Judgment V.Ramaswami, J. 1. In this case the petitioners have applied for a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singh bhum, dated 28-2-1952 in Kolhan Title suit, No. 11 of 1951, and also the order of the Commissioner of Chota Nagpur Division, dated 29-2-1956, affirming the same in Kolhan Title Appeal No. 53 of 1952. 2. It appears that in March, 1951, opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 filed a Kolhan Title suit against the petitioners in the court of the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum, praying for a declaration of the plaintiffs title to the suit land and for recovery of khas possession by eviction of the defendants. The suit was tried by the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum under Wilkinsons Rules and a decree was granted to the opposite parties Nos. 3 to 6 on 28-2-1952. The petitioners preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Chota Nagpur Division, but the appeal was dismissed and the order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner in the Kolhan Title suit was affirmed. The contention of the petitioners is that the Civil Procedure applies to the area and the suit ought to have been tried not under the Wilkinsons Rules but under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. It is, therefore, contended that the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum had no jurisdiction to grant a decree in the Kolhan Title suit and the Commissioner of Chota Nagpur Division had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal from that decree. 3. The first ground taken by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum adopted a procedure prescribed by Wilkinsons Rules which are no longer in force. In support of this argument reference was made to a judgment of this court in K.K. Sinha V/s. Basudeo Harjiwan, Misc. Judl. 3. The first ground taken by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners is that the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum adopted a procedure prescribed by Wilkinsons Rules which are no longer in force. In support of this argument reference was made to a judgment of this court in K.K. Sinha V/s. Basudeo Harjiwan, Misc. Judl. case No. 392 of 1952, D/-22-12-1952 (A) in which it was held that Act II of 1951 amended the Civil Procedure Code so as to extend its operation to the whole of India, including the so-called scheduled districts, with the exception of certain Tribal Areas in the State of, Assam, in the State of Madras and in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the State of Manipur, Act II of 1951 received the assent of the President on 17-2-1951, and came into effect from that date, and so it was held by the High Court in that case that the Civil Procedure Code applied to the entire district of Singhbhum, including the scheduled area of Kolhan. But on behalf of the State of Bihar it was pointed out by learned Counsel that the effect of this judgment was superseded by the issue of a notification by the State Government, dated the 26th August, 1953, issued in exercise of the authority conferred on the State Government by sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The notification of the State Government is in the following terms :- "No. A/AB-303/53-3533J. - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India the Governor of Bihar is pleased to direct that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951 (II of 1951) shall not apply to the Sadr Sub-divisional of the district of Singhbhum except the areas comprised within the Chaibassa and Charakdhar Municipalities. 2. This notification shall be seemed to have come into force on the 1st April 1951, the date on which the said Act was brought into force by the Central Government, By order of the Governor of Bihar, R. Singh, Secy." In view of this Government notification J do not think that the ratio of the decision in Misc Judicial Case No. 392 of 1952 (A) has any application to the present case. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioners that even before the promulgation of Act II of 1951 the Civil Procedure Code was in force in the Kolhan area. I do not think there is any substance in this argument. Sec.1 of the Civil Procedure Code as it stood before the Amending Act II of 1951 reads as follows :- "1.(1) This Act may be cited as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (2) It shall come into force on the first day of January, 1909. (3) This section and Sections 155 to 158 extend to the whole of British India the rest of the Code extends to the whole of British India except the Scheduled Districts." The argument on behalf of the petitioners is that the schedule Districts Act was repealed by the Adaptation Laws Order, 1937, and therefore, it must be held that the Civil Procedure Code was in force in the Kolhan area even before the Amending Act II of 1951. This contention is not correct, because the expression "Scheduled Districts" in Sec.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Code must be interpreted with reference to Sec.3 (53) of the General Clauses Act, which states that "Scheduled District shall mean a scheduled District as defined in the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 ." Even assuming that the scheduled Districts Act, that is, Act XIV of 1874, was repealed by the Adaptation Laws Order of 1937, the meaning of the expression "Scheduled Districts" in Sec.1 (3) must be determined with reference to sec. 3 (53) of the General Clauses Act and with reference to the definition of "Scheduled Districts" in the scheduled districts Act of 1874. The argument of learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners on this point must, therefore, fail. 4. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that Regulation XIII of 1833, under which the Agent to the Governor-General made Wilkinsons Rules, has been repealed by Act XII of 1876 and, therefore, Wilkinsons Rules do not exist any longer as they have been automatically repealed with the repeal of Regulation XIII of 1833. I do not think that this argument is correct, because Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874 has the legal effect of continuing the life of Wilkinsons Rules. Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874 states as follows: "7. I do not think that this argument is correct, because Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874 has the legal effect of continuing the life of Wilkinsons Rules. Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874 states as follows: "7. All rules here to before prescribed by the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government for the guidance of officers appointed within any of the scheduled Districts for all or any of the purposes mentioned in Sec. 6 and in force at the time of the passing of this Act, shall continue to be in force unless and until the Governor-General in Council or the Local Government, as the case may be, otherwise directs. All existing officers so appointed previous to the date on which this Act comes into force in such districts, shall be deemed to have been appointed hereunder". It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that Section 7 does not apply to this case because there is no proof that Wilkinsons Rules were "prescribed by the Governor-General in Council for the guidance of officers appointed within any of the scheduled districts", within the meaning of Section 7 of Act XIV of 1874. Now it appears on examining Regulation XIII of 1833 that the authority to prescribe rules has been granted to the Governor General under section V of the Regulation which runs as follows: "V. It shall be competent to the Governor-General, by an order in Council, to prescribe such rules as he may deem proper for the guidance of the agent and all the officers subordinate to his control and authority; to determine what powers shall be exercised by the agent and his assistants respectively; also to determine to what extent the decision of the agent in civil suits shall be final, and in what suits an appeal shall lie to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, and to define the authority to be exercised by the agent in criminal trials, and what cases he shall submit for the decision of the Nizamut Adawlut". 5. Schedule IV of this Regulation is also important and may be reproduced in full; "IV. 5. Schedule IV of this Regulation is also important and may be reproduced in full; "IV. The administration of civil and criminal justice, the collection of revenue, the superintendence of the Police, of the land revenue, customs, abkaree, stamps, and every branch of Government within the tracts of country separated as prescribed in the foregoing section, shall be vested in an officer appointed by the Governor-General in Council to be denominated agent to the Governor-General". 6. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that Wilkinsons Rules were framed under section IV of Regulation XIII of 1833 and not under section V by the Governor-General by an order in council. But no material has been produced on behalf of the petitioners to show that the rules were framed by Mr. Wilkinson under section IV of Regulation XIII of 1833. It is true that the typed copy of Wilkinsons Rules produced by the parties in the course, of argument has been signed by Mr. Wilkinson as "Governor-Generals Agent". But the first paragraph of the typed copy shows that the rules have been framed "for the administration of Civil Justice within the jurisdiction of the Agent to the Governor-General under Regulation XIII of 1833". It is, therefore, not possible to say from the typed copy of the rules whether the Governor-General has prescribed them by an order in Council or whether Mr. Wilkinson made the rules under the authority granted to him by section IV of the Regulation. On behalf of the opposite parties the Government Advocate submitted that the order in Council by which the Governor-General prescribed the rules is not traceable, although a search has been made at Calcutta and at Delhi. But it is clear that Wilkinsons Rules have been accepted as valid law and acted upon by the Government officers and the people of Kolhan area for several decades. Decisions have been given, titles to property have passed and contracts have been made on the basis that Wilkinsons rules continue to exist in Kolhan area. It is important to notice that the Kolhan Inquiry Committee appointed by the State Government in 1948 has stated in Chapter II of its report that Civil justice is still administered under Wilkinsons Rules and that these rules are statutory rules framed under Regulation XIII of 1833 and are still in force in that area. It is important to notice that the Kolhan Inquiry Committee