Judgement JUDGMENT : This is a second appeal preferred against the decree and judgment of the learned District Judge of Tiruchirapalli in A. S. No 141 of 1953, confirming the decree and judgment of the learned District Munsif of Tiruchirapalli in O. S. No. 398 of 1949. 2. The dispute in this case relates to S. No. 132/1B in Varaganeri village, of an extent of Ac, 1-06 cents. 3. The case for the first plaintiff the Pappammal Anna Chatram at East Chintamani (hereinafter referred as the Chatram) supported by the second plaintiff lessee in regard to this land is as follows : S. No. 132/1B formed part of a land called Pallamavadi in S. F. No. 132/1 of an extent of 4 acres 95 cents. S. F. No. 132/1 was purchased for the Chatram by its Receiver Trustee from one Chandrasekhara Pillai on 19-12-1930 and till 1948 the patta for it was in the Chatrams name and its kist was being paid by the Chatram. The land was being leased by public auction. The fourth defendant was a lessee tinder the Chatram of the entire extent of Ac. 4-95 cants, from Adi 1943 till 1949. The second plaintiff was a sub-lessee under the fourth defendant. 4. To the east of the Suit land lies S. No. 129/2 called Koluvadi which belongs to one Usman Abdul Rub Sahib. He had no right to the suit land or any portion of S. No. 132/1. His lessee was the second defendant. The two of them applied to the Tahsildar and the latter effected a sub-division of S. No. 132/1 into S. No. 132/1-A and S. No. 132/1-B. The Chatrams patta was restricted to S. No. 132/1-A Ac. 3-86 cents, and for S. No. 132/1-B Ac. 1-06 cents, patta was issued to Usman Abdul Rub Sahib. The fourth defendants lease was due toiex-pire as just now mentioned in July 1949. The Chatram did not favour him with a renewal because he had encroached on Chatrams land and joined Rub Sahib in the patta proceedings. The lease was therefore granted to the second plaintiff for five years at Rs. 650/- per annum. The second plaintiff entered into possession but defendants 1 to 4 threatened to obstruct. They were warned by the Police on one occasion on 20-7-1949. The lease was therefore granted to the second plaintiff for five years at Rs. 650/- per annum. The second plaintiff entered into possession but defendants 1 to 4 threatened to obstruct. They were warned by the Police on one occasion on 20-7-1949. Subsequently they again commenced to obstruct the second plaintiff and to destroy the Kanni Vaikkal running east to west. 5. The plaintiffs filed the suit out of which this second appeal arises, for a declaration and perpetual injunction and later amended the plaint claiming right to the property by adverse possession. 6. The case for the contesting defendants was that the suit land never belonged to the Chatram and has never been in the enjoyment of the plaintiffs or the fourth defendant, that this land and the land east of it measuring Ac. 3-18 cents, is called Koluvadi, that the first defendant purchased the suit land from Rub Sahib who got it by registered partition deed dated 26-6-1929, that the sub-division by the Tahsildar Janab Syed Baharuddin Sahib was as per enjoyment and that the second defendant has been the lessee of Ac. 3-18 cents, including the suit land for a long time and was in possession and that after the first defendants purchase the second defendant became his lessee and raised plantain crop on 16-7-1949 and that there is no Kanni Vaikkal which is said to have been destroyed and that defendants 3 and 4 are unnecessary parties. 7. Both the Courts below found that none of the tide deeds to which the Chatram traced its title comprised the suit land whereas the title deed* by which the defendants traced their title comprised the same. Both the Courts however found that whatever might be the original title the claim of the defts. to the land had become barred by the Chatram prescribing title by adverse possession and limitation. Therefore the suit was decreed by the trial Court and the appeal therefrom was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal; by the defeated defendants 1 and 3. 8. The contention of Mr. S. Ramachandra Ayyar for the appellants is that the Chatram cannot succeed on the strength of possessory title aft against the true owner. 9. Therefore the suit was decreed by the trial Court and the appeal therefrom was dismissed by the lower appellate Court. Hence, this second appeal; by the defeated defendants 1 and 3. 8. The contention of Mr. S. Ramachandra Ayyar for the appellants is that the Chatram cannot succeed on the strength of possessory title aft against the true owner. 