Assistant Public Prosecutor Quilon v. The Secretary Aluminium Industries Ltd
1958-08-14
K.SANKARAN, P.T.RAMAN NAYAR
body1958
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER P.T. Raman Nayar, J. 1. This is a report under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code made by the District Magistrate, Quilon, in the following circumstances: In Crime No. 39 of 1957 of the Sadar Ambala Police Station, Punjab, a case under section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Central Act II of 1947) was registered against one J. R. Woodwall, a Sub-Divisional Officer of the Punjab P.W.D. and this case is being investigated by Randhir Sain, a Sub-Inspector of Police of the Special Enquiry Agency, Anti-Corruption Department of the Punjab Government, under authority from a magistrate as required by section 3 of the Act. The corruption alleged is in respect of the supply of about Rs. 40 lakhs worth of aluminium conductors by the Aluminium Industries, Ltd., Kundara, in this State (hereinafter referred to as the company), and Woodwall was the Passing Officer who came to the factory and after inspecting the conductors, accepted them on behalf of the Punjab Government. Randhir Sain went to the office of the company on 18th June 1957 for purposes of the investigation, and it is not disputed that he was afforded full facilities for the inspection of such of the books and other records of the company as he asked for. A room was placed at his disposal and all the books and records he wanted (including the 26 books which form the subject matter of this case) were handed over to him for inspection. He conducted this inspection until the 3rd July, taking copies of such documents as he required, the company helping him in the matter by placing photostat facilities at his disposal. Meanwhile, he had on 25th June 1957 produced the order Ext. P1, addressed to the General Manager of the company by his superior, a District Superintendent of Police who was the Officer-in-charge of the Special Enquiry Agency. This order purported to be under section 94 read with section 551 of the Criminal Procedure Code and it required the General Manager to produce all records including vouchers for travelling, etc., relating to the purchase of the conductors by the Punjab P.W.D., as maintained by the company, before Randhir Sain at the office of the company on 18th June 1957. 2.
2. All the records, including what I may call the 26 disputed books, had already been produced before Randhir Sain, but, on 3rd July 1957, when, on the strength of Ext. P1, Randhir Sain wanted to take away the 26 disputed books the company objected. The next day Randhir Sain acting under section 166, Criminal Procedure Code, addressed a letter to the Station House Officer, Kundara, requesting the latter to search for and seize the books and hand them over to him. The S.H.O. did not regard the matters of such urgency as to require him to proceed under section 165, Criminal Procedure Code and being of the view that there was time enough to obtain a search warrant, he applied for a search warrant to the Sub-Magistrate, Quilon and the Sub-Magistrate directed the issue of a warrant, apparently under section 96 (1) of the Code. The warrant, Ext. P 4, was issued the same day, and, on the following day, the S.H.O., Kundara, searched the premises of the company and seized the 26 disputed books under a list which he forwarded, along with the seized books and his report, Ext. P 5, to the court on 6th July 1957. In his report he said that the seized books may be sent to the trial court in Punjab through Randhir Sain for the purposes of further investigation. While the books were on their way, Randhir Sain presented the petition, Ext. P 6, to the Sub-Magistrate, Quilon, requesting that he may be allowed to take the books with him to the Punjab trial court where he said it was required both for purposes of investigation and for production before court when the need arose. On this the Sub-Magistrate endorsed the single word order [Ext. P6 (a)], " Allowed ". (The original petition, with his order endorsed therein he handed over to Randhir Sain. The District Magistrate has commented adversely on this, but after having secured the original he has committed the same mistake so that what we have before us is only a certified copy of, the petition and the order thereon.) But, before the books could be handed over, the company intervened with a petition, Ext. P7, praying for the return of the books and the petition Ext. P8 praying that, pending final orders on Ext. P7, the books may be returned to it on a bond. On Ext.
P7, praying for the return of the books and the petition Ext. P8 praying that, pending final orders on Ext. P7, the books may be returned to it on a bond. On Ext. P8, as also on Ext. P-5, the Magistrate endorsed the orders, Ext. P 8 (a) and Ext. P5(a) respectively, both dated 6th July 1957 to the effect that the books should be kept in the Quilon Police Station pending the disposal of the petition, Ext. P7. On Ext. P 7 he ordered notice to the Station House Officer, Kundara, and, after hearing the parties (the Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for Randhir Sain), passed the order Ext. P 7 (a), dated 10th July 1957, directing that the books be handed over to the company on a bond for Rs. 10,000 for their production before a court of law when required. Against this order the Assistant Public Prosecutor, Quilon, went on revision to the District Magistrate, Quilon, on 11th July 1957, and, after hearing both sides, the District Magistrate has, on the 2nd August 1957, made the present report. 3. In the opinion of the learned District Magistrate, the order Ext.. P 6 (a), dated 6th July 1957, by the Sub- Magistrate allowing Randhir Sain to take away the books was a proper order, The subsequent order, Ext. P 7(a), dated 10th July 1957, directing the return of the books to the company on a bond was without jurisdiction and has to be set aside. It is for this purpose that he has reported the case to this court for action under section 439, Criminal Procedure Codes Pending the orders of this court, he has directed that the books be kept in safe custody under seal in the Police Station, and he has further directed that the officers of the Inquiry Agency be given access to them for the purposes of investigation with the permission of the Sub-Magistrate. 4. We have heard Mr. P. Govindan Nair for the company and the learned Advocate-General, instructed by the Special Inquiry Agency, for the State. The 26 books seized are the cash book and ledgers, and despatch and inward registers of the company from 1st April 1950 to 31st March 1952 during which period presumably, its contract with the Punjab Government was being executed. Mr. Govindan Nair for the company, does not ask for the return of these books.
