., observed as follows in 24 Suth WB 36 (Cr) : "It can hardly have been the intention of the Legislature that when a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from one of several persons charged with an offence, and when others give like information, that the fact should be treated as discovered from the information of them all. It should be deposed that a particular fact has been discovered from the information of A. B., and this will let in, under Sec.27, only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered." 12. It should be deposed that a particular fact has been discovered from the information of A. B., and this will let in, under Sec.27, only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered." 12. With utmost respect, I find myself to agree with the proposition laid down in this Weekly Reporter case. As stated above, I do not find any sufficient reason to hold that a fact cannot be said to be discovered in consequences of the information of more than one person accused of any offence. The information may be by one or by several persons but, if the information precedes the fact of discovery, the discovery must be attributed to the joint and several information by all and so much of the information as leads distinctly to the fact thereby discovered must be admitted in evidence under Sec.27 of the Act against all such persons who gave that information. 13. Straight J., pointed out in ILR 6 All 509: "It seems to me that the evidence of Haflzullah, the constable, who deposed to these so-called confessions, has been most carelessly taken by the Sessions Judge, and contrary to all recognised rules as to the mode in which the testimony of witnesses should be recorded. I have more than once pointed out that it is not a proper course, where two persons are being tried, to allow a witness to state they said this, or they said that, or the prisoner then said. It is certainly not at all likely that both the persons should speak at once, and it is the right of each of them to have the witness required to depose as nearly as possible to the exact words he individually used. And, I may add, where a statement is being detailed by a constable as having been made by an accused, in consequence of which he discovered a certain fact or certain facts, the strictest precision should be enjoined on the witness, so that there may be no room for mistake or misunderstanding." With respect I am in agreement with the rule of caution and prudence, if I may say so, laid down in the above Allahabad case by the learned Officiating Chief Justice. 14. I would now refer to the case of AIR 1930 Bom 244. 14. I would now refer to the case of AIR 1930 Bom 244. In this case what had happened was that the four accused were taken to certain field which did not belong to them where they individually and by turn pointed out the place by which some of the stolen articles were recovered. The evidence did not show what statements were made by which of the four accused in consequence of which the discovery of the stolen articles was made. In such a situation Mirza J. held (at page 246, column 2)-- "All that it amounts to is that those accused along with accused 2 pointed out places where the stolen articles were concealed. The only value that could be attached to the discovery of these articles would depend upon any relevant statements the accused may have made which led to the discovery. It is not shown from the evidence what statement each of the accused made which led to the discovery of the articles." The view of Mirza J., quoted above does not go against the view expressed by me. But Broom-field J., who was a party to the judgment, held as follows (at page 248, column 2)-- "When a fact is discovered in consequence of information given by one accused, and other accused persons also give the same, information, it is not legitimate to say that the fact is discovered within the meaning of Sec.27 from the information given by all of them;" The 24 Suth WR qase was followed by Broomfield J. Respectfully I differ from this view. 15 In the case of AIR 1932 Cal 297 what happened was this. From the evidence of the Sub-Inspector it was clear that the information which was said to have led to the discovery of the dead body had been given by the four accused at a time when they were not in custody. The evidence was, therefore, ruled out as being inadmissible under Sec.27 because the accused persons were not in custody of the police officer. The evidence was, therefore, ruled out as being inadmissible under Sec.27 because the accused persons were not in custody of the police officer. C. C. Ghose J., further considered the question which falls to be decided here in this case and held (at page 299 column 2)-- "Now, apart from the question whether these persons were in the custody of the police, it is quite clear that the statements of the persons other than the first person who made the statement cannot be used in evidence. The statement made by the first individual under Sec.27 and in the circumstances described therein may be treated as evidence against him; but it is not allowable under the provisions of the law to treat the evidence of the other persons who may have made statements of the description referred to in Section 27 as evidence admissible under the provisions of that section." Here again this view was expressed following the case of 24 Suth WR 36 (Cr.). 