Order This is a petition by the Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Company, Limited, for the issue of a writ of prohibition to restrain the first respondent from carrying on any investigation into the affairs of the company in pursuance of an order made under section 33 of the Insurance Act by the Central Government. The relevant facts are these: The petitioner-company was incorporated on 25th September, 1941, and came under the purview of the Insurance Act, 1938. The company applied for and obtained certificates of registration for carrying on various classes of insurance business. On 15th October, 1956, there was an Extraordinary General Meeting of the share-holders of the company at which four resolutions were passed. By the first it was resolved: “that the company do forthwith cease to carry on business as Insurers in respect of fire, motor, marine and accident and other general insurance business.” The second resolution required the Directors “to stop the carrying on the business of insurers in all the branches of the said business and not to issue any policy of insurance, cover notes or other contract of insurance from and after this date”. The third resolution required the Board of Directors “carry on the business of money-lending as a loan company and also to do investment business”. The fourth resolution authorised and instructed the Directors to notify the Controller of Insurance that the company had with effect from that date ceased to carry on the business of insurers. The Directors were also instructed not to apply for renewal of the licences which the company held, when those licences terminated in the usual course. On 10th December, 1956, the company wrote to the Controller of Insurance, Government of India, informing him that by reason of the resolutions that had been passed at the Extraordinary General Meeting of the company held on 15th October, 1956: "We cannot apply to you for the renewal of registration under sub-section (2) of section 3-A of the Insurance Act, 1938, and we are, therefore, not applying to you for the renewal of registration which please note". On 14th May, 1957, the Controller of Insurance wrote to the company stating that as the company had failed to obtain renewal of its certificates of registration, the previous certificates had been cancelled with effect from 1st July, 1957. The cancellation was also notified in the Gazette of India. On 14th May, 1957, the Controller of Insurance wrote to the company stating that as the company had failed to obtain renewal of its certificates of registration, the previous certificates had been cancelled with effect from 1st July, 1957. The cancellation was also notified in the Gazette of India. In October, 1956, and subsequently the Government of India received complaints against the company. On 17th July, 1957, the Government of India passed an order directing the Controller of Insurance to investigate the affairs of this company and to submit a report. The Controller of Insurance appointed Messrs. Fraser and Ross, the first respondent in this petition, to be auditors to assist him in the investigation of the affairs of the company. Thereupon the company on 9th October, 1957, wrote to the Controller of Insurance drawing his attention to the resolutions that had been passed and pointing out "We submit that the action taken by you purporting to be under section 33 of the Insurance Act of 1938 upon a direction from the Central Government in this behalf is without jurisdiction and not warranted by provisions of the Act". The Controller wrote back overruling this objection raised by the company. In consequence the company has come to this Court and asked for the issue of a writ of prohibition. Mr. Jadadisa Ayyar, the learned counsel, for the petitioner, argued: The only provision in the Act which enables the Central Government to issue an order of the kind now complained of is to be found in section 33 of the Act. In consequence the company has come to this Court and asked for the issue of a writ of prohibition. Mr. Jadadisa Ayyar, the learned counsel, for the petitioner, argued: The only provision in the Act which enables the Central Government to issue an order of the kind now complained of is to be found in section 33 of the Act. The first sub-section of that section runs as follows: "The Central Government may, at any time, by order in writing direct the Controller or any other person specified in the order to investigate the affairs of any insurer and to report to the Central Government on any investigation made by him." The word "insurer" occurring in this sub-section is defined — so far as that definition is here relevant — in section 2 (9), paragraph (b) in these terms: "any body corporate (not being a person specified in sub-clause (c) of this clause) carrying on the business of insurance, which is a body corporate incorporated under any law for the time being in force in India; or stands to any such body corporate in the relation of a subsidiary company within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, as defined by sub-section (2) of section a of that Act." To come within the terms of this definition the body corporate must be actually carrying on the business of insurance. It is not sufficient if it had carried on the business of insurance in the past ; if it has ceased to carry on the business of insurance it would not be an " insurer " within the meaning of this definition ; consequently it will be outside the scope of section 33 which cannot therefore be applied to its affairs. Dealing with section 2-D of the Act Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar explained that it would not apply to a case like the present where a company has closed down every one of its various lines of insurance business. Section 2-D enacts: "Every insurer shall be subject to all the provisions of this Act