9. The scope of possessory title is a mode of acquiring proprietary rights, in rem has been clearly set out in Salmonds Jurisprudence, VIII Edition,, at p. 465 as follows : "The possession of a material object is a title, to the ownership of it. The de facto relation between person and thing brings the de jure relation along with it. He who claims a chattel or a piece of land as his, and makes good his claim in fact by way of possession, makes it good in Law also by v,-ay of ownership. There is, however, an important distinction to be drawn. For the thing so possessed may, or may not, already belong to some other person. If, when possession of it is taken by the claimant, it is as yet the property of no one - res nullius as the Romans said - the possessor acquires a title good against all the world. The fish of the sea and the fowls of the air belong by an absolute title to him who first succeeds in obtaining possession of them. This mode of acquisition is known in Roman Law as Occupatio: "On the other hand, the thing of which possession is taken may already be the property of some one else. In this case the title acquired by possession is good, indeed, against all third persons, but is of no validity at all against the true owner. Possession, even when consciously wrongful, is allowed as a title of right against all persons who cannot show a better, because of a prior title in themselves. Save with respect to the rights of the original proprietor, my rights to the watch in my pocket are much the same, whether I bought it honestly, or found it, or abstracted it from the pocket of some one else. If it is stolen from me, the law will help me to the recovery of it. Save with respect to the rights of the original proprietor, my rights to the watch in my pocket are much the same, whether I bought it honestly, or found it, or abstracted it from the pocket of some one else. If it is stolen from me, the law will help me to the recovery of it. I can effectually sell it, lend it, give it away, or bequeath it, and it will go on my death intestate to my next of kin, whoever acquires it from me, however, acquires in general nothing save my limited and imperfect title to it, and holds it, as I do, subject to the superior claims of the original owner. A thing owned by one man and thus adversely possession by another has in truth two owners. The ownership of the one is absolute and perfect, while that of the other is relative and imperfect, and is often called, by reason of its origin in possession, possessory ownership. If a possessory owner is wrongfully deprived of the thing by a person other than the true owner, he can recover it. For the defendant cannot set up as a defence his own possessory title, since it is later than, and consequently inferior to, the possessory title of the plaintiff. Nor can he set up as a defence the title of the true owner -the jus tertii, as it is called; the plaintiff has a better, because an I earlier, title than the defendant, and it is irrelevant that the title of some other person, not a party to the suit, is better still. The expediency of this doctrine of possessory ownership is clear. Were it not for such a rule, force and fraud would be left to determine all disputes as to possession, between persons of whom neither could show an unimpeachable title to the thing as the true owner of it." (Asher v. Whitlock, (1865) 1 QB 1 (A); Perry v. Clis sold, (1907) AC 73 (B); In Re Atkinson Horsells Contract, 1912-1 Ch 2(C), Vane v. Vane, (1872) 8 Ch. A. 383 (D); Lows v. Telford, (1876) 1 AC 414 (E). ) 10. A. 383 (D); Lows v. Telford, (1876) 1 AC 414 (E). ) 10. This exposition is further illustrated by Pollock and Wright in their "An Essay of Possession in the Common Law" (1888) at page 95 et seq as follows : "......Possession being once admitted to be a root of title every possession must create a title which, as against all subsequent intruders, has all the incidents and advantages of a true title. William is the possessor and apparent owner of a house; in that house he dies; we will suppose him to die intestate. John, wrongly supposing himself to be entitled as the heir of William, enters and occupies the house. Peter is really Williams heir, but ignorant of the facts; in course of time, having obtained information and advice, he sues John. It turns out that William had disseised Giles the true owner, by mere encroachment or in some other way, and would have had no answer to an action brought by Giles or his assigns to recover the land. But since Williams death the period of limitation has expired, and the right of Giles is extinguished. Can John" use this as a defence against Peter? No, for the statute has nothing to say, for better or worse, about the person in actual possession, "or the relative worth of the qualified rights to possess which may have arisen while time was running against the "true owner. It says that Giles, and those who have or would have had his estate, shall not from henceforth sue any one, it does not say that Peter shall not sue John. Whether some one else has a higher title or not, Peter has a better title than John, as he would have had though the true owners claim were still enforceable. In the language of the modern authorities, possession is good title - nothing less - against all but the true owner. As to the substance of those authorities it has been repeatedly held in cases of ejectment, an action where the right to possess is clearly and solely in issue, that possession even for a short time is a good title against all subsequent intruders. One years possession under a lease has been held to be enough, though the lessors title was not shown. Ten years possession has been decisive even against several years subsequent possession under colour of tide. One years possession under a lease has been held to be enough, though the lessors title was not shown. Ten years possession has been decisive even against several years subsequent possession under colour of tide. And it has been adjudged, expressly on the analogy of the old law, that when a man occupying without title purports by his will to settle the land so occupied, that settlement is effective as regards all persons not claiming under the true tide, and governs the possessory tide (which meanwhile may be perfected by lapse of time), exactly as it would govern a title good from the first. A person in peaceable possession of land has, as against every one but the true owner, an interest capable of being inherited, devised, or conveyed." 