JUDGMENT N. Varadaraja Iyengar, J. 1. These two appeals arise respectively from two connected suits between the same parties, O. S. 14 of 1125 and O. S. 36 of 1950 on the file of the Trichur District Court. The common plaintiff is the appellant in both the appeals. The common defendant is similarly the respondent. Of these suits O. S. 36 of 1950 was the earlier instituted, having been O. S. 673 of 1124 on the file of the Wadakkancherry Munsiff's Court before its transfer to the Trichur District Court and renumbering there, for purpose of joint trial with O. S. 14 of 1125. As this later suit O. S. 14 is more comprehensive, we will refer to the facts with reference to it. 2. The plaintiff is the karnavan and manager of the Kariottu Kalathil tarwad in Talappilli Taluk, in Cochin. The plaint schedule item 1 to 20 consisting of wet lands appertained to this tarwad. The tarwad is an ancient aristocratic one having considerable properties some in direct possession and others, outstanding with tenants. The items 1 to 20 referred to above belonged originally to this latter category having been entrusted to Raman Naidu deceased, under Verumpattom arrangement. On the death of this Raman Naidu in or about 1103, his wife Lekshmi was continued as verumpattomdar in his place. On 15-9-1108, Lekshmi executed an unregistered lease deed filed in the case as Ext. F in favour of the plaintiff, in respect of these items 1 to 20 undertaking to pay a pattom of 255 paras according to the plaintiff's mudrapara and certain perquisities besides, per year. Item 21 which lay adjacent to these items 1 to 20 was purchased by the plaintiff in two halves from Lekshmi and her coowner under Exts. G and H of 1113 and 1115 and entrusted to Lekshmi herself under Verumpattom along with the items 1 to 20. She was to pay 60 paras more under this arrangement. 3. This relationship between plaintiff and Lekshmi continued unbroken until the Mundakan crop of 1118 was over. According to the plaintiff, Lekshmi soon thereafter became concerned with the recurrence of heavy arrears of rent falling due from her and decided to surrender her Verumpattom right in all the items 1 to 21 to the plaintiff. 3. This relationship between plaintiff and Lekshmi continued unbroken until the Mundakan crop of 1118 was over. According to the plaintiff, Lekshmi soon thereafter became concerned with the recurrence of heavy arrears of rent falling due from her and decided to surrender her Verumpattom right in all the items 1 to 21 to the plaintiff. The defendant, Gopalakrishna Naidu had married one of the daughters of Lekshmi and as such was helping her to cultivate the plaintiff's lands. For some years past, he had been noting the payments and balances outstanding on the back of Ext, F. He therefore noted this fact of surrender also on the back of Ext. F. on 10-8-1118. It is the plaintiff's case that for all the period subsequent until and inclusive of the Viruppu harvest of 1124 he was personally carrying on cultivation in items 1 to 21, though for this purpose he had secured the services of the defendant for remuneration fixed. 4. The plaint averred that after the Viruppu harvest in Kanni 1124 the defendant applied to and obtained from the plaintiff, a small plot about 56 cents of Jnal land in the southern most portion of items 1 to 21 for purposes of cultivating vegitables for his own purposes on condition of its return in time for the normal paddy cultivation at the next crop. The defendant contrary to his undertaking planted banana also on the land and so failed to make the land available. He went further and attempted to cultivate the rest of the properties in items 1 to 21 without plaintiff's permission. It was then, on 29-8-1124 that the plaintiff filed his suit O. S. 673 of 1124 of the Wadakkancherry Munsiff's Court for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from entering into the properties, items 1 to 21. Along with the suit, the plaintiff made interlocutory motion for injunction pending suit. Notice returnable on the reopening of the court after midsummer recess, on 25-10-1124 was alone ordered. Taking advantage of the situation, the defendant completed his trespass and effectually occupied the entire block of items 1 to 21 during the interval by 5 - 9-1124 and followed it up by filing written statement on 8-12-1124, repudiating the surrender by Lekshmi in 1118 and his caretakership thereafter as alleged by the plaintiff. Taking advantage of the situation, the defendant completed his trespass and effectually occupied the entire block of items 1 to 21 during the interval by 5 - 9-1124 and followed it up by