G. MEHROTRA J. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution on behalf of eleven appli­cants praying that the order passed on 26-12-1955 by the Deputy Commissioner of Sibsagar under the Payment of Wages Act be quashed. Briefly the facts are that the petitioners are employed in the industrial establishment known as Kakajan Tea Estate of the Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd. in the District of Sibsagar. The Divisional Mana­ger of the said Tea Estate is responsible for pay­ment of wages to the petitioners under S. 3 of the Payment of Wages Act & it is on that averment that he has been impleaded as Opposite Party No. I to this petition. The petitioners claim to be artisans. They are employed in the said Tea Estate. Petitioners Nos. 1 to 4 are carpenters, Nos. 5 and 8 are Assis­tant Fitters, No. 6 is a Motor Mechanic, No. 7 is an Electrician, No. 9 is a General Mechanic and Nos. 10 and 11 are Engine Drivers. The petitioners have specified the salaries which according to them they were drawing up till 31-12-1954. The salaries which they were drawing comprise of the basic pay, dearness allowance and servant allow­ance. The complaint of the petitioners is that with­out giving any notice to the petitioners the ser­vant allowance of the petitioners Nos. 1 to 8 was reduced in each case to half i. e. Rs. 26-2-6 and that of the other petitioners Nos. 9, 10 and 11 was totally cut down. It is this reduction in the ser­vant allowance of the petitioners from their sala­ries by the employers that has been challenged by means of the present petition. The petitioners then applied to the authority appointed under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for a direction that the amount of servant allowance which has been deducted from their salaries should be paid to them. The total amount claimed by the petitioners was Rs. 20,385/-. Rs. 2,000/- was claimed as the amount deducted by the employers and Rs. 18,000/-has been claimed as compensation. The opposite party entered appearance and contested the claim of the petitioners inter alia on the grounds that the petition was not maintainable in law as there was no cut in wages as contemplated by law. The amount claimed was also contested by the opposite party. 18,000/-has been claimed as compensation. The opposite party entered appearance and contested the claim of the petitioners inter alia on the grounds that the petition was not maintainable in law as there was no cut in wages as contemplated by law. The amount claimed was also contested by the opposite party. Witnesses were examined by the Deputy Commissioner and after consideration of the entire material before him the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 26-12-1955 rejected the appli­cation. The Deputy Commissioner has come to the conclusion in effect that by a circular issued on 6-12-1954 the scale of pay was revised and the rights of the parties to get basic wages and allow­ances will be governed by this circular. On that basis the Deputy Commissioner came to the con­clusion that the petitioners are not entitled to any amount. The Deputy Commissioner further held that the effect of the circular of 1954 is that the petitioners are not getting anything less that what they were entitled to get under the contract of employment and as the petitioners have not established that they are getting under the new circular anything less than the amount which! they were entitled- to get under the contract of service, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. The main contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioners were no party to the circular of 1954 and thus it is not binding on them. It is further contended that even if the circular can be said to be binding on them, it is illegal in view of the provisions of S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act. Under this section it is not open to the parties to enter in any contract or agreement which would affect the rights of the workers under the Act. The peti­tioners have filed their contracts of employment and on the basis of those contracts it is urged that the servant allowance formed part of the wages and as such the authority had no power to reduce the amount of the servant allowance. The circular by which it is done is hit by the provisions of S. 23 of the Act. It is further con­tended by Mr. The circular by which it is done is hit by the provisions of S. 23 of the Act. It is further con­tended by Mr. Chowdhury that the fact alleged by them that they have been drawing the said salaries in December 1954 has not been disputed by the other side and if that fact is admitted, then obviously the employers are not willing to pay their salary in full any more to the petitioners and the petitioners had a right to approach the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act for the payment of their full salaries under the contract of employment. In order to appreciate the points raised by the petitioners, it will be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. S. 2(vi) of the Act defines the 'wages' as meaning all remuneration, capable of being ex­pressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether con­ditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person em­ployed, or otherwise, to a person employed in re­spect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and include any bonus or other ad­ditional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable. Section 3 of the Act provides that every em­ployer shall be responsible for the payment t» persons employed by him of all wages required t» be paid under this Act. S. 7(2) then provides "that the deductions from the wages of an employed person shall be made only in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and may be of the kinds enumerated in that section. S. 15(2) gives a right to any employee if any deduction has been made from his wages or the wages have not been paid, to apply to an authority appointed by the Govern­ment and if the authority after consideration of the entire material comes to the conclusion that the petitioner is entitled to the amount claimed, a direction is to be issued by the authority under S. 15(3). S. 23 of the Act then provides as follows : "23. S. 23 of the Act then provides as follows : "23. Any contract or agreement, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, whereby an employed person relinquishes any right