JUDGMENT R.S. Shukla, Member The appellant is an ex-proprietor of village Notinpur, tahsil Mungeli, district Bilaspur. Against item 5, Bab IV of the village Wajib-ul-arz of 1927-28 there was an entry that the 64 teak trees involved in this case belonged to the Malguzar. This Bab related to the rights in Banjar land (wasteland). While preparing a new Wajib-ul-arz the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms revised this entry and recorded the 64 trees as belonging to Government. The matter went up in appeal to the Board of Revenue which, by its appellate order dated 26-6-53 set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, dated 28-3-52 on the ground that the procedure prescribed u/s 47, Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act was not correctly followed and remanded the case for fresh disposal according to law. The learned Additional Deputy Commissioner who dealt with, the case after remand rejected appellant's claim. Hence this appeal. A perusal of the record does not clearly indicate as to how the order of the Board was subsequently complied with. It appears that on the report of the patwari dated 25-12-54 that the appellant had cut certain trees from the Big Tree Forest (B.T.F.) of the village, entirely new proceedings were started against him. It is not mentioned whether these proceedings were commenced u/s 202 of the Land Revenue Act or some other provision of law. No notice appears to have been sent to the appellant although his presence is marked in the order-sheet entry dated 3-10-55. A reading of the entire order-sheet does not disclose the subject-matter which was under inquiry of the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner. The reports of the patwari and the Revenue Inspector also do not furnish any guidance. Presumably this inquiry related to the cutting of the trees from the B. T. F. If so, this was obviously something quite apart from the matter which was remanded by the Board of Revenue for fresh decision according to law. Any way, the case lingered on with snail's speed and on 7-12-55 the appellant produced copies of Wajib-ul-arz for the years 1927-28 and 1943-44 along with Milan Khasra of 1909-10 and the case was closed for orders. Any way, the case lingered on with snail's speed and on 7-12-55 the appellant produced copies of Wajib-ul-arz for the years 1927-28 and 1943-44 along with Milan Khasra of 1909-10 and the case was closed for orders. A reading of the impugned order, on the other hand, shows that after remand from the Board of Revenue a proclamation was issued inviting objections against the proposed revision of the Wajib-ul-arz and the same was published in the village. The exact language used by the lower Court is as follows: A proclamation inviting objections was published in the village as usual and facts were ascertained at the time of the in star enquiries. This proclamation is, however, not on record and there is no mention of it in the order-sheet. It is, therefore, difficult to say whether the lower Court referred to some other proclamation issued on a different occasion or that the proclamation, if it pertained to the present case, was otherwise regular and in order. The observations of the lower Court, cited above, are conveniently vague and, in any case, the action taken by it was not at all a proper compliance of the Board's order. In fact, the entire proceedings of the lower Court betray a deplorable degree of carelessness. If the intention was, as it should have been, that the appellant should be noticed to show cause why a particular change or modification may not be made in the village administration paper, a clear proclamation should have been issued so as to offer reasonable opportunity for interested persons to submit their objections, if any, and the fact of such publication should have been clearly recorded in the order-sheet of the case. Failures of this kind to observe the normal procedure present unnecessary and avoidable difficulties at the appellate stage and very often result in the prolongation of litigation to the cost of the litigants. The use of the words so often indulged in, is meaningless unless it is also stated at the appropriate stage what the was and what was done. The record shows that the inquiry related to the cutting of trees while the order passed by the lower Court (as also the heading of the case file) are referable to the correction of the Wajib-ul-arz entries !! The record shows that the inquiry related to the cutting of trees while the order passed by the lower Court (as also the heading of the case file) are referable to the correction of the Wajib-ul-arz entries !! The impugned order makes a very confused reading and is exposed to be challenged on grounds such as lack of opportunity, vagueness of the order or the issue on which evidence was called for and the like. I cannot but severely deprecate such un-business-like and non-judicial approach of the revenue officers in the disposal of revenue cases, a tendency which seems to be growing. For the above irregularities committed by