ORDER N. Varadaraja Iyengar, J. 1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution by Messrs. Palghat Central Transports, complaining against the fixation by the Secretary of the 1st Respondent Regional Transport Authority, Palghat, of certain timings, on the application made by Respondents 2 and 3, viz. The Nataraja Motor Service, Nemmara, Palghat and the National Bus Transport, Palghat. 2. On 4-12-1957, the 1st respondent Authority invited applications for grant of two stage carriage permits for the route Peringottukurissi-Pollachi, via Kottayi, Kozhalmannam, Koduvayoor, Pudunagaram, Kollengode and Govinda-puram, a straight distance of 45 miles. There were 12 applicants for the route. The 1st respondent granted the two permits to respondents 2 and 3 by Ext. A order dated 26-5-1958. These respondents thereafter, on 27-5-1958, applied to the Secretary for fixing timings in respect of their permits. It was then that the impugned order filed as Ext. B was passed. The order styles itself to be a tentative one until final orders are passed after hearing representations to be made on or before 19-6-1958 and at the timing conference to be held on 11-7-1958. 3. There are two grounds of attack against Ext. B order taken before me (1) that the Secretary who passed the same had not the authority to do so, and (2) that the order involves the fixation of cut trips and timings for the same in violation of the terms of Ext. A order granting the permits. The sufficiency of these grounds is questioned by respondents 2 and 3 who have entered appearance. 4. As the second ground is sufficient to allow the petition take it up first. There is no doubt, in my opinion, that Ext. B order as passed by the secretary, involves not alone the straight route from Peringottukurissi to Pollachi covered by the permit but also of portion of the route or cut route as it is called between Pollachi to Kozhalmannam and back. It seems to me that the secretary, assuming he has the power to fix the timings in aid of the permit granted by the Road Transport Authority, cannot so fix them as to authorise variations of the route. The only argument on which learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 seeks to support Ext. It seems to me that the secretary, assuming he has the power to fix the timings in aid of the permit granted by the Road Transport Authority, cannot so fix them as to authorise variations of the route. The only argument on which learned counsel for the respondents 2 and 3 seeks to support Ext. B order is to say that a "route" has not been defined anywhere in the act and may be intrepreted as part of a route. But that certainly is not possible. See the meaning of "route" given in the Oxford Dictionary " way taken in getting from starting point to destination". That is to say the line between the two termini of Peringottukurissi and Pollachi here and not part thereof. Learned counsel for the respondents said that Ext. B is only an interlocutory order capable of being rectified by the Subordinate Authority in the course of the conference proposed. And he referred to certain authorities expressing the view that the Court will be unwilling to interfere in matters of this sort, e.g. Kuriakose v Central Road Traffic Board, 1953 KLT 879 and Asiatic Engineering Co. v Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 All. 746 . But we have the authority of the Supreme Court in Narendranath v Commr, of Hills Division 1958 S. C. 398, that even interlocutory orders will be interfered with when they are passed in flagrant violation of a party's rights. 5. Learned counsel finally said that the petitioner was estopped from contending against the validity of the fixation of cut trips and timings therefor as here because, he had himself obtained the benefit of such fixations in other proceedings. But this has no relevance on the question of jurisdiction involved in the order herein. 6. It follows, therefore, that Ext. B order is invalid to the extent it has fixed cut routes and timings therefor. Ext. B order will therefore stand quashed to the above extent. The Original Petition is thus allowed to the above extent and dismissed otherwise. There will however be no order for costs.