16 The case of AIR 1942 Mad 532 (1) is a short judgment of Horwill J., sitting singly. There the statement seems to have been made by 4 accused persons and it was held inadmissible against them. Of course, the observations are there that the statement of one only could be admissible as distinctly relating to the discovery of the fact, but there is not much of discussion in support of this view. 17. In AIR 1945 Oudh 235, Misra and Kaul JJ. have held (at page 240, column 1)-- "The use of the word a person in singular, we think, is somewhat significant and we are inclined to the view that the word was used in singular designedly because we cannot conceive the joint statement of a number of persons can be said to be an information received from any particular one of them. When a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from one of several persons charged with an offence, and when others give like information, it is impossible to treat the discovery as having been made from the information received from each one o£ them." With utmost respect I say that the first reason given by their Lordships is not correct. In the earlier Sections also, namely, sections 24, 25 and 26 the word referring to the accused or the person is in singular and vet one cannot conceive that it does not mean plural. Sec.13 of the General Clauses Act says: "In all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context-- xxx (2) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa." The view expressed in this Oudh case was dissented from in a recent Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nathu V/s. State, AIR 1958 All 467 . On review of many cases on the point, it has been held in this Allahabad case at page 472 column 2-- "It is easily conceivable that two or more persons simultaneously or jointly furnish an information and as a result of that information a common discovery is made; such a case will if either con options are satisfied be covered by the section. Each case will, however, have to be judged on its own facts but the underlying principle seems to be that the information is such information as cannot be said to be already in the possession of the police and that the discovery is made in consequence of that information and further that the discovery is not rediscovery of something already discovered." Reference may also be made to the two cases relied upon in this Allahabad case, namely, Naresh Chandra Das V/s. Emperor, AIR 1942 Cal 593 and State Government, M.P. V/s. Chhote Lal Mohan Lal, (AIR 1955 Nag 71). In the Calcutta case it has been observed by Pal J., sitting in a Division Bench (at page 603, column 1) as follows-- "When a fact is once discovered in consequence of information received from some source, any further information subsequently received from any other source cannot be said to be the information whereby the fact is discovered. But the mere plurality of information received before discovery shall not necessarily take any of these informations out of the section. But the mere plurality of information received before discovery shall not necessarily take any of these informations out of the section. In a suitable case it is possible to ascribe to more than one accused the information which leads to the discovery." The Nagpur decision also is a Division Bench decision of that Court and takes the view (at page 75 column 1)-- "It, therefore, appears that simultaneous statements are not per se inadmissible in evidence and are liable to be considerded if the discovery made in consequence thereof affords a guarantee about the truth of the statements." 18. In AIR 1946 Cal 452, Sharpe J. held as follows (at page 456 column 1)-- "If, of course, the prosecution are in a position to establish that the statements or the action which led to the discovery were actually made, or took place, simultaneously we do not think that evidence in regard to the simultaneous statements or the simultaneous action would entirely shut out by the provisions of Sec.27, Evidence Act, but there must be clear and satisfying evidence on this point such as will enable the Court to decide and to give a specific direction to the jury whether the evidence is admissible against both of the accused or against either and if so against which." With very great respect, I fail to see any difference between the simultaneous statements of information in consequence of which the discovery of a fact is made and the statements relating to the same information made one after the other by more than one person in consequence of which the discovery of a fact is made, provided the statements are made before the discovery of the fact and they are believable. To me it appears that the statement does not become one statement simply because it is made simultaneously in chorus, by two or more persons and therefore becomes admissible under Sec.27 against all. The statement nevertheless remains the statement of two or more persons, whether made simultaneously or one after the other, and, if it is admissible against all those who made the statement, if made simultaneously, it is equally admissible if made one after the other. The statement nevertheless remains the statement of two or more persons, whether made simultaneously or one after the other, and, if it is admissible against all those who made the statement, if made simultaneously, it is equally admissible if made one after the other. As a matter of fact, I would like to emphasise that from a practical point of view it is difficult to conceive a case where two or more accused persons would make simultaneous statement and in exactly the same