Judgment :- 1. These appeals by the State are against judgments of the Second Class Magistrate, Cochin in C.C. Nos. 1160,1161 and 1162 of 1957 The complainant in the 3 cases is the Health Inspector, Willingdon Island and the accused, the Secretary. Co-operative Society No. 509 Willingdon Island. The Co-operative Society was conducting 3 canteens in the Willingdon Island. The complainant's case was that the, canteens were conducted from 1st April 1956 without obtaining the requisite licence from him. This was alleged to constitute an offence under S.265 (1) and 321 (a) of the Cochin Municipal Act (XVIII of 1113). The accused admitted that the canteens were conducted without obtaining licence. The defence was that it was not necessary to take any licence and that the act of the accused would not constitute an offence under these sections. The complainant and another witness, the Health Assistant, Willingdon Island, were examined in C.C.No.1160 of 1957. In the other two cases the Health Assistant alone was examined for the prosecution. At that stage the accused filed applications in the three cases raising certain preliminary points regarding the sustainability of the charge. The points raised were that the complainant derived his authority under a notification issued by the Assistant Director of Public Health on 9-1-1952 and that under this notification the complainant got jurisdiction only in places outside the one mile limit of the Municipal areas in the erstwhile State of Cochin. The Municipal Council alone could issue such a notification so far as places within one mile of the Municipal limits and that too with the previous sanction of the Government. As the Mattancheri Municipal Council had not issued such a notification and as the complaint was not by the Executive Authority of the Municipality or a person authorised by him, it was stated that the complaints had to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate heard arguments on the preliminary objection and upheld the same, acquitting the accused in the three cases. These three appeals have been preferred against the orders of acquittal in the three cases. 2. The reasons given by the learned Magistrate are that under the notification Ext. The learned Magistrate heard arguments on the preliminary objection and upheld the same, acquitting the accused in the three cases. These three appeals have been preferred against the orders of acquittal in the three cases. 2. The reasons given by the learned Magistrate are that under the notification Ext. P1 issued by the Assistant Director of Public Health on 9-1-1952 the direction was that no one should conduct any trade of the category mentioned in the schedule appended to the notification in areas outside the one mile limit of Municipalities without remitting the licence fees prescribed against each item, that the canteens were within one mile of the Municipal limits and that the notification related only to the period 1952-53 whereas the charge was in respect of the period from 1-4-1956. It was further held that the executive authority of the Municipality alone was competent to prosecute the accused and that too, in case the Municipality had issued a notification as provided by S.255 (1) of the Act. As there was no such notification by the Municipality it was held that the prosecutions could not stand. 3. On behalf of the State it was contended that the court was labouring under a misapprehension of facts in coming to this conclusion. The way in which the prosecution was conducted is mainly responsible for this state of affairs. Sri. M.U. Isaac who appeared for the State before us frankly conceded that the notification Ext. P1 issued by the Assistant Director of Public Health was absolutely irrelevant and ought not to have been relied on by the prosecution. His argument was that the Government of Cochin had issued a notification dated 17-4-1940/5-9-1115 published in the Cochin Government Gazette dated 27-4-1940 under which the provisions relating to Licences and Fees and certain other special provisions of the Municipal Act were made enforceable in all the non-municipal areas in the State. The Director of Public Health and Panchayats was appointed the Officer for carrying out these provisions. S.373 (b) under which this notification was issued provides as follows: "The Government may, by notification, issued after previous publication. The Director of Public Health and Panchayats was appointed the Officer for carrying out these provisions. S.373 (b) under which this notification was issued provides as follows: "The Government may, by notification, issued after previous publication. enforce either permanently or temporarily all or any of the provisions of this Act relating to scavenging (Chapter VIII), nuisance (Chapter XI), Licences and fees (Chapter XII) and vital statistics and the prevention of diseases (Sections 139,140,141 and 142 of Chapter VII and (Chapter XIII), in any specified area in a taluk and appoint officers for carrying out these provisions. Such officers shall have the powers of a Municipal authority." The Notification may be extracted: "17th April 1940 (5th Medam 1115). In exercise of the powers conferred by S.373 (b) of the Cochin Municipal Act, XVIII of 1113, and in modification of Notification No. 502 dated 17th Mithunam 1113 (1st July 1938), published at page 866 of the Cochin Government Gazette, dated 18th Mithunam 1113, Government are pleased to enforce permanently the provisions of S.131 to 142 of Chapter VII, S.147 to 154 of Chapter VIII, S.216 to 246 of Chapter XI, S.247 to 296 of Chapter XII and S.298 to 313 of Chapter XIII of the said Act, in all the villages in the non-municipal areas of the State, and to appoint the Director of Public Health and Panchayats as the officer to carry out the above provisions of the Act, in the said areas." 