JUDGMENT Dayal, J. - This is a special appeal against the order of a learned single Judge rejecting the Appellant's writ petition praying for the quashing of the proceedings of the meeting of Haldwani-Kathgodam Municipal Board dated 18-6-1957 in connection with the no confidence motion against the Appellant. 2. Two points have been urged before us by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant. One is that the meeting convened on 18-6-1957 had been held beyond the period of thirty-five days allowed to the Distt. Magistrate under sub-6. (3) of S. 87 A of the Municipalities Act from the date of the presentation of the no-confidence motion to him. The second point is that the Municipal Board Haldwani Kathgodam was constituted in accordance with the provisions of S. 10 of the Municipalities Act and that the Government notification varying the constitution of the Board was bad as it did not indicate that the Government was satisfied that certain circumstances rendered inadvisable the application to this municipality of the provisions of S. 9 of the Act. In this connection it was further contended that even S. 10 of the Municipalities Act was ultra vires as it gave very wide powers to the State Government amounting to delegation of powers to legislate. 3. The learned single Judge held against the Appellant on both these points. 4. On the second point we need simply say that if the contention for the Appellant is correct, the Municipal Board of which he was the Chairman before the passing of the no-confidence motion against him was itself an illegally constituted body and that therefore the Appellant does not deserve success in this appeal on the ground that that would amount to his occupying the office of Chairman in an illegally constituted Board. He cannot have a grievance that he has been removed from the office of Chairman of an illegally constituted Board. We therefore need not discuss this contention on merits. 5. We do not agree with the first contention as well. The Distt. Magistrate did call a meeting for considering the no confidence motion within thirty-five days of delivery of the notice of that motion to him. The notice was served sometime in January 1955 and the meeting was called by the Distt. Magistrate on 6-2-1955. It is not disputed that 6-2-1955 was within the period of thirty-five days of the delivery of notice. The notice was served sometime in January 1955 and the meeting was called by the Distt. Magistrate on 6-2-1955. It is not disputed that 6-2-1955 was within the period of thirty-five days of the delivery of notice. The meeting however could not be held on 6-2-1955 in view of an interim order of stay issued by this Court on the Appellant's moving a writ petition challenging the validity of the no-confidence motion. That writ petition was rejected on 4-5-1955 with the result that the interim stay order stood automatically discharged. 6. The Appellant filed a special appeal against the rejection of his writ petition and another interim stay order was passed on 27.8-1955. This order was vacated on 8-5-1957. Thereafter the Distt. Magistrate called the impugned meeting on 18-6-1957. This meeting was held beyond thirty-five days of the vacation of the interim order and certainly beyond thirty-five days from the date of delivery of the notice of no-confidence motion to the Distt. Magistrate in January 1955, even if the two periods during which the proceedings were stayed under the orders of this Court be excluded from the total period which elapsed between the date of delivery of the notice of no-confidence motion and 18 6-1957. 7. Sub S. (3) of S. 87 A of the Municipalities Act provides that "the Distt. Magistrate shall then convene a meeting for the consideration of the motion to be held at the office of the Board, on the date and at the time appointed by him which shall not be earlier than thirty and not later than thirty-five days from the date on which the notice of no-confidence motion was delivered to him." It further requires him to send by registered post not less than seven clear days before the date of the meeting a notice of such meeting and of the date and time appointed therefor to every member of the Board at his place of residence and to cause such notice to be published in such manner as he may deem fit. This period of time is not really a period of limitation for the Distt Magisttate taking a certain action. The conception of a period of limitation is that an aggrieved person is to move a public authority for the redress of his grievance within a certain period. This period of time is not really a period of limitation for the Distt Magisttate taking a certain action. The conception of a period of limitation is that an aggrieved person is to move a public authority for the redress of his grievance within a certain period. He has to move in the matter in accordance with law within a certain period, and if he lets that period go by he ordinarily loses the right to agitate his grievance any more. There is no period of limitation in that sense when a public authority is required to take a certain action within a certain time. Further, in the present case it appears to us that this period of thirty to thirty-five days has been fixed to provide reasonoble time fos the Distt Magistrate to take the necessary action in compliance with the requirements of the said section. He has to consider the appropriate time and date for the meeting in consultation with the judicial officer who has to preside at the meeting in accordance with Sub-section (4) of S. 87 A. He has to take into consideration the requisite time for the due service of notice on the various members of the Board and for the publication of the notice. The provisions of Sub-section (3) of S. 87A by their terms apply to the first calling of a meeting for the consideration of a no-confidence motion and do not apply to the calling of a subsequent meeting for the purpose when the first meeting could not be held in view of the orders of the Court. If the first meeting is adjourned by the judicial Officer who was to preside over the meeting, the provisions of Sub-section (5) of S. 87A come into play and, according to them, the judicial officer has to adjourn the meeting after recording his reosons to some date not later than fifteen days from the date appointed for the meeting under sub-S (3) S. 87A does not contemplate a meeting for considering a no-confidence motion when the original meeting convened for the purpose is to be put off under the orders of the Court. We are, therefore, of opinion, that the meeting convened on 18-6-1957 cannot be held to be an illegal meeting, on the ground that it was convened after a period of thirty-five days plus the period of stay granted under the orders of the Court from the date of delivery of notice of no-confidence motion. 8. In view of the above, we dismiss this appeal.