JUDGMENT The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHATURVEDI, J. - This is an appeal under section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, as amended by Act No. XXVII of 1956 (hereinafter called the Act), against the judgment of the Election Tribunal of Bijnor, allowing an election petition filed by Ratan Lal Jain (hereinafter called the respondent) The dispute arises out of election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly form constituency No. 51, known as Afzalgarh constituency, situate in the district of Bijnor. Six persons sought the election from the above constituency. The polling took place on the 6th March, 1957, and as a result of the counting of votes, which took place on the 10th March, 1957, Allah Bux (hereinafter called the appellant), was declared as the duly elected candidate. Ratan Lal Jain, respondent in this appeal, decided to challenge the election of the appellant Allah Bux, and sent an election petition, within the time allowed by law, to the Election Commission. The Election Commission sent it for trial to the District Judge of Bijnor who was appointed as the Election Tribunal to try and dispose of the election petition. The respondent had impleaded the appellant and one Banwari Lal as opposite parties to the election petition. The appellant was impleaded as the duly elected candidate and Banwari Lal as one of the candidates who had committed certain corrupt practices. In the election petition three grounds were taken, namely, that the appellate was disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Legislative Assembly in view of the provisions of section 7(d) of the Act, that the appellant, along with his relations, workers, supporters and agents, had committed corrupt practices of undue influence, bribery and systematize appeal to the electors to vote for him on the ground of his community and religion. The third charge was that Banwari Lal, opposite party in the election petition, had been bribed by the appellant in order to induce Banwari Lal to stand as a candidate at the election. The third charge was that Banwari Lal, opposite party in the election petition, had been bribed by the appellant in order to induce Banwari Lal to stand as a candidate at the election. Both the appellant and banwari Lal contested the election petition, but on the 31 July, 1957, the learned counsel for the respondent, Ratan Lal Jain, made a statement before the Tribunal that he did not propose to press the grounds relating to the commission of the different kinds of corrupt practices and that the he would confine his case to the first ground mentioned above. On this statement being made, it became unnecessary to continue Banwari Lal as a party to the election petition and the Election Tribunal consequently assessed an order the same day striking off the name of Banwari Lal from the array of opposite parties in the election petition and Banwari Lal was awarded his costs, which he had incurred till that date. The election petition then proceeded only against the appellant and only on the first ground. The ground is set out in paragraph 4(a) of the election petition and it is to the effect that the appellant was disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, because he, along with his brothers Ali Husain and Kifayatullah, and his uncle, Inayatullah, and other members of the family, jointly carried on business in the name of Messrs Azmatullah Inayatullah and the business was of purchasing at auctions timber and bamboo from the forest department of the Uttar Pradesh Government and supplying sleepers, prepared out of the timber, to the Uttar Pradesh Government. The appellant was said to a have a share, as well as an interest, in the contract for the supply of sleepers to the Government, and it was pleaded that the appellant was disqualified from being chosen to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly because of the provisions of section 7(d) of the Act. The above facts, if proved, would establish the ground for declaration of the election of the appellant to be void under section 100(1)(a) of the Act. The above facts, if proved, would establish the ground for declaration of the election of the appellant to be void under section 100(1)(a) of the Act. The appellant, in his written statement, denied that he had any share or interest in the contract for the supply of goods or for the execution of any works or the performance of any services undertaken by the State Government, that he had no interest in the timber and used business carried on by the firm, Azmatullah Inayatullah, that the appellant's brother Ali Husain, and his uncle Inayatullah, only purchased the right to cut trees from Government forest, but even they had not entered into contract of any kind for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government and that the appellant himself had never even purchased the right to cut trees from the Government forests and had not carried on this business individually or in partnership with anybody else. He alleged that his only business was agricultural farming. As a result of the pleadings, the Election Tribunal framed the following issue, which is the only issue relevant for the purpose of the appeal. Issue No. 1. - Was respondent No. 1, Shri Allah Bux, disqualified under section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, for being chosen as a member of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly ? If so, its effect ? * * * * In order, however, to see whether the respondent has been able to established the ground of disqualification set up in the election petition, we shall have to consider whether all the ingredients set out in section 7(d) of the Act have been fully proved by the respondent. The respondent has to establish : 1. Whether the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah had a contract for the supply of sleepers, which contract subsisted on the relevant dates ? 