JUDGMENT This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1957 confirming the judgment and decree of the Munsiff, in Title Suit No. 125 of 1958. The defendant in the said suit is the appellant. 2. The respondent brought the suit for a declaration of his title to the said property, which was an ingkhol. He stated that he was in possession of the said ingkhol on the strength of an oral gift by his maternal uncle, (who was the father of the appellant), some 30 years before suit. The suit was originally dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, before whom it was filed. But in the appeal to this Court, my learned predecessor though agreeing with the finding that the gift was not proved, remanded the suit for fresh trial on the question whether the respondent had perfected title to the ingkhol by adverse possession against the appellant. In the further trial, the learned Munsiff, before whom the suit came up, held that the respondent had perfected title by adverse possession and he disbelieved the case of the appellant that the respondent was in permissive possession or that he was paying rent either to his maternal uncle during his life time or subsequently to the appellant. The District Judge in appeal also agreed with the learned Munsiff. 3. It came out in the course of the evidence that the respondents maternal uncle even during his life-time had vacated this ingkhol bearing patta No. 85/1227 I.W.T. in favour of the respondent and had shifted to the southern portion, namely, the ingkhol bearing patta No. 85/1226. The respondents case was that his maternal uncle gave the northern half of the ingkhol bearing patta No. 85/1227 to him and gave the southern half bearing patta No. 85/1227 to his daughter, namely, the appellant. Thus, the appellant and the respondent have been neighbours for 30 years before suit. It may also be mentioned that the respondent was born in the suit ingkhol and brought up in the suit ingkhol by his maternal uncle who died about 5 years after shifting from the northern half to the southern half. After his death, the respondent continued in possession of the suit ingkhol, while the appellant continued to live in the ingkhol to the south of it. After his death, the respondent continued in possession of the suit ingkhol, while the appellant continued to live in the ingkhol to the south of it. The appellant further admitted that the respondent built a house in the said ingkhol about 20 years before suit. She also admitted that the appellant has been throughout paying the revenue for the ingkhol. Her case that the revenue was being paid by him on her behalf was rightly rejected by both the lower Courts. The appellant did not produce any evidence in support of her case that the respondent was living in the ingkhol as a tenant paying rent to her father during his life time, or paying rent to her after her fathers death. 4. Thus the position was that the respondent has been living in the suit ingkhol as if it was his own property and his possession was exclusive, notorious and uninterrupted. The appellant having lived as his neighbour all these years cannot be heard to say that she was unaware of such possession after her admission that the respondent put up a house in the ingkhol 20 years before suit. It was only in 1952 when the respondent applied for mutation of the patta in his name that the appellant, for the first time, objected and stated that the respondent was only in permissive possession. Immediately the respondent came forward with this suit to establish his title. The fact that the respondent was in possession as if he was the true owner and asserting his title cannot be disputed by the appellant. 5. But the appellants learned Advocate came forward with a rather ingenious argument that the Law of Limitation did not apply to Manipur until the Indian Limitation Act was extended to this State in 1950 by means of the Part C States (Laws) Act 1950 and that therefore any possession by the respondent prior to the application of the Law of Limitation to Manipur cannot be treated as adverse possession and that the appellants right to the property as the heir of her father cannot, therefore, be extinguished by any possession on the part of the respondent which cannot be called adverse to her. 6. 6. It was pointed out that the appellants right to the property can be said to be extinguished if at all, only under section 28 of the Limitation Act, as she has been out of possession for more than 12 years and the period for instituting a suit for possession in such a case was 12 years when the possession of the respondent became adverse to the appellant. The argument was that since the Law of Limitation did not apply to Manipur before 1950, any possession by the respondent prior to 1950 cannot be called adverse to the appellant and so neither section 28 nor Article 144 of the Limitation Act would apply to the present case, as the Act cannot be treated as having retrospective operation. 7. In that connection, the decision Bhura Dhana v. Kala, AIR 1950 Kutch 69 was also brought to my notice. But the Kutch decision will not apply at all, as in the State of Kutch there was no law of Limitation by