Subrahmanyam, J.- The petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956 and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act (Madras Act XXIV of 1956), in so far as the enactments affect the petitioner’s right under the ‘waram’ agreement entered into between him and the first respondent in 1955. Although the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956, is alone specified in the petition, the scope of the challenge was, with the consent of the learned Advocate-General, widened at the hearing so as to extend to the other two enactments as well, in so far as they affect the petitioner’s rights under the said ‘waram’ agreement. All the three enactments will for convenience be referred to as the impugned enactments. The first respondent (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) filed a Petition — No. 1096 of 1957 — in the Rent Court at Mayuram in the Tanjore District praying that the fair rent payable by him to the petitioner be fixed under section 9 of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act. The petitioner appeared before the Rent Court and alleged that the respondent was a tenant cultivating on “waram” basis from 1955 and that he had never been a lessee of the land agreeing to pay fixed rent. The petitioner contended that the Act was not applicable to “waram” tenure and that the Act, in any event, placed unreasonable restrictions on his right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and was hence of no effect as against him. Repeating those contentions, the petitioner files this petition in this Court praying for an appropriate writ prohibiting the Rent Court at Mayuram from enquiring into the respondent’s petition to fix fair rent. In order to appreciate the petitioner’s contentions on the question of the constitutional validity of the impugned enactments, it is necessary to pass in rapid review, legislation enacted in this State since 1952 regulating the relations of landlords and tenants in the Tanjore District. Reports were widespread in 1951 that the Government contemplated legislation regulating the relationship of landowners and tenants in ryotwari areas. Reports were widespread in 1951 that the Government contemplated legislation regulating the relationship of landowners and tenants in ryotwari areas. The apprehensions entertained by landowners regarding the form and content of such legislation led, particularly in the District of Tanjore, to what the Legislature considered unjust evictions of their tenants. Tenants thus affected tended to take the law into their own hands with a view to be restored to possession of the lands they had held. The Government could not immediately find other means of livelihood for tenants who were thrown out of the lands they were cultivating and considered it just that the great industry of agriculture should be so organised as equitably to support all the citizens who were for the time being dependent upon it for their livelihood, viz., landowners, tenants and farmhands or pannaiyals. The Governor of Madras hence passed Ordinance IV of 1952, Ordinance V of 1952 and Ordinance VI of 1952 with a view to regulate relations between landowners and tenants in the District of Tanjore. The substance of the Ordinances was enacted by the Legislature as the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952). The provisions of the Ordinances and of the Act regarding pannaiyals are not relevant for our present purposes. In the Act, the expression “cultivating tenant” or “tenant” was defined as meaning “a person who contributes his own physical labour or that of the members of his family in the cultivation of any land belonging to another under a tenancy agreement, express or implied . .” . Sections 7 and 8 of the Act prescribed the terms applicable to all tenancies. They said in effect that every tenant who was in possession of land or who would be let into possession within five years thereafter would continue in possession as such tenant until May, 1957, subject to payment of rent as prescribed in section 8. No such tenant could be evicted unless he failed to pay rent or did any of the acts specified in section 10, which would render it undesirable that he should be continued as tenant on the land. During the period prescribed by the Act for the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant might surrender the lease on six months’ notice, ending with a year of the tenancy. During the period prescribed by the Act for the continuance of the tenancy, the tenant might surrender the lease on six months’ notice, ending with a year of the tenancy. The tenancy would continue for a further term of five years from 1st May, 1957, unless the landowner gave notice, not less than 12 months before 1st May, 1957, that the tenancy would determine on that date. The Act contained certain other provisions regarding restoration of lands to tenants who having been in possession in 1950-1951 or on 1st December, 1951, had ceased to be in possession on the date of the commencement of the Act, viz., 23rd August, 1952. In regard to tenants who had been in possession on the 1st December, 1951, but had ceased to be in possession on 23rd August, 1952, the Act said that they would, on application to the officer named in the Act, be entitled to be restored to possession, any other person admitted to possession as tenant after the 1st day of December, 1951, being evicted from the land. In respect of tenants who were in possession during the agricultural year 1950-1951, but were not in possession on 1st December, 1951, the Act said that they would be entitled to be restored to possession, subject to certain stated terms and conditions. The constitutional validity of the Act was upheld in Santanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam1. For the protection of tenants in the Tamil areas of the State other than the areas in which the provisions of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952, were in force and other than the Gudalur Taluk of the Nilgiris District, the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Madras Act XXV of 1955). The Act was to be in force for a year. A cultivating tenant was thus defined in the Act: “‘Cultivating Tenant’ means a person who cultivates by his own labour or by that of any other member of family or by hired labour under his supervision and control, any land belonging to another under a tenancy agreement, express or implied........” The Act said that no cultivating tenant should be evicted from his holding or any part thereof at the instance of the landowner, during the continuance of the Act. whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise. whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise. The exceptions were that, if rent was not paid by the date stated in the Act or if the tenant did any of the acts stated in the Act which disentitled him to be continued in possession of the land, he could be evicted on application being made to the Revenue Divisional Officer. The Act contained a provision for restoration to possession analogous to the provisions contained in the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act Section 4 (1) of the Act said: “Every cultivating tenant who was in possession of any land on the 1st December, 1953, and who is not in possession thereof at the commencement of this Act, shall on application to the Revenue Divisional Officer, be entitled to be restored to such possession on the same terms as those applicable to the possession of the land on the 1st December, 1953.” Limitations on such right to restoration to possession are contained in sub-section (2) of section 4. The Act became law on 27th September, 1955. The period of one year expired with 26th September, 1956. In 1956, the Madras Legislature enacted Madras Act XIV of 1956, which amended Madras Act XXV of 1955. The Amending Act came into force on 1st October, 1956. The Amending Act said that the principal Act should be deemed to have continued in force until 1st October, 1956 and that the Act as amended would remain in force for a period of three years. The Act was extended also to areas in which the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act was in force and section 10 of Madras Act XIV of 1956 said: “If any provision contained in the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952) is repugnant to any provision contained in the principal Act as amended by this Act, the latter provision shall prevail and the former provision shall, to the extent of repugnancy, be of no effect.” Subject to the conditions and limitations stated in the Act, the Act entitled the landowner to resume from any cultivating tenant possession, for the purpose of personal cultivation, of lands not exceeding one half of the extent of the lands leased out to the cultivating tenant. By Act XXV of 1956, enacted on the 31st October, 1956, the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act was repealed in so far as it related to tenants. Thereafter, relations of landowners and tenants were, in the Tanjore District, as elsewhere in the State, governed, in the matter of eviction and personal cultivation, by Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956. On the 31st October, 1956, the Madras Legislature enacted Madras Act XXIV of 1956, called the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act. The Act had effect from 1st October, 1956. The Act says “with effect from the 1st day of October, 1956, every cultivating tenant shall be bound to pay to the landowner and every landowner shall be entitled to collect from the cultivating tenant fair rent payable under this Act”. “Fair rent” is defined as the rent payable under the Act. In regard to wet lands, fair rent is 40 per cent. of the normal gross produce or its value in money. “Normal gross produce in respect of any land” means “the produce which would be obtained, if the rainfall and seasons were of a normal character, from lands of the same class as the land in question, similarly situated and possessing similar advantages”. Fair rent may be in cash or in kind, provided that where the crop raised is paddy, the landowner shall have the right to insist that it shall