filing written statement on 8-12-1124, repudiating the surrender by Lekshmi in 1118 and his caretakership thereafter as alleged by the plaintiff. On the other hand, according to him, he had taken sublease from Lekshmi on 1-7-1114 as regards items 1 to 20 and had been from that time duly discharging the plaintiff's dues of 255 paras until 1124. As regards item 21, he personally was the direct lessee of the plaintiff for a rent liability of 45 paras. His possession was therefore no way wrongful and the injunction suit was uncalled for. 5. The plaintiff therefore laid the suit O. S. 14 of 1125 on 10-1-1125 for recovery of items 1 to 21 on the basis of title with mesne profits estimated at the original rent, 315 mudrapara equivalent to 330 3/4 standard para. The item 22 covered by the plaint is a portion of a vast paramba let by plaintiff to various persons for purpose of dry cultivation. The defendant had taken this item 22 under license arrangement in 1123 for purpose of black gram cultivation at Rs. 5/- rent per year, on condition of its return after the cultivation was over. The defendant failed so to return and was holding it along with items 1 to 21. The additional prayer was therefore made in the plaint for recovery of this item as well with mesne profits of Rs. 5 per year due thereon. 6. The contentions raised by the defendant in the injunction suit as regards items 1 to 21 were reiterated by him in his written statement filed in the title suit on 16-3-1125. As regards item 22, the defendant pleaded there was no question of licence but only of a lease at the rent rate mentioned by the plaintiff. On 26-3-1125 he obtained sanction to raise the alternative plea that he had come into direct relationship with the plaintiff as regards items 1 to 20 as well, though from when, he did not make clear. 7. On 26-3-1125 he obtained sanction to raise the alternative plea that he had come into direct relationship with the plaintiff as regards items 1 to 20 as well, though from when, he did not make clear. 7. As mentioned earlier, O. S. 673 of 1124 was transferred from the Wadakkancherry Munsiff's Court to the file of the Trichur District Court and then renumbered as O. S. 36 of 1950 for purpose of joint trial with O. S. 14 of 1125 there. The common evidence was let in, in the title suit [O. S. 14 of 1125]. The court below found ultimately that the defendant was looking after the cultivation and so was in possession of items 1 to 21 on behalf of and under Lekshmi and the sublease of items 1 to 20 and the lease of item 21 set up by him were not true. At the same time it found the surrender by Lekshmi in 1118 and the trespass by the defendant in 1124 as alleged by the plaintiff were not true. The court below did not find on the alternative plea raised by the defendant in his supplemental written statement because apparently it was not pressed. So the court below dismissed the title suit except in regard to item 22 and following this it dismissed the earlier injunction suit as well. Hence these two appeals. AS No. 415 of 1955 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has not canvassed before us the pleas set up by the defendant and found against him by the court below. The only questions that arise for consideration are therefore (i) whether Lekshmi surrendered the properties to the plaintiff on 10-8-1118, and (ii) whether the trespass set up in the plaint is true. This second question naturally turned on the answer to the first. For if Lakshmi's interest had ceased by 1118, the defendant could have no more to do with the properties under her or on her behalf and anything that he did on the land later must be traced only to the consent of the plaintiff. And once that consent was withdrawn trespass arose automatically. 9. Taking up then the question of surrender by Lekshmi we have first the endorsements on the back of Ext. F lease deed of 1108. And once that consent was withdrawn trespass arose automatically. 