Judgment Kanhaiya Singh, J. 1. In this case applicant moves under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of prohibition directed to the Regional Transport Authority, North Bihar, Muzaffarpur (opposite party 1) to prohibit it from proceeding with the application of Jagarnath Prasad (Opposite Party 2) for grant of a temporary permit between Paleza Ghat and Ziradei in the district of Saran. The ground on which prohibition is sought is that under Sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act the Regional Transport Authority has no power to grant a temporary permit during the pendency of an application for the grant of new permit under Sec. 46 or Section 54 of the said Act. The facts that need to be stated for the disposal of this application are these. 2. There are three persons holding permanent stage carriage permits to run passenger bus service, two of them including the petitioner from Paleza Ghat to Gopalgani covering a distance of 101 miles, and the third between Paleza Ghat and Ziradei for a distance of 98 miles, with a common route of 78 miles. In 1948 opposite) party 1 decided to allow another bus service on the same routes, and by a notification no. 1016 NRT dated 26th March, 1958, published in the official Gazette of Bihar invited applications for the same. Since a new vacancy had been created, the applicant was entitled to law to apply for permanent permit for this new bus service also. Opposite party 2 was one of the applicants for the same. During the pendency of these applications the Regional Transport Authority, North Bihar (opposite party 1) by its order dated 16th March, 1958, granted a temporary permit to opposite party 2 to run bus service between Paleza Ghat and Ziradei for a period of four months, from 20th March to 20th July, 1958. The applicant filed an application under Sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act to the State Transport Authority to revise the said order of opposite party 1 on the ground of illegality and want of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, For the applicant, the said Transport Authority took no action, and although the period of four months for which the temporary permit was valid has expired, the application still awaits its decision. In the meantime, opposite party 2 made another application for extension of the period of the first temporary permit. Unfortunately, For the applicant, the said Transport Authority took no action, and although the period of four months for which the temporary permit was valid has expired, the application still awaits its decision. In the meantime, opposite party 2 made another application for extension of the period of the first temporary permit. The petitioner filed objection, but heedless of his objection opposite party 1 by its order dated 16th/l7th July, 1958, extended the period of the temporary permit by two months with effect from 21st July, 1958. Thereupon, the applicant moved this court by an application under Article 226 for a writ of certiorari to call up and quash the said order, but since the State Transport Authority had not been moved for revision of the said order under Sec. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, this application was subsequently withdrawn. On 1st August, 1958, the applicant filed an application before the State Transport Authority under Sec. 64 of the Act. The latter did not move expeditiously in this matter, and it is alleged that before the disposal of his revisional application, the Regional Transport Authority (opposite party 1) has again entertained another application of opposite party 2 made in the second week of September, 1958, for issue of a temporary permit in continuation of the earlier temporary permit which is due to expire on 20th September, 1958. The petitioner prays that grant of temporary permit is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction, having regard to the provisions of Sec. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and accordingly opposite party 1 should be restrained by an appropriate order from proceeding with the application of opposite party 2 for grant of temporary permit. 3. The applicant also sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order of opposite party 1 dated 16th/ 17th July, 1958, Since however, the order has spent its force, and the period of temporary permit has already expired, learned counsel for the applicant did not, and 1 think rightly, press for a writ of certiorari. 4. Opposite party 2 in his affidavit did not controvert the facts alleged in the petition of the applicant. He supported the grant of the temporary permit to him on the ground of public convenience and benefit to the passengers. 4. Opposite party 2 in his affidavit did not controvert the facts alleged in the petition of the applicant. He supported the grant of the temporary permit to him on the ground of public convenience and benefit to the passengers. He alleged further that the operation of this temporary bus service did not at all affect the interests of the petitioner or other permit-holders. 5. The only question is whether during the pendency of the application for permanent permits grant of temporary permits was valid in law. Mr. Basudeo Prasad appearing for the applicant contended that it was not and referred to Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides as follows :- "A Regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in Sec. 