Judgment Raj Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The sole question for determination in this appeal by the plaintiff is whether the finding of the trial Judge that the principal defenj dants had acquired title by adverse possession is correct in law. 2. It is not disputed that the original owners of the, house in dispute were the defendants. But they executed a sale deed (Ext, 1) on 9-10-1922 in favour of the plaintiff and the consideration of the sale deed was set off towards earlier dues due from the defendants to the plaintiff. In the Court below, the title of the plaintiff, was questioned on the ground that the sale deed (Ext. 1) was a benami transaction. The learned Subordinate Judge, however after a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, came to the conclusion that the sale deed in question was not a benami transaction but a real transaction which was given effect to. This finding has not been challenged by Mr. B.C. De who appeared for the defendant-respondents. 3. The present dispute between the parties arose under the following circumstances : According to the plaintiff, as he was residing in the State of Orissa, he let out a portion of the house, which is situated at Dhanbad in the State of Bihar, at the request of the principal defendants father, Lachhmi Narain to him, after the execution and registration of the sale deed (Ext. 1) on a monthly rental, and he on the 9th October, 1922, executed a letter acknowledging his monthly tenancy (Ext. 13 (e)). The house, thereafter, continued to be let out to the defendants from time to time, and later on the entire house was let out to them and kirayananias were every time executed by the defendants father, Lachhmi Narain, which are Exhibits 13(e), 13(i), 13(j) and 13(b). The first Kiryanama is exhibit 13(e) and the last one is. Exhibit 13(b). The plaintiff, thereafter, determined the monthly tenancy of the defendants on the 3rd January, 1949 by a notice (Ext. 6) and on failure of the defendants to vacate the house, brought the present suit in ejectment. 4. Mr. De challenged the genuineness of these Kirayanamas on the ground that they were not signed by Lachhmi Narain the defendants father. The plaintiff, thereafter, determined the monthly tenancy of the defendants on the 3rd January, 1949 by a notice (Ext. 6) and on failure of the defendants to vacate the house, brought the present suit in ejectment. 4. Mr. De challenged the genuineness of these Kirayanamas on the ground that they were not signed by Lachhmi Narain the defendants father. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, has considered the question of genuineness of the above Kiryanamas and come to the conclusion that these kirayamas executed by Lachhmi Narain, father of the principal defendants 1 to 3 in respect of the house now in occupation of the principal defendants, were genuine. I have myself examined these original kiryanamas and also read the evidence in this connection and do not find any reason to differ from the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge regarding the genuineness of the Kirayanamas Exts. 13 (e), 13(f), 13(g), 13(h) 13(i) and 13(j). The learned Subordinate Judge, further found that the plaintiff had proved his title to the house in dispute and this finding is not challenged by Mr. De. 5. The trial Judge, however held that the suit was governed by Article 144 of the Limitation Act and therefore, as the principal defendants had established that they had acquired title by adverse possession it was barred by limitation. This is the only finding, which is against the plaintiff, and on which ground alone he nas been non-suited. The correctness of this finding has been challenged by Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha the learned Government Advocate. 6. The question therefore, is if the plaintiff has proved his subsisting title. 7. There is no dispute in this Court between the parties and, their learned counsel are also agreed, that the proper Article of the Limitation Act, which was applicable to the present case, was Article 139 and not Article 144, which had been applied by the trial Judge. The difference between the parties was only regarding the date oi commencement of the limitation under Article 139. Mr. Lal Narayan Sinha who appeared for the appellant contended that limitation under Article 139 would run from the 3rd January, 1945 when the tenancy was determined by a notice (Ext. 6) which has been found by the Court below to have been properly served on the principal defendants before the filing of the suit and which finding has not been challenged by the respondents. 