4. Pursuant to the above notification the Director of Public Health of the State of Travancore-Cochin published a notification Ext. P3 dated 22-2-1956 in the Government Gazette dated 27-3-1956/14-8-1131. Para.1 and 2 of Ext. P3 read as follows: Under S.255 (1) of the Cochin Municipal Act XVIII of 1113 it is hereby notified for the information of the public, that the Director of Public Health has resolved that with effect from 1st April 1956 and thereafter until otherwise notified, no place within the one mile limit of Mattancheri Municipal limits shall be used for any one or more of the purposes specified below and coming under Schedule V of the said Act without the licenses of the Executive Authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein. The fee that will be charged for the license is shown hereunder. The fee that will be charged for the license is shown hereunder. The owner or occupier of every such place shall on or before 1st March 1956 and thereafter not less than thirty days before the end of every year, apply to the Executive Authority for a licence or renewal of license for the use of such place or such purpose. Applications for licences for places to be newly opened shall be made not less than thirty days before they are opened." 5. The argument was that it was under this notification that the obligation to take out a licence arose. Under S.373 (b) the officers appointed for carrying out the provisions have the powers of a municipal authority. The expression "Municipal Authority" has not been defined in the Act but S.6 (1) states that the municipal authorities charged with carrying out the provisions of the Act are (a) a Council, (b) a Chairman and (c) An Executive Authority It is therefore clear that the Director of Public Health who was appointed as an officer by the notified order dated 17-4-1940 could exercise all the powers of a municipal council, chairman and executive authority of the council These matters were not brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate and prosecutions were sought to be sustained on the strength of Ext. P1. If Ext. P1 had stood alone, the conclusion of the learned Magistrate could have been justified. But we cannot ignore the earlier order of the Government published in 1940 which has to be read along with Ext. P3. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents raised a point that the order dated 17-4-1940 was ultra vires as the Government could enforce the provisions of the Municipal Act only in a specified area in a taluk and not the whole State. We are unable to accept this argument because there is nothing in S.373 (b) which prohibits the Government from enforcing the provisions of the Act in any village in any non-municipal area of the State, provided such area in specified The order dated 17-4-1940 specifies the area as all the villages in the non-municipal areas of the State. This in our opinion is sufficient compliance with the provision that the area should be specified. This in our opinion is sufficient compliance with the provision that the area should be specified. It may be that the legislature did not anticipate that the State would enforce the provisions of the Act in such a large area but the question for decision is whether the Government could do it in exercise of the powers conferred by S.373 (b). As observed earlier we do not see any reason to hold that such areas had to be limited to one or more of the villages in the State. The Director of Public Health can exercise in the notified area such powers as the Municipal Council, Chairman or Executive Authority have under the Act. It follows that the main ground on which accused was acquitted cannot be supported. 7. Learned counsel for the defence pointed out that the above conclusion is insufficient to enter a conviction as it is open for the accused to challenge the prosecution on other grounds which have not been considered by the learned Magistrate. It was urged that even if the Director of Public Health could issue notification like Ext. P3, the question whether it is in compliance with S.255 (1) of the Act, whether the complainant can prosecute the accused on the strength of the delegated authority from the District Health Officer and whether the accused can be convicted so long as S.321 (a) is not made enforceable in the notified areas are some of the other matters to be considered by the court. We do not consider it proper to express any opinion on such matters at this stage as the prosecution had not closed its case when the preliminary objection was raised. All pleas available to the accused and raised at the trial will be considered by the court below and this order will not be a bar to the same. The only point we now decide is that the Director of Public Health has power to issue a notification like Ext. P3; whether Ext. P3 is in compliance with the provisions of the Municipal Act is a matter to be decided by the court below hereafter. 8. In the result the three appeals are allowed and the judgments acquitting the accused are set aside. The three cases are remanded to the court, below for further trial and decision, after taking such evidence as may be adduced by the parties. Allowed.