language giving information to the investigating officer in consequence of which the discovery may be made. It would, therefore, be correct to lay down as a rule of prudence that the investigating officer in such a situation should take down the statements of the accused persons in their precise language as far as possible one after the other and then it should be judged by the court, when so much of the information as led to the discovery of a fact is deposed to before it, as to whether the evidence is believable; if so, against whom. Simply because one accidentally happens to utter the words first or the investigating officer happens to record his statement first, it should not be held that the statement of information given by the first person is the information in consequence of which the discovery may be said to have been made and the statements of the others should be excluded on the ground that they had not led to the discovery. 19. The view expressed in AIR 1949 Orissa 67, is on the lines of the AIR 1932 Calcutta case and, for the reasons already stated by me, I, with respect, do not subscribe to this view. I may now refer to two Supreme Court cases. In Lachhman Singh V/s. The State, AIR 1952 SC 167, a doubt was cast on some decisions on the point which were cited before their Lordships of tie Supreme Court in the following language : "It seems to us that if the evidence adduced by the prosecution is found to be open to suspicion and it appears that the police have deliberately attributed similar confessional statements relating to facts discovered to different accused persons, in order to create evidence against all of them, the case undoubtedly demands a most cautious approach. But, as to what should be the rule when there is clear and unimpeachable evidence as to independent and authentic statements of the nature referred to in Sec.27, Evidence Act, having been made by several accused persons, either simultaneously or otherwise, all that we wish to say is that as at present advised we are inclined to think that some of the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have perhaps gone farther than is warranted by the language of Sec.27, and it may be that on a suitable occasion in future those cases may have to be reviewed." (The underlining (here above) is mine.) In Ramkishan Mithanlal V/s. State of Bombay, (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 , it was observed (at p. 116 Col. 2) referring to a Bombay decision : "The question that really arose for the consideration of the Court there was whether the joint statement attributed to the accused 1 and 2 in that case was admissible without specifying what statement was made by a particular accused which led to the discovery of the relevant fact and it was rightly held that a joint statement by more than one accused was not contemplated by Sec.27 and the evidence of Mistry, the Police Officer, in that behalf should therefore have been excluded." 20. Giving my most careful consideration to the point raised in this revision and, in spite of my having taken the view that statements of more than one accused, if properly deposed to, leading to the discovery of a fact are admissible under Sec.27 of the Evidence Act, yet I find it difficult to hold in this particular case that the statement which is jointly attributed to Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal as having told the Assistant Sub-Inspector that they had kept the utensils in a sota is admissible against either of them for the simple reason that it suffers from vagueness and is not definite on the question as to what Moti Lal said and what Lakhan Lal said. If the statement would have been deposed to clearly and definitely, it would have been admissible against both. I would, therefore, following the observations of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 , hold that the statement attributed to Moti Lal that he told the Assistant Sub-Inspector as having kept the utensils in the sota is inadmissible against him. I would, therefore, following the observations of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 , hold that the statement attributed to Moti Lal that he told the Assistant Sub-Inspector as having kept the utensils in the sota is inadmissible against him. The argument of Mr. Verma, learned Additional Standing Counsel, that it must be presumed that the statements in the exact language were simultaneously made by both the accused or that they were made one after the other in the sequence recorded in the deposition is not acceptable to me, for the simple reason that I cannot read into the evidence which is not there. 21. Now the question arises whether the utensils taken out from the sota by Moti Lal could be held to be in possession of Moti Lal from the simple fact of his going alone to the Sota and taking out the utensils from the place of conceal-ment in the sota. In my opinion, it is right to hold that Moti Lal was found in possession of the stolen utensils. The sota was a public place no doubt -- not in the exclusive possession of Moti Lal. But here we are not concerned with the possession of the sota; we are here concerned with possession of the utensils. The utensils were kept in a hidden place and, according to the evidence of P.W.5 as quoted above by me, other persons who were asked to take out the utensils from the sota failed, it was Moti Lal who went and brought the utensils out. It was, therefore, within his exclusive knowledge as to where the utensils were kept concealed