in relation to any class of insurance business so long as his liabilities in India in respect of business of that class remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for." Commenting on this section Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar explained: A company may be carrying on several lines of insurance business, fire, marine, accident and so on. Jagadisa Ayyar explained: A company may be carrying on several lines of insurance business, fire, marine, accident and so on. What section 2-D says is that merely because it has closed down one line or department of insurance the company will not cease to be an "insurer" and will not cease to be subject to the liabilities imposed on it in respect of the other departments which it continues to carry on. It may even be that one can properly say that so long as it carries on any line of insurance business, it is an " insurer " and in consequence subject to the provisions of the Act even in respect of the branch or branches which it has shut down. Granting all that, the position is that once a company has shut down all its branches of insurance business, it would cease to be an ‘insurer’ and so an investigation cannot be ordered under section 33 of the Act in respect of its affairs. The word “ insurer” in section 2-D must be read as a person who is actually carrying on the business of insurance. Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar further pointed out that in this particular case the certificate of registration that had been issued to the company was cancelled with effect from 1st July, 1957, and he argued that though it may be that such cancellation does not absolve the company from the obligations, if any, arising out of the policies it had issued in the past, it is entirely precluded from doing any further insurance business. That is another reason why section 33 cannot be utilised for directing an investigation into its affairs. It had ceased to do insurance business ; it had also lost the right to do any insurance business ; it therefore ceased to be an “insurer” within the meaning of section 33 of the Act. I am unable to accept this line of reasoning. The word “ insurer” is used in the Act to include, (a) persons actually carrying on insurance business; (b) persons about to commence insurance business; and (c) persons who have stopped insurance business but against whom claims or liabilities might be outstanding. Take section 7 to begin with. That requires every “ insurer” who does not fall under section 2 (9) (c), to deposit and keep deposited with the Reserve Bank of India various amounts of money. Take section 7 to begin with. That requires every “ insurer” who does not fall under section 2 (9) (c), to deposit and keep deposited with the Reserve Bank of India various amounts of money. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) runs: “Where the business done or to be done in life insurance only, two hundred thousand rupees.” Eight other similar clauses follow. In every one of these clauses the expression used is “ where the business done or is to be done”. Now the use of the expression “ to be done” in relation to the word “ insurer” is obviously intended to include a person who is about to commence the business. Then, there is section 9 which provides for situations “ where an insurer has ceased to carry on in India any class of insurance business” . If therefore in this section the word “ insurer” means a person who is actually carrying on the business of insurance, then that section would be self-contradictory and stand stultified. Further down we have got section 55, the first sub-section of which begins: “In the winding up of an insurance company or in the insolvency of any other insurer the value of the assets and the liabilities of the insurer shall be ascertained.......” in the manner subsequently provided for. It is obvious that after insolvency supervenes the business cannot be carried on and so the word “insurer” in this section must mean a person who has ceased to carry on business. The meaning of the word “insurer” in section 56 is also the same. As regards the contention of Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar based on the cancellation of the certificates of registration, it would be enough to observe that it would logically lead to a situation where a person can profit by his own wrongful acts. A certificate of registration may be cancelled for failure to comply with one or other of the various requirements of the statute. A person who wants to avoid an investigation has only to do something or omit to do something which, by reason of the provisions of the Act, would lead to the cancellation of the certificate of registration. Thereafter if Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar were right it would be possible for him to say that since the registration has been cancelled there can be no investigation into his affairs. I now come to section 33. Thereafter if Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar were right it would be possible for him to say that since the registration has been cancelled there can be no investigation into his affairs. I now come to section 33. Under clause (b) of sub-clause (4) of that section the Central Government may direct the Controller to cancel the registration of the insurer, which means that from that time the “insurer” cannot carry on the business of insurance. Then there is clause (c) which provided that the Central Government may direct the Controller to apply to the Court for the winding up of the insurer, if a company, whether the registration of the insurer has been cancelled under clause (b) or not. If the argument of Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar were right we shall reach this position. The moment the registration is cancelled the company would cease to be “insurer” . And if it ceases to be