6) which has been found by the Court below to have been properly served on the principal defendants before the filing of the suit and which finding has not been challenged by the respondents. According to Mr. De however, the limitation would run from the expiry of one year from the last kirayanama (Ext. 13(b)) which is dated Magh Sudi 15, Sambat 1988, and which would correspond to the 21st February, 1932 that is from the 22nd February, 1933. 8. The learned Government advocate in support of his contention relied on Sections 106 and 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, and also on Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act. He also supported his contention by relying on a Privy Council decision in Mt. Bilas Kunwar V/s. Desraj Ranjit Singh,, ILR 37 All 557: AIR 1915 PC 96: 42 Ind App 202 and on a decision of the Madras High Court in Seshaman Shettati V/s. Chickaya Hegade, ILR 25 Mad 507. 9. In the just mentioned Privy Council case, it was held that a tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however defective it may be so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord. 10. In the above-mentioned Madras case, it was held that a person who has come into possession of land as a tenant from year to year or for a term of years, cannot by setting up during the continuance of such relation, any title adverse to that of the landlord, inconsistent with the real legal relation between them and that however notoriously and to the knowledge of the other party acquire by the operation of the law of limitation title as owner, or any other tide inconsistent with that under which he was let into possession. It was further held that in the case of a lease, the landlords title can be extinguished only at the expiration of the period prescribed under Article 139 of the Limitation Act, and under that Article, such period will commence to run only when the tenancy is determined. 11. The above two decisions, undoubtedly support the contention of the learned Government Advocate that a person who is in possession as a tenant during the continuance of his tenancy, cannot prescribe against his landlord. 11. The above two decisions, undoubtedly support the contention of the learned Government Advocate that a person who is in possession as a tenant during the continuance of his tenancy, cannot prescribe against his landlord. Relying on the ratio of the above case it was contended that in the present case also, the limitation under Article 139 would commence to run from the 3rd January, 1945, when the tenancy was determined by a notice (Ext. 6) as required by Section 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, and therefore, the present suit to recover possession having been instituted on the 9th March, 1953 within the statutory period of limitation of twelve years, was not barred by limitation. Mr. De in reply met the above argument by contending that, in the case of a monthly tenancy it is valid for only one year, and after the expiry of one year, unless there is a registered document to the contrary, the continuance in possession of there while monthly tenant becomes adverse to the landlord, even if there be no assertion by him of any hostile title or any overt act on his part to the knowledge of the landlord. 12. Mr. De sought support from e number of authorities, such as, Madan Mohan Gossain V/s. Kumar Rameswar Malia, 7 Cal LJ 615. Kamakhaya Narayan Singh V/s. Ram Raksha Singh, ILR 7 Pat 649: (AIR 1928 PC 146), Ram Lohan V/s. Kumar Kamkhya Narain Singh. 4 Pat LT 123: (AIR 1923 Pal 201), Maharaj Singh V/s. Budhu Chamar, ILR 30 Pat 964: ( AIR 1952 Pat 46 ), Rani Rikhi Nath Kuari V/s. Rangoo Mahto, ILR 7 Pat 675: (AIR 1929 Pat 18) and Rama Bahadur Kamakhya Narain Singh V/s. Harkhu Singh, AIR 1949 Pat 265. 13. Let us first clear the ground on the question of fact. The question is, is the trial Judge correct in law in drawing the inference from the payment of choukidari taxes and water rates in respect of the house in question by the defendants that they paid them as owners and not as occupiers? 14. 13. Let us first clear the ground on the question of fact. The question is, is the trial Judge correct in law in drawing the inference from the payment of choukidari taxes and water rates in respect of the house in question by the defendants that they paid them as owners and not as occupiers? 