11. To sum up, in the language of Lightwood on "Possession of Land" (1894), page 125: "........It is still prima facie evidence of seisin in fee and, where the evidence is not rebutted, the seisin in fee may be relied on as a tide. But this is no longer its only importance. It is itself the source of a right of possession which, while the possession lasts, is protected in trespass, and which, after possession has been lost, is a title against stranger in ejectment..................... ........". 12.In India the underlying idea of the rule of law as laid down by the majority of High Courts except the Calcutta High Court, wherein also the view has not been uniform, is that acqusition of title by operation of the law of limitation being a lawful mode of acquiring tide, the person in peaceable possession is entitled to maintain such possession against all but the true owner, and, therefore, a third party who has no better tide than the person in possession has no right to invade upon the possession of the latter and interrupt or arrest his lawful acquisition of title by his continuing to remain in possession for the statutory period. According to the majority the interest of a person in possession is heritable and transferable. It is capable of being disposed of by deed or will or by execution sale. According to the majority the interest of a person in possession is heritable and transferable. It is capable of being disposed of by deed or will or by execution sale. Thus, even before mere possession is converted by prescription into a right of ownership, it is in itself a right which according to the present law of India is protected and remedies are provided as under sections 9 and 42 of the Specific Relief Act. (For a detailed study see Aggarwalla, The Law of Specific Relief in India and Pakistan, first edition (1951) (Metropolitan Book Co., Faiz Bazar, Delhi) p. 239 and foil : "Mere possession as basis in title suits"). 13. The decisions of this Court and of the Privy Council are: Narayanappa v. Hanumanthappa, AIR 1932 Mad 32 (F); Periasami v. Anandayi Ammal, AIR 1924 Mad 722 (G); Maruthappan Asari v. Marimuthu Asari, AIR 1927 Mad 1185 (H); Ajagar v. Annammah, AIR 1927 Mad 572 (I); Vythilinga v. Ponnusami, AIR 1921 Mad 642 (J); Mustapha Saheb v. Santha Pillai. ILR 23 Mad 179 (K); Narayana Rao v. Dharmachar, ILR 26 Mad 514 (L); Krishna Iyer v. Secretary of State, ILR 33 Mad 173 (M); Kalyanam v. Alakam, 15 Ind Cas 613 (Mad) (N); Subbaiya Pandaram v. Mahomed Mustapha, 40 Ind Cas 50: (AIR 1918 Mad 974) (O); Nallagonda Pedda v. Asupallee, 31 Ind Cas 55: (AIR 1916 Mad 873) (P); Adinarayana v. Krishnan, 15 Ind Cas 97 (Mad) (O); Sivananjiah v. Sithaya Goun-dar, 70 Ind Cas 367 : (AIR 1921 Mad 627) (R); Unni Moideen v. Pecker, 39 Mad LJ 626 : (AIR 1921 Mad 317) (S); Akumella Panchayat Board v. Venkata Red-di, AIB 1945 Mad 506 (T); Ismail Ariff v. Md. Ghous, ILR 20 Cal 834 : 20 Ind Arm 99 (PC) (U); Sunder v. Parbati, 16 Ind App 186 (PC) (V). 14. In the present case if the Chatram had not perfected its title by adverse possession and limitation for over a period of twelve years against the true owner, the Chatram would not be able successfully to rest its claim on possessory title which would itself alone be sufficient to protect the possessory tide against all intruders excepting the true owner. 15. 15. But here the statute of limitation comes in and greatly assists, as put in Markbys Elements of Law, Fourth Edition page 269 "the party who has been long enough in possession to get the benefit of them". "Laws thus limiting suits", says Story in his Conflict of Laws, "are founded in the noblest policy. They are statutes of repose, to quiet titles, to suppress frauds, and to supply the deficiency of proofs arising from our ambiguity and obscurity" or the antiquity of transactions: controversies are limited to a fixed period of time lest they should be immortal while men are mortal. Ne A Autem Lites Immortales Essent Dum Litigantes Mortales Sunt. Besides while the law is vigilant in protecting titles, it is equally the obligations of the owners not to sleep over their rights. Vigilants are assisted by court and not those who are sleepy: Vigilantibus, non-dormentibus jura subveniunt. Prescription may be defined as the effect of lapse of time in creating and destroying rights. It is the operation of time as vestitive fact. It is of two kinds namely (1) positive or acquisitive prescription and (2) negative or extinctive prescription. Lapse of time has therefore two opposite effects. In positive prescription it is a title of right e.g., exercising easementary right for over the prescribed period; but in negative prescription it is a divestitive fact e.g., prescription of title by adverse possession and limitation. Extinctive prescription or the limitation of actions causes not a transfer of right but merely the loss of a remedy. In both forms of prescription, fact and right to possession and ownership tend to co-incidence. Ex facto oritur jus (Holland Elements of Jurisprudence, Fifth Edition, p. 183). 