JUDGMENT R. Dayal, J. - These are petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the validity of an order of the Board of Revenue. The circumstances in which the petitions have been filed are these. 2. In 1944, the petitioners filed five suits under Secs. 175 and 179 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, hereafter called the Act, for the ejectment respectively of the defendant-respondent from certain plots of land on the allegation that the petitioners were sirdars of the plots and these respondents were their tenants. The suits were contested, the defendant in each case alleging, inter alia, that he was the hereditary tenant of the plots in suit. 3. On the 14th April, 1945, the trial court decided the suits in favour of the petitioners and passed decrees for the ejectment of the defendant-respondents. Those decrees were put into execution and in 1945 the petitioners obtained possession of the plots. The petitioners have continued in possession of the plots which had been in the occupation of the defendant Kehari, but they let out the plots which had been in the possession of the other defendants to other persons (who were not parties to the proceedings in the revenue courts and are not parties to these petitions) and these tenants were recorded as occupants of the plots in 1356 Fasli. 4. Appeals which had been filed by the defendants against the decision of the trial court were dismissed by the Additional Commissioner, Rohilkhand Division, on the 28th November, 1945. Thereafter the defendants filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue. Those appeals did not, it seems, come on for hearing until 1957, and the point was then argued on behalf of the appellants that they had each acquired the status of an adhivasi under Sec. 20 (a) (i) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and could not therefore be ejected. That argument prevailed and the Board allowed the appeals by its order dated the 8th/12th October, 1957. It is the validity of that order which is challenged in this petition. 5. That argument prevailed and the Board allowed the appeals by its order dated the 8th/12th October, 1957. It is the validity of that order which is challenged in this petition. 5. It was argued before the Board and in this Court that the petitioners had alleged in their suits, and the two lower Revenue Courts had found, that the defendants were the tenants of the petitioner's sir land; that notwithstanding the ejectment of the defendants in executions of the decrees which had been passed against them they continued to be tenants of sir on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and that they had, therefore, under Sec. 20 (a) (i) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, acquired the status of adhivasis and that therefore they could not be ejected. This legal position was accepted by the plaintiff subject to the contention that the defendant lost his subtenancy status and ceased to be sub-tenant after his ejectment in execution of the decree for ejectment in view of Sec. 45(b) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The correctness of this contention by the plaintiff was challenged by the defendant on the ground that the defendant's second appeal against that decree being pending and the decree having not become final the right of the defendant as tenant of the sir land had not been lost under Sec. 45 (b) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The Board agreed with this contention of defendant and accordingly set aside the decrees of the courts below. 6. The question to consider in these petitions is whether this view of the Board is wrong. "S. 45 and 46 of the Act, relevant for our purpose are: S. 45 - "The interest of a tenant shall be extinguished - (a) When he dies leaving no heir entitled to inherit, in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (b) in land which has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent or from which he has been ejected in execution of a decree or order of a court; (c) subject to the provisions of secs. (b) in land which has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent or from which he has been ejected in execution of a decree or order of a court; (c) subject to the provisions of secs. 82 to 88 by surrender, or by abandonment: (d) in land which has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; (e) subject to the proviso to Sec. 46 by merger; (f) where the tenant has been deprived of possession and his right to recover possession is barred by limitation. S. 46 - Where a tenant acquired succeeds to the entire proprietary right in his holding or where the holder of the entire proprietary right over a holding inherits or otherwise acquires the holding, the tenancy is extinguished : Provided that if the transaction by which the proprietary right was acquired is after-wards set aside by the order of a competent court, or if such a right is lost in consequence of the exercise of a right of preemption, the tenancy shall revive. Explanation - In this section the words "proprietary right" include the rights of an under-proprietor, of a permanent lessee and of a permanent tenure-holder. It is noticeable that all other provisions of Sec. 45 except those of clauses (b) and (e) state the circumstances for the extinction of an interest of a tenant and cannot give rise to any revival of tenancy later on. A tenancy extinguished in accordance with the provisions of clause (b) or clause (e) is however liable to be revived." 7. The provisions of clause (e) are subject to the proviso to Sec. 46. The proviso deals with the revival of tenancy extinguished under the provisions of clause (e) in case the tenant who acquired entire proprietary right in the holding loses that right in certain circumstances. 8. If the provisions of clause (e) of Sec. 45 refer to a decree which was liable to be set aside in appeal there could have been a provision in the Act for the revival of the extinct tenancy in case that decree for ejectment was set aside. There is no such specific provision in the Tenancy Act. It is however not disputed by the petitioner that such a tenancy must revive if the ejected tenant succeeds in appeal and the decree for ejectment is set aside. There is no such specific provision in the Tenancy Act. It is however not disputed by the petitioner that such a tenancy must revive if the ejected tenant succeeds in appeal and the decree for ejectment is set aside. How can a tenancy which has become extinct under a statute revive without there being an explicit provision in that or any other statute for revival ? We are therefore of opinion that the provisions of clause (b) of Sec. 45 contemplate ejectment of a tenant under a decree which has become final not merely in the sense that it is effective and liable to be obeyed but in the sense that it is no more open to being set aside by a superior court. So long as it is open to be set aside, any ejectment of a tenant in execution of that decree will not lead to the extinction of his tenancy though it certainly leads to his being dispossessed of the land in suit. When the decree is set aside in appeal its effect is that the possession of the actual occupant of that land subsequent to execution would be deemed unlawful and the person entitled to the possession of that land during that period would be the person in whose favour the ultimate decree is. It is on the basis of such a consideration that the ultimate successful party is entitled to restitution of possession and mesne profits from the actual occupant. 9. If we were to hold otherwise, it would mean that when the trial court decrees the suit, the decree is executed and the tenant is dispossessed, his tenancy comes to an end. He has thus no right left in himself on the basis of which he could press his appeal later on before the higher court. He may have a right to appeal against the decree, but his tenancy is lost and he has nothing to rely upon to press his contention. 10. It follows, therefore, that the Board is right in holding that the defendant had not lost his sub-tenancy status by the time, the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force. 11. We therefore dismiss these petitions with costs.