Section 27, Income-tax Act, covers a case where the assessee refuses to produce books which he admits he possesses and also a case where the asses-eee refuses to produce books which the Income-tax Officer believes he possesses and which he contends he does not possess. In both the cases, the basis of the Income-tax Officers order is that the conduct of the assessee is contumacious and being contumacious he proceeds to make a best judgment assessment under S. 23(4). Thus, S. 2T is wide enough to cover every kind of cases where the Income-tax Officer proceeds to make a best judgment assessment by reason of the contumacious conduct of the assessee. Hence, where the Income-tax Officer has taken the view that the assessee maintains a double set of books and calls upon him to produce the other set and the assessee contends that he does not maintain a double set of books, section 27 applies, and as a specific right of appeal has been given to the assessee under S. 30 against the order passed under S. 27 and if he does not avail himself of that right, the order made by the Income-tax Officer that under the circumstances he is entitled to make a best judgment assessment becomes final and conclusive. To that extent when the assessee appeals against an assessment under S. 23(4) he cannot challenge that order. Apart from that, it is open to him to satisfy the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the assessment made by the Income-tax Officer was not a proper assessment. 12 ITR 327 dissented from. (Para 6) S. 23(4) while providing for the best judgment assessment also empowers the Income-tax Officer when the assessee is a firm to refuse to register it or to cancel its registration if it is already registered. This provision is penal in character. The result of the contumacy of the assessee is not only that he is liable to be assessed as it were exparte but if the assessee happens to be a firm, the result of its contumacy may be that the registration of the firm may be cancelled. No provision is made under S. 27 for applying to set aside cancellation of the registration, as there is a provision for setting aside the best judgment assessment. No provision is made under S. 27 for applying to set aside cancellation of the registration, as there is a provision for setting aside the best judgment assessment. The only right with regard to the cancellation of registration is a substantive right of appeal given under S. 30; so that when a registration is cancelled under S. 23(4) the only right that the assessee has is to appeal against that order under S. 30. (Para 7) Whereas the Act has set up a machinery under S. 27 for challenging the decision of the Income-tax Officer to assess according to his best bhai Dhulaji and Daulatram Kundanmal as mentioned in the plaint are firm-names and a firm name is not always the name of the proprietor of a firm. Therefore, the only person described with particularity is the successor of Bansidhar Bajranglal which is represented now by Pannalal Hariram. The learned Judge was therefore, right in taking the view that the names of the parties were not mentioned with particularity in the notice. But this, in our opinion, is not a substantial contention, because even if plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 3 are rejected on the ground that they are firms while they are mentioned in the notice as individuals, plaintiff No. 4 still survives and there is no reason why with regard to plaintiff No. 4 the notice is not a proper notice. (27) But the more serious objection with regard to the notice is the objection based upon the contention that the proper person to be sued is the Municipal Corporation and not the Municipal Commissioner. S. 4 (a) shows that one of the Municipal Authorities is the Corporation and S. 5 (2) provides: "The corporation shall, by the name of The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, be a body corporate and have perpetual succession and a common seal and by such name may sue and be sued." Again, S. 61 (1) of the Act shows that one of the duties of the Corporation is to secure and to remove dangerous buildings and places. S. 527, by sub-s. (1), provides: "No suit shall be instituted against the corporation or against the Commissioner, the General Manager or a Deputy Commissioner, or against any municipal officer or servant, in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act." The provision contained in S. 527 is, therefore, mandatory and the language would seem to be simi-lar to the language as used in S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case reported in Bhagchand v. Secretary of State, 29 Bom LR 1227 section 80 is express, explicit and mandatory, and it admits of no implications or exceptions. If, therefore, one of the duties cast upon a Corporation is to secure or remove dangerous buildings, there can be no question that the person to be sued is not the Municipal Commissioner but the Corporation and it is not sufficient compliance with S. 527 to say that a suit would be filed against the Municipal Corporation. It may be that the objection is one of technicality, but if a certain form is prescribed, according to which a notice is to be given in a particular form, I think it is essential that the form prescribed should be strictly adhered to, because, after all, the object of giving a notice is not merely to show as to what claim the plaintiff is making in the suit but also to show against whom the claim is made. Moreover, the learned Judge was right in taking the view that the Municipal Commissioner was not the proper person to be sued. The Municipal Commissioner is not a body corporate. He could not, therefore, be sued. It is not, therefore, sufficient compliance with S. 527 to give notice to the Municipal Commissioner and not to give notice to the Municipal Corporation. That a notice given to the Municipal Commissioner is not in order would be seen by reference to the case reported in 29 Bom LR 1227. Although, therefore Mr. He could not, therefore, be sued. It is not, therefore, sufficient compliance with S. 527 to give notice to the Municipal Commissioner and not to give notice to the Municipal Corporation. That a notice given to the Municipal Commissioner is not in order would be seen by reference to the case reported in 29 Bom LR 1227. Although, therefore Mr. Chandrachud may be right that even if the first three plaintiffs disappear from the record, the fourth plaintiff can sustain the suit, we cannot accept the contention that the notice is good in spite of the grave infirmity that the proper person to be sued is the Corporation and not the Municipal Commissioner. (28) But Mr. Chandrachud contended that no notice was necessary to be given under S. 527 because of the mala fides which he had alleged in the plaint. There is no substance in this contention also. The plaintiffs