an “insurer” the Controller cannot proceed to direct an investigation of its affairs. None the less this clause provides that notwithstanding the cancellation of the registration, the Central Government may direct the Controller to apply to the Court for the winding up of the insurer and his company. In other words, even in sub-section (4) the word “insurer,” is used to comprehend companies which have ceased to carry on the business of insurance. The only clear alternative would be the assumption that the Legislature has contradicted itself in the same clause. I agree with Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar that in the Act an attempt has been made for certain purposes to maintain a distinction between the various lines of business which an insurer may be carrying on. But from that it does not follow that the other parts of his contentions are sound. It seems to me that section 2-D was deliberately inserted to provide for a contingency of the kind that has arisen in this case. It could only have been intended to prevent a person or company which has been carrying on the business of insurance from escaping the liabilities and duties imposed upon it by the Act by the simple device of stopping its insurance business. Mr. It could only have been intended to prevent a person or company which has been carrying on the business of insurance from escaping the liabilities and duties imposed upon it by the Act by the simple device of stopping its insurance business. Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar argued that if section 33 was intended to apply to situations where an insurer had ceased to carry on the business of insurance, then the Legislature would have added the phrase “notwithstanding that the insurer has ceased to carry on the business” at some appropriate place in that section. It seems to me that what the Legislature has done is this: Instead of using this phrase in numerous places in the Act, it inserted section 2-D so that it could be made plain that for all purposes of the Act a person who had been carrying on the business of insurance would continue to be subject to the liabilities and obligations imposed by the Act “so long as his liabilities in India in respect of the business of that class remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for.” Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar further argued: Even if it be that section 2-D applies to an insurer who has ceased to transact business, it must appear that his liabilities in India in respect of the business he had been carrying on remain unsatisfied or unprovided for. In the order they made under section 33 of the Act the Central Government do not say that the liabilities of the petitioner-company remain unsatisfied or unprovided for and till they record such a finding they cannot issue an order under section 33. On this argument certain comments may be made. In the first place, it is clear that certain claims are still pending against the company. Even in the reply affidavit of the petitioner, it is admitted that one Mrs. Sarla Devi, Delhi, has obtained a decree for Rs. 50 ,000 against the company and that an appeal from the decree is pending in the Punjab High Court. In respect of another item, Item 10 in Annexure B to the reply affidavit of the petitioner, the remarks made are: “ Repudiated on the ground that the driver was acquitted in the criminal case.” Apart from others these are sufficient to show that certain claims are still pending against the company. In respect of another item, Item 10 in Annexure B to the reply affidavit of the petitioner, the remarks made are: “ Repudiated on the ground that the driver was acquitted in the criminal case.” Apart from others these are sufficient to show that certain claims are still pending against the company. I express no opinion whatever in respect of any of the allegations that may have been made against the company by the persons who petitioned the Government of India. Secondly it is no doubt true that the order which the Government of India made under section 33 does not make any reference to the liabilities of the company as subsisting. But then I can see nothing in section 33 which requires the Government of India to record any finding in that regard. That section does not say that the Government of India must be satisfied that any claims are outstanding. It does not even say that the Government of India must have received complaints. That section gives power to the Central Government, “ at any time by order in writing” to direct the Controller or any other person they may specify to investigate the affairs of the insurer and report to them. Finally it will be realised that if the argument of Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar were pressed to its logical end an impasse will result. The Government cannot order an investigation unless it appears that there are liabilities which remain unsatisfied or unprovided for. But then this cannot be satisfactorily ascertained except after an enquiry. We thus move round in a vicious circle. We cannot have an enquiry because there is no finding; we cannot have a finding because there can be no enquiry. A line of reasoning that produces such a result cannot be accepted. I would repeat one point I made earlier. If the contentions of Mr. Jagadisa Ayyar were right, a company whose affairs are being conducted in a fraudulent or dishonest manner — I am not expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations made against this company — would be able to avert an enquiry by the very simple device of passing a resolution suspending all its business. That is not a device I am willing to countenance. In the result, this Writ Petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate’s fee Rs. 250. Memorandum of costs will follow. R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.