appointed by the State Government in 1948 has stated in Chapter II of its report that Civil justice is still administered under Wilkinsons Rules and that these rules are statutory rules framed under Regulation XIII of 1833 and are still in force in that area. In a case of this description I think that the maxim omnia praesumunter rite et solenniter esse acta donee probetur in contrarium is applicable. There is a striking illustration of this Principle in Queen V/s. Powell, (1854) 118 ER 1183 (B) in which a Bye-law of a Corporation was presumed to exist from long usage, and in Williams V/s. Eyton, (1858) 157 ER 318 at page 320 (C) where the presumption was made from usage that there was a statutory order of two justices under Section 8 of the General in closure Act. The presumption was also applied by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Queen Empress V/s. Ganga Ram, ILR 16 All 136 (D) in which a question arose as to the validity of the appointment of Mr. Justice Burkitt of the Allahabad High Court under the provisions of sections 7 and 16 of the Statute 24 and 25 Vic., Cap. 104. It was held by the learned Judges constituting the Full Bench that the presumption must be drawn that Mr. Justice Burkitt was lawfully appointed from the fact that he was actually functioning as a Judge of the High Court since November, 1892. The gravity of the question was apparent because if Mr. Justice Burkitt was not legally appointed, all his judgments, decrees and orders in Civil and Criminal cases would have been ultra vires and illegal. It was, therefore, held by the Full Bench that it must be presumed that the appointment was legally made in the exercise of some power unknown to the Court vested in the Secretary of State for India. In view of the principle laid down in the above-mentioned cases we must prestime in the present case that Wilkinsons Rules were prescribed by the Governor-General by an order in Council under section V of Regulation XIII of 1833 and that these rules have been continued by Act XIV of 1874 and succeeding statutes. I, therefore, reject the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners on this point. 7. I, therefore, reject the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners on this point. 7. It was argued by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that even if Wilkinsons Rules were made under Section V of Regulation XIII of 1833 by the Governor-General by an order in Council, nevertheless the passing of Act I of 1903 put an end to the life of these rules, Learned Counsel conceded that Section 7 of Act XIV, of 1874 had contained a saving clause. It was also conceded by learned Counsel for the petitioners that Act XII of 1891 also contained a saving clause. Sec.3 of this Act is in the following terms: "3.The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any Statute, Act or Regulation in which such enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to; and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequences of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy or proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation, liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already granted, or the proof of any past act or thing; nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or establish jurisdiction, form or course of pleading, practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment, notwithstanding that the same respectively may have been in any manner affirmed, recognised or derived by, in or from any enactment hereby repealed; nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment provide or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom, liability, right, title privilege, restriction, exemption, usage, practice, procedure or other matter or thing not now existing or in force". 8. But it was pointed out by the learned Counsel that Act I of 1903 repealed Act XII of 1891, including Sec.3 and the schedules, and subsequent passing of Amending Act X of 1914 did not have the effect of reviving the saving clause. I do not wish to pronounce any concluded opinion on this point. 8. But it was pointed out by the learned Counsel that Act I of 1903 repealed Act XII of 1891, including Sec.3 and the schedules, and subsequent passing of Amending Act X of 1914 did not have the effect of reviving the saving clause. I do not wish to pronounce any concluded opinion on this point. Assuming that the argument of the learned Counsel is right, the fact remains that Wilkinsons Rules have been accepted as valid law and acted upon by the Government officers and the people of Kolhan area for several decades, even after the passing of Act I of 1903. I have already referred to the Kolhan Inquiry Committee appointed by the State Government in 1948, which states in Chapter II of its report that civil justice is still administered in the area under Wilkinsons Rules. It is manifest that for a long period of time suits have been fought, decisions have been given, titles to property have passed and contracts have been made on the basis that Wilkinsons Rules continue to validly exist in the Kolhan area. In my opinion, the principle of the maxim communis error facit jus should be applied to this case. The principles underlying the maxim is that "the law so favours the public good, that it will in some cases permit a common error to pass for right"; as