The 26 books seized are the cash book and ledgers, and despatch and inward registers of the company from 1st April 1950 to 31st March 1952 during which period presumably, its contract with the Punjab Government was being executed. Mr. Govindan Nair for the company, does not ask for the return of these books. What he presses is that they should not be carried away to the Punjab until they are actually required by a court of law. He points out that the company needs the books for frequent reference in connection with its business and, in particular, tor certain legal proceedings. He says that there is a petition pending in this very court for which the books are required, and he also points out that a dispute between the company and the Punjab Government in respect of the very contract now in question is pending arbitration. The company has made a big claim against the Punjab Government, and reference to the disputed books will be necessary for the prosecution of that claim. If the books are carried away and kept with the Police in the Punjab, the company will have no access to them and this will put the company to untold and entirely unnecessary hardship. On the other hand, he does not want that the investigation should be hampered in the least, and he assures us that the company is willing to co-operate in all reasonable ways. He suggests that the books be kept safely and under lock and key in s6me court in Quilon (the company is prepared to provide steel boxes or almirahs for the purpose) and that, subject to the orders of that court, both the officers of the company and of the Special Inquiry Agency be allowed to inspect the books and take such copies (including certified copies) as they may require. Should the Special Inquiry Agency require this, the company is prepared to take and furnish photostat copies of the necessary records at the company's expense. Mr. Govindan Nair also draws our attention to the fact that, although it is now more than a year since the District Magistrate passed the order permitting the officers of the Special Inquiry Agency to have access to the records, the agency has not cared to take advantage of the permission.
Mr. Govindan Nair also draws our attention to the fact that, although it is now more than a year since the District Magistrate passed the order permitting the officers of the Special Inquiry Agency to have access to the records, the agency has not cared to take advantage of the permission. This, he argues, betrays an entire lack of bona fides and shows that the Agency is more intent on harassing the company than on getting on with the investigation. 5. The suggestion made by Mr. Govindan Nair seems to us very reasonable and designed to ensure that, while the investigation can proceed quite unhampered, the company is not put to unnecessary hardship by being deprived of access to its own record. We are therefore passing orders on those lines. But, since the learned Assistant Public Advocate-General has contended for the extreme position that we are bound to direct that the books be handed over to Randhir Sain, it becomes necessary to consider the argument advanced in support of this contention. The argument is that, once a court decides to issue a warrant under section 96 (1) of the Code in aid of an order made by a police officer under section 94 (1) and directs a special search for a particular document or thing, as distinguished from a general search, it has no option but to hand over the document or thing found as a result of the search, to the officer. According to him the court is in no different position from a police officer making a search under section 165 in compliance with a requisition under section 166 (1) and is under a similar obligation as that placed on the police officer by section 166 (2) which requires that the thing found be forwarded to the officer at whose request the search was made. 6. We do not agree. But, before considering the argument we might observe that Ext. P1 itself seems to imply that the company was to produce the books for Randhir Sains inspection at the company's office; not that Randhir Sain should be allowed to take them away.
6. We do not agree. But, before considering the argument we might observe that Ext. P1 itself seems to imply that the company was to produce the books for Randhir Sains inspection at the company's office; not that Randhir Sain should be allowed to take them away. But, assuming that it directed the removal of the books and that power seems to reside in section 94 we do not think that a court whose assistance is sought, and which issues a search warrant under section 96 (1), is in any way bound by the direction. A police officer acting on a requisition under section 166(1) is, no doubt, required to hand over the thing found to the officer making the requisition but, surely a court whose assistance is sought by a police officer, unable to secure compliance with his own order, cannot be placed in the same position. The court is not a limb of the police officer, and that is doubtless why there is no provision in section 96 similar to that found in section 166 (2). Even a police officer obtaining a document or thing under section 94 or under sections 165 and 165 is bound to see that no unnecessary hardship is caused to the person in possession. He can detain the document or thing only to the extent necessary or the purposes of the investigation. Once that purpose is satisfied he must either return the thing or send it to court. And surely a court whose assistance is sought and given must have the power to ensure this. Doubtless it must not forget the purpose for which it issued the warrant, and it must see that the investigation is not hampered in any way. But it is equally its duty to see that the person from whose possession the document or thing is seized is put to no more hardship than is necessary for the purposes of investigation. When it issues a warrant it cannot know, even though the document or thing may be specified, how far that document or thing is really necessary for the investigation, and, if after hearing the person from whose possession the document or thing is seized, it is satisfied that the document or thing is not really necessary for the investigation it seems to us that it has the power to direct its return.