be payable in kind. Where, in respect of any land fair rent has been determined, it shall continue in force for five years. The Government may, by notification, constitute Rent Courts and Rent Tribunals for the purposes of the Act. Notwithstanding any agreement between the landowner and the cultivating tenant, or any decree or order of a Court, either party may apply to the Rent Court for fixation of fair rent. From every decision of a Rent Court, an appeal shall lie to the Rent Tribunal. It is under this Act that the respondent applied to the Rent Court, Mayuram, to fix the fair rent in respect of the lands of which he claimed to be in possession as a cultivating tenant. From every decision of a Rent Court, an appeal shall lie to the Rent Tribunal. It is under this Act that the respondent applied to the Rent Court, Mayuram, to fix the fair rent in respect of the lands of which he claimed to be in possession as a cultivating tenant. In the petition filed in the Rent Court, the respondent said that he was in possession as a cultivating tenant under the petitioner of 1.80 acres of a single crop wet land and 1.35 acres of double-crop wet land in the Madirimangalam Village, Mayuram taluk, Tanjore District. The respondent alleged further in his petition in he Rent Court that, after duly estimating the share of the produce payable to the petitioner for the kuruvai crop of the year 1956, the respondent gave the petitioner 25 kalams of paddy and that for the samba crop of 1956-1957, the respondent gave the petitioner 65 kalams of paddy as rent (kuttagai). The respondent prayed that fair rent be fixed for Faslis 1366-1370. In the counter-statement filed by him in the Rent Court, the petitioner said that the respondent was only a tenant cultivating on “waram” basis for two years from 1955 and had never been a lessee on an agreement to pay a fixed rent. The petitioner pleaded that the Act was not applicable to cases of “waram” tenure and that the Act was ultra vires the Legislature. In the petition filed in this Court, the petitioner alleges that the respondent was engaged by the petitioner to cultivate his land under “waram” system and that the respondent agreed to accept 25 per cent. of the net yield every year in respect of both the crops, kuruvai and thaladi. The petitioner contends in the petition that a cultivator under the “waram” system “is not a tenant or lessee but only a person contracting with the landowner, from time to time under an agreement to receive a share of the produce as remuneration for his services.” The counter-statement filed by the petitioner in the Rent Court states that the respondent is “only a tenant cultivating on waram basis” and not a lessee liable to pay fixed rent. The contention that the respondent is not a “cultivating tenant” and that the petitioner is not a “landowner”, as those terms are defined in the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956, was not argued at the hearing of this petition. For the purpose of determining the constitutional validity of the impugned enactments, we shall assume, without deciding it, that the respondent is a “cultivating tenant” and the petitioner a “landlord” or “landowner” as the terms are defined in sections 2 (a) and 2 (e) of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and sections 2 (b) and 2 (f) of Madras Act XXIV of 1956. It may be useful that we ascertain in the first instance the alterations effected by the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956, (assuming the Acts to be intra vires the Legislature) in the tenancy agreement entered into between the petitioner and the respondent. The respondent was let into possession in 1955 on the agreement that the respondent would be in possession for a year as waramdar and would pay the petitioner 75 per cent. of the net yield in respect of both the crops. It is not clear whether, in arriving at the net yield, the expenses of harvesting alone would be excluded or whether the expenses of cultivation and harvesting would both be excluded. When the respondent was let into possession in 1955 on the agreement that he would cultivate the land as a waramdar for a year, the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act (XIV of 1952) was in force. I accept, with respect, the view expressed by Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., in Dharmalinga Moopanar v. Anusamba Bi Trust1, that a cultivating tenant, inducted subsequent to the 23rd August, 1952, would, under section 7 (f) of the Act, be entitled to continue in possession till 1st May, 1957. The validity of sections 7 and 8 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act was not challenged at the hearing of Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam2, in which the Act was contended to be ultra vires the Legislature (see pages 328 and 329 of the Report). The validity of sections 7 and 8 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act was not challenged at the hearing of Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam2, in which the Act was contended to be ultra vires the Legislature (see pages 328 and 329 of the Report). Under section 7 (f) of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, the respondent had the further right to continue in possession for a fresh term of five years from May, 1957, unless the petitioner gave notice to the respondent in writing not less than 12 months before 1st May, 1957, that the respondent’s tenancy would end on that date. There is no allegation that the petitioner gave any such notice to the respondent. The respondent was, therefore, entitled to remain in possession as tenant until 1st May, 1962. Under Madras Act XXV of 1955 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act), as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956, read with Madras Act XXV of 1956, which repealed the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act in so far as it related to cultivating tenants, the term of the tenancy of the respondent was cut down to three years commencing from 27th September, 1955. The result of the legislation of which the petitioner complains was that the respondent became liable to vacate the land in September, 1958, instead of being entitled to continue in possession as tenant until May, 1962. In regard to rent, the agreement between the petitioner and the respondent was that he should give the petitioner 75 per cent. of the net yield. Under section 8 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, which was in force at the time of the commencement of the tenancy, the tenant was entitled to 2/5ths of the gross-produce, after deducting all harvesting and poradi charges in the case of paddy. The tenant was responsible for all the labour and expenses of cultivation and had to bear the entire cost of natural manure used on the land. When chemical fertilizers and other artificial manures or groundnut cakes were used on the land, the cost had to be divided between the landowner and the tenant in the proportion of 3/5ths and 2/5ths. The tenant was responsible for all the labour and expenses of cultivation and had to bear the entire cost of natural manure used on the land. When chemical fertilizers and other artificial manures or groundnut cakes were used on the land, the cost had to be divided between the landowner and the tenant in the proportion of 3/5ths and 2/5ths. Under Madras Act XXIV of 1956 (The Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act) all the cultivation expenses, inclusive of cost of seed, ploughing, manuring, harvesting and threshing, have to be borne by the cultivating tenant. The landowner bears all the capital expenditure necessary to maintain the land and wells in a state of proper repair and pays the cist and other public charges. Of the gross-produce, the cultivating tenant takes 60 per cent. and the landowner takes 40 per cent. If adverse seasonal conditions result in the reduction of the gross-produce from any particular crop to the extent of more than 25 per cent., the landowner has to remit a proportionate part of the fair rent due to him, subject to such conditions as the Revenue Court may impose. The rent which under Madras Act XIV of 1952 was 60 per cent of the gross produce, after deducting harvest and poradi charges, becomes 40 per cent. of the normal grossproduce under Madras Act XXIV of 1956. In regard to rent, learned counsel for the petitioner does not contend that, if the Legislature of the State of Madras has the power to direct fixation of fair rent in supersession of the terms of the Contract between a landowner and his cultivating tenant as to the quantum of rent payable by the latter to the former, objection can legitimately be taken to the fixation of fair rent in accordance with the terms of, and by the machinery created by the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act (Madras Act XXIV of 1956). In particular, no objection is taken either to the proportion of the normal gross-produce which the Act makes payable to the landowner or to the method of arriving at the normal gross-produce or the allowances or deductions that are directed to be made. Petitioner’s learned counsel’s objections to the impugned enactments are more basic in character. In particular, no objection is taken either to the proportion of the normal gross-produce which the Act makes payable to the landowner or to the method of arriving at the normal gross-produce or the allowances or deductions that are directed to be made. Petitioner’s learned counsel’s objections to the impugned enactments are more basic in character. In regard to the extension of the respondent’s term of tenancy effected by Madras Act XXV of 1955, as amended by Act XIV of 1956, petitioner’s learned counsel contends that the extension is constitutionally invalid, because there was no emergency in 1955 or 1956 to call for such interference with rights of landowners and tenants under the terms of their respective contracts. The proposition which petitioner’s learned counsel invites us to endorse is that legislation, which takes away from the owner of agricultural land his right to recover such land from a tenant whose term under the contract of tenancy has expired, is