an instance of which may be mentioned the case of common recoveries in English Law, which were fictitious proceedings introduced by a kind of pia fraus to elude the statue de Donis and which were at length allowed by the Courts to be a bar to an estate tail, so that these recoveries however clandestinely introduced, became by long use and acquiescence a legal mode of conveyance whereby a tenant in tail might dispose of his lands. There is a reference made to this principle by Lord Blackburn in his speech in Davidson V/s. Sinclair, (1878) 3 AC 765 (E) at pages 787-788 at follows : "The silence of the Judges on this point is accounted for from their thinking that the point had been concluded by authority since the decision of Weatherstone V/s. Marquis of Tweeddale, (1833) 12 Shaw, 1 (F) now forty-five years ago; and assuming (perhaps from the point not being pressed before them) that this was so generally agreed by the practitioners in Scotland that it was unnecessary to say anything about it. My Lords, I need hardly say that the opinion of the profession, on any matter of every day occurrence on which they are continually asked to advise, is a very weighty authority. A Court of appeal should be cautious before determining that a decision, frequently considered and always acquiesced in, was wrong. And if from the time which has elapsed, and the nature of the point, (as, for instance, a point in conveyancing law), there is reason to believe that rights have been regulated and arrangements as to property made on the basis of the decision, it may be right to uphold it, even though convicted that it was originally wrong. In such cases the maxim communis error facit jus applies". 9. In a subsequent case, Charles Dalton V/s. Henry Angus and Co., (1881) 6 AC 740 (G) at page 812 Lord Blackburn states: "I quite agree with what is said by the late Chief Justice Cockburn in Angus and Co. V/s. Dalton, (1878) 3 QBD 85 at p. 105 (H) that where the evidence proved an adverse enjoyment as of right for twenty years, or little more and nothing else, no one had the faintest belief that any grant had ever existed, and the presumption was known to be a mere fiction. He thinks that thus to shorten the Period of prescription without the authority of the Legislature was a great judicial usurpation. Perhaps it was. The same thing may be said of all legal fictions, and was often said (with, I think, more reason) of recoveries. He thinks that thus to shorten the Period of prescription without the authority of the Legislature was a great judicial usurpation. Perhaps it was. The same thing may be said of all legal fictions, and was often said (with, I think, more reason) of recoveries. But I take it that when a long series of cases have settled the law, it would produce intolerable confusion if it were to be reversed because the mode in which it was introduced was not approved of: even where it was originally a blunder, and inconvenient, communis error facit jus. But to refuse to administer a long established law because it was based on a fiction of law, admitted to be for a purpose and producing a result very beneficial, is, as it seems to me, at least as great a usurpation of what is properly the function of the Legislature as it was at first to introduce that fiction"; 10. In my opinion, therefore the principle of the maxim communis error facit jus applies to the facts of the present case and the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioners must be rejected. 11. It was then submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the Additional Deputy Commissioner was wrong in holding that the decision of the Munsif of Chaibassa in the Title suit will operate as res judicata in the Kolhan suit. I do not think this argument is right. It appears from the judgment of the Additional Deputy Commissioner at page 4 of the paper-book that the Munsif of Chaibassa held that the Title Suit was barred on account of the previous decision of the Commissioner in the Partition suit. It is obvious from the admitted facts of this case that the issue of title arose between the same parties in the Partition suit before the Commissioner, and the land at present in dispute was also the subject matter of the Partition suit before the Commissioner. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the partition suit was decided upon an award given by the arbitrators and a decree was granted in pursuance of the award. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the partition suit was decided upon an award given by the arbitrators and a decree was granted in pursuance of the award. That circumstance, however, will not prevent the application of the doctrine of res judicata because it is well established that a decree passed in an award is also conclusive as res judicata between the parties, see, for example, a decision in Vyankatesh V/s. Sakharam, ILR 21 Bom 465 (I). I do not, therefore, consider that there was any error of law in the decision of the Additional Deputy Commissioner or of the Commissioner which is challenged in this case. 12. For these reasons I hold that the petitioners have made out no case for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The application fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs payable to respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Hearing fee Rs. 100/-. R.K.Choudhary, J. 13 I agree.