JUDGMENT : N.V. Iyengar, J. - 1. This second appeal is by the 1st defendant in a suit for permanent injunction which has been concurrently allowed by both the courts below. 2. The respondents in this appeal who were also the respondents in the court below, are the plaintiffs 1 to 6 and the 2nd defendant. They were occupying a house V/81 put up by their ancestor, inside S. No. 1989/2 of the Ernakulam Town Municipality, on permission from its original owner Manuel Rodrigues-vide Ext. I koolicharth dated 20-6-1093. In the partition which took place in the family of Manuel in or about 1104, all the space to the east of the house and right up to the Market Road which formed the eastern boundary of the survey number, measuring 6½ cents on the whole, fell to the share of Inaz Rodrigues while Mark Rodrigues similarly got the portion in the west. The 1st defendant obtained assignment of this 6½ cents from Inaz under Ext. VI dated 22-11-1950 and soon after, set about to erect his western fence close to the eastern wall of the respondent's house. The respondents who had till then been using the whole space in front of that house, as a front yard and also as a means of access to the Market Road, thereupon sought relief in this suit by way of permanent injunction restraining the 1st defendant. 3. The 1st defendant contested the suit on the footing that the plaintiff's rights in the paramba were confined, if at all, to the site on which the house stood and the 1st defendant or his assignor were not in any event bound to accommodate the respondents to any extent so far as the cents space in the front, was concerned. The first defendant also pleaded that a pathway parallel to the southern fence though on the other side, had been specially provided by arrangement between Inaz and Mark, for the purpose of egress and ingress of the respondents to the Market Road and there was accordingly no question of any way of necessity remaining. 4. The evidence furnished by the commissioner in the case showed that the respondents had enclosed their house by a fencing so as to leave some space all round. 4. The evidence furnished by the commissioner in the case showed that the respondents had enclosed their house by a fencing so as to leave some space all round. The eastern fence was about 23 links from eastern wall of the house and practically abutted the Market Road while the southern fence was put up 14 links away from the wall on that side. The house had only two doors opening to the outside, one on the northern wall and the other on the southern wall of the kitchen which was on the western side of the house. There were no windows except two holes on the north wall, the shutters of which could not be opened fully on account of the fence on the northern side. The lower end of the roof on the eastern side was about 6 feet from the ground so that if a normal fence 5 feet 4 inches in height was put up close to the eastern wall of the house, very little space would be left for the passage into the house, of light and air. Finally, there was no pathway to the Market Road on the farther side of the southern fence and available for the use of the respondents, as alleged by the 1st defendant. Basing himself on these facts the learned Munsiff directed that 2 koles width of space should be left on the eastern side when the 1st defendant put up his western fence and he should also provide a pathway 1½ koles in width along his southern boundary fence and granted permanent injunction decree accordingly. The learned Judge in appeal by the 1st defendant, upheld the findings of the Munsiff and in the result confirmed his directions and hence this second appeal. 5. When the case came up in this court in the first instance, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the courts, below had not the benefit of a reference to a sale deed executed by Inaz, the 1st defendant's assignor in favour of Mark, the present landlord of the respondents, in respect of ¾ cents of property on the other side of the southern fence for the specific purpose of providing a pathway for the benefit of the respondents, as alleged by the 1st defendant. This sale deed had not been filed in the trial court and though filed in the court below, had not been marked. This court therefore remanded the case for revised findings of the courts below on that account. But they have found no reasons for a revision of their prior findings. 6. On the appeal being taken up after remand as above, the contention urged by the 1st defendant in the courts below that no portion of his property could in law, be made a servient tenement in relation to the respondents' house was again pressed. According to learned counsel, the only right claimable by the respondents was against eviction from the site of the house and reference was made to the provision in section 3 of the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 13 of 1955 that every “kudikidappukaran” in occupation of a “kudiyirippu” shall have a right of permanent occupancy in his kudiyirippu, which under the definition in section 2(c) comprised only the site of a homestead. But this argument overlooks the rule as to accessory licenses, that when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use. That is to say, when a person is entitled to the enjoyment of any interest or to the exercise of any right, he is deemed to be entitled to do all acts which are necessary for such enjoyment or exercise, except it may be, to the extent of any express reservation requiring the grantee not to do certain acts. See section 55 of the Indian Easements Act, which provides: “All licenses necessary for the enjoyment of any interest, or the exercise of any right are implied in the constitution of such interest or right”. 7. So when the owner of a flat leaves it to a tenant for him and his family's residence he must be deemed to have given permission for what is reasonably necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment of the flat for that purpose. Butterly Co. Ltd. v. New Huckwall Colliery Co., (1910) A.C. 381. And these accessory licenses continue so long as the interest or the right to which they are annexed continue. Butterly Co. Ltd. v. New Huckwall Colliery Co., (1910) A.C. 381. And these accessory licenses continue so long as the interest or the right to which they are annexed continue. So if the original license cannot be revoked, e.g. when the licensee acting upon the license has put up a permanent structure, the accessory licenses cannot likewise be revoked (i.e.) they can both be enforced against all transferees of the property. Whether or not a license is an appurtenance to the property transferred so as to run with it like any other appurtenance thereto, is always a question of fact which depends on the examination of all the relevant circumstances attending a particular case. The respondents cannot therefore be denied a right of action against the 1st defendant, if their accessory licenses are disturbed by any action of his. 8. The only question then surviving is how far the grant of space in front of the house or of the pathway, could be justified on the ground of necessity from the point of view of enjoyment of the house. Taking up the pathway aspect first, there can be no doubt that a means of access to the road is vital for purpose of the enjoyment. The case set up by the 1st defendant that an actual pathway had already been provided betrays his consciousness as to the need. And to the extent he has failed to prove the existence or availability of an alternative pathway, and in this, I accept the concurrent findings of the court below, the grant of the path-Way as made, is unexceptionable. Coming to the other question of space the learned Munsiff approached the question from the point of view of an easement or license of light and air and thought that a minimum of two koles space was called for. The learned Judge took it that it was rather a question of elbow space on the eastern side and thought a two koles space was still called for. It seems to me however that the position taken up by both the Munsiff and the Judge cannot be justified. There can be no question of making particular provision for light and air from the eastern side as the Munsiff thought nor was there any special necessity for any elbow space-on that side, as the Judge thought. It seems to me however that the position taken up by both the Munsiff and the Judge cannot be justified. There can be no question of making particular provision for light and air from the eastern side as the Munsiff thought nor was there any special necessity for any elbow space-on that side, as the Judge thought. At the same time there can be no doubt that the 1st defendent cannot be allowed to put up his fence beyond the point at which the projecting eves of the house drop. On this account a space of one kole width may have to be left on the eastern side. 9. I therefore modify the decrees of the courts below to this extent that instead of the two koles as provided therein, one kole space alone need be left on the eastern side of the house by the 1st defendent when he puts up his fence. The decrees are confirmed as regards the pathway. In the circumstances of the case the parties will suffer their costs throughout.