an invasion of the constitutionally protected rights of such owner, and that such legislation must be struck down in the absence of proof that such legislation is intended and is reasonably necessary to meet an emergency in the relations of the classes of tenants and landowners with whom such legislation deals. The argument by which that proposition is supported runs on the following lines: The petitioner’s right to hold, that is to say, enjoy the 3 and odd acres described in the respondent’s petition in the Rent Court, is guaranteed to the petitioner by Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. In 1955, that right to enjoy the land included the right to evict the respondent in 1956, that is, on the expiry of a year from the date of the respondent’s admission to the land as tenant. Act XXV of 1955, as amended by Act XIV of 1956, takes away the petitioner’s right to evict the respondent at the end of the year and recover possession of the land either for personal cultivation or for being let to another person. The petitioner is thereby deprived of property. Act XXV of 1955, as amended by Act XIV of 1956, takes away the petitioner’s right to evict the respondent at the end of the year and recover possession of the land either for personal cultivation or for being let to another person. The petitioner is thereby deprived of property. A citizen may be deprived of his property by the State only in one of three ways: (1) by the exercise by the State of its police power; (2) by the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain; and (3) by the exercise by the State of its power of taxation. No question of the power of taxation arises in this case. No compensation is paid or offered; hence no question arises of eminent domain. What remains for consideration is the State’s police power. The State cannot exercise its police power so as to "take" a citizen’s property. The deprivation of the petitioner’s property, although it does not amount to "taking" such as would bring Article 31 (2) of the Constitution into play, yet, the deprivation is "taking" beyond the reach of the police power of the State. Such "taking" is constitutionally prohibited. Hence Madras Act XXV of 1955, as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956, is ultra vires the Madras Legislature in so far as the enactments purport to affect the petitioner’s right, on the expiry of the term limited by the contract, to evict the respondent from the land. That, in outline, is the petitioner’s argument. The ability of the argument is apparent. Equally obvious is the way it is rooted in, and draws sustenance from, doctrines of American Constitutional Law. Two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, viz., Block v. Hirsh1, and Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair2, are particularly relied on and that makes it necessary for us to consider them in some detail. In October, 1919, Congress passed the District of Columbia Rents Act. By section 109 of the Act, the right of a tenant to occupy a building was to continue notwithstanding the expiration of his term, at the option of the tenant, subject to regulation by the Commission appointed by the Act, so long as he paid the rent and performed the conditions as fixed by the lease or as modified by the Commission. Mr. Justice Holmes said in Block v. Hirsh1. Mr. Justice Holmes said in Block v. Hirsh1. "The statute embodies a scheme or code which it is needless to set forth, but it should be stated that it ends with the declaration in section 122 that the provisions of title 2 are made necessary by emergencies growing out of the war, resulting in rental conditions in the district dangerous to the public health and burdensome to public officers, employees, and accessories, and thereby embarrassing the Federal Government in the transaction of the public business. As emergency legislation the title is to end in two years unless sooner repealed." The learned Judge proceeded to state that the facts set out in the preamble to the Act were well known and that an emergency existed in relation to housing. He held: " . . . . Circumstances have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law. Plainly, circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space as to clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private concern." As regards the argument that the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he would with his own and to make what contract he pleased were cut down, the learned Judge said: "But if the public interest be established, the regulation of rates is one of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has been settled since Munn v. Illinois3. The validity of the legislation was upheld, Mr. Justice Mckenna dissented, the Chief Justice and two other Judges concurring in the dissent. Block v. Hirsh1, was heard along with Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Marcus Feldman4. That case related to a similar statute passed by the Legislature of the State of New York regarding letting of buildings. The Attorney-General of New York filed a brief defending the constitutionality of the statute as a proper exercise of the police power of the State. The Attorney-General defined police power, "as the power or duty of the Legislature to enact appropriate and necessary laws in order to protect and safeguard the health, safety, order, morals or general welfare of the public". (page 882 of the Report). In this case also, Mr. The Attorney-General defined police power, "as the power or duty of the Legislature to enact appropriate and necessary laws in order to protect and safeguard the health, safety, order, morals or general welfare of the public". (page 882 of the Report). In this case also, Mr. Justice Mckenna for himself and the Chief Justice and two other Judges wrote a dissenting judgment. Mr. Justice Mckenna said that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts embodied in section 10 of Article 1 of the Constitution was a limitation upon the national legislation with which Block v. Hirsh1, was concerned and upon State legislation with the which Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Macous Feldman4, was concerned. The opinion of the Court said that police power warranted the regulation made in both instances, notwithstanding the prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts. On that point, having regard apparently to the definition of “police power” given by the Attorney-General of New York, Mr. Justice Mckenna said: “The police power has some pretence for its invocation. Regarding alone the words of its definition, it embraces power over everything under the sun, and the line that separates its legal from its illegal operation cannot easily be drawn. But it must be drawn.” The learned Judge held that police power should stop short of legislation of the kind impugned in these cases. The Federal statute considered in Block v. Hirsh1, was limited to expire in two years from October, 1919, the date of its commencement. An Act of 24th August, 1921, purported to continue the earlier Act in force (with some amendments) until 22nd May, 1922. On that day, a new Act declared that the emergency described in the original Act still existed, re-enacted with further amendments the amended Act of 1919 and provided for its continuance until 22nd May, 1924. The validity of the extension of the Act of 1919 until 22nd May, 1924, came up for consideration in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair2. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the Court. He said that, so far as the Judges knew, the emergency could not be said to continue and that the Court was not bound to accept the statement made to the contrary in the Amending Act of 1922. The learned Judge added, “We need not inquire how far this Court might go in deciding the question for itself”. He said that, so far as the Judges knew, the emergency could not be said to continue and that the Court was not bound to accept the statement made to the contrary in the Amending Act of 1922. The learned Judge added, “We need not inquire how far this Court might go in deciding the question for itself”. The Judge referred to certain precedents and wound up by saying: “These cases show that the Court may ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for laying down a Rule of Law, and if the question were only whether the statute is in force today, upon the facts that we judicially know, we should be compelled to say that the law has ceased to operate. Here, however, it is material to known the condition of Washington at different dates in the past. Obviously the facts should be accurately ascertained and carefully weighed, and this can be done more conveniently in the Supreme Court of the District than here. The evidence should be preserved so that if necessary it can be considered by this Court.” Before we proceed to consider the applicability of Block v. Hirsh1, and Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair2, to the facts before us, it may be useful to refer to Bowles v. Willingham3. In January, 1942, that is, immediately after Pearl Harbour,. Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act. Section 2 (b) of the Act provided, in part, that “Whenever in the judgment of the Administrator, such action is necessary or proper in order to effectutate the purposes of this Act, he shall issue a declaration setting forth the necessity for, and recommendations with reference to, the stabilization or reduction of rents for any defence-area housing accommodations within a particular defence rental area”. Pursuant to that authority, the Administrator, on April 28, 1942, issued a declaration designating twenty-eight areas in various parts of the country, including Macon, Georgia, as defence-rental areas. The Act was held valid as a proper exercise of the war-power of Congress, just as the Acts considered in Block v. Hirsh1and Marcus Brown Holding Company v. Marcus Feldman4, were upheld as a proper exercise of the police power of the State. Petitioner’s learned counsel affirms that Block v. Hirsh 1 , is part of the Constitutional Law of this country just as much as of the United States. Petitioner’s learned counsel affirms that Block v. Hirsh 1 , is part of the Constitutional Law of this country just as much as of the United States. But the value of Block v. Hirsh1, in the Constitutional Law of our country is bound to be very limited by reason of the fact that the findings recorded in it hinge on certain special features of American Constitutional Law which have no place in our system. Speaking of the Government of the Union, Chief Justice Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland5. “This Government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers” To the powers of Congress enumerated in section 8 (1) to (17) of Article 1 of the Constitution was added by section 8 (18) the power to make all laws which would be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers, that is to say, powers necessary to enable the Congress to deploy to the best advantage the powers expressly granted. Powers other than those thus delegated to the Congress were, by Amendment 10 of the Bill of Rights, reserved to the States. The power thus reserved to the States to legislate for the protection and promotion of the people’s health, morals, safety and general welfare has, since the time of Chief Justice Taney, been known as the police power.1 The police power of the State is subject to the prohibition enacted in section 10 (1) of Article 1 of the Constitution. One of the prohibitions is, “No State shall make any law impairing the obligation of Contracts”. It is one of the peculiarities of the American Constitutional system that the police power of the States, though of wide amplitude, is subject to limitations to which Congress is not subject,in exercising its enumerated or delegated powers. But situations arose in which some of the obstacles to beneficial legislation, apparently caused by the limitations placed on the police power of the States, had to be surmounted. In response to the demands made by the Granger Movement, States enacted laws subjecting business of a certain description to regulation in the matter of rates and other terms and conditions of business. The validity of such legislation was upheld on the basis of a new doctrine regarding businesses affected with a public interest. In response to the demands made by the Granger Movement, States enacted laws subjecting business of a certain description to regulation in the matter of rates and other terms and conditions of business. The validity of such legislation was upheld on the basis of a new doctrine regarding businesses affected with a public interest. In Munn v. Illinois2, the Supreme Court decided that terminal grain elevators were businesses sufficiently affected with a public interest to enable the Legislature to regulate the charges which they made. Similarly, in Peik v. The Chicago and North- Western Railway Co.3, the Supreme Court held in regard to railroads that the property of railroads was clothed with a public interest which permitted legislative limitation of charges for its use. That case related to railroads in intra-State commerce subject to the police power of the State. In regard to such railroads, it was necessary to hold that they were clothed with a public interest before the State Legislature could be held competent to regulate charges. No such finding would be necessary in regard to railroads in inter-State commerce, because the commerce power of the Congress is subject to no such limitation regarding obligation of contracts. Now, this doctrine of businesses affected with a public interest is one of those waves which appear from time to time on the sea of American Constitutional Law, have their day and disappear. This particular doctrine of businesses affected with a public interest was in full force and effect at the time of Block v. Hirsh4. That made it necessary that, before Mr. Justice Holmes could hold that, in the exercise of police power, the State Legislature of New York or Congress in relation to the District of Columbia, could regulate rents of buildings, he had to find that circumstances had clothed the letting of buildings in the district and in the State with a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law. He held that the emergencies growing out of the war, which resulted in rental conditions in the district and in the State becoming dangerous to the public health and burdensome to public officers, constituted circumstances which clothed the letting of buildings with a public interest. When the emergency ceased, the State’s police power to regulate the letting of buildings would terminate too. When the emergency ceased, the State’s police power to regulate the letting of buildings would terminate too. That is the reason why in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair5, the learned Judge directed the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to find the facts relating to the conditions about housing accommodation and rates of rent and decide whether the statute continued to be enforceable. It is easy to see that a decision growing out of those special features of the American Constitutional system cannot easily be transplanted on our soil. It is necessary to consider the use made, of those decisions, by this Court in Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam6, and by the Supreme Court in Sirdar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan7. 1. “From Marshall to Mukherjea” by Mr. Justice Douglas 1956 edn. 168 and “The Growth of American Republic” by Morrison and Commager, 4th Edn., Vol. II, page: 70. Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam1, considered the validity of section 6 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act. That section provided for a five-year term for certain tenants, subject to renewal for a further five-year term. That section provided further for the restoration to possession of tenants who had been in possession on 1st December, 1951, but who were not in possession on the date of the commencement of the Act, and also for the restoration to possession, subject to terms and conditions, of tenants who had been in possession in 1950-1951 but were not in possession thereafter. Restoration to possession of a tenant who has been evicted or who has surrendered possession is an unusual feature in tenancy legislation. In Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam1, the Court considered that the tenants who had been evicted after 1950-1951 had not in every case been evicted for just cause and that it was probable that those who surrendered did so in some cases under coercion. It would be right for the Legislature to provide for the restoration of such tenants to possession of the lands they had held. But to hold an enquiry as to who, among the tenants who had been in possession in 1950-1951 and were not in possession in August, 1952, had a moral claim to be restored to possession, would cause delay in legislation which the emergency would not allow. But to hold an enquiry as to who, among the tenants who had been in possession in 1950-1951 and were not in possession in August, 1952, had a moral claim to be restored to possession, would cause delay in legislation which the emergency would not allow. In that state of affairs, the emergency justified the enactment of all the parts of section 6 of the Act. For that proposition, support was sought in the principles enunciated in Block v. Hirsh2. In the case before us, the restrictions complained of by the petitioner as imposed by the impugned enactments differ in quality from the group of restrictions imposed by section 6 of the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act. I am unable to regard Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam1, as authority for the proposition that statutory extension of a tenant’s term beyond the period fixed by the contract would be constitutionally invalid in the absence of proof of emergency in the relations between landlords and tenants of that category. Sirdar Index Singh v. State of Rajasthan3dealt with legislation by the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan by which, pending the enactment of comprehensive tenancy law, eviction of tenants was prohibited, by successive extensions of temporary legislation, for seven years from June, 1949. There was in that case no emergency of the kind found in Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam1. Protection from eviction was granted for the purpose merely of giving time to the State to decide on the form and content of comprehensive tenancy law. Block v. Hirsh2was considered. The Supreme Court said: “A law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller some fixity of tenure, cannot on that ground alone be said to be unreasonable. Legislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee. Block v. Hirsh2was considered. The Supreme Court said: “A law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller some fixity of tenure, cannot on that ground alone be said to be unreasonable. Legislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee. Thus, in Block v. Hirsh2 a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in possession even after the expiry of the lease, was held to be valid.” I am unable to hold that Block v. Hirsh2, and Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair4, are part of the Constitutional Law of this country so as to compel the Courts to hold that tenancy legislation by which a tenant, whose term has expired, is authorised to continue in possession, subject to terms as to payment of fair rent and proper use of the land, for a reasonable period after the termination of the tenancy, must be held ultra vires the State Legislature, unless such legislation is intended and is reasonably necessary to meet an emergency in the relations of tenants and landowners of that description. I am in complete agreement with the learned Advocate-General in his submission that the proper way of reaching a decision on the question of the constitutional validity of an enactment of an Indian Legislature is not to start at the point at which the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner commences. Legislative powers in our country are not