JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, J. - The petitioners by this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution have sought the quashing of the order made by the Special Judge, first grade, Barabanki, directing the Compensation Officer under the U.P. Zaimindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to place at his disposal a sum of Rs. 6,152/- of taluqa Bhilwal out of the interim compensation payable in respect of the estate which had vested in the State Government under that Act. Previously that estate vested in the petitioners who were the trustees of a trust, the property acquired by the State under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act being the subject of the trust. 2. The case came up before the learned Chief Justice and he referred it to a Division Bench for deciding the question whether a revision under Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act did or did not lie after indicating his view that in case a revision did lie it was not proper to entertain this petition. 3. The trustees had filed an application under Sec. 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. In those proceedings, the opposite-parties had filed a claim in respect of the arrears of guzara payable to them out of taluqa Bhilwal. It was while those proceedings respecting the claim were pending before the Special Judge that the special Judge made the order in question purporting to act in exercise of the powers accruing to him under Sec. 70 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Sec. 70 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was not applicable in respect of interim compensation, but that is a question which we think we need not go into. The question that we have to decide is whether the order passed by the Special Judge, purporting to be in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 70 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, is an order which could be brought up to this Court and suitable orders in respect of which could be passed by this Court under Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act. The learned Chief Justice, when referring this case to the Division Bench, has taken notice of a number of cases which were cited before him, but it appears that the decision in all those cases turned on the language of Sec. 45 of the Encumbered Estates Act. In most of the cases, the provision that came up for consideration was sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 45 and in other cases it was sub-sec. (2) or (2a) of Sec. 45. None of those cases deal with the scope of Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act which is the provision with which we are at present concerned. Sub-sec. (I) of Sec. 45 is as follows: "Any court empowered under sub-secs. (1), (2) and (2a) of Sec. 45 to hear an appeal under this Act may of its own motion, or on the application of any person concerned, call for the record of proceedings in any case under this Act pending in a court from which appeals lie to such court and after giving due notice to the parties concerned pass such order thereon consistent with the provisions herein contained as it thinks fit, and such order shall be final." 4. It is to be noticed that the language of this provision of law is markedly different from the language of sub-secs. (1), (2) or (2a) of Sec. 45. Under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 45, an appeal can be directed against "any decree or order finally disposing of the case of a Special Judge of the first grade under this Act." It will be seen that the only orders that are appealable are those which finally of a case under the Encumbered Estates Act. Under sub-sec. (2) the same language has been used. Under sub-sec. (2a) an appeal is permitted against an appellate order or decree of a District Judge passed under sub-sec. (2). The language of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 46 is entirely different. It does not require that, before the power under this section can be exercised, there should be any order or decree finally dispose of a case under the Act. This section empowers the calling of the record of proceedings in any case under the Encumbered Estates Act. (2). The language of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 46 is entirely different. It does not require that, before the power under this section can be exercised, there should be any order or decree finally dispose of a case under the Act. This section empowers the calling of the record of proceedings in any case under the Encumbered Estates Act. This means that Sec. 46 comes into play whenever there is a case under the Encumbered Estates Act in which circumstance the record of any proceeding in that case can be called for and, thereupon, suitable orders can be passed by the Court empowered to call for the record. Thus there is the distinction that, under Sec. 45, the order must dispose of a case under the Act, whereas under Sec. 46 all that is necessary is that there should be a case under the Act in which there may be any proceedings in which it is considered necessary to pass suitable orders. In the present case there is no doubt that a case under the Encumbered Estates Act was pending before the Special Judge. In fact the Special Judge was functioning as such only because of the powers which vested in him under the Encumbered Estates Act. It was in his capacity as a Special Judge that, in that very case before him, he took the proceedings of sending the order to the Compensation Officer under Sec. 70 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. This was, therefore, a case where there was "a proceeding in a case under the Encumbered Estates Act" and the order was therefore clearly capable of being revised under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 46 of the Encumbered Estates Act. 5. Since a revision lay, there is no reason why this petition should be entertained. The petitioner should seek his remedy appropriately, if so advised, by filing a revision either against the present order or later when a subsequent order is also passed by the Special Judge regarding the disposal of the money as he is enjoined to do by the last part of Sec. 70 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The petition fails and is dismissed, but since no one has appeared on behalf of the opposite-party, we make no order as to costs.