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1958 DIGILAW 155 (ORI)

GANGADHAR ALIAS GUHIA DAS v. STATE

1958-12-23

MOHAPATRA, S.BARMAN

body1958
JUDGMENT : Barman, J. - These are appeals from an order of conviction and sentence passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Balasore, Camp: Baripada, convicting the Appellant Gangadhar alias Guhia Das in Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1958 u/s 302 and 148 Indian Peal Code and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life and to thee years rigorous imprisonment under each count respectively; the sentences to run concurrently; and further convicting the Appellants in Criminal appeal No. 82 of 1958 u/s 148 Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to rigorous imprisonment for three years each in Sessions Trial No. 40-M of 1957. 2. (sic) circumstances giving rise to the incident in question were these In village Bhuskunda within Police station Suliapada in the district of Mayurbhanj, there was a tank called Tala Pokhari which belonged to Govinda Jiew Thakur. The Marfatdar in respect of the said tank was one Mahant Govinda Gopalananda Deb Goswami under whom there was a Tahasildar named Pruthunath Das (P. W. 26) who looked after the management of lands and collection of rents. The topography of the tank is clearly shown in the spot map (ext. 23) prepared by P.W. 28. We are mainly concerned with the area bonded by points E. F. G. and H forming almost a square area including the water port on inside the tank which is marked by points J, K, L, and M as shown in the spot map. If appears from evidence that fishing right in respect of the said tank is given by the Mahant to different persons from year to year. Prior to Amli 1363 (corresponding to the year 1956-57) the fishing right had been given to the accused-Appellant Narayan Das. For how many years prior to the year 1956-57 in question, with which we are concerned in these appeals, the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had this fishing right in respect of the said tank is not quite clear from evidence. It is in evidence however, that for the year previous to the year in question 1956-57, the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had the fisbing right. The dispute, however, arose in respect of this particular year 1956-57. Both the accused party as also the complainant party claimed fishing right in respect of this year 1956-57. It is in evidence however, that for the year previous to the year in question 1956-57, the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had the fisbing right. The dispute, however, arose in respect of this particular year 1956-57. Both the accused party as also the complainant party claimed fishing right in respect of this year 1956-57. The facts, however, which brought the matter to an issue were these the prosecution version as given by the complainant (P.W. 1) was that the deceased Harish Chandra Sahu and P.W. 1 Chintamoni Das had taken lease of the tank for Rs. 20/- for the year beginning from the month of Baisakh of the Amli year 1363 to the month of Chitra of the Amli year 1364, that is to say, from April 15, 1956 to April 14, 1957 (according to the English Calender) approximately. This was corroborated by the Tahsildar (P.W. 26) of the Mahant. These alleged lessees paid the sum of Rs. 20/- and the Tahsildar is said to have granted them a receipt (ext. 16). The accused party headed by the accused-Appellant Narayan Das also claimed to be lessees in respect of the self same tank for the same year; and in support of their alleged rival claim they strongly relied upon Ext. E and Ext. E-1 being money order acknowledgment and postal receipt respectively purporting to show that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had also remitted a sum of Rs. 15/- to the Mahant all May 3, 1956 intended to be as rent in respect of the lease of the said tank for that particular year. Further-more, the other circumstances in favour of the accused partys alleged rival claim to the fishery right was that admittedly the accused party had the fishery right in the year previous to the year in dispute. In other words, accused Party's case has throughout been and is that this remittance of Rs. 15/- to the lessor who acknowledged the receipt of the same is clear proof of continuance of their lease for the following year 1956-57. This aspect of the case is very vital. The complainant (P. W. 1) on the other hand, in the strength of ext. 15/- to the lessor who acknowledged the receipt of the same is clear proof of continuance of their lease for the following year 1956-57. This aspect of the case is very vital. The complainant (P. W. 1) on the other hand, in the strength of ext. 16 being the Chalan form in respect of the fishery lease granted to him jointly with Haris Chandra Sahu deceased, contended that it was they, namely, P.W. 1 Chintamoni Das and the deceased Harish Chandra Sahu who were the lessees for that year having had made payment of the rent towards water-tax: covering their right in respect of the tank and the ditch and the Palms on the bank of the tank which were given on contract basis for one year to the said two lessees from the month of Baisakh of the Amil year 1363 to the month of Chaitra of the Amli year 1364-one years time-as clearly stated in ext. 16. This period referred to in the document is corresponding to the period from April 15, 1956 to April 14, 1967 approximately as aforesaid. To this extent, there is no mistake about the alleged claim of the complainant party. This dispute, however, between the parties making rival claims to fishery rights over the tank, immediately manifested itself in the form of litigation. On July 10,1956 the complainant (P.W. 1) and the deceased Harish Chandra Sahu as lessees had put in fish fries in the said tank; and again on July 26, 1956 they took some more fish fries to the tank and put them in the water. At that time some members of the accused party headed by the accused-Appellant Narayan Das came and threatened to assault them. However, the complainant and the deceased Had Sahu came away and lodged First Information Report at the local Police Station. The Police after enquiry started proceedings u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure against both parties. Incidentally, these proceedings u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure remained pending until January, 1958, that is to say, till after ten months from the date of the incident which took place on April 2, 1957 hereinafter stated. 