9. Taking up then the question of surrender by Lekshmi we have first the endorsements on the back of Ext. F lease deed of 1108. These range from 1109 onwards until 1118, and show the state of accounts between the parties under the lease year after year. They all purport to be signed by Lekshmi. Those on 6-5-1117 and 10-8-1118 have also a thumb impression apparently that of Lekshmi against them. It is testified by the plaintiff as PW 1 and his kariasthan PW 3 that these two entries as well as the just previous one for 4-9-1116, were written by the defendant. The entry dated 10-8-1118 with which we are most concerned says that the properties in question were being released on that day to the plaintiff and Lekshmi had no more rights thereto or possession thereof and that the arrears of rent amounting to 163 paras would be paid off soon. The vernacular expression runs as follows:- xxx xxx xxx 10. This endorsement on 10-8-1118 is confirmed in all details by the entries in the plaintiff's thirattu accounts for 1118 filed as Ext. N. The surrender and consequent assumption of direct possession by the plaintiff and the further employment of the defendant for future cultivation are entered as follows:- xxx xxx xxx The plaintiff's paddy ledger filed as Ext. A C, contains among others, the results of the plaintiff's direct cultivation of the plaint lands for 1119 and Ext. Aa and Ab thirattu accounts exhibit the position for the later years 1120 and 1124. One noteworthy feature of these accounts is that Lekshmi does not figure as having anything to do with the properties during the period covered. Reference is on the other hand made to the conduct of cultivation through the agency of the defendant. The direct cultivation by the plaintiff at this period was further borne out by Ext. O series returns made by plaintiff to the Grains Purchasing Authority in the State for the years 1120 to 1123. There was also the oral evidence of PW 2 the independent witness along with those of the plaintiff and his kariasthan as PW 1 and PW 3 to speak to the matter. 11. The above evidence if accepted, would have been quite enough to accept the plaintiff's case as to surrender. There was also the oral evidence of PW 2 the independent witness along with those of the plaintiff and his kariasthan as PW 1 and PW 3 to speak to the matter. 11. The above evidence if accepted, would have been quite enough to accept the plaintiff's case as to surrender. But the court below found itself unable to do for reasons mainly (i) that the surrender was improbable, (ii) that Ext. F entry dated 10-8-1118 was forgery and was also otherwise inadmissible in evidence, and (iii) that plaintiff's evidence as to direct possession after 10-8-1118 was neither clear nor conclusive. We will deal with these reasons one by one. But we may say at once that we are not satisfied to any extent with their validity. First as to the improbability of the surrender. This was rested by the court below on the circumstances mainly that with the passing of the Cochin Verumpattomdar's Act VIII of 1118, in Kumbhom 1118, Lekshmi obtained fixity of tenure and could accordingly have had no incentive to surrender thereafter on 10-1-1118. But this fixity depended on clearance of arrears within time fixed and it was for Lekshmi to have appreciated the situation. That there were arrears recurring year after year could not be gainsaid, vide the endorsement on the back of Ext. F and Exts. L, K, M thirattu accounts for 1114 to 1117. To explain off these arrears, as the court below has done by saying that they might not have been thought to be huge by Lekshmi was rather to indulge in speculation. It is betraying this defect again when the court relied on the facts that paddy was getting scarce and the price showed a tendency to soar up, as further agreements against the probability of the surrender. 12. Secondly as to the falsity of the entry of 10-8-1118 in Ext. F. This inference the court below drew from the fact that the figure 1118 therein appeared to be an overwriting on 1117 and the arrears of 163 paras as on 10-8-1118, though correct, was also an overwriting on 224 paras and odd which was the arrear on 10-8-1117. That is to say the entry had been made first with reference to 10-8-1117 and also the arrears on that date and later corrected so as to conform to 10-8-1118. That is to say the entry had been made first with reference to 10-8-1117 and also the arrears on that date and later corrected so as to conform to 10-8-1118. From this the court below drew the inference that the entry must as a whole have been written some time after 10-8-1118 so as to reflect the position on 10-7-1117 but by way of after thought corrected still later, so as more appropriately to correspond with that of 10-8-1118. But, when exactly these writings were or could have been made, the court did not stop to analyse. The court below had also an alternative theory that there was a real surrender on 10-7-1117, but the parties mutually agreed soon after to go back upon it with the result that Lekshmi continued to be a lessee as of old for all the future. This alternative theory we can discard at once, because it was not the case of any party. As regards the main theory it ill accords with the apparently contemporaneous entry as to