JUDGMENT M.L. Chaturvedi, J. - These are two connected first appeals arising out of two suits brought by the Plaintiff Respondent, Parbati Bibi, against the Appellants in the two appeals. 2. Both the suits were based on simple mortgage bonds executed by Chhabbu Lal in First Appeal No. 553 of 1945 and by Bisheshar Prasad, brother of Chhabbu Lal, in First Appeal No. 554 of 1945. Both the mortgage deeds were executed by the brothers on the same date, namely, 3-6-1930. They were for the sums of Rs. 2000/- each and both of them carried interest at the rate of 7 1/2 per cent, per annum compoundable six monthly. The property mortgaged in the deeds were shares in Khalifa Mandi in the city of Allahabad. These mortgages had been executed in lieu of the amount due on an earlier mortgage of 7-11-1912. The suits were for the recovery of Rs. 5998/9/2 in each of the two cases. The main defence taken by the Defendants in the two suits was that the rate of interest was excessive and should be reduced. The learned Civil Judge considered the circumstances of the cases and arrived at the conclusion that the rate of interest was not excessive and there was no reason for reducing it. He accordingly decreed the suits in their entirety. 3. The Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants in the two appeals have argued that the court had power to reduce the rate of interest under the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 as(sic) amended by the UP Legislature in 1934. u/s 3 of the Act, the UP Legislature substituted the word "or" for the word "and" between Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of S. 3. The result of the amendment was that it was not necessary for the applicability of the Act that both the conditions laid down in Cls. (a) and (b) should be satisfied, and the section would come into operation even if one of the two conditions was satisfied. The courts in the Uttar Pradesh have the power to reduce interest under the Act if they find the interest to be excessive or the transaction between the parties to be substantially unfair. There is no question in the present cases of the transactions between the parties being substantially unfair, but the Learned Counsel had argued that the interest was excessive. 4. U/Cl. There is no question in the present cases of the transactions between the parties being substantially unfair, but the Learned Counsel had argued that the interest was excessive. 4. U/Cl. (b) of sub S. (2) of S. 3, in considering the question whether the interest is excessive or not the court has to take into account any amounts charged or paid, whether in money or in kind, for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonuses and such other matters and if compound interest has been charged, the periods at which it was culculated and the total advantage which might reasonably be taken to have been expected from the transaction. U/Cl. (c), in considering the question of interest the court shall take into account the value of the property and the financial condition of the debtor and the result of any previous transaction between the parties. Explanation to Cl. (d) says that interest may of itself be sufficient evidence that the transaction was substantially unfair. 5. In sub S. (2) of S. 3 it has been provided after Cl. (d) that in the case of loan secured by the first mortgage the court shall deem the interest to be excessive if the rate exceeds 12 per cent, per annum or the amount of interest that might become due at any time exceeds the amount that would become due at that time if the rate of interest was 12 per cent per annum and the interval between rests were six months. In the case of unsecured loans the court shall deem the interest to be excessive if the rate exceeds 24 per cent per annum. It is then laid down that in the case of secured loans the court shall not deem the interest to be excessive if the rate does not exceed 7 per cent per annum and the amount of interest that might become due at any time does not exceed the amount that would become due at the time if the rate were 7 per cent per annum and the interval between the rests were six months. 6. The legal position, therefore, is that as far as this State is concerned, the Legislature has laid down cases where the interest must be deemed to be excessive and cases where it must not be deemed to be excessive. 6. The legal position, therefore, is that as far as this State is concerned, the Legislature has laid down cases where the interest must be deemed to be excessive and cases where it must not be deemed to be excessive. There is a wide field in between these two positions, and the present cases fall on the edge of that field. If the interest provided were only 7 per cent per annum, compoundable six monthly, the court could not have deemed it to be excessive only because of the rate of interest provided. In the present cases, the agreed rate was 7 1/2 per cent per annum higher than 7 per cent per annum. The cases are very nearer the lower limit than the higher one. 7. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants argued that the security was ample that the loan transaction started in 1912 and that lot of amount has been paid to the mortgagee by now. There is no reason to suppose that the security is not adequate, but, as regards the second circumstance, there is no evidence on the record to prove how much actually was paid under the previous mortgage of 1912 and how much given up by the mortgagee. There is no evidence whether any money was paid for expenses, inquiries, fines, bonuses or other things of that kind by the mortgagors. There is nothing unusual in provision for six monthly rests. The circumstances which have been mentioned by the Learned Counsel favouring the reduction of rate of interest, were also brought to the notice of the learned Civil Judge, who decided these suits, and the learned Civil Judge, after a consideration of those circumstances, refused to reduce the contractual rate of interest. I do not see any reason for taking a different view. The very fact that it is open to court to reduce the rate of interest does not mean that the court should actually do it. The circumstances of the case have to be taken into consideration and I do not find any circumstance which would justify interference with the contracts solemnly entered into between the parties. 8. Stress has been laid on the fact that in the previous mortgage interest at only 6 per cent per annum with six monthly rests was provided. But I do not think that this circumstance helps the Appellants. 8. Stress has been laid on the fact that in the previous mortgage interest at only 6 per cent per annum with six monthly rests was provided. But I do not think that this circumstance helps the Appellants. The previous mortgage" was for a sum of Rs. 28,000 and the present mortgages were only for Rs. 2000 each. It is well known that rate of interest on large loans is lower than the rate of interest on small ones. I, therefore, think that there is no justification in these cases for reducing the rate of interest provided in the mortgage deeds. 9. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants then argued that the rule of Damdupat should be applied in this state also and a decree should not be passed for a sum of more than double the amount of the mortgage. I have not been shown any case where the rule of Damdupat has been applied as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience. But this Court has never recognised that there is any impropriety in making the debtor pay more than double the amount of the loan, if the dabtor did not pay up the amount of the mortgage earlier which he had every right to do. If the debtor has kept the use of the money for a long time, there is no rule of equity or justice, which says that interest after a particular date should stop and the creditor should never be able to recover more than double the amount of his advance. There is no legislative enactment applying the rule of Damdupat to this State. It was a rule of Hindu Law, but that rule has not been made applicable by the Bengal, Assam and Agra Civil Courts Act. Consequently, as stated above, this rule could only be applied as a rule of equity, justice and good conscience. But I do not think that it would be either equity, justice or good conscience not to compel the debtor to perform his contractual obligation and to permit him to keep the money with him and at the same time not to pay any interest on it. 10. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants brought to my notice a passage contained in paragraph 600 of the Hindu Law by Mulla. 10. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants brought to my notice a passage contained in paragraph 600 of the Hindu Law by Mulla. It is stated therein that the rule of Damdupat applies in the Bombay Presidency and it also applies in the town of Calcutta but not in any other part of Bengal. It is not in force in any part of the Madras Presidency, though it was applied to Santhal Parganas by S. 6 of the Santhal Parganas Settlement Regulation. To my knowledge, the rule has never been applied to this State. The rule was applied in the Bombay Presidency and in the town of Calcutta because of a provision in the Charter of the High Courts concerned that the Hindu Law concerning contracts was to be applied to those territories. 11. For the above reasons both these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.