3. The Police after enquiry started proceedings u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure against both parties. Incidentally, these proceedings u/s 107 Code of Criminal Procedure remained pending until January, 1958, that is to say, till after ten months from the date of the incident which took place on April 2, 1957 hereinafter stated. 3. During the pendency of Section 107 Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings, what happened was this On April 2, 1957, that is to say, within less than two weeks before the expiry of the complainant's lease there was a fight between the two rival parties on the question of their respective alleged fishery right over the tank itself. It appears from evidence that both the complainant party and the accused party were armed with lathis, bows, arrows, balams, tangi, sword and tablas etc. In this fight, there were serious casualties resulting in the death of the said Harish Chandra Sahu, one of the co-lessees of the complainant Chintamoni Das (P. W. 1), and also of Narendra Chandra Sahu who was the maternal uncle of the said Harish Chandra Sahu. Apart from deaths, several men on both sides were seriously injured. 4. This leads me to the consideration of certain details of the actual incident necessary for the purpose of determination of individual liability of those who participated in the incident including the accused Appellants before us. XXX His Lordship narrated some more details of the case. 5. At the trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, there were twenty accused persons charged u/s 302, 148 and 302/149 I.P.C. The learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted thirteen accused persons and convicted the remaining seven including the six accused-Appellants in Criminal Appeal 82 of 1958 and the said Gangadhar alias Guhia Das being the sale accused-Appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1958 who was a school student of about eighteen years of age. He was a son of the accused-Appellant Narayan Das whose other son was the accused-Appellant Biswambar Das. All the seven accused-Appellants were convicted and sentenced as afore said. 6. The main point for consideration in these appeals which was taken by the defence, is whether the accused-Appellants had the right of private defence in the circumstances of the case. The background, as appears from the evidence, is that the accused-Appellants were also severely injured including Gangadhar's father Narayan Das and his brother Biswambar Das. 6. The main point for consideration in these appeals which was taken by the defence, is whether the accused-Appellants had the right of private defence in the circumstances of the case. The background, as appears from the evidence, is that the accused-Appellants were also severely injured including Gangadhar's father Narayan Das and his brother Biswambar Das. The evidence of the doctor (P. W. 27) is relevant in this context. This doctor had examined the deceased persons Harish Chandra Sahu and Narendra Sahu as also the injured accused persons including the accused-Appellants Biswambar Das, Narayan Das, Harihar Das and Radha Mohan Giri. The other doctor (P. W.20) examined the dead body of Harish and proved the postmortem report (ext. 3). Among the injured persons on the complainant's side were P. Ws. 1 and 6. On the accused side, four accused persons were injured as aforesaid. The nature of injuries shows that both hides were violent. 7. Mr. H. Kanungo and Mr. P.C. Chatterji, learned Counsel for the accused-Appellants contended that the accused persons had the right of private defence of both property ani person. Let us take the of plea alleged right of private defence of property first. In support f this aspect of the defence case the learned defence counsel relied both on documentary and oral evidence adduced at the trial. In short, the accused persons are state to have participated in the incident in the manner they did purporting to do so under a bonafide claim of right in respect of the tank. The accused party thought that their fishery lease in respect of the said tank had been continued for the following year (1956-57) also as they had already remitted the rent amount (Jalkar) of Rs. 15/- money order which bad been accepted by the Mahant Goswami. Weighing the evidence on both sides, it appears that the prosecution relied on ext. 16 as aforesaid as also the evidence of P.W. 26 the Tahsildar who proved ext. 16. The prosecution adduced further evidence to show that the complainant party had taken the lease for the year in question P.W. 1 Chintamani admitted that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had taken the lease for the previous year 1955-56. 