JUDGMENT A.P. Srivastava, J. - This application in revision raises a short but interesting question of law. The facts are not much in dispute. The applicant Sri Arjun Singh Bhadoria is a leader of the Praja Socialist Party, Etawah, and the other two applicants Sri Raja Ram and Sri Lal Ji are members of his party. In January 1955, one Hub Lal was said to have been beaten by the police authorities of Jaswantnagar. The applicant, Sri Arjun Singh Bahadoria, brought him on a car to the residence of the Sudpt. of Police of Etawah on 29-1-1955. At the direction of the Supdt. of Police he was admitted as an indoor patient in the Sadar Hospital, Etawah. It is however said that on 1-2-1955 Hub Lal was forcibly removed from the Sadar Hospital with the help and connivance of the police authorities. The applicant Sri Arjun Singh Bhadoria felt aggrieved at this and wrote a letter to the Sudpt. of Police on 2-2 1955 demanding that Hub Lal should be readmitted in Sadar Hospital and that the Police Authorities concerned should be adequately punished. In that letter he expressed his intention to resort to hunger strike at the residence of the Supdt. of Police if his damands were not fulfilled. On 3-2-1955 at 10 a.m. Sri Arjun Singh Bhadoria entered the compound of the bungalow of the Supdt. of Police, Etawah and took his seat in the visitors' shed and started his hunger strike, the other Appellants Sri Lal ji and Sri Raja Ram accompanied him and they too took their seats in the same shed. The Supdt. of Police naturally felt annoyed. The applicants were asked to remove themselves from the compound of the bungalow but they persisted in remaining there and Sri Arjun Singh continued his hunger strike. They were subsequently informed that Hub Lal had been readmitted in the hospital and that the complaint against the police officials was being enquired into. They were told that their presence in the visitors' shed was causing annoyance to the Supdt. of Police. They however refused to leave the place. They were arrested at 4 a.m. in the night between the 3/4-2-1955, after they had been there for 18 hours and were subsequently prosecuted u/s 447, IPC for criminal trespass. 2. They were told that their presence in the visitors' shed was causing annoyance to the Supdt. of Police. They however refused to leave the place. They were arrested at 4 a.m. in the night between the 3/4-2-1955, after they had been there for 18 hours and were subsequently prosecuted u/s 447, IPC for criminal trespass. 2. The applicants did not deny the fact that they had entered the compound of the Supdt, of Police Etawah at about 10 a.m. on 3-2-1955 and had occupied the visi tors' shed till they were arrested at 4 a.m. in the night between the 3/4-2-1955. Sri Arjun Singh also admitted that he was on hunger strike during his 18 hours' stay in the visitors' shed. He however contended that he had resorted to hunger strike for self purification at the direction of his inner voice and that he had a right to do so because it was necessary for him to protest against the unjustified conduct of the police. He said that he had no intention to intimidate, annoy or insult the Supdt. of Police. He added that the persons present near the visitors' shed had told him that no one felt annoyed, insulted or intimidated by the hunger strike which he had undertaken. The other two applicants admitted having stayed with Sri Arjun Singh in the visitors' shed but said that they had gone there to make a complaint to the Supdt. of Police. 3. Three witnesses, Sri S. U. Zuberi, City Kotwal, Mushtaq Ahmad, Circle Inspector and Jogindrapal Singh, another Circle Inspector of Police were produced in support of the prosecution case. The applicants examined Sri Debi Dayal Dubey, Sri Amar Nath Pandey and Sri Balram Dubey in their defence. The learned Magistrate who tried them summarily accepted the prosecution case that the applicants had trespassed into the visitors' shed of the bungalow of the Supdt, of Police with the intention of annoying and intimidating him. He therefore convicted the applicants u/s 447, IPC and sentenced each of them to three months' rigorous imprisonment. The applicants preferred an appeal to the Civil and Sessions Judge Etawah who upheld their conviction but reduced the sentence of Sri Arjun Singh Bhadoria to one months' rigorous imprisonment and those of Sri Lal Jit and Raja Ram to two weeks rigorous imprisonment. With this modification he dismissed the appeal. 4. The applicants preferred an appeal to the Civil and Sessions Judge Etawah who upheld their conviction but reduced the sentence of Sri Arjun Singh Bhadoria to one months' rigorous imprisonment and those of Sri Lal Jit and Raja Ram to two weeks rigorous imprisonment. With this modification he dismissed the appeal. 4. The applicants have now come up in revision and question the correctness of their conviction. A number of points were raised before the Sessions Judge, but all of them except one have been given up here. The only point which has been pressed on behalf of the applicants in this Court is that the offence u/s 477, IPC cannot be held to have been made out because the intention with which the applicants trespassed into the visitors' shed of the Supdt. of Police was not one of the intentions mentioned in S. 441, IPC but was the intention of going on a hunger strike for the purpose of self purification and for the redress of certain grievances against the police authorities. On this grouud it is urged that the conviction of the applicants was illegal and must be set aside. Reliance is placed in this connection on a Full Bench case of the Lahore High Court reported in AIR 1938 514 (Lahore) 5. S. 447, IPC provides for the punishment of criminal trespass, and the criminal trespass has been defined in S. 441 of the Code which is in these terms: 441. Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an offence is said to commit criminal trespass. 6. It is obvious that the essence of the offence of criminal trespass lies in the intention with which the trespass is committed. By itself trespass on property in the pessession of another is not an offence though it may make the trespasser liable for damages or eviction in a Civil Court. The trespass becomes an offence only if it is done with one of the intentions mentioned in S. 441. That intention must be either to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession. The trespass becomes an offence only if it is done with one of the intentions mentioned in S. 441. That intention must be either to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the person in possession. 7. Forming of an intention is a mental act and direct evidence cannot be expected to be produced about it. Intention has therefore to be inferred from admitted or proved facts and the question with what particular intention a person trespassed on the property in the possession of another must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Two things however appear to be well settled in this connection. The first is that the intention contemplated by S. 441, IPC is the primary intention and not the secondary or subsidiary intention of the trespasser. The other is that knowledge is not identical with the intention. A trespasser may know that his act if discovered may cause annoyance but that does not necessarily mean that he commits the trespass with intent to annoy. Another principle which has to be borne in mind is that every one is presumed to intend the natural consequence by his acts and if certain results are in the natural course expected to follow from a particular course of conduct the person pursuing that course of conduct can be presumed to intend those results even though he may pretend that he actually intended something else. 8. Bearing these principles in mind we have to interpret the admitted and established facts in the present case and find out whether the trespass which the applicants admittedly committed was made with any of the intentions mentioned in S. 441, IPC. It is conceded that the applicants cannot be held to have intended to commit an offence or to insult the Supdt. of Police. What is contended is that their clear intention was to intimidate or annoy the Supdt. of Police. It is urged in the alternative that even if it is assumed that that was not the intention of the applicants at the initial stage, when after being warned that the Supdt. of Police was feeling annoyed and intimidated they persisted in remaining in the visitors' shed and Sri Bhadoria continued his hunger strike there till his demands were fulfilled their intention in so remaining in the visitors' shed certainly became one to intimidate or annoy the Supdt. of Police was feeling annoyed and intimidated they persisted in remaining in the visitors' shed and Sri Bhadoria continued his hunger strike there till his demands were fulfilled their intention in so remaining in the visitors' shed certainly became one to intimidate or annoy the Supdt. of Police, and the trespass at that stage at any rate became criminal trespass. 9. It is common ground that the applicants felt aggrieved at the conduct of the police. They thought that the police had, without any justification, assaulted Hub Lal at first, and when on their intervention he had been admitted into the Hospital they had got him removed from there. It is also not in dispute that the applicant bad two demands which they wanted the Supdt. of Police to fulfill. In the first place, they wanted Hub Lal to be readmitted into the Hospital immediately. They also wanted the police officials concerned to be adequately punished. From the letter which Sri Arjun Singh Bhadoria admittedly wrote to the Supdt. of Police before he started his hunger strike, it is clear that though professedly the hunger strike was undertaken for self purification at the bidding of the inner voice its real purpose was to compel the Supdt. of Police to fulfill the two demands which Sri Bhadoria was making. There is evidence of Sri Zuberi which has been accepted by both the courts below, to the effect that he informed the applicants that Hub Lal had already been readmitted into the Hospital and the enquiry against the police Officials concerned was pending. He also warned them that the continuance of the hunger strike in the visitors' shed was causing annoyance to the Superintendent of Police. The assurance given by Sri Zuberi was not accepted and the warning given by him went unheeded. If even after this warning and after knowing full well that their conduct was causing annoyance to the Supdt. of Police and he was feeling intimidated, the applicants did not leave the visitors' shed, but persisted in remaining there and continuing the hunger strike, it appears to be quite reasonable to infer that at least at that stage their intention in continuing the trespass became that of intimidating and annoying the Supdt. of Police. of Police and he was feeling intimidated, the applicants did not leave the