2. Whether the appellant had a share or interest in the said contract for the apply of sleepers ? 3. Whether the contract had been entered into either by the appellant himself or by any other person, that is Ali Husain, for the benefit of the appellant ? and 4. Whether the contract was for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government ? * * * * Point No. 1. 3. Whether the contract had been entered into either by the appellant himself or by any other person, that is Ali Husain, for the benefit of the appellant ? and 4. Whether the contract was for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government ? * * * * Point No. 1. - Whether the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah had a contract for the supply of sleepers, which contract subsisted on the relevant dates ? * * * * We have thus no hesitation in holding that the firm, Azmatullah Inayatullah, had not only taken the contract for the purchase of wood of lot No. 28 but had also taken the contract for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government according to the list prepared by the forest department. The appellant was declared elected on 10th March, 1957, the sleepers were supplied on 12th March under the contract and payment was made long after this. Under the circumstances, the disqualification would attach to the appellant if he was a partner of this firm according to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram (9 E.L.R. 301). This brings us to the next point. Point No. 3. - Whether the appellant had a share or interest in the said contract for the supply of sleepers ? We have already held above that it has been proved in the case that the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah had contract for the purchase of the wood in lot No. 28 and also entered into a contract for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government. This contract was for the year 1956-57 and the sleepers under the contract were supplied to the Uttar Pradesh Government on the 12th March, 1957, after the declaration of the result of the election. The most important evidence of the fact that the appellant was a partner in the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah is afforded by the three documents concerning assessment proceedings for 1955-56 under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The first document is the assessment order, exhibit 9, passed by the Sales Tax Officer of Bijnor on the 25th May, 1956, with respect to the assessment year 1955-56. The first document is the assessment order, exhibit 9, passed by the Sales Tax Officer of Bijnor on the 25th May, 1956, with respect to the assessment year 1955-56. Exhibit 44 is the return of sales tax for this year submitted to the Sales Tax Officer and exhibit 49 is the statement of Allah Bux, appellant himself, made to the Sales Tax Officer, in the course of assessment proceedings for the above year. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that these three documents were excluded from evidence by the provisions of section 23 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948. Sub-section (1) of this section is important and it is as follows :- "23. (1) All particulars contained in any statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of the act or of the rules made thereunder, or in any evidence given or affidavit or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings under the Act or the rules made thereunder, or in any record of any proceedings relating to the recovery of a demand, prepared for the purpose of the Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be treated as confidential." Sub-section (2) permits disclosure of certain particulars which are enumerated in clauses (i) to (vi) of the sub-section. A reading of this sub-section shows that the sub-section directs that the matters enumerated in it shall be treated as confidential. They are particulars contained in any statement made or return furnished in the course of any proceedings under the Act or the rules or in the record of any proceedings relating to recovery of a demand, as well as certain other papers with which we are not concerned. The argument of the learned counsel is that the statement made by the appellant before the Sales Tax Officer and the return furnished to him are directed to be treated as confidential, which necessarily means that no court in permitted to take the above documents into evidence or to ask the Sales Tax Officers to file them or their copies in court. He also says that as far as the assessment order goes, it is a document produced under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and has thus also been directed to be treated as confidential. He also says that as far as the assessment order goes, it is a document produced under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act and has thus also been directed to be treated as confidential. A comparison of the provisions of section 23(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act with the provisions of section 54(1) of the India Income-tax Act shows that there are two very important points of difference between the two sections, though the language of section 23(1) of the Sales Tax Act appears to have been borrowed from section 54(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act. The two important points of difference are that section 54(1) includes within its ambit "all particulars contained in any record of any assessment proceeding", but those words have been omitted from section 23(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The omission of the above words from section 23(1) of the Sales Tax Act appears to be a deliberate one and this omission clearly shows that the intention of the Legislature was not to make the particulars contained in the record of any assessment proceeding confidential. The assessment order, exhibit 9, thus does not come within the ambit of section 23(1) of the Sales Tax Act at all and there is no direction to treat the said