14. It is true, as found by the Court below that after 1938, no rent had been received by the plaintiff; but in my opinion, mere non-payment of rent did not constitute assertion of hostile title to the knowledge of the landlord and as such it alonet will not give rise to the claim of adverse possession by the tenant as held in Ram Lochans case, 4 Pat LT 123: (AIR 1923 Pat 201) (supra) relied upon by Mr. De, unless he by some overt act or by notice, determines the tenancy or asserts any hostile title against his landlord. In the present case, admittedly no such notice was given by the defendants or their ancestor, nor any overt act had been alleged or proved on the part of the defendants which can show that that overt act was sufficient notice of the hostile title asserted by the defendants against the plaintiff. Mr. De very strongly relied on the fact that choukidari taxes from 1937 to 1952 (Ext. C-series) and water rates from 1941 to 1952 (Ext. D-series) had been paid by the defendants or their ancestor, but never by the plaintiff at all, and therefore, the defendants must be taken to be owners of the house/ in suit as they have been described as assessee therein. But, in my opinion these two series of documents did not prove that the defendants were paying choukidari taxes and water rates in the capacity of owners of the house and not as occupiers thereof. The learned Subordinate Judge, who was very much impressed by these two series of documents observed, while considering them, that there was nothing to show that the defendants were paying the taxes not as owners, but as occupiers. The learned Subordinate Judge, who was very much impressed by these two series of documents observed, while considering them, that there was nothing to show that the defendants were paying the taxes not as owners, but as occupiers. From this observation it is clear that these receipts do not show that the defendants or their ancestor paid the choukidari taxes and water rates as owners nor do they show that they paid them as occupiers of the house; but, when they were in possession as tenants, as found by me earlier, and, when admittedly they were in occupation of the house, it was very natural that they should have paid the taxes and water rates for the house, and therefore, the only legal inference that can be drawn from these documents is that the defendants paid these rates or taxes as occupiers and not as owners. The payment of these taxes or water rates by the defendants does not, in the least, in my opinion, go to show that they were in adverse possession against the plaintiffs. The plaintiff has examined himself as P. W. 5. He very frankly admitted that ho did not know the state of things before 1991 Sambat and that he had not realised rent since 1992 Sambat He has further said that these choukidari taxes and water rates were payable by the defendants in addition to rents. P. W. 5 has been believed and, therefore, there is no reason why his evidence should not be accepted. In my opinion, therefore the payment of these taxes and rates cannot lead to the conclusion that they were paid by the defendants as owners of the house and not as occupiers in the absence of definite evidence to the effect that the defendants were assessed and paying them as owners and not as occupiers. The suggestion of the plaintiff seems to be very natural, that as he was residing in Orissa and the defendants were put in possession as tenants o£ the house in Bihar, they were asked to pay these taxes and rates as well. In my judgment, therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge has erred in holding that the payment of these taxes and water rates by the defendants should be taken as payments by them as owners and not as occupiers, and, therefore, the defendants had proved that they were owners of the house in suit. In my judgment, therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge has erred in holding that the payment of these taxes and water rates by the defendants should be taken as payments by them as owners and not as occupiers, and, therefore, the defendants had proved that they were owners of the house in suit. 15. It is not necessary to notice all the cases relied upon by Mr. De, because, in my opinion, they have no application here. 16. In Madan Mohan Gossains case, 7 Gal LJ 615 (supra) for instance, it was held that if a lessee holds over after the expiry of the lease and if no subsequent arrangement is arrived at between him and his lessor by which a new tenancy is created, time begins to run under Article 139, Schedule II of the Limitation Act, against the lessor from the date of the expiry of the lease. Mr. De conceded that here was not a case of holding over and, therefore the tenancy having been determined by a notice on the 3rd January, 1945, the suit was within time and as such there was no question of the defendants acquiring any adverse possession. 17. Similarly in the Privy Council case of Kamakhya Narain Singh, ILR 7 Pat 649: (AIR 192S PC 146) (teupra) it was a case of mokarari istirari for life only. It was held that, if the grantees heirs or assignees remain in possession, claiming contrary to the contention of the grantor that the patta is permanent and heritable, their possession is adverse to the grantor for the purpose of the Indian Limitation Act, unless the grantor has recognised the existence of a tenancy so that the relationship of landlord and tenant is created. At no time in the present case there was ever any conflict of interest or assertion of any hostile title by the defendants so as to put an end to the existing relationship of landlord and tenant. 18. Such was the position also in Rani Rikhi Nath Kuaris case ILR 7 Pat 675: (AIR 1929 Pat 189 (supra) where it was held that, upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the lessee becomes a trespasser unless the landlord chooses to treat him as a tenant for a fresh period. 18. Such was the position also in Rani Rikhi Nath Kuaris case ILR 7 Pat 675: (AIR 1929 Pat 189 (supra) where it was held that, upon the expiration of the term of a lease, the lessee becomes a trespasser unless the landlord chooses to treat him as a tenant for a fresh period. In Maharaj Singhs case ILR 30 Pat 964: ( AIR 1952 Pat 46 also, which was a case of invalid lease, the same principle was laid down. 19. In my opinion, the principles which can be extracted from the authorities cited at the Bar, may be re-stated as below: 20. Sec.116 of the Indian Evidence Act is perfectly clear that a tenant who had been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord, Where a lessee enters into possession under a lease, he cannot acquire any title by adverse possession against his lessor pending the term of the lease unless he distinctly asserts such a title to his knowledge and gives him notice that he asserted such a title. A failure to pay rent to the lessor during the period of the lease does not alone operate to create in favour of the lessee a title by adverse possession. If a lessee holds over after the expiry of the lease and if no subsequent arrangement is arrived at between him and his lessor by which a new tenancy is created, time begins to run under Article 139, Schedule II, of the Limitation Act, against the lessor from the date of the expiry of the lease. A person who has lawfully come into possession of land as tenant from year to year, or for a term of years, cannot during the continuance of such relation of landlord and tenant, by setting up any adverse title to that of the landlord, inconsistent with the real legal relation between them, and however notoriously and to the knowledge of the other party, acquire, by the operation of the law of limitation, title as owner, or any other title inconsistent with that under which he was let into possession. In such a case, the landlords title can be extinguished only at the expiration of the period prescribed by Article 139 of the Limitation Act and under that Article, such a period will commence to run only when the tenancy is determined. 21. Applying the principles to the present case, which is much stronger, in that, never any hostile title was asserted to the knowledge of the plaintiff and, even according to Mr. De, except (a) payment of taxes and rates and (b) non-payment of rent by defendants, no other overt act was ever committed by the defendants to the knowledge of the plaintiff, we find that the tenancy cannot in law be deemed to have been determined earlier than the 3rd January 1945 and, as such, here there was no question of any adverse possession. Mr. De did not cite any authority nor could he point out any provision of law that, in the case of a monthly tenancy, it is valid in law only for one year and, after the expiry of one year, the possession of the monthly tenant becomes adverse to his landlord, even though the tenancy has not been determined by either party in accordance with Sec.111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act. 22. In the present case, therefore, the defendants never became a trespasser until after the 3rd January 1945, when they were served with a notice by the plaintiff to quit the house. The relationship of landlord and tenant continued until it was terminated by the notice. In this view, the defendants cannot be said to have acquired adverse possession against the plaintiff when the present suit has been brought within the time allowed by Art, 139, Schedule II, Limitation Act. I, therefore, accept the contention of the learned Government Advocate and reject that of Mr. De and hold that the terminus a quo of the limitation under Article 139 in the present case, is the 3rd January 1945, and not the 22nd February 1933, and as such, the plaintiffs suit was not barred by limitation. 23. For these reasons, I hold that the defendants were not in adverse possession of the house in suit, and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the same from the defendant by ejectment. 23. For these reasons, I hold that the defendants were not in adverse possession of the house in suit, and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the same from the defendant by ejectment. The judgment and decree of the Court below are, therefore, set aside, the appeal is allowed and the plaintiffs suit is decreed with costs throughout.