divided between the States and the Centre on the pattern of the division of powers in the United States. We do not have a Centre with enumerated powers of legislation and the State with reserve power. All the subjects of legislation are set out in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The first thing to do, in determining the constitutional validity of an enactment in India, is to turn to Part XI and Schedule VII of the Constitution. All the subjects of legislation are set out in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The first thing to do, in determining the constitutional validity of an enactment in India, is to turn to Part XI and Schedule VII of the Constitution. Even where, as in this case, the attack on the validity of the enactment is based solely on Part III of the Constitution, a preliminary examination of the amplitude of the power of the concerned Legislature to legislate on the subject and the purposes which such legislation might attempt to achieve would create the necessary atmosphere for a competent consideration of the questions arising under Part III. In this case, we find that the subject-matter of the impugned legislation falls under Item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, viz., “Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant”. The impugned enactments purport to regulate the relation of landlords and tenants in agricultural lands in the State. The Act deals not merely with tenants whose terms are current but also with tenants who are in possession after the expiry of the terms limited by their respective contracts. The question arises whether an ex-tenant is a tenant within the meaning of that word in Item 18. It is well-settled that words used in the Seventh Schedule should be construed in their widest sense as denoting only subjectmatters of legislation. Tenancy legislation both in this country and in England has always been regarded as not limited to the regulation of the terms of existing tenancies but as extending also to the prescribing of terms on which tenants, whose terms have expired, could continue in possession as tenants. The Calcutta Rent Act (Bengal Act III of 1920) regulated letting of buildings in Calcutta in the years immediately following the First World War. Questions arising under the Act were ultimately decided by the Privy Council in Karnani Industrial Bank v. Satya Niranjan Shaw1. Their Lordships held that the word ‘tenant’ used in that Act included a person whose term under the contract of tenancy had come to an end, and added that the word ‘tenant’ had similarly been construed by the English Court of Appeal in considering questions arising under the Increase of Rent Act, 1920. Their Lordships held that the word ‘tenant’ used in that Act included a person whose term under the contract of tenancy had come to an end, and added that the word ‘tenant’ had similarly been construed by the English Court of Appeal in considering questions arising under the Increase of Rent Act, 1920. Tenancy legislation to which reference is made in the judgments of this Court in Sundararaja Aiyar v. Sub-Collector, Dindigul2, and in R. C. No. 8G of 1954 related not merely to ‘tenants’ strictly so called but also to ex-tenants. The statute considered in The State of West Bengal v. Suhodh Gopal Bose3, was enacted after the coming into force of the Constitution. By the Act, certain rights of tenants, which had become extinguished by the operation of an earlier statute, were revived and kept in force. Even in cases where decrees for the eviction of tenants had been obtained and the tenancies had been finally put an end to in that manner, the Act restored the tenants to the position they had held before the termination of the tenancy. I hold that the term ‘tenant’ in Item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution includes an ex-tenant. It follows that the circumstance that the Acts impugned in this case confer rights on persons who were let into possession on tenancy agreements but who continue after the expiry of the terms of their tenancy would not take the Acts beyond the scope of Article 246(3) and Item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The power to regulate the relations of landlords and tenants is granted to the Legislature under Item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution in addition to the power granted to the Legislature to make laws with respect to contracts and transfer of property concerning agricultural land. The Legislature is therefore competent to modify, and introduce obligatory terms in contracts of leases of agricultural land. After determining whether the legislation is within the competence of the Legislature under Part XI and Schedule VII of the Constitution, we would have to turn to Part III of the Constitution to ascertain whether any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by that part are affected by the legislation. After determining whether the legislation is within the competence of the Legislature under Part XI and Schedule VII of the Constitution, we would have to turn to Part III of the Constitution to ascertain whether any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by that part are affected by the legislation. It will be recognised that this is a totally different method of approach to the solution of the problem from the method adopted by the petitioner’s learned counsel when he started with axioms of American Constitutional Law and placed particular reliance on Block v. Hirsh1. In Block v. Hirsh1, Mr. Justice Holmes had to consider whether letting of buildings could be regarded as business, and if so, whether circumstances had been proved which clothed that business with a public interest. It is obvious that, if we begin discussing questions relating to tenancy legislation in this country falling under Article 246(3) and Item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of our Constitution, in the light of the principles governing legislation in the United States in the exercise of the power to regulate business affected with a public interest or in the exercise of the war power of Congress, we are in danger of losing sight of the essentials of our problem and realities of our own constitutional structure. We have found that the impugned Acts are within the competence of the State Legislature under Article 246(3) and Item 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Now, except where a statute deals with a purely beneficial subject, like, for example, the regularization of titles acquired under Bhoodan, a statute is bound to affect personal rights strictly so called or rights to property or office. When a legislation is impugned on the ground that it adversely affects rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, we would first have to ascertain whether the right claimed is one of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and, secondly, whether the right is affected in a manner not warranted by the Constitution. In this case, the legislation does affect rights to property. A citizen who owns land is under Article 19 (1) (f) entitled to hold and dispose of such land. But it is not an absolute right, because Article 19 (1) (f) subjects the right to the power of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest. In this case, the legislation does affect rights to property. A citizen who owns land is under Article 19 (1) (f) entitled to hold and dispose of such land. But it is not an absolute right, because Article 19 (1) (f) subjects the right to the power of the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest. The Constitution guarantees the citizen’s individual rights of property because it is considered in the public interest that property should be quietly inherited, enjoyed and disposed of in accordance with the Laws of Succession and Transfer made by the State from time to time. Every Act of inheritance, transfer and enjoyment is protected by all the sanctions at the disposal of the State. It is obvious that, in return for those benefits, the citizen who holds property owes obligations to the State and his fellow-citizens. There is certainly no modern State which does not, from sound reasons of policy, curb the rights of private property at a hundred points. It would be wrong to think that, because Article 19 of the Constitution mentions first the citizen’s right to hold land and then the State’s power to impose reasonable restrictions, the citizen’s right is anterior to Society and the State and that the State’s power is a super-imposed evil and that should be tolerated when it cannot be avoided. On the other hand, the citizen’s right and the State’s power are alike founded on social utility or public interest and are co-eval and of equal weight in the ultimate scales of social well-being. The Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act conferred on tenants who. had been let into possession of land under an agreement of tenancy and who were in possession of such land on 1st December, 1951, the right to continue in occupation as tenants until May, 1957. It further conferred on persons let into possession subsequent to 1st December, 1951, the right to continue in. possession till the same date and to continue in possession thereafter for a further period of five years unless the tenancy was put an end to by notice given before 1st May, 1957. It further conferred on persons let into possession subsequent to 1st December, 1951, the right to continue in. possession till the same date and to continue in possession thereafter for a further period of five years unless the tenancy was put an end to by notice given before 1st May, 1957. The Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as amended by Act XIV of 1956, gave the tenants in the Tanjore District protection from eviction until September, 1958, The question is whether these were reasonable restrictions to impose on the right of a landowner to evict from his land a tenant whose term would under the contract of tenancy expire before May, 1957, or before September, 1958. The right which a landowner has to evict a tenant on the expiry of his term under the contract of tenancy is vested in