surrender in Ext. N thirattu accounts for 1118 which we have extracted above. Again it allows the defendant to escape with a simple denial of his handwriting in Ext. R pro-note dated 9-11-1123 executed by himself and his brother and incorporated in this case, for purpose of comparison of handwriting, from the records of S. C. 238 of 1118 of the Wadakkancherry Munsiff's Court. The court below was itself able to find that the explanation given by the defendant that Ext. R was not the original of the pro-note executed by him and his brother was too far-fetched. If so, there was no reason not to accept the evidence of PW 3 in whose favour that pro-note was executed and who had further obtained decree in the small cause suit without contest, as to the genuine ness of Ext. R. For ourselves having compared the handwriting in Ext. R and the endorsement, we have no hesitation to uphold the plaintiff's claim that it was the defendant who wrote that endorsement. Finally why, if the correction was made after 10-8-1118 should the plaintiff not have been careful even in the first instance. The fact seems to be that the court below rather misled itself on what after all was an innocent correction in the endorsement by placing too much reliance on the defendant and his story. 13. Finally why, if the correction was made after 10-8-1118 should the plaintiff not have been careful even in the first instance. The fact seems to be that the court below rather misled itself on what after all was an innocent correction in the endorsement by placing too much reliance on the defendant and his story. 13. As regards the admissibility of Ext. F endorsement, the court below was no doubt correct in saying that to the extent the endorsement purported to extinguish Lekshmi's interest as a tenant of the properties its registration was compulsory. But where it erred was in thinking that that interest can be assumed to be of value of Rs. 100 or more at the date of its execution. If such consideration for the surrender had been mentioned, that might have been taken to be the value for purposes of registration. See Rohini Debia v. Shib Chander Chatterjee, 15 Suth. W. R. 558. But where it was not stated as here, the market value is the test and the burden of proof is on the party pleading that the document must be registered, to show that the property dealt with by it was of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards at the time of its execution. See Abdulla v. Fetch Mohammad, AIR 1921 Lah. 117. And where there is no evidence on the point the document need not be registered. See Ramachandra Shankar v. Anandi Bai, AIR 1932 B. 188. In this case there was no such proof on the side of the defendant and no objection was raised either, as to its admissibility on this score when the plaintiff tendered the endorsement in evidence. For it should not be forgotten that a question of admissibility of a document depending on facts, will not be allowed to be raised at any stage unless the facts are either admitted or proved beyond controversy. See Official Liquidator v. Burjorjee, AIR 1932 P.C. 118 . The court below was therefore wrong in its view that Ext. F entry dated 10-8-1118 was not admissible in evidence. There was in any event no objection to the reception of the endorsement in evidence to show the nature of the plaintiff's possession of the properties thereafter. It was not as if the court below was unaware of this position. The court below was therefore wrong in its view that Ext. F entry dated 10-8-1118 was not admissible in evidence. There was in any event no objection to the reception of the endorsement in evidence to show the nature of the plaintiff's possession of the properties thereafter. It was not as if the court below was unaware of this position. But it precluded itself from considering this aspect because of its finding that the plain tiff was not in possession after 10-8-1118. 14. Coming finally to the criticism of the court below of the plaintiff's evidence of direct possession after 1118. The court below made much capital, in our opinion wrongly, on the existence of an entry dated 29-11-1118 in Lekshmi's Ledger page in the plaintiff's thirattu account Ext. N for 1118 mentioning a loan of paddy for purposes of cultivation. This transaction was after the alleged surrender. So, asked the learned Judge, why should Lekshmi be granted a loan and that for cultivation. The answer was evident to him that Lekshmi must still have been the lessee of the plaintiff and the surrender story stood disproved on plaintiff's own admission. In our opinion this entry is not capable of so much