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use o£ a transport vehicle temporarily:- - (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of permit; and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit, Provided that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under Sec. 46 or Sec. 54 during the pendency of the application. Provided further that a temporary permit under this section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for renewal)." This section is perfectly clear and invests the Regional Transport Authority with power to grant temporary permits without following the procedure laid down in Sec. 57 for the purposes specified in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d). The exercise of tins power is subject to the exception laid down in the first proviso to this section. When once an application for grant of a new permit under Sec. 46 or Sec. 54 of the Act has been made, during the pendency of such application no temporary permit shall be granted in any case in respect of any route of area specified in the said application. Mr. When once an application for grant of a new permit under Sec. 46 or Sec. 54 of the Act has been made, during the pendency of such application no temporary permit shall be granted in any case in respect of any route of area specified in the said application. Mr. P.R. Das appearing for the opposite party put Forward the argument that the Regional Transport Authority was competent to grant a temporary permit to meet a particular temporary need, as provided in Clause (c) of Sec. 62 of the Act. His further submission is that the first proviso to this section puts unreasonable restriction on the power of the Regional Transport Authority to grant permit, especially when the convenience of the passengers needed provision for further bus service. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Das is not valid and cannot be accepted as correct. There is undoubted power in the Regional Transport Authority, to grant temporary permits to meet special situation or in special circumstances. The proviso, however, puts a limitation upon this power and forbids grant of a temporary permit when application for a regular permit is pending. The main object of this proviso is to prevent nepotism and undue favour to one of the applicants to the disadvantage of the other applicants. It is not unlikely that in absence of such restriction although several persons might have put in applications for permanent permits, one of them might be undoubtedly favoured by the authority and given temporary permits from time to time and to the detriment of other applicants. This will prevent expeditious disposal of the applications and cause unnecessary prejudice to the other applicants. In my opinion, this restriction cannot be regarded as unreasonable and is meant to prevent injustice to the other applicants. Whenever applications for permanent permits are pending the proper course for the Regional Transport Authority is to dispose of those applications as expeditiously as possible and not to delay their disposal by recourse to temporary permits which will manifestly operate great prejudice to the other applicants. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Das must be overruled. Whenever applications for permanent permits are pending the proper course for the Regional Transport Authority is to dispose of those applications as expeditiously as possible and not to delay their disposal by recourse to temporary permits which will manifestly operate great prejudice to the other applicants. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Das must be overruled. The provisions of the first proviso to Sec. 62 are mandatory, and the Regional Transport Authority has no power to grant temporary permits in any case during the pendency of the application for the grant or new permits under Sec. 46 or Section 54 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, the Regional Transport Authority has as jurisdiction at all to entertain an application from opposite party 2 for grant of temporary permits. When grant of temporary permits, in the circumstances of the present case, is beyond the ambit of the power conferred upon it by Sec. 62, I think the order of prohibition should go. I am fortified in this view by the decisions of the Kings Bench Division in the cases of R. V/s. County of London Quarter Sessions, (1348) I All ER 72, and R. V/s. West Kent Quarter Sessions (1951) 2 All ER 728. In the first case one Stanley Arther Williams was bound down by the Magistrate and was directed to enter into his own recognizance in the sum of 225 to be of a good behaviour for a period of twelve months. He gave notice of appeal to the Quarter Sessions against this order. Art application was moved to prohibit the Quarter Sessions from hearing the appeal on the ground that no appeal was provided by law, It was held that no appeal lay from the order of the Magistrate to Quarter Sessions. Accordingly the order of prohibition asked for was given in this case. In the second case, one Sydney Neill pleaded guilty to a charge and was convicted by a court of Summary Jurisdiction. He appealed against his conviction and sentence. Sec.36 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, provided for an appeal in case the accused persons pleaded guilty or admitted the truth of the information, against his sentence only. Therefore, the appeal by Sydney Neill against his conviction was not competent. An application was made for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Quarter Sessions from hearing the appeal. Sec.36 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, provided for an appeal in case the accused persons pleaded guilty or admitted the truth of the information, against his sentence only. Therefore, the appeal by Sydney Neill against his conviction was not competent. An application was made for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Quarter Sessions from hearing the appeal. It was held in this case that as the accused had pleaded guilty in the court below, the Quarter Sessions had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. In these circumstances, a writ of prohibition was issued. The ratio decidendi of this case governs the present case also. The Regional Transport Authority opposite party (1) had no right to entertain an application from opposite party 2 for a temporary permit when applications of the petitioner and others, including opposite party 2 for new permits were still pending. 6. In the result, this application is allowed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 64/-. Writ of prohibition will issue to the Regional Transport Authority prohibiting it from entertaining the application of opposite party 2 for grant of temporary permit. V.Ramaswami, J. 7 I agree.