Judgment.- These are five connected Civil Revision Petitions against the orders of the Revenue Court, Tanjore, in Petition Nos. 261 to 265 of 1956,dated 29th November, 1956 and 5th January, 1957. Those five petitions were filed under section 10 (2) of Act XIV of 1952 by one Mohammed Rowther against the petitioners in these five Civil Revision Petitions alleging that they were cultivating tenants under him in respect of their holdings in Sirumuttam village, and not ryots with occupancy rights, and, claiming that as they were owing arrears of rent to him, they should be evicted. The Revenue Court relied on the Order of the Settlement Officer, dated 27th December, 1950, holding that the village of Sirumuttam in Arantangi, Tanjore District, in which the lands were situated was not an inam estate, and held, for that reason, that the village was not an estate under the Estates Land Act, forgetting that the Settlement Officer had, in a previous paragraph of the same order, definitely held that the village was an estate under section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, though that finding may not be binding on the landholder in these petitions, as rightly urged by Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar, his counsel. The lower Court relied also on an order of the Estates Manager, Arantangi, dated 2nd June, 1954, stating that, as there were no ryoti-lands in Sirumuttam Village, the provisions of the Rent Reduction Act would not apply to that village, and cancelling some prior orders making the Rent Reduction Act applicable to that village. Of course, his finding that there were no ryoti-lands in that village, would not bind the tenants, as urged by Mr. D. Ramaswami Ayyangar, their learned counsel. The lower Court also relied on certain admissions by the petitioners and other ryots on 22nd April, 1954, before the Estates Manager, Arantangi, saying that they had no kaniyatchi rights in the lands in Sirumuttam Village and that Mohammad Rowther, the landlord, was the iruvaramdar in respect of these lands and that he used to deliver them to the ryots as he pleased, and that they had to pay him half the share in the crops, as admissions that the lands covered by these petitions were iruvaram lands where no question of occupancy rights in the petitioners arose. The lower Court then went into the question of arrears, and held that there were arrears due by these petitioners, and determined them, and gave notice to the petitioners to pay up the arrears or be evicted. Then these Civil Revision Petitions have been filed. I have perused the records and heard the learned counsel on both sides. Mr. D. Ramaswami Ayyangar, the learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the lower Court had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the petitions for eviction under Act XIV of 1952, as the lands covered by the petitions were situated in an estate and were ryoti lands, and, that at any rate, the lower Court should have found that they were proved by the land-holder to be not ryoti lands. He said that the lower Court had clearly gone wrong in holding that the village was not an estate under the Estates Land Act, and, in not discussing therefore the question whether the lands covered by the petitions were proved by the land-holder to be private lands in an “estate”. Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar, the learned counsel for the landholder, urged that it was immaterial even if the lower Court made a wrong observation that the Sirumuttam Village was not an “estate” under the Estates Land Act, as it had made it clear that in any event, the landholder was entitled to in these lands, rights and that the petitioners were not entitled to occupancy rights as Kudivaramdars. I cannot accept this contention of Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar. A Court is expected to give clear findings, and to draw its conclusions and deliver its judgment only after giving such clear findings. When the lower Court held that the village in question was not an “estate” under the Estates Land Act, it would have had no occasion to consider whether, if it were an “estate”, the suit lands were the “private lands” of the land-holder. He did not purport to consider that question also. Under section 185 of the Estates Land Act, the burden of proving that the suit lands, though situated in an estate, were the private lands of the landholder would lie on the landholder, though, if the village were not proved to be an estate, the burden would be on the petitioners to show that they were entitled to occupancy rights in these lands. The burden of proof, under our law, is not a fixed one; it shifts from side to side as in a shuttlecock game, as evidence is let in. The initial burden of proving an assertion of occupancy rights in lands lies on the person asserting it, but when those lands are proved to lie in an “estate” under the Estates Land Act, the burden shifts to the landholder, and he has to prove that the lands are not ryoti lands. So, it was very important to give a finding, at the very outset, as to whether the village in which these lands are situated is an “estate” under the Estates Land Act or not, and, to give a correct finding. The lower Court delivered its orders in these petitions before the Bench decision of this Court in Srinivasa Ayyangar v. Revenue Court, Tanjore1, which has made the position in law crystal-clear. That ruling has definitely laid down that nothing in the Cultivating Tenants Acts like Act XIV of 1952, Act XXV of 1955 and Act XIV of 1956, repeals the provisions of the Estates Land Act, and that, therefore a Court has to carefully determine whether the lands covered by petitions like these are situated in an “estate” under the Estates Land Act, and have to be dealt with under the provisions of that Act, if they are ryoti lands, only private lands falling Within the purview of Act XIV of 1952, etc. The evidence on records eem to show that the whole village or at least a named village had been granted as inam. That is why the Settlement Officer held that the village was an “estate” under the Estates Land Act. No doubt, Mr. Viswanatha Ayyar is right in urging that the finding of the Settlement Officer is not binding on the lower Court, and that, when remanding these petitions to the lower Court, I should remand also the question of whether Sirumuttam Village is an “estate” within the Estates Land Act and direct the lower Court to decide it. It is obvious that the Settlement Officer’s finding that Sirumuttam was not an “estate” for the purpose of the Estates Abolition Act is not inconsistent in any way with his finding that it is an “estate” within the Estates Land Act. It is obvious that the Settlement Officer’s finding that Sirumuttam was not an “estate” for the purpose of the Estates Abolition Act is not inconsistent in any way with his finding that it is an “estate” within the Estates Land Act. Nor can the Estates Manager’s finding that there were no ryoti lands in this village of Sirumuttam be conclusive, or even binding on the petitioners in these petitions. Their alleged admissions have to be weighed and assessed at the remanded enquiry, and cannot be taken at this stage as concluding that these lands are private lands. The usual rule of law is that the admissions of ryots that they have no occupancy rights in ryoti lands will have little value, in the face of statute, if they are proved as a matter of fact to be ryoti lands. The policy of the law has been to protect the weak man against himself. It is not elicited in the evidence what the term kaniyatchi exactly connotes, and whether what the tenants want is that they had no occupancy rights or only they they had no ownership rights in these lands. Kaniyatchi by itself means hereditary rights in land, which may conceivably vary according to circumstances. The interpretation of the terms kaniyatchi in the statement has to be made carefully by the lower Court at the remanded hearing, after hearing evidence and arguments. Mr. Ramaswami Ayyangar contended that the orders of the lower Court should be set aside, and the five petitions sent back to the lower Court for fresh hearing and disposal after determining whether Sirumuttam village is an “estate” under the Estates Land Act, and, if it is an “estate”, whether the lands covered by the petitioners are the private lands of the landholder, the burden being on him and therefore falling within the purview of Act XIV of 1952. I agree. The orders of the lower Court are set aside, and the five petitions are remanded to the lower Court. Of course, the observations of the Settlement Officer, the Estates Manager and the statement of the ryots will be carefully considered by the lower Court at the remanded hearing and their weight and bearing accurately determined for the purpose of giving the fresh findings. Of course, the observations of the Settlement Officer, the Estates Manager and the statement of the ryots will be carefully considered by the lower Court at the remanded hearing and their weight and bearing accurately determined for the purpose of giving the fresh findings. It is clear to me, and it was not disputed by either side, that the lower Court has the power to go into the question of jurisdiction. The parties will be free to let in all fresh, relevant oral and documentary evidence. In the circumstances, all the parties to these Civil Revision Petitions will bear their own costs. P.R.N. ----- Petitions allowed: Orders set aside and cases remanded.