16 as aforesaid as also the evidence of P.W. 26 the Tahsildar who proved ext. 16. The prosecution adduced further evidence to show that the complainant party had taken the lease for the year in question P.W. 1 Chintamani admitted that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had taken the lease for the previous year 1955-56. It was suggested by the defence in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das was regularly taking the lease of the tank for about twenty years prior to the complainants lease. P.W. 1, in cross-examination admitted that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had taken lease for some years and further that others also had taken lease of the said tank. It appears from the evidence of P.W. 1 that he himself and the deceased Harish Chandra Sahu had gone to the house of the Mahant to obtain the lease on April 15, 1956. He also added that be took the Patta from the Tahasildar who gave a printed receipt in acknowledgment of the lease amount for the tank; but no formal Patta was given to them. Apparently, P.W. 1 bad then no knowledge that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had also sent Rs. 15/- by money-order to the Mahant for lease of the tank nor did he know if the accused-Appellant Narayan Das had put in fish fries during his period of the lease of the tank. It further appears from his evidence that the dispute over the tank lead to the proceedings u/s 107, Code of Criminal Procedure as aforesaid which were not closed until January 30, 1958. As against the prosecution evidence the accused-Appellants relied on ext. E being the postal acknowledgment in respect of the said amount of -Rs. 15/- sent to the Mahant who acknowledged receipt. The defence witness in this context was D.W. 1, the Postmaster, who proved Ext. E and Ext E-1 having been in his hand. It was in this background that this accused Appellant, however mistaken they might have been as to their alleged right in respect of the fishery lease of the tank, intervened in the manner they did while the rival claimant were challenging their fishery right over the tank, particularly when Section 107 Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings against both parties were still pending. Such timely intervention was thought to be necessary and not without justification. Such timely intervention was thought to be necessary and not without justification. What, indeed, the accused-Appellants wanted was that the complainant party should stay their hands and maintain the status quo until their respective rights were decided in a court of law. It was exactly in this spirit that the accused-Appellant Narayan Das, as P.W. 3 said in his evidence-did not say anything except paying "Jala Pakiba Anyay (It is illegal to throw nets)." 8. As regards the right of private defence of person, it requires us to probe further into the matter find out the circumstances in which the respective parties were placed during the incident.XXX His Lordship narrated some more details of the case. The complainant party, however, went prepared for all eventualities in aggressive spirit and did not pay any head to such requests and took recourse to violent methods, which directly were responsible for what had followed resulting in two persons killed and several persons injured on both sides. As regards the accused-Appellant Gangadhar, he was a mere school student, who had just appeared on the scene in the midst of the fight between the two parties in which his own father and brother, he found to have been involved and, in fact, surrounded, attacked and assaulted by the rival party. Naturally, the young son Gangdhar become apprehensive that his fathers life was in danger and in that state of mind he snatched a Balam from one of the participants in the incident and pierced it in the manner he did with the unfortunate result that subsequently followed. Immediately thereafter Gangadhar pierced Haris Sahu with the same Balam in sheer self-defence because he had reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt. He can rightly claim the right of private defence and is entitled to acquittal on that ground. As regards the other six accused-Appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 82 of 1958 convicted u/s 148 I.P.C. we are not satisfied on evidence that the charge against any of them have been proved. There is no evidence that they went to Tala Pokhari as aggressors to attack the complainant party. As regards the other six accused-Appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 82 of 1958 convicted u/s 148 I.P.C. we are not satisfied on evidence that the charge against any of them have been proved. There is no evidence that they went to Tala Pokhari as aggressors to attack the complainant party. In fact, the evidence shows that the accused party led by Narayan Das did everything they could to stop the complainant party from fishing when Section 107 Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings were pending and tried to persuade them in that direction but when persuasion failed, the battle began and come people became involved, but the evidence in support of the charge against the accused-Appellants is lacking. They must have the benefit of doubt. Besides, they had a right of self-defence. 