conferred by this Act shall be null and void in so far as it purports to deprive him of such right." It is true that the definition of the word 'wages' includes any allowance which is agreed .1 to between the parties and is a part of the con­s' tract of employment. But in our opinion there is no bar to the parties modifying the contract of service. S. 23 in our opinion only prohibits an em­ployee from entering into a contract by which the employer person relinquishes his right under the Act. The inhibition is against a contract by which an employee relinquishes his right under the Act. The amount of wages is fixed by a contract and thus the claim to get the wages arises out of the contract and not under the Act. The only right under the Act is to get his wages under the contract. The question as to 5 what actual wages are and what is the contract between the parties is not a right which has been conferred under the Act to an employee, that is, a right which the employee claims under the con-i tract. When an employee makes an application under S. 15 for payment of certain amount, which has not been paid to him, it is open to the autho­rity to determine on the merits what is the amount of wages which is due to an employee which he is entitled to get under an existing con­tract. Whether that contract subsists under which the employee can claim any amount as wages is also a matter which can be determined by the authority appointed by the Government under S. 15. But this does not mean that any contract validly entered into between the employer and the employee by which the contract of service has been modified as regards the amount of wages will be hit by the provisions of S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act. But this does not mean that any contract validly entered into between the employer and the employee by which the contract of service has been modified as regards the amount of wages will be hit by the provisions of S. 23 of the Payment of Wages Act. If the circular issued in the year 1954 was a result of the negotiations between the employer and the employees and also the Government was a party to it, it cannot be said that the circular cannot be taken into consideration in determin­ing the terms of the contract which was subsist­ing on the date when the application was made for payment of the amount of the wages. , The terms of the contract of employment Jean be deduced from the original contract in the "light of various subsequent circulars. The court below on consideration of the terms of the con­tract entered into in the year 1950 and all the subsequent circulars, has come to the conclusion that the circular of 1954 incorporates the terms of the condition of the service of the applicants and that this circular was issued with the agree­ment of the workers and the employers. Under those circumstances it cannot be said that the circular was wrongly held to be binding on the employees. Moreover if it is contended by the petitioners that the circular is not bind­ing on them and the contract which was subsist­ing on the date when they claimed their wages was the contract of service entered into in the year 1950 or thereabout, then they cannot claim -the benefit under the circular of 1954. They are entitled either to get the wages in accordance with the terms of the original contract or accord­ing to the circular of 1954. The court below is right in our opinion in holding that the petitioners have not succeeded In establishing that what they are getting now under the circular of 1954 is less than the actual amount which they were entitled to get under the contract of employment. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to go into various preliminary points raised by the respondent. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to go into various preliminary points raised by the respondent. It is however enough to point out that the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that the present petition is not maintainable under Art. 227 of the Constitution because at the highest the trial court has committed an error of law but it has not exceeded its jurisdiction, The power of superintendence of this Court is only to see that the court below does not ex­ceed its bounds. If the court below had juris­diction to decide a matter and in the exercise of that jurisdiction has committed any error of law, that is no ground for this Court to interfere in the exercise of its powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. In a Pull Bench decision of this Court in 'Jagat Chandra De v. Gopalram Das' reported in AIR 1952 Assam 166 (A), it was held as follows: "In case where the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court has been taken away by a com­petent legislature the High Court unless there is an absence, excess or abuse, of jurisdiction, will not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 227 and make that juris­diction a substitute for the revisional jurisdic­tion." Article 227 of the Constitution was not intended I to be a substitute for the revisional jurisdiction1 of this court. (2) The next preliminary objection raised by the respondent is that the petitioners have an altenative remedy by way of appeal to the Dis­trict Judge under S. 17 (1) of the Act and as that remedy is available, this court will not exercise its powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution. In the first place it is not necessary for us to go into that question in detail, because the petition fails on merit but apart from it, it is not an absolute rule that in all cases where there Is an alternative remedy available, this court will not exercise its power under Art. 227 of the Con­stitution. It is not desirable for this court to exercise its powers in those cases but that is not an abso­lute bar. There may be cases where the alter­native remedy may not be equally efficacious and this court may find it necessary to interfere un­der Art. 227 or under Art. 226. It is not desirable for this court to exercise its powers in those cases but that is not an abso­lute bar. There may be cases where the alter­native remedy may not be equally efficacious and this court may find it necessary to interfere un­der Art. 227 or under Art. 226. In the result therefore we see no force in this petition and we reject it. In the circumstances . of the case we make no order for costs. (3) H. DEKA J. : I agree. R.G.D. Petition rejected.