visitors' shed, but persisted in remaining there and continuing the hunger strike, it appears to be quite reasonable to infer that at least at that stage their intention in continuing the trespass became that of intimidating and annoying the Supdt. of Police. Such annoyance and intimidation was the natural outcome of the applicants' conduct and the applicants had been told that that result was being produced by what they were doing. Their demands had been practicallay conceded. Hub Lal had been readmitted in the hospital. They could not expect the police officials concerned to be punished without an enquiry being held. From that stage onwards, therefore, their continued occupation of the visitors' shed can only be attributed to their intention of annoying and intimidating the Supdt. of Police. At that stage at least the pretext of self-purification under the dictates of the inner voice became a hollow excuse, and the main intention that remained was to cause annoyance to the Supdt. of Police and to cow him down to agree under compulsion to punish the police officials as desired by the applicants without any enquiry. Though the term 'criminal intimidation' has been defined in S. 503, IPC the expression used in S. 441 is not 'criminal intimidation'. It is 'Intimidation'. This latter word must therefore be interpreted according to its dictionary meaning and that includes 'Inspire with fear, cow, especially in order to influence conduct', vide concise Oxford Dictionary. If the applicants threatened to starve one of tnemselves so that the police officials concerned may be punished, it is clear that they wanted to cow down the Supdt. of Police in agreeing to act according to their wishes under the threat of their own starvation. That was clearly intimidation. It also does not need much argument to show that the Supdt. of Police must have been feeling greatly annoyed by what the applicants were doing. In the circumstances, the courts below appear to be correct in inferring that the trespass which was being committed by the applicants was at least from a particular stage being committed with the intention of intimidating and annoying the Subdt. of Police on whose property the applicants were trespassing. 10. The Lahore case of AIR 1938 514 (Lahore) does not appear to be of much help to the applicants. of Police on whose property the applicants were trespassing. 10. The Lahore case of AIR 1938 514 (Lahore) does not appear to be of much help to the applicants. In that case Elahi Bux was the owner of two continuous houses which had separate entrances and separate courtyards but had an intervening door through which one could go from one courtyard to the other. Elahi Bux lived with his sister Mst. Kariman in one of the houses while the other house was in the occupation of a police constable Manzur Ahmad Shah. The accused Mohammad Yar had illicit connection with Mst. Kariman and on the night in question he unchained the outer door of the courtyard of Manzur Ahmad's house and was passing through that courtyard in order to go to the house of Elahi Bux with the object of having sexual intercourse with Mst. Kariman. He was noticed by Manzur Ahmad's wife who raisd an alarm and he was arrested while still in the courtyard of Manzur Ahmad's house. The question raised was whether the accused had trespassed into the house of Manzur Ahmad with intent to annoy Manzur Ahmad or his wife or whether he had trespassed with the intention of committing adultery with Mst. Kariman. It was held that the accused could not have had any intention to insult or annoy Manzur Ahmad or any other person of that house. His sole object was to stealthily pass through the courtyard of Manzur Ahmad in order to enter the house of Elahi Bux to meet Mst. Kariman. He may have known that if his entry in the courtyard of Manzur Ahmad was discovered, the latter may feel annoyed but on that account it could not be held that he had any intention of insulting or annoying him. The facts of that case appear to be cleary distinguishable from those of the present one. In that case the accused had entered the courtyard of Manzur Ahmad taking precautions that his trespass may not be noticed. His intention obviously was to meet Mst. Kariman and not to insult or annoy the person through whose courtyard he was passing. In the present case, the applicants trespassed into the visitors' shed of Supdt. of Police openly and deliberately and continued to remain there even after they had been told that their presence was causing annoyance and intimidation. His intention obviously was to meet Mst. Kariman and not to insult or annoy the person through whose courtyard he was passing. In the present case, the applicants trespassed into the visitors' shed of Supdt. of Police openly and deliberately and continued to remain there even after they had been told that their presence was causing annoyance and intimidation. The facts of the two cases being entirely different, the present case cannot be governed by the principle which was applied to the Lahore case. 11. I am, therefore, of opinion that the only contention which has been urged on behalf of the applicants is entirely without force. Their conviction u/s 447 IPC is quite correct. The sentences have already been reduced by the Sessions Judge and need no further interference. The application in revision has, therefore, no merits and is rejected. If the applicants have not served out their sentences, they will surrender and serve them out now.