the landowner under the general Law of Contracts and the principles enacted in the Transfer of Property Act. Clear authority for the proposition that the Legislature has the power to modify or curtail for the benefit of the tenant (including in the term an ex-tenant), rights which are,vested in the landowner under the general law and the Transfer of Property Act is furnished by the decision of the Supreme Court in The State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose1. In that case, the Calcutta High Court held that the landowner’s right to annul under-tenures and evict under-tenants, being a vested right acquired by him under his purchase before section 37 of the Bengal Land Revenue Sales Act 1859, the retrospective deprivation of that right by section 7 of the amending Act was an infringement of his fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (f) to hold the land with all the rights acquired under his purchase ; that such deprivation was not a reasonable restriction on the landowner’s exercise of his vested right; and that consequently section 7 was not saved by clause (5) of Article 19 of the Constitution and was void. In appeal, the Chief Justice of India differed from the High Court and held that the amending Act was in line with traditional tenancy legislation in this country affording relief to tenants whenever the tenancy laws were found, due to changing conditions, to operate harshly on the tenantry. In appeal, the Chief Justice of India differed from the High Court and held that the amending Act was in line with traditional tenancy legislation in this country affording relief to tenants whenever the tenancy laws were found, due to changing conditions, to operate harshly on the tenantry. Das, J., (as he then was) concurred though, on points not material for our present purposes, His Lordship differed from the learned Chief Justice. In the concurring judgment His Lordship referred to certain provisions in the West Bengal Revenue Sales (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1950, which conferred some benefits on the landowner and thus concluded the discussion on that point: “The cumulative effect of the foregoing facts which were not placed before the High Court much outweighs the consideration of the pecuniary loss of the respondent, Subodh Gopal Bose as the auctionpurchaser, and in the circumstances, the infliction of the loss of the right to eject under-tenants can only be regarded as a reasonable restriction permitted by Article 19 (5) to be imposed on the exercise of the right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f).” It follows from that ruling that restrictions imposed on landowners for the benefit of tenants cannot be regarded as unreasonable or beyond the competence of the Legislature on the mere ground that the restrictions deprive the landowner of certain antecedent vested rights. The petitioner admitted the respondent to possession of the land in 1955. Subject to the conditions stated in the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1955, as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956, the petitioner is disabled by the said Act from recovering possession of the land for a period of three years from September, 1955. The learned Advocate-General told us that comprehensive tenancy law is under consideration by the State Government. In Rajasthan, pending enactment of such tenancy law, eviction of tenants was prohibited, by successive extension of temporary legislation, for seven years from 1949. The validity of such legislation was upheld in Sirdar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan2. The denial to landowners in the State of Madras of the right to evict their tenants for a period of three or four years cannot, in the circumstances, be considered as an unreasonable restriction of their rights. The presumption is in favour of the constitutional validity of the legislation. I find that the presumption holds. The denial to landowners in the State of Madras of the right to evict their tenants for a period of three or four years cannot, in the circumstances, be considered as an unreasonable restriction of their rights. The presumption is in favour of the constitutional validity of the legislation. I find that the presumption holds. I need hardly add that the wisdom of the policy of the Legislature is not in question here, but only the ambit of its legislative power. That, in the matter of rent, the Legislature of the State has power, in supersession of the terms of the contract, between the parties, to direct the fixation and payment of fair rent, appears, so to speak, on the face of the relevant provisions of the Constitution referred to in the preceding paragraphs and is affirmed in some of the authorities cited above, to which it is unnecessary that any further specific reference be made. Fixing or directing the fixation of fair rent is part of what the authorities call the pattern of tenancy legislation in this country. It is not contended that the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act is an unreasonable exercise of the power. Out of respect for the petitioner’s learned counsel, I shall proceed to consider the more important decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which were cited by him in support of the position that the impugned enactments impose unreasonable restrictions on the landowner’s right to enjoy property. In Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. State of Nebraska1, an order of the Nebraska State Board of Transportation directing a railroad company to surrender a part of its land to certain individuals for the purpose of building and maintaining an elevator upon it was held to be a taking of private property of the company for the private use of such persons, and, as such a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. All that has happened in the case before us is that the term of a tenant let into possession by the landowner has been extended by the statute beyond the period fixed by the contract between the parties. All that has happened in the case before us is that the term of a tenant let into possession by the landowner has been extended by the statute beyond the period fixed by the contract between the parties. Cases such as MissouriPacific Railway Company v. State of Nebraska1, where A an owner of land, is compelled against his will to put another person in possession of his (A’s) land for a term or permanently are clearly distinguishable from cases where the landowner, who has let a tenant into possession is compelled to allow him to continue in possession for a reasonable term. In Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mohan2, statute forbidding the mining of coal under private dwellings or streets in places where the right to mine such coal is reserved in the grant was held to be unconstitutional as taking property without due process of law. It is in that case that Mr. Justice Holmes spoke his famous sentence, “We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” So far as tenancy law in our country is concerned, however, we have the authority of State of West Bengal v.Subodh Gopal Bose3, for the proposition that legislation is not invalid on the mere ground that the landowner is deprived thereby of antecedent vested rights. Petitioner’s learned counsel next relied on Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company4, and Louieville Joint Stock Land Bank v. William W. Redford. 5 These decisions were handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States in May, 1935. In those decisions, statutes which formed part of the New Deal legislation were declared void as violating the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Those decisions were criticised at the time as expressing political and economic doctrines which the people had put behind them by the verdicts they recorded in the elections of 1932 and 1934. In addition to the Acts struck down by those decisions, several other enactments of the Roosevelt regime were declared invalid by the Supreme Court in the years 1935 and 1936. In addition to the Acts struck down by those decisions, several other enactments of the Roosevelt regime were declared invalid by the Supreme Court in the years 1935 and 1936. Historically speaking, it was perhaps necessary and proper that those opinions have been rendered, because they enabled the American People to think out the full implications of the new philosophy they were opting for and the increased responsibility which they were placing upon the National Government, viz., the responsibility of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise, conditions under which there would be afforded useful employment for those able, willing and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power — a responsibility which the National Government formally accepted under the Employment Act of 1946.6 We must go back however to 1936. It is well-known that after the almost unanimous election by the people of President Roosevelt as President for a second term in 1936, the outlook of the Supreme Court on the social and economic problems to which New Deal legislation attempted to find solutions, changed, and that the Court took a more restricted view of its own jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment of the Legislature on matters within its competence. In West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish7, the Court expressly overruled its earlier decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital8, and upheld the validity of a Minimum Wage Law of the State of Washington. On the same date, viz., 29th March, 1947, the Supreme Court in Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank9, upheld the validity of the amended Frazier Lemke Act. The earlier Frazier-Lemke Act had been held void on 27th May, 1935, in Louieville Joint Stock Land Bank v. William W. Bedford1. “In a series of notable decisions handed down on the 24th May, 1957 Carmichel v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.2, Charles C. Steward Machine Co. The earlier Frazier-Lemke Act had been held void on 27th May, 1935, in Louieville Joint Stock Land