order as confidential. The reason for the difference in the two provisions of these two Acts appears to be that an assessment order passed by the Income-tax Officer exposes the real financial status of the assesses, whereas the assessment order under the U.P. Sales Tax Act would only show the value of sales and purchases made by the dealer in the particular year. The assessment order under the Sales Tax Act would show the amount for which business was transacted in particular year by a dealer but did not really disclose his real financial status. Whatever the reason, a reading of the two provisions mentioned above makes it quite clear that the omission of the relevant words quoted above was a deliberate one. The assessment order under the Sales Tax Act would show the amount for which business was transacted in particular year by a dealer but did not really disclose his real financial status. Whatever the reason, a reading of the two provisions mentioned above makes it quite clear that the omission of the relevant words quoted above was a deliberate one. The second important difference between the two provisions is that in section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act the Legislature, after saying that the documents mentioned in it shall be treated as confidential, proceeds to say : "and notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no Court shall, save provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents or record or any part of any such record, or to give evidence before it in respect thereof." The whole of the above sentence is omitted from section 23(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which goes to show that the prohibition contained in the sentence quoted above has not been applied to the documents mentioned in section 23(1) of the Sales Tax Act. Sub-section (2) of the Sales Tax Act contains certain exceptions as also does sub-section (3) of section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act contain a clear direction to the courts not to require any public servant to produce before them the documents specified in the sub-section. The existence of similar exceptions in sub-section (1) of section 23 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, therefore, does not have the effect that the direction to use the documents as confidential must necessarily mean that the courts should not accept evidence afforded by the documents enumerated in the sub-section, if they do not fall within the exceptions mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 23 of the Sales Tax Act. The very fact that the Legislature, while enacting section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act, in spite of the use of the word "confidential", considered it necessary to lay down a prohibition against the courts requiring any public servant to produce the documents mentioned in the sub-section, shows that the mere use of the word "confidential" did not mean that the courts were bared from asking the officers of the department to produce the documents enumerated in the section before them. The same must be the position with respect to the use of the same words in the analogous provision of law contained in section 23(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. It appears that the direction contained in the two enactments for treating the documents mentioned therein as confidential is a direction to the officers of the two departments not to voluntarily disclose the contents of the documents or to supply their copies to outsiders. The court has not been prohibited from asking the said officers to produce the relevant documents before it, nor are the officers prohibited from disclosing the contents of the documents or from filing those documents in court. If the use of the word "confidential" had the effect of bringing out this result, it would not be possible even for the assesses to produce such documents, though the provision is meant mainly to protect the interest of the assesses. There are a number of decisions of different courts holding that the use of the word "confidential" did not debar the assesses from producing any of the documents mentioned in section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act in a court of law. We might mention in this connection two cases of this Court, namely, Suraj Narain v. Jhabbu Lal (A.I.R. 1944 All. 114; 13 I.T.R. 13) and Naim Singh v. Tikam Singh (A.I.R. 1955 All. 388). A Division bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Emperor v. Osman Chotani (A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 289; 10 I.T.R. 429), has ruled that in providing that the documents are to be treated as confidential the Legislature only meant that they are to be treated by the Income Tax Authorities as confidential and not that the documents were confidential in whosoever's hands they might be and the section did not prevent an assesses from disclosing the contents of the documents referred to in section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya (I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 969; 8 I.T.R. 450) has also taken the view that the fact that the return of the income-tax is to be treated as a confidential document does not mean that the assesses himself cannot obtain a copy of it for his own purpose. 