9. This leads us to the consideration of the position in law where it is not possible for the court to find that the plea of self-defence, as taken by the accused persons, has been completely established. This aspect of the law was fully considered by my learned brother Mr. Justice Mohapatra, in his two earlier decision which were cited before us. In Banambar Saku and Ors. v. The State 24 C.L.T. 321, (Mohapatra and Rao JJ.) Mohapatra, J in his judgment held that this is always the accepted principle that the standard of proof necessary on the part of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt is not what is required of the accused persons to establish their plea under any of the general exceptions, of the Indian Penal Code. But if the Court, after review of the entire evidence on record, finds that the plea is a plausible thereby and if the Court entertains a reasonable doubt in his mind as to the guilt of the accused, the accused is certainty entitled to the benefit even though the accused persons have not been able to fully establish their plea of self-defence or any other plea under the general exceptions of the Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, their Lordships allowed the plea of the accused-Appellants and acquitted them of the offences under Sections 302 and 148 Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, their Lordships allowed the plea of the accused-Appellants and acquitted them of the offences under Sections 302 and 148 Indian Penal Code. In the judgment, there is a reference to an earlier decision of my learned brother Mohapatra, J. in Nitai Naik v. The State 23 C.L.T. 203, where, after a review of quite a number of decisions on the point and particularly relying upon Full Bench decisions of the Rangoon and Allahabad High Court Emperor v. Damapala AIR 1937 Rang 83 F.B., Parbhoo and Others Vs. Emperor it was held that, on a review of the entire evidence, if the Court entertains a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, he is entitled to an acquittal in the case, on the cardinal principle of criminal justice which has not been affected by the special provision of Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Aher Raja Khima Vs. The State of Saurashtra their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that there are two important factors in every criminal trial that weigh heavily in favour of an accused person. One is that the accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt and the other, an off-short of the same principle, that when an accused person offers a reasonable explanation of his conduct, then, even though he cannot prove his assertions, they should ordinarily be accepted unless the circumstances indicate that they are false. In the light of these principles we had to weigh the evidence in this case. 10. Our suspicions were further confirmed by one other staring circumstance that several members of the accused party were found to have been injured, as appears from the medical evidence (P.W.27). The Patna High Court (in circuit at Cuttack) in Mir Amhad Ali v. The King Emperor 16 C.L.T. 59, held that where in a fracas some of the accused bore some injuries and the prosecution evidence does not explain as to how the accused came by the injuries, the accused are entitled to an acquittal particularly when the prosecution is guilty of suppression of a part of the occurrence. 11. As we have already discussed, the alleged eve-witnesses were mostly casual spectators. There were contradictions in their statements. 11. As we have already discussed, the alleged eve-witnesses were mostly casual spectators. There were contradictions in their statements. One of the prosecution witnesses (P.W.9) before the Committing Magistrate had to be declared hostile on a material point. He said that he did not mark any weapons in the hands of accused persons who were present on the spot. These circumstances are indeed suspicious and consequently no absolute reliance could be placed on the evidence of the eye-witnesses. Mere competence to depose as an eye witness does not necessarily mean that this evidence should be taken as reliable. Here, all the eye-witness apparently belonged to a hostile faction and it is clear that they were suppressing a material portion of the occurrence. Therefore, it is difficult to accept their evidence as to how exactly the fight took place. If a consistent story had been put forward, it might be possible for us even to accept the testimony of these partisan witnesses specially where there were admittedly two rival parties both claiming fishery lease in respect of the tank and disinterested persons might not be available. But when in the teeth of apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of the witnesses on material points which consequently did not tally, it would be extremely hazardous for a Court to conjecture as to how the fight must have taken place. Mr. P. C. Chatterji, the learned defence counsel cited before us a decision of this High Court in Kasinath Patro v. State and Bhagaban Pradhan v. State 24 C.L.T. 23, (Narasimham, C.J. and Rau, J.), where on somewhat similar facts Chief Justice Narasimham in his judgment observed that the nature of the injuries sustained by both sides lent some support to the view that there was some sort of mutual fight during the course of which the deceased sustained fatal injuries; but the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as to how he was assaulted and who his assailants were could not be accepted and the accused-Appellants could claim the benefit of doubt and accordingly, the Appellants were acquitted. 12. 12. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis, it is not possible for is to accept the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution as coming with a true story; but nevertheless, the materials transpiring in the prosecution case go a great way to make the defence version plausible and reasonable and lead us to entertain grave and reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused persons. 13. In conclusion, therefore, both the Criminal Appeals being Criminal Appeal Nos. 76 and 82 of 1958 are allowed, all the accused-Appellants are acquitted of the offences u/s 302 and 148 Indian Penal Code, the convictions and sentences are set aside and the accused-Appellants are to be set at liberty forthwith. Mohapatra, J. 14. I agree. 15. Appeals allowed. Final Result : Allowed