Judgment :- 1. The point for decision is whether a suit for recovery of arrears of rent due from a person who had surrendered possession of the holding before the date of the suit was liable to be stayed under S.4 of The Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act (I of 1957). The 1st defendant's deceased husband had taken on lease 50 acres of paddy field from the plaintiff. The lease terminated in March 1953 and from the order of the court below it appears that possession was surrendered to the plaintiff before the date of suit. The plaintiff sued for recovery of the rent which fell due in March 1953. Before the 1st defendant filed her written statement, Act I of 1957 was passed and thereupon she moved for stay of trial of the suit under S.4 of the Act. This was resisted by the plaintiff on the ground that the lease was not subsisting and that the 1st defendant was not therefore entitled to such an order. The court below upheld the plaintiff's objection and declined to pass an order staying the suit. The 1st defendant has therefore preferred this Civil Revision Petition. 2. The question whether the trial of the suit should be stayed or not depends on the construction of S.4 of the Act which is as follows : "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, with effect on and from the commencement of this Act, no suit or other proceedings for eviction of a person from his holding or for the recovery of arrears of rent in respect of, or for damages for use & occupation of, the holding accrued due before the commencement of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance, 1957, shall lie in any court and all suits, proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings pending in the Courts at such commencement for such eviction or recovery of arrears of such rent or damages shall be stayed". 3. According to the learned judge, the preamble of the Act indicated that it was intended to give temporary protection to tenants, Kudikidappukars etc., pending enactment of a comprehensive legislation relating to tenancy and a person who had surrendered possession of the holding was not a tenant entitled to such protection. I am unable to accept this conclusion. 3. According to the learned judge, the preamble of the Act indicated that it was intended to give temporary protection to tenants, Kudikidappukars etc., pending enactment of a comprehensive legislation relating to tenancy and a person who had surrendered possession of the holding was not a tenant entitled to such protection. I am unable to accept this conclusion. The learned judge's view is based solely on the preamble of the Act and the section has been totally ignored by him. The general rule regarding the effect of the preamble upon the enacting part of the statute has been stated by the Earl of Halsbury in Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. (1899 A. C. 143) in the following terms: "Two propositions are quite clear, one that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, and the other that if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment. And Lord Davey in the same case said: "But, further, I am of opinion that the argument itself is illegitimate if it is sought thereby to cut down the language of the enactment according to its plain and natural meaning or to restrict the enactment to the particular matter set forth in the preambles. 'Undoubtedly'-I quote from Chitty, L. J's judgment words with which I cordially agree-'it is a settled rule that the preamble cannot be made use of to control the enactments themselves where they are expressed in clear and unambiguous terms'. But the preamble is the key to the statute, and affords a clue to the scope of the statute, where the words construed in themselves without the aid of the preamble are capable of more than one meaning. There is, however another rule of warning which cannot be too often repeated, that you must not create or imagine an ambiguity in order to bring in the aid of the preamble or recital. To do so would in many cases frustrate the enactment and the general intention of the Legislature." 4. The section must therefore be examined to see whether there is any ambiguity. To do so would in many cases frustrate the enactment and the general intention of the Legislature." 4. The section must therefore be examined to see whether there is any ambiguity. It prohibits institution of suits for eviction of a person from his holding or recovery of arrears of rent in respect of or for damages for use and occupation of the holding accrued before the commencement of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance 1957. There is a further provision for stay of trial of such suits and proceedings in execution of decrees or orders and other proceedings pending in courts on the date of the Ordinance So far as the provision for stay of suits for eviction is concerned, the suits contemplated are those in which the tenants are in possession and it is clear that the leases need not be subsisting on the date of suit because a suit for recovery of possession is instituted only when the lease is determined. The words used in the section are, "Eviction of a person from his holding" and not eviction of a tenant. Thus for the application of S.4 the lease need not have been subsisting on the date of the suit. There are no restrictive words in the section to indicate that it would apply only to such suits as are instituted during the continuance of the lease. So far as a suit for recovery of rent is concerned all that the section requires is that the amount sued for must be rent of a holding and that such rent must have accrued due before the commencement of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance. The section does not require that the holding should be in the possession of the tenant when the benefit of the section is claimed. The protection given is to a category of persons viz, those who have incurred obligations either for surrender of holdings or for payment of arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation of a holding or both. The real test is to see whether the claim sought to be enforced is one for arrears of rent of a holding. This is clear from the fact that the section provides for stay of proceedings in execution of decrees or orders for eviction or recovery of rent etc. The real test is to see whether the claim sought to be enforced is one for arrears of rent of a holding. This is clear from the fact that the section provides for stay of proceedings in execution of decrees or orders for eviction or recovery of rent etc. If the view taken by the court below is adopted, execution proceedings for recovery of arrears of rent cannot be stayed where the decree-holder has recovered possession of the holding before realisation of the rent. Such a conclusion is not warranted by the section. The question whether the defendant is in possession of the holding or not is therefore quite irrelevant in deciding whether the suit should be stayed or not. In my opinion there is no ambiguity in the section and there is no need to imagine an ambiguity where none exists so as to bring in the aid of the preamble. I may also add that the preamble does not warrant the conclusion that protection is intended to be given to the tenants only during the continuance of the lease. What is intended is to give protection to persons who have come into possession as tenants or Kudikidappukarans as the case may be, in respect of obligations arising out of the relation of landlord and tenant. The view taken by the court below is therefore unsustainable and the order must be set aside. 5. The Civil Revision Petition is accordingly allowed and the order of the court below is set aside. The suit will stand stayed during the continuance of Act I of 1957. In the circumstances I make no order as to costs. Allowed.