construction. There was no warrant anyhow for the supposition, in the absence of a specific suggestion, to that effect during the cross examination of the plaintiff. The learned Judge next built an argument on the non production of the plaintiff's thirattu account for 1119, the year next after the 'surrender'. But in this he failed to notice that Ext. AC nalvazhi ledger fully subserved the purpose. Finally he felt much impressed by the fact that plaintiff was willing to say that Exts. Aa and Ab thirattu ledger for 1120 to 1124 did not contain entries as to remuneration paid to the defendant on account of his caretakership of the lands during the period. But what did it matter when plaintiff at the same time said there were other accounts and he was prepared to produce them but nobody pursued the matter. 15. Aa and Ab thirattu ledger for 1120 to 1124 did not contain entries as to remuneration paid to the defendant on account of his caretakership of the lands during the period. But what did it matter when plaintiff at the same time said there were other accounts and he was prepared to produce them but nobody pursued the matter. 15. But where, according to us, the learned Judge most misled himself was when he was prepared to go the full length with the defendant in his assertion that he did not submit returns during 1120 to 1124 as to his own cultivation before the State Grains Purchasing Authorities, all because the plaintiff persuaded him to that effect. It would otherwise have involved an acknowledgment of lease and consequent measuring out of more paddy to the State, so he explained. The learned Judge had already found the defendant to be unreliable on the question of sublease of items 1 to 20 and direct lease of item 21. How then did he, without support of any records, become creditworthy here. The learned Judge, in our opinion should have hesitated much before attributing fraud and collusion, not to speak of falsification of accounts to a person of the status of the plaintiff, relying for this purpose of the uncorroborated testimony alone of the defendant. We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff had fully made out his case as to surrender by Lekshmi of items 1 to 21 on 10-8-1118 and as to trespass thereon by the defendant on 5-9-1124. 16. The findings of the court below as to the extent of mesne profits due to the plaintiff and the absence of claim in the defendant for any improvement value have not been objected to before us. The Respondent's learned counsel however raised the question as to the defendant's right under the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, I of 1957 newly enacted, to continue in occupation on the strength of his 'agentship' or 'licence' which he said was relied on by the plaintiff. The Respondent's learned counsel however raised the question as to the defendant's right under the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, I of 1957 newly enacted, to continue in occupation on the strength of his 'agentship' or 'licence' which he said was relied on by the plaintiff. S.7 of the Act says : "Any person cultivating the land of another, whether as an agent or otherwise, under a Sambalapattom or Coolypattom arrangement or under any licence at the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding the expiry of termination of such arrangement or licence, be entitled to continue on the same terms and conditions as were applicable to him at such commencement, to cultivate the land". The caretakership of the defendant, as alleged by the plaintiff and upheld by us, is however not an agency under a Sambalapattom or Coolypattom arrangement nor a licence within the meaning of the Act. We therefore overrule this plea. 17. In the result we allow the appeal and modify the decree of the court below so as to enable the plaintiff to recover items 1 to 21 of the scheduled properties as well, from the defendant, with mesne profits at the rate of 330 paras per year from 29-8-1124 the date of institution of the first suit O. S. 36 of 1950 until the plaintiff himself as Receiver took possession of the properties. The plaintiff will get his costs of both the courts from the defendant. A. S. 472 of 1955 18. The prayer in the suit herein for declaration of possession and permanent injunction became practically incapable of enforcement with the defendant's subsequent trespass pending suit as found by us in the connected appeal. Adequate relief to the plaintiff arising out of the trespass has also been granted by us in that appeal. We therefore direct that this appeal will stand dismissed. There will be no order for costs.