in the sota. From this fact of knowledge, an inference can be drawn under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act, in absence of any other thing on the record to show as to how Moti Lal had knowledge of these things, that he had knowledge because he kept them there and therefore he had control over those articles and had the conscious possession of them. I may quote a sentence from Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. I may quote a sentence from Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 10, at p. 811, where while considering the possession of stolen properties it has been said : "It is unnecessary to prove a manual possession of the goods by the prisoner; it is sufficient that they were under his conscious control, or that he is in joint possession with the thief." As soon as it is held that the utensils were in possession of the petitioner, illustration (a) of sec. 114 of Evidence Act is attracted, and the stolen articles being found in possession of the petitioner soon after the theft, it must be presumed in the circumstances of this case that Moti Lal received the goods knowing them to be stolen because he did not account for his possession. A controversy has arisen in some of the cases and the point was argued by Mr. Nageshwar Prasad also before us as to whether mere knowledge of the fact as to where the stolen goods were kept can necessarily lead to the inference that they were in possession of the person having that knowledge. On this question, in my opinion, every case will depend upon its own facts. There may be cases where a court may not be justified in presuming possession of the person who had mere know-ledge of the articles placed but there may be cases I where the articles are concealed in a place about which the particular person had the knowledge and it may he assumed in such cases that the articles were in his possession. I may in this connection refer to the case of Chavadappa Pujari v. Emperor, AIR 1945 Bom 292. In this case a reference is made to an unreported Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Rama Balappa V/s. Emperor, Criminal Appeal No. 291 of 1943, D/- 11-11-1943, where it was held that, though the place in which the property was found buried did not belong to the accused, the very fact that he knew that the property was buried there would justify the presumption that he was in possession of it since he would be able to exercise control over it and remove it any time he liked. Divatia, J., distinguished this unreported decision and took a different view, on the facts and in the circumstances of the AIR 1945 Bombay case. Divatia, J., distinguished this unreported decision and took a different view, on the facts and in the circumstances of the AIR 1945 Bombay case. But, Lokur, J., who was a party to the unreported Bombay case and was also a party to the AIR 1945 Bombay case stuck to his view. I would, with respect, follow the decision of the earlier unreported case. I may in this connection also refer to a decision of the Madras High Court by Ramaswami, I. sitting singly, reported in In re Murugan, AIR 1958 Mad 451 , In similar circumstances it was held at p. 452 : "The important point is that the circumstances and conduct of the accused point clearly to his knowledge of the exact spot where the ornaments were and, in the absence of any explanation, the reasonable inference is that he put them there himself." I, therefore, hold that Moti Lal, the petitioner, was found in possession of the stolen utensils which he had kept concealed in the sota and, in absepce of any explanation of his possession, it must be presumed that the articles having been found, in his possession soon after the theft, were received by him with the knowledge that they were stolen properties. He has, therefore, been rightly convicted under Sec. 411, Indian Penal Code, so far as this item of property is concerned. 22. As respects the recovery of the gold tabiz from the olti of the verandah which, according to the finding, was in joint possession of both Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal, I am of the view that the conviction of the petitioner cannot be maintained for being in possession of the stolen gold tabiz. The verandah was an open one and that too in the joint possession of Moti Lal and Lakhan Lal, and, therefore, unless there was something more to show the conscious possession of Moti Lal, the petitioner, it could not be held that Moti Lal was in possession of the stolen gold tabiz or had absolute control over it. It may well be that it was in possession of Lakhan Lal alone. In that view of the matter, I do not consider it safe to uphold the finding of the court of appeal below in respect of the conscious guilty possession of the petitioner of the gold tabiz. 23. It may well be that it was in possession of Lakhan Lal alone. In that view of the matter, I do not consider it safe to uphold the finding of the court of appeal below in respect of the conscious guilty possession of the petitioner of the gold tabiz. 