It has likewise the power and the duty to make such orders regarding the custody of the thing as, in its discretion, best ensures that the investigation is carried on with the least hardship to the person from whose possession the thing was seized. The destination indicated under section 94 is not necessarily the destination once the court acts under section 96. Although there is no express provision to that effect in Chapter VII of the Code, it is obvious that, when a court issues a search warrant, the person executing the warrant must produce the things found before the court; and that this is so, is apparent froth the Form VIII in Schedule V to the Coda for a warrant under section 96. That form requires that all such things as may be taken possession of in execution of the warrant should forthwith be brought before the court. It would thus appear that even when a warrant is issued under section 96 in aid of an order made under section 94, the things seized come into the custody of the court and that their disposal thereafter is within its power and discretion. Doubtless the discretion is to be properly exercised having regard to the purpose of the seizure. The entire position has been gone into very fully and, if we may say so with due respect, stated correctly in S. K. Srivastava v. Gajinand A.I.R. 1956 Cal. 609. That the warrant there was issued under section 172 of the Sea Customs Act and not under section 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code makes no difference. A search warrant under section 172 of the Sea Customs Act has to be executed in the same way and has the same effect as a search warrant issued under the Code, and the entire discussion in the judgment is with reference to the provisions of the Code. 7. It was argued by the learned Advocate-General that officers of the company might very well be involved in the matter and that it is possible that some of them might actually be prosecuted. Therefore if the books are handed back to the company they might be suppressed, and even the bond might be unenforceable in view of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. Since we do not propose to return the books it becomes unnecessary to consider this argument.
Therefore if the books are handed back to the company they might be suppressed, and even the bond might be unenforceable in view of Article 20 (3) of the Constitution. Since we do not propose to return the books it becomes unnecessary to consider this argument. But we might say that there is as yet no case registered and no investigation made against any officer of the company. 8. We invited the learned Advocate-General to tell us how exactly he apprehended that the investigation might be prejudiced by the order we propose to make. He was unable to satisfy us on the point. He said that it might be necessary to have the books scrutinised by the technical experts of the Punjab Government. For that the technical expert could very well be brought down to Quilon if, for some reason or other, the taking of the necessary copies is not practicable. It was next said that Woodwall and other officers of the Punjab P.W.D. might have to be confronted with certain entries in the books. But such entries are admittedly few and none of them is by Woodwall or the officers concerned. Copies of the entries should therefore be quite sufficient for the purpose. Then, it was said, that some of the persons who posted the accounts and other registers are no longer in the service or the company and that it might be necessary question them with reference to the entries made by them. But it is not pretended that these persons are in the Punjab or anywhere near there. On the contrary it is admitted that they must be in or about Quilon and there should be no difficulty in showing them the entries and in questioning them in the premises of the court at Quilon. We are not satisfied that any of the difficulties stated are genuine difficulties, and in this connection we might observe that, although we do not go to the same extent as the learned counsel for the company, the attitude displayed by the investigation in doing nothing for over a year despite the facility offered by the order of the learned District Magistrate for the examination of the books is an attitude that does not commend itself to us. 9. One of the grounds urged against the order Ext.
9. One of the grounds urged against the order Ext. P 7 (a) passed by the learned Sub-Magistrate is that it is in effect a revision of his own order Ext. P6 (a) allowing Randhir Sain to take away the books. It is pointed out that the learned Magistrate had no power to revise his own order. That of course is so. But we are inclined to regard Ext. P 6 (a) as an interim and not a final order. Ext. P 7 (a) is the final order; and hence no question of its being in revision of Ext. P 6 (a) can arise. However that might be, the whole matter is now before us, and, whether or not the Sub-Magistrate had the power to modify Ext. P 6 (a), our jurisdiction to pass such orders as we deem proper is not questioned. 10. In modification of the order passed by the learned Sub-Magistrate, we direct that the books seized be kept in safe custody by the Sub-Magistrate, Quilon, for such period as it might be required for the purposes of investigation or for production before a court of law. The company will provide the boxes or almirahs necessary for the purpose. The officers of the Special Inquiry Agency and of the company will be allowed inspection, and will be allowed to take copies (including photostat copies and certified copies) subject to such safeguards such as the immediate supervision of an officer of the court and notice to the other party, as to the court might seem proper. In making the inspection the officers of the Special Inquiry Agency will also be allowed to question witnesses with reference to the books.