JUDGMENT This is an appeal by the plaintiff whose suit for a declaration of his title to a certain land described in the plaint, for a declaration that it is unnecessary to demolish a wall erected on the land with the permission of the Municipal Committee, and for the further declaration that a resolution passed by the Dewas State Cabinet on 27th January 1948, holding that the land belonged to the State and directing the plaintiff to demolish the wall was ultra vires, has been dismissed by the Courts below. The suit was dismissed on the ground that it was not filed within six months from the date of the accrual of the cause of action as required by section 17 of the Dewas Municipality Act, 1941. That section reads as follows: S. 17 (1)-No suit shall be instituted against a committee or against any member, officer or servant of a Municipality or any person acting under the direction of the Government or the President for anything done or purporting to be done under this Act until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing stating the cause of action, the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff and the relief which he claims, has been delivered or left at the Municipal Office, and in case of any such person as aforesaid, delivered to him or left at his office or usual place of abode. (2) Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within six months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action and service of such notice as aforesaid is admitted or proved. The plaintiff's suit was filed on 7th December 1949. He alleged that the cause of action arose on 27th January 1948, that is the date on which the Dewas State Cabinet passed a resolution asserting the ownership of the State to the land and directing the plaintiff to remove the wall constructed on the land. There can be no doubt that if section 17 of the Act is applicable to the plaintiff's suit then it is barred by time. But Mr. Chaphekar learned counsel for the appellant, contended that section 17 (2) had no applicability to a suit for a declaration of title to property. There can be no doubt that if section 17 of the Act is applicable to the plaintiff's suit then it is barred by time. But Mr. Chaphekar learned counsel for the appellant, contended that section 17 (2) had no applicability to a suit for a declaration of title to property. It was argued that section 17 of the Act was intended to afford protection to officials against personal responsibility for official acts and that the object of that provision was to give an official the opportunity to reconsider his position with regard to the claim and to make amends or settle the claim if he was so advised, and that this principle could not be applied to a suit whose object was to obtain a declaration of title to property. Reliance was placed on Chunder Sikhur Bundopadhya v. Obhoy Churn Bagchi I L R 6 Cal. 8, President of the Taluk Board, Sivaganga v. Narayan I L K 16 Mad. 317 and Govinda Pillai v. The Taluk Board, Kumbakonam I L R 32 Mad. 371. In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the provisions of section 17 of the De-was Municipalities Act, 1941, do not apply to a suit for a declaration of title to property must be given effect to. It will be seen that under section 17 notice is necessary in the case of a suit "for anything done or purporting to be done under the Act" by the Municipal Committee or any member, officer or any servant of the Municipal Committee. Now, the plaintiff no doubt stated that the cause of action arose on 27th January 1949, when the De-was State Cabinet passed a resolution asserting the ownership of the State to the land in question, and the suit was a equal to this resolution. But the bare assertion of the State of a claim to a property cannot be considered to be "an act done or purporting to be done under the Act" by any member, officer or servant of the Municipality or by any person acting under the direction of the Government or the President. The resolution passed by the De-was State Cabinet merely contained an expression of belief that the land belonged to the State. It is not an act done. The resolution passed by the De-was State Cabinet merely contained an expression of belief that the land belonged to the State. It is not an act done. A mere assertion of title to a property is not doing an act or purporting to do an act. Consequently, the plaintiff's suit cannot be said to be one for any act done or purporting to be done under the Act by the Municipality or any of its officers. In Narayanchandra Mitra v. Surendranath Mukerjee 1938 N L J 264 : A I R 1938 Nag. 449. where a certain amount under a promissory note was claimed by the official receiver from the debtor and where the debtor filed an inter-pleader a suit resisting the claim, and the official receiver raised a plea about want of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, it was held that mere setting up of a claim to property on behalf of the estate which the receiver represented could not be considered to be an act done or purporting to be done by the receiver. The principle of this decision would be applicable in the instant case. In the case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, and in Municipal Committee, Dinga v. Fateh Mohammad AIR 1939 Lah. 254., Municipal Council, Cochin v. Paratath Bavu Devussi AIR 1926 Mad. 235 . and Shidamallappa Nurandappa v. The Gokak Municipality I L R 22 Bom. 605. also suit for declaration of title to immovable property and for the ancillary relief of injunction or possession thereof was not regarded as a suit for compensation for some wrongful act committed by the public officer concerned. The relief of the declaration that it is unnecessary to demolish the wall erected on the land, which is the property of the plaintiff, is merely ancillary to the relief of declaration of title to the land. If, as I think, section 17 of the Act is not attracted to the suit for a declaration of title to a land, then it follows that it is also not attracted to the suit in so far as it claims the relief of declaration with regard to the demolition of the wall. As regards the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the resolution passed by the Dewas State Cabinet was ultra vires, a notice was no doubt necessary for the plaintiff to claim this relief. As regards the plaintiff's claim for a declaration that the resolution passed by the Dewas State Cabinet was ultra vires, a notice was no doubt necessary for the plaintiff to claim this relief. Whether it was within or outside the province of the Dewas State Cabinet to pass such a resolution, it is plain that the resolution would be ineffective if it is held that the plaintiff-appellant is the owner of the land. It must be noted that the Dewas State Cabinet passed the resolution containing the direction to the plaintiff to demolish the wall not after accepting his title to the land but holding that the permission to erect the wall was wrongly accorded by the Municipal Committee. The direction was based on the assertion that the land belonged to the Dewas State. That being so, it cannot be said that when the plaintiff is claiming the declaration that it is unnecessary for him to demolish the wall he is in any way calling in question or complaining against any act of the cancellation of the permission, and the plaintiff's suit is, therefore, for ''an act done or purporting to be done under the Act". I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title to the land and for a declaration that it is unnecessary for him to demolish the wall was within time. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the decisions of the Courts below are set aside and the learned trial Judge is directed to determine the question of ownership of the plaintiff to the land and of the grant of permission by the Municipal Committee for the construction of the wall and dispose of the suit according to law. Costs of this appeal shall follow the result of the suit. Appeal allowed.