have not proved the mala fides, alleged by them. As I have pointed out earlier, the theory of mala fides was abandoned, in view of the opinion given by the Municipal Commissioner and if the notice was bona fide, then there is no question that S. 527 requires that a notice is to be given in respect of any act done in pursuance of the Act. It is also in respect of the intended execution of the Act. In our view, therefore, the learned Judge was right in coming to the conclusion that the suit was not maintainable for want of proper notice as required by S. 527. (29) The contention based upon mala fides has no substance, because we have already held that the plaintiffs had really no evidence to give, in view of the opinion given by the Municipal Commissioner. I cannot imagine that a Judge would proceed to dispose of a suit when one of the issues still remained to be heard and decided on evidence, unless it be upon the footing that it was conceded at the Bar that in view of the opinion of the Municipal Commissioner, the plaintiffs had no evidence to give as regards the mala fides. (30) Mr. Chandrachud appearing for the plaintiffs adopted the arguments of Mr. Phadke both as regards S. 354 which, according to Mr. (30) Mr. Chandrachud appearing for the plaintiffs adopted the arguments of Mr. Phadke both as regards S. 354 which, according to Mr. Phadke, required a judicial approach and also on the ground that S 354 was open to a challenge in view of Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. But with regard to the latter point Mr. Chandrachud, as was to be expected, took up a further point. He contended that in order that a restriction may be reasonable, it is necessary that the person upon whom the restriction is placed is heard and he contended that no restriction is reasonable unless the person affected by the restriction is given a hearing. In this connection, he relied upon a decision of this Court reported in 52 Bom LR 544 of the report (Bom LR) the learned Chief Justice points out: "But what is much more important, and to my mind what is fatal to the validity of the restriction placed by the Legislature, is the fact that the person against whom an order of externment is to be made has no right whatever to be heard in his defence before he is asked to leave his home and hearth and go and reside in some other place. There is no obligation upon the authority to tell him what he is charged with or what are the grounds against him which make it incumbent upon the Government to ask him to leave his home town. Nor is there any obligation upon the authority to hear the person against whom the order is intended to be made in his defence before the order is made." Now, Jeshingbhais case (AIR 1950 Bom 363), was a case dealing with an externment order and, therefore, the question was with regard to the personal liberty of the citizen and the curious feature which was pointed out by the learned Chief Justice was that whereas in the case of an order of detention opportunity is given to the person detained, no such opportunity is given to the person against whom an order of externment is made, and Mr. Chandrachud pointed out to us what he considered to. be a contrast between the cases decided in 52 Bom LR 544 and 52 Bom LR 558; Emperor v. Abdul Rahiman. Chandrachud pointed out to us what he considered to. be a contrast between the cases decided in 52 Bom LR 544 and 52 Bom LR 558; Emperor v. Abdul Rahiman. It was pointed out in the latter case - and I think correctly - that there was a provision whereby the person against whom an order was made had a right to be heard and also had a right of appeal to the Provincial Government and it was said, again with respect, correctly that the principle in Jeshingbhais case (AIR 1950 Bom 363), would not apply to the case reported at page 558. But Jeshingbhais case on which reliance has been placed strongly was considered in a later case which is reported in 58 Bom LR 418. The learned Chief Justice after referring to the case at p. 422 (of Bom LR) of the report distinguished that case from the case of Barrarao Dhondiba, ((S) AIR 1956 Bom 300 ). At p. 423 of the report (Bom LR) this is what he stated: "But even assuming that provision should be made for representation to be made by all the citizens of Greater Bombay, it is still difficult to understand on what point or issue that representation should be made, because the Legislature has left it to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police as to whether there is an emergency which calls for the issuing of such an order for the preservation of the public order. It is not any one elses satisfaction, it is not any one elses judgment, that has to determine or to decide whether such an order should be issued or not. It is only the opinion and the decision of the Commissioner of Police that is conclusive in the matter." It is true that that was a case in which one of the elements considered was the element of emergency. But in this case the principle underlying Section 354 is a principle about the policy of the law and if the satisfaction is the satisfaction of the authority concerned and the question of public safety is involved, then I think it is not reasonable to hold that merely because a person has no right to be heard, that, therefore, the restriction placed upon the right is not a reasonable restriction. To the same effect are the observations in Spl. To the same effect are the observations in Spl. C. A. No. 233 of 1956, to which I have referred above. (31) There is one point to which reference may be made before finishing consideration of the argument and that is the point urged by Mr. Rediz. Mr. Rediz seems to contend - if I understand him correctly - that in view of the amendment of Art. 31 in 1955 the decisions of the Supreme Court to which Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar has referred, do not remain as binding authorities. But we have a two fold difficulty. We have not merely a decision of a Division Bench to explain but we have a current of authorities of the Supreme Court to which reference has been made exhaustively in the judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar. If Mr. Rediz is right, the forum is not this Court and we do not propose to express any opinion upon the point urged by him. (32) In the result therefore, all these contentions must fail. It follows that the appeal must fail. (33) As regards costs in F. A. No. 224 of 1957, we think that the fair order to make would be that the appellants and the first respondent will bear their own costs. But the appellants will pay the costs of respondent No. 2. As regards costs in F. A. No. 650 of 1956 the appellants and respondent No. 3 will bear their own costs. But the appellants will pay the costs of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in one set. Appeals dismissed.