the lower Court, I would have remanded the case for further inquiry but I have advisably refrained from doing so as, for apart from further prolonging the litigation, it will serve no useful purpose as the following observations would show. The case of the appellant, in short, is that the entry in the Wajib-ul-arz to the effect that the 64 teak trees in the Banjar belong to the Malguzar should not be deleted. Assuming that this is done and the entry in question is also repeated in the Wajib-ul-arz or the Nistar Patrak, as the case may be, that would not, ipso facto, confer any right of property on the appellant over the trees in question. The scheme of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act shows that all the waste-lands, grasslands, scrub jungle, etc. vest in the State u/s 4 (1) (a) but certain properties are saved subject to certain conditions mentioned in section 5 ibid. It is conceded by the appellant that the trees in question stand on the waste-land of the village. Assuming that they were planted by the appellant and belonged to him on the date of vesting, section 4(1) (a) ibid would still operate against him and the trees would, by operation of law, vest in the State. In order to succeed in saving the trees from vesting, the onus lay on the appellant to show that his claim was protected or preserved under any sub-section of section 5 ibid. For instance, it was up to him to show that the trees fell within one of the categories of properties mentioned in sub-sections (c), (d) and (h) of section 5 ibid. For instance, it was up to him to show that the trees fell within one of the categories of properties mentioned in sub-sections (c), (d) and (h) of section 5 ibid. The record of the case shows that at no stage any such stand was taken by the appellant. No doubt, in the prayer part of his memo, of appeal before the Board, the appellant has stated that the trees may be settled with him u/s 5 (h) ibid. In the first place this change of pleadings cannot be allowed at the appellate stage and secondly, there is nothing on record to say that the trees formed a grove so as to be covered by the provisions of section 5 (h). The case of the appellant has throughout been that the entry in the Wajib-ul arz of 1927-28 should not have been altered so as to record the trees as belonging to Government. It was nowhere stated that he claimed this benefit because the trees formed a grove and were recorded in his name in the village papers. The necessary requisites of section 5 (h) are that (i) the trees should form a grove though they may be situated anywhere i.e. either on occupied or unoccupied land, and (ii) the grove should be recorded in village papers in the name of the outgoing proprietor. Under rule (ix) of Chapter 5 of the Land Records Manual, Vol. I, the patwari has to record whether the area is a 'grove' or a B.T.F. or scrub-jungle, or grass etc., etc. and if, in the instant case, the trees were not recorded as 'grove' the presumption would be against the appellant. The copy of khasra for the year 1942-43 filed by the appellant before the lower Court shows that only 50 teak trees (and not sixty) standing on K. No. 77 (B.T.F.) were in the possession of the Malguzar. That is not the same thing as to say that these trees constituted a grove and belonged personally to the appellant as such. On the other hand, it is clear that these trees formed part of the waste-land and in accordance with the provisions of section 4 (I) (a) ibid would vest in the State irrespective of the fact that they were recorded in the possession of the Malguzar or were planted by the present appellant who is the ear-proprietor. On the other hand, it is clear that these trees formed part of the waste-land and in accordance with the provisions of section 4 (I) (a) ibid would vest in the State irrespective of the fact that they were recorded in the possession of the Malguzar or were planted by the present appellant who is the ear-proprietor. In the above view it would be seen that a mere entry or its continuation in the Wajib-ul-arz that 64 teak trees on Banjar land were in the possession of the Malguzar would not make any difference so far as the vesting of the trees in the State is concerned. They would, in either case, vest in the State by operation of law unless the appellant could show that his claim was covered by the provisions of section 5 (h). Although the appellant appeared before the lower Court on several occasions with his counsel no evidence was tendered in this behalf. As it is, there being nothing on record to warrant a finding in favour of the appellant u/s 5 (h) ibid, his prayer cannot be granted even as an alternate relief. The learned counsel for the appellant, no doubt, argued the case with ability but was unable to state anything to take a contrary view. Under the circumstances it would serve little purpose to remand the case. For reasons stated, the appellant cannot claim proprietary rights over the teak trees and they must, in result, vest in the State. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.