23. Now coming to the recovery of the silver ornaments from the well, it will be found that the evidence of the Assistant Sub-Inspector (P.W.2) is as follows : "Both these accused further pointed out that two chandi Hasulis and one pair of chandi Bajoo were thrown in a well." No other special part was attributed to Moti Lal, the petitioner. It may be that he had knowledge that the silver ornaments were in the well but the evidence is not very clear as to whether this was within his exclusive knowledge and/or whether the silver ornaments were within his absolute control. Somebody else esitered the well the following morning and took them out from the well. In these circumstances, mere knowledge of the petitioner about the ornaments being in the well will not be sufficient to lead to the inference that he was in possession of those ornaments. There was no evidence as to who had kept the ornaments in the well. The evidence was again in that indefinite form that both the accused pointed out the ornaments in the well. In these circumstances, I do not think it safe to uphold the finding of the lower appellate court that Moti Lal, the petitioner, was in possession of the stolen silver ornaments. 24. The result, therefore, is that the petitioner has been rightly convicted under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code for being found in possession of the stolen articles, namely, the utensils and his conviction can be supported on that account but not on account of having been found in possession of the gold tabis and/or the silver ornaments. In any event, the conviction stands and, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, I would maintain the conviction of the petitioner under Section 411 I. P. C. and also the sentence of six months rigorous imprisonment but would reduce the sentence of fine to Rs. 200/-, in default, further rigorous imprisonmemt for six weeks. With this modification in the sentence, the application in revision fails and is dismissed. 200/-, in default, further rigorous imprisonmemt for six weeks. With this modification in the sentence, the application in revision fails and is dismissed. K.Sahai, J. 25 I entirely agree and I desire only to add a few words on the true scope of Sec.27 of the Evidence Act. 26. The important point to be noted is that the word used in Sec.27 is "discovered" and not "rediscovered". If a relevant fact is discovered in consequence of information received from one or more persons, the section allows so much of the information to be proved as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. In view of Sec.13 of the General Clauses Act, the words "a person" used in Sec.27 in singular number must be held to include the plural. If the police officer concerned discovers any fact by himself or in consequence of information received from another source, that fact cannot be said to be discovered in consequence of any subsequent information received by him from an accused in his custody. At the most, the fact can be said to have been rediscovered. Such information will not be admissible under Sec.27. Again, if the police officeir discovers any fact in consequence of information received by him from one accused in his cutody, Sec.27 will not make admissible any information which he subsequently receives reflating to the same fact from another accused in his custody. 27. The view expressed in one line of decisions, which have been discussed by my learned brother, is that, when a fact is discovered in consequence of statements made by two or more accused persons, the statement of that accused person who makes his statement first is alone admissible. With great respect, the conclusion reached in those cases is incorrect because the premises which have been formulated are inaccurate. For instance, Jackson, J. has stated in 24 Suth WR (Cr.) 36: "It can hardly have been the intention of the Legislature that when a fact is discovered in consequence of information received from one of several persons charged with an offence, and when others give like information, that the fact should be treated as discovered from the information of them all." The mistake lies in supposing that the fact has already been discovered in consequence of information received from one accused before other accused give similar information. If the supposition were correct and if the accused other than the first made their statements after the relevant fact had already been discovered as a consequence of the statement made by the first accused, the statements of the other accused would undoubtedly be inadmissible. If, however, the discovery is made not as a consequence of the statement of only one accused but as a consequence of the statements of two or more accused, there is no reason why the statements of all of them should not be admissible under Section 27. 28 In another line of decisions, which have also been discussed by my learned brother, the view which has been expressed is that the statements of two or more accused leading to the discovery of a relevant fact will be admissible only if they are simultaneously made. I am unable to find any principle in support of this view. If simultaneous statements by two or more accused can be covered by Sec.27, it is difficult to see why statements made by two or more accused one alter the other should not be admissible under that section, provided always that the statements made by those accused which are to be admitted relate distinctly to the discovery and not rediscovery of the relevant fact. 29. In my opinion, the scope of Sec.27 can be simply stated in this way. If a relevant fact is discovered in consequence of statements made by one or more accused in custody, so much of those statements as relates distinctly to the discovery of that fact is admissible under Sec.27. No such statements relating to a relevant fact is admissible if it is made after the discovery of that fact or if it does not relate distinctly to the fact discovered.