16.It is thus that adverse possession which may arise from dispossession or discontinuance of possession extinguishes the right of the true owner, provided it fulfils certain requirements. In order that possession should be adverse there must be a competitor capable of a suit and exercising due diligence to take steps to oust the adverse possessor; Kameswara Rao v. Somanna, (1954) 2 Mad LJ (Andhra) 228: ((S) AIR 1955 Andhra 212) (W). Whether possession is adverse or not depends on the nature of the claim made by person in possession, not upon the assent or dissent of the rightful owner. Adverse possession is a relative term. Whether possession is adverse or not depends on the nature of the claim made by person in possession, not upon the assent or dissent of the rightful owner. Adverse possession is a relative term. Though it is true that possession is prima facie adverse, mere user does not amount to adverse possession and mere possession is not adverse: Kaluluddin v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 Hyd 137 (X). There must be co-existence of two distinct ingredients which have been summed up by Markby, J. in Bejoy Chunder v. Kalli Prosonno, ILR 4 Cal 327 (Y). "Adverse possession means possession by a person holding the land on his own behalf or on behalf of some person other than the true owner having a right to immediate possession", provided the true owner is not under a disability or incapable of suing. The question whether certain admitted facts constituted an open assertion of title is always one for the Court to decide. The rule that adverse possession should be shown to have been brought to the knowledge of the person against whom it is claimed is not applicable to a person who is a complete stranger. It is sufficient that the possession should be overt and without any attempt at concealment. (Haria v. Bhindru, AIR 1950 Him Pra 8 (Z)). It is the intention to claim exclusive title which makes possession adverse and this intention Animus possidendi must be evidenced and effectuated by the manner of occupancy and which once again depends on the nature of the Property, since possession must be the kind of possession of which the particular subject is susceptible. Janaki Amma v. Kunjipennu, AIR 1951 Trav-Co 246 (Z1). That possession to the extent to which it is capable of demonstration must be hostile, notorious and exclusive to make it adverse, and will only extend to the land in actual occupation of the wrong doer. Bona fides is not required for adverse possession rather the reverse is generally present. Rajeswararao v. Narsingarao, AIR 1952 Hyd 75 (Z2). The classical requirement is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. (For an exhaustive and lucid discussion of every facet of adverse possession see especially Ch. IV p. 79 and foll: of Prof. M. Krishnaswamis extremely valuable monograph Law of Adverse Possession 2nd Edn. 1952, Law Book Co., Sardar Patel Marg Post B. No. 4, Allahabad). 17. The classical requirement is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. (For an exhaustive and lucid discussion of every facet of adverse possession see especially Ch. IV p. 79 and foll: of Prof. M. Krishnaswamis extremely valuable monograph Law of Adverse Possession 2nd Edn. 1952, Law Book Co., Sardar Patel Marg Post B. No. 4, Allahabad). 17. The important decisions of this Court in which these principles are set out are: Ittappan v. Manavikrama, ILR 21 Mad 153 (Z3); Kuthali Moo-thavar v. Kunharan Kutty, ILR 44 Mad 883: (AIR 1922 PC 181)(Z4); Sivasubramanya v. Secy, of State, ILR 9 Mad 285 (Z5); Secretary of State v. Vira Rayan, ILR 9 Mad 175 (Z6); Seeti Kutti v. Kunhi Patiiumma ILR 40 Mad 1040 at p. 1059: (AIR 1919 Mad 972 at pp. 982-983) (Z7); Narayana v. Nagappa, AIR 1926 Mad 245 (Z8); Peria Aiya Ambalam v. Shunmuga Sunda-ram, ILR 38 Mad 903: (AIR 1914 Mad 334 (2)) (FB) (Z9); Veetilkelu v. Chakkara Chappan, AIR 1936 Mad 308 (Z10); Taluk Board Dindigul v. Venkatrama Aiyar, 45 Mad LJ 333: (AIR 1924 Mad 197) (Z11); Veerabhadrayya v. Seetamma, AIR 1940 Mad 236 (Z12); Kuppuswami v. Kuppuswami, AIR 1941 Mad 866 (Z13); Palania Pillai v. Amiath Ibrahim, AIR 1942 Mad 622 (Z14); Ambu Nair v. Secy, of State, ILR 47 Mad 572: (AIR 1924 PC 150)(Z15); Varada Pillai v. Jeevaratnammal, ILR 43 Mad 244: (AIR 1919 PC 44) (Z16). 18.Bearing these principles in mind, if we examine the facts of this case, we find that both the Courts below have exhaustively analysed the evidence in this case (the learned District Munsif in paragraph 26 of his judgment and the learned District Judge in paragraphs 22 to 25 of his judgment) and have come to the conclusions with which conclusions I agree and which conclusions have not in any way been rebutted before me, that from 1930 onwards till the eve of the suit the Chatram has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property adversely to the true owner and had prescribed its title by adverse possession and limitation. 19. In the result, this second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.