Bank v. William W. Bedford1. “In a series of notable decisions handed down on the 24th May, 1957 Carmichel v. Southern Coal and Coke Co.2, Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis3and Belwaring v. Davis4the Supreme Court sustained all the crucial provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935 and thus announced a concept of national welfare so broad that it constituted, in theory, if not in fact, a reversal of many of the conservative decisions of the earlier New Deal period and a return to the Marshall interpretation of the Constitution5 The learned authors from whose monumental work” The Growth of the American Republic “ the quotation given above has been taken, add ”Such an interpretation of the Constitution, had it been adopted earlier, might well have sustained the Agricultural Adjustment Act6, and the Railway Pension Legislation7“8 Decisions of the Supreme Court striking down legislation relating to rights of property as violating the due process clause of Amendment V and XIV of the Constitution, prior to March, 1937, are not considered authoritative in the United. States at the present time and cannot be of much assistance to us here in this country on the question of reasonable restrictions on the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. I hold, that, in order that the Legislature of a State might enact legislation extending the term of a tenant of land beyond the period fixed by the contract of tenancy, it is not necessary that there should be a situation, which can be called an emergency in the relations of such landowners and tenants. I find further that the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952, the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955, as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956 and the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payment of Fair Rent) Act, 1956 represent a valid exercise of the State’s legislative power under Article 246 and Item 18 of List II. of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and that the restrictions imposed by those enactments on the landowners’ right to hold property are reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the general public. Petitioner’s learned counsel contended next that the impugned legislation violates Article 14 of the Constitution. of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and that the restrictions imposed by those enactments on the landowners’ right to hold property are reasonable restrictions imposed in the interests of the general public. Petitioner’s learned counsel contended next that the impugned legislation violates Article 14 of the Constitution. The argument is that while landowners, who were themselves cultivating their lands, are left free so to continue to cultivate them, landowners, who had admitted tenants into possession, are denied freedom to evict the tenants on the expiry of the term limited by the contract but are compelled to continue such tenants in possession after the expiry of such term. The impugned legislation deals with the relations of landowners and tenants. Compelling landowners, who have no tenants, to admit tenants, is outside the scope of the subject-matter of the legislation. Further, even assuming that landowners who have no tenants, and landowners whose tenants are continuing in possession after the expiry of the term limited by the contract of tenancy, stand on the same footing, it is not necessary, in order to avoid the charge of discrimination that the State should legislate at one and the same time for both these classes of landowners. The statute fixing minimum wages in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish9, related only to women and children. It was contended that the statute violated the Article relating to equal protection because the statute did not extend to men as well. In repelling that contention, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said: ”The argument that the legislation in question constitutes an arbitrary discrimination, because it does not extend to men is unavailing. This Court has frequently held that legislative authority, acting within its proper field,is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The Legislature ‘is free to recognise degrees of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. ‘If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. There is no ‘doctrinaire requirement’ that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms." I hold that the statutes do not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Petition is dismissed. No costs. Ganapatia Pillai, J.:-I also agree. There is no ‘doctrinaire requirement’ that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms." I hold that the statutes do not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. Petition is dismissed. No costs. Ganapatia Pillai, J.:-I also agree. Rajagopalan, J.-I had the advantage of reading in advance the judgment which Subrahmanyam, J., has just delivered. I am in complete and respectful agreement with his conclusions, that the impugned Tenancy Acts do not infringe the fundamental right of equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution, and that the restrictions imposed by those Acts on the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner by Article 19 (1) (f) are reasonable and within the limits permitted by Article 19(5) of the Constitution. I wish, however, to add a few observations of mine to supplement the discussion of my learned brother. With reference to the challenge to the validity of the impugned Acts based on Article 14, I only wish to add that a somewhat similar contention, but even more restricted in its scope, was repelled by the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan1. At page 620 His Lordship observed: "The contention.....is that under that section landlords who had tenants on their lands on 1st April, 1948, were subjected to various restrictions in the enjoyment of their rights as owners, while other landlords were free from similar restrictions. There is no substance in this contention." In the present case the classification was between owners of lands who themselves continued in possession of their lands and those who admitted tenants into possession of their lands under contracts express or implied, after which the tenants were in actual, physical and lawful possession of the lands. It was on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of America in Block v. Hirsh2, and in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair3, that Mr. Venkatasubramania Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied to a considerable extent to support his plea, that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts did not satisfy the test of reasonableness imposed by Article 19 (5) of our Constitution. Venkatasubramania Ayyar, learned counsel for the petitioner, relied to a considerable extent to support his plea, that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts did not satisfy the test of reasonableness imposed by Article 19 (5) of our Constitution. The learned counsel urged that the principles laid down in Block v. Hirsh2, and in Chestleton Corporation v. Sinclair3, have become part of the law which this Court has to administer, because those principles were approved of by Venkatarama Ayyar, J. when he delivered the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingami, and again when the same learned Judge delivered the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan1. Before I examine which among the principles laid down by Holmes, J., in Block v. Hirsh2, were approved of, I should like to record my respectful agreement with what Venkatarama Ayyar, J., stated at page 1129 in Santhanakrishna Udayar v. Vaidyalingam4. "It appears to me that the question is one which has to be determined solely on a construction of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and that there is no need to, discuss at any length the American law on the subject. If what would otherwise be an invasion of the rights of a citizen under Article 19 (1) (f) is reasonable and in the interests of the public, then all the requirements of Article 19 (5) are satisfied." A similar caution has been administered more than once by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. That is why I have refrained from undertaking over again a detailed examination of the American cases, which have all been considered by Subrahmanyam, J. One of the principles laid down in Block v. Hirsh2, which was approved of in Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan1was that explained at page 620 of the report. After pointing out: ‘“The preamble of the Ordinance recites that there was a growing tendency on the part of the land-holders to eject tenants, and that it was therefore expedient to enact a law for giving them protection.” Venkatarama Ayyar, J., observed: “We should add that the petitioners sought to dispute the correctness of the recitals in the preamble. This they clearly cannot do. This they clearly cannot do. Vide the observations of Holmes, J. in Block v. Hirsh 1 .” We are not really concerned with the application of that principle in the case before us. Nothing in the preambles of the impugned Acts was relied upon to sustain the constitutional validity of the legislation. I would, however, like to add that I do not understand the Supreme Court to have laid down that the recitals in the preamble of an Act are conclusive of the facts stated therein. Such was not the view taken by Holmes, J., in Block v. Hirsh1, even independently of what he said in his subsequent decision in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair2. In Block v. Hirsh1, Holmes, J., stated: “No doubt it is true that a legislative declaration of facts that are material only as the ground for enacting a rule of law, for instance, that a certain use is a public one, may not be hel,d conclusive by the Courts-But a declaration by a legislature concerning public conditions, that, by necessity and duty it must know, is entitled at least to great respect. In this instance, Congress stated a publicly notorious and almost world-wide fact. That the emergency declared by the statute did exist must be assumed......” In Santhanakrishna v. Vaithialingam3, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., cited this passage with obvious approval and then proceeded to refer to the affidavits filed in the proceedings before him. The learned Judge observed: “The affidavits filed in these petitions also amply established the seriousness of the general situation.....Thus it is amply established that a state of emergency had arisen and strong measures had to be taken for meeting the same.” No more in Block v. Hirsh1 , than in Santhanakrishna v. Vaithialingam 3 , were the recitals in the preamble of the impugned Act accepted as conclusive proof of the facts stated therein. The other passage from the judgment of Holmes, J., in Block v. Hirsh1, that was quoted with approval by Venkatarama Ayyar, J., at page 1122 in Santhanakrishna v. Vaithialingam3, and at page 622 in Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan4, was: “The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the Commission established by the Act, and that thus the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut down. But if the public interest be established, the regulation of rates is one of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has been settled since Munn of Illinois v. People5. The preference given to the tenant in possession is an almost necessary ingredient of the policy, and is traditional in English law. If the tenant remained subject to the landlord’s power to evict, the attempt to limit the landlord’s demands would fail.” In Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan4, the Supreme Court relied on this passage to support the position: “Thus in Block v. Hirsh1, a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in possession even after the expiry of the lease was held to be valid” . As I understand the judgment of his Lordship, it was only for that limited purpose that he relied on that passage from the judgment of Holmes, J. In Santhanakrishna v. Vaithialingam3, however, the passage from the judgment of Holmes, J., which has been set out above, was relied on to sustain the view, that where the impugned Act was an emergency measure, in the sense that it was designed to meet an emergency and was to be in force for a strictly limited period of time, that was a very relevant factor in deciding whether the restrictions it imposed were reasonable within the scope of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution......(see the observations at page 1122). It is needless for me to refer again to what my learned brother Subrahmanyam, J., has emphasised in his judgment, that we have been asked to consider the constitutional validity of the impugned Tenancy Acts on the basis, that they Were not emergency measures in the sense I have indicated above. Of course, the principles laid down by Holmes, J., in Block v. Hirsh1, have to be understood in the light of what that great Judge himself held subsequently in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair2. While there was no specific reference to the decision in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair2, in the decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan3, it was specifically referred to in Santhanakrishna v. Vaithialingam1. At page 1123 Venkatarama Ayyar, J., observed: “Reliance was also placed on the decision in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair 2-----But Holmes, J., affirmed the correctness of the decision in Block v. Hirsh1 and held that the principle, of that decision did not apply as in fact the emergency had come to an end. This decision would be in point if the State of Madras should re-enact Act XIV of 1952.” Based on his plea, that the principles laid down by Holmes, J., in Block v. Hirsh1 have been approved of by the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan3, the proposition of law that Mr. Venkatasubrahmania Ayyar invited us to accept was that, when legislation takes away from the owner of agricultural land his right to recover his property from the time-expired tenant, who continues in possession without the authority of the owner, such legislation is an invasion of constitutionally protected rights of property which can be justified only upon proof of an emergency justification (I have italicised the passage on which the learned counsel laid most stress). As I understand the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sardar Inder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan3, no such proposition of law was laid down there. It is true at page 622 of the report in Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan3, after referring to the passage from the judgment of Holmes, J., in Block v. Hirsh1, which I have already set out above, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., stated: “It should also be remembered in this connection that the impugned Ordinance is an emergency legislation of a temporary character, and, as observed in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi6 that is a factor to be taken into account in judging its reasonableness.” But that does not sanction the acceptance of the contention of Mr. Venkata-subramania Ayyar, that the Supreme Court would have struck down the Ordinance in question there as unconstitutional, but for the fact that it was an emergency legislation of a temporary character. I did not understand Mr. Venkatasubramania Ayyar to contend that no restrictions could be imposed on the fundamental right to hold and dispose of property guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f) except in an emergency. His plea was, as I understand it, a more limited one, that the two sets of restrictions imposed by the two Tenancy Acts (1) restriction on the right of the owner of the land to recover possession from the tenant, whose period of tenancy as regulated by the contract between the parties, express or implied, has expired, and (2) the restriction on the right of the owner to regulate by contract between himself and the tenant in possession of the land the rent the latter should pay for the period of his lawful occupation of the land, were unconstitutional as there was no case of emergency to be considered at this stage. I have already dealt with this argument, that if at all these restrictions could be accepted as reasonable within the scope of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution there should have been proof of emergency during the limited duration of which the restrictions were to be in force. Whether without any consideration of such emergency, the restrictions are reasonable and within the limits permitted by Article 19 (5) still remains for consideration. Judged by the pattern of tenancy legislation during the last fifty years in this State and in the rest of India, which secured for the tenant-in-possession a reasonable fixity of tenure subject to his paying a fair rent during the period he is permitted to remain in possession, both regulated by legislation independent of the contractual obligations already incurred or which the parties are prepared to incur, the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts, to which I have referred above, cannot be characterised as unreasonable. That these restrictions have been imposed on owners of lands held under ryotwari tenure makes, in my opinion, no difference to the standards of reasonableness to apply. That these restrictions have been imposed on owners of lands held under ryotwari tenure makes, in my opinion, no difference to the standards of reasonableness to apply. In judging the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts, due regard must be had also to the economic background and the need for a planned agricultural economy in the interests of the country as a whole, both of which were explained in some detail in Sundararaja Ayyar v. Sub-Collector, Dindigul1, by a Division Bench of this Court of which I was a member. I also see considerable force in the contention of the learned Advocate-General, that in testing the reasonableness or otherwise of the restrictions imposed by the impugned enactments, the Court should consider whether those restrictions were greater than those needed for the proper effectuation of the law, because, such effectuation of the law itself is in the interests of the public. Legislative competence of the Madras Legislature to enact the tenancy laws, the constitutional validity of which has been impugned in these proceedings, was never in issue. It was only their constitutional validity that was assailed. The reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned enactment has also to be judged in relation to the objective in view, what the intended legislation was designed by the Legislature to achieve. That was one of the principles explained in Guruviah Naidu v. State of Madras2, the observations are at pages 478-479. See also Canadian Federation of Agriculture v. Attorney-General for Quebec3. Though that is a relevant factor, still the Court has to decide whether the means to achieve the end in view are those within the limits set down by the Constitution, in this case, by Article 19 (5) of the Constitution. To adopt the words of Holmes, J., which my learned brother has already quoted in his exhaustive judgment, we should not forget that a strong public desire to improve the conditions of the tenants of ryotwari lands is not enough to warrant an achievement of that desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way. Once again I must say that I have placed these views of mine on record only to supplement what my learned brother has dealt with exhaustively in his learned judgment. Once again I must say that I have placed these views of mine on record only to supplement what my learned brother has dealt with exhaustively in his learned judgment. I agree with Subrahmanyam, J., that the restrictions imposed by the impugned Tenancy Acts on the rights of owners of ryotwari lands like the petitioner are reasonable and satisfy the requirements of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution. V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.