969; 8 I.T.R. 450) has also taken the view that the fact that the return of the income-tax is to be treated as a confidential document does not mean that the assesses himself cannot obtain a copy of it for his own purpose. For the above reasons, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the Election Tribunal was not authorised to take exhibits 9, 44 and 48 into evidence. The question was raised before the Election Tribunal also and it passed a considered order permitting the respondent to produce the documents concerning the sales tax and to produce the Sales Tax Officer, but it refused to permit the respondent to examine the Income-tax Officer or to have any documents concerning income-tax proceedings of the firm to be produced in court. We may now proceed to consider what exhibits 9, 44 and 48 prove. Exhibit 9 is the order of assessment for the assessment year 1955-56. The name of the dealer is mentioned as "Azmatullah Inayatullah, Timber Merchant, Dhampur", and it is said that the dealer was represented by "Allah Bux (appellant) partner". In the body of the order it is stated that in response to the notice under the U.P. Sales Tax Rules to produce the account books of the firm, in order to verify the correctness of the return submitted, Allah Bux, partner of the firm, Azmatullah Inayatullah. This is a public document and it contains entries which are relevant to the matter in issue before us. It is admissible under section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no reason why the Sales Tax Officer mentioned the fact that the appellant is a partner in the firm, if it had not been admitted before him. At least the manner in which this fact has been stated shows that there was no dispute concerning the above fact. Exhibit 44 is a return of the turnover of the firm, Sheikh Azmatullah Inayatullah, for the year for which the tax was assessed under exhibit 9. It purports to bear the signatures of the appellant and also described the appellant either as proprietor or partner or manager of the firm. In fact the form is printed one and the inappropriate description of the persons signing the form was to be scored out. It purports to bear the signatures of the appellant and also described the appellant either as proprietor or partner or manager of the firm. In fact the form is printed one and the inappropriate description of the persons signing the form was to be scored out. It was expected that two out of the three words, "proprietor", "partner"or "manager", would be scored out and the word connecting the appropriate description of the person signing he return was to be allowed to stand, but none of the words having been scored out the position is that Allah bux, appellant, was described either as proprietor or partner or manager of the firm. Allah Bux totally denies having had anything to do with this firm and this denial of his is proved to be wrong by the contents of exhibit 44. * * * * The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that this form is a public document and is also admissible in evidence under sections 7 and 11 of the Evidence act, besides, section 35 of the Evidence Act. Section 35 brings within its ambit not only entries in public or official books, registers or records and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties, but also the entries in any public or other record made by any other person in the performance of his duties, specially enjoined by the law of the country. The argument of the learned counsel is that every assesses is enjoined by law to submit a return of his turnover and the return is thus a document prepared by a person in the performance of such a duty. This may be so, but the further requirement is that the relevant entry must be in any public or other official book, register or record. It is likely that the return of turnover is a part of the official record maintained by the Sales Tax Officer and the return is a public document admissible under section 35 of the Evidence Act. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya ((1940) I.L.R. 1940 Mad. It is likely that the return of turnover is a part of the official record maintained by the Sales Tax Officer and the return is a public document admissible under section 35 of the Evidence Act. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Rama Rao v. Venkataramayya ((1940) I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 969; 8 I.T.R. 450), cited above, held that profit and loss statement and a statement showing the details of the net income filed by an assesses in support of his return of income furnished under section 22 of the Income-tax Act are public documents within the meaning of section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act and the certified copies of the same would be admissible under section 65(8) of the Indian Evidence Act. We agree with the decision of the Madras High Court and, on the principle laid down in the case, it must be held that the return of sales tax filed by an assesses under the U.P. Sales Tax Act is also a public document. Apart from section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, we think this return of the sales tax is also admissible under section 11 of the Evidence Act, as it makes the existence of the fact in issue highly probable. But even if this document is excluded from consideration, the evidence afforded by exhibit 48 conclusively proved the case of the respondent. It is a copy of the statement made by the appellant himself before the Sales Tax Officer. It begins : "I, Allah Bux, son of Azmatullah, Sheikh, partner of the firm, Azmatullah Inayatullah, Dhampur, Bijnor, state on oath." This statement refers to the assessment evidenced by exhibit 9 and the appellant has clearly admitted that he was a partner in the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah. In the body of the statement he has stated : "We deal in timber business", and then, "We had no other ales besides this." The use of the word "we" clearly included the appellant also as a person who was a partner or a co-sharer in this business. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the first paragraph of the statement is not admissible in evidence, because, according to him, this portion where the name of the witness, or his description, or parentage, is given is not a part of the statement of the witness himself. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the first paragraph of the statement is not admissible in evidence, because, according to him, this portion where the name of the witness, or his description, or parentage, is given is not a part of the statement of the witness himself. In support of his contention he relied upon a decision of the Privy Council in the case of Maqboolan v. Ahmad Husain ((1904) 31 I.A. 38). Their Lordships in this case, while considering the heading of a statement recorded under the Code of Criminal Procedure, observed that the description given of a witness in the heading of a deposition was not part of the deposition proper and was not even a part of the evidence given by the witness on solemn affirmation and this portion may have been filled in by a subordinate official and may not have been read out to the witness by the Magistrate. In these circumstances, they observed that even assuming that there was no slip or accidental omission in the heading of the document and assuming that the document was admissible in evidence, the document was not entitled to any weight. We think that the position with respect to the record of the description of the witness before recording his statement under the Code of Criminal Procedure is different from the position that this document, exhibit 48, discloses. The statement as regards the description of the appellant in exhibit 48 expressly purports to be a statement made by the appellant himself. The portion stated on oath begins afterwards, but as far as the admission contained in this portion is concerned, it would be admissible in evidence, even though the admission was not on oath and had been made before the oath was administered. * * * * The above three documents leave no room for doubt that the appellant was a partner in the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah in the year 1955-56 and also on the date he furnished the returns, that is 31st March, 1956, and on the date that he made the statement, i.e., 16th May, 1956. The assessment for the year 1956-57 has not yet been completed and no useful papers regarding that assessment could, therefore, be filed. The appellant took up the case that he was never a partner in this firm after 1946. The assessment for the year 1956-57 has not yet been completed and no useful papers regarding that assessment could, therefore, be filed. The appellant took up the case that he was never a partner in this firm after 1946. This case has been conclusively proved to be wrong and the contrary has been established. Section 109 of the Evidence Act is to the effect that when the question is whether the persons concerned are partners and it has been shown that they had been acting as such, the burden of proving that they are not partners or that they had ceased to be partners is on the person who says that he was not a partner or had ceased to be a partner. The presumption under this section, therefore, is that the appellant, who has been acting as a partner, is in fact a partner in the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah, and that he continues to be such. Apart from the above presumption, other circumstances have been proved to show that the appellant all along has been and still continues to be a partner in the firm. * * * * It has thus been fully established that the appellant is a partner in the firm Azmatullah Inayatullah, which firm had taken a contract for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government and that the said contract subsisted even after the date of the declaration of the appellant as the duly elected candidate. The appellant is proved to have had a share and interest in this contract for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government. Point No. 3. - Whether the contract had been entered into either by the appellant himself or by any other person, that is, Ali Husain, for the benefit of the appellant ? On the findings that we have recorded above, there can be no difficulty in deciding this point also in favour of the respondent, because the facts that we have found above clearly establish that Ali Husain had entered not a contract for the supply of sleepers to the Uttar Pradesh Government on behalf of the firm Azmatullah inayatullah, and that the appellant is a partner in the said firm. But the learned counsel for the appellant argued that, if a partner enters into a contract on behalf of the firm, the case would not come under clause (d) of section 7 of the Act at all. He says that the words "firm" and "partner" have no where been mentioned in clause (d) and the words that have been used do not cover the case of a partner entering into a contract on behalf of his firm. We do not find it possible to accept this argument of the learned counsel. We think that if one partner of a firm takes a contract on behalf of the firm, the case would fall under clause (d), and the other partners of the firm would also be disqualified under the said clause from being chosen as members of the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly or Council. What is to be proved is that the candidate seeking election has any share or interest in such a contract and his share or interest may have been created either by himself or by any other person for his benefit or on his account. When one partner takes a contract on behalf of the firm, he takes it for the benefit of all the partners of the firm, and all the partners of the firm would be disqualified, if the contract is for the supply of goods to the appropriate Government. The learned counsel argued that the words "for his benefit" can only apply to a case where the share or interest has been created for the exclusive benefit of the candidate and not where the person, who obtains the contract, is only a sharer in the benefit which the candidate also may have in the contract. We see no reason for adding the word "exclusive" before the word "benefit". If the candidate has a share or interest in the contract and is likely to be benefited along with the other partners in the firm, we think his case also would fall within the ambit of clause (d) of section 7 of the Act. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs, and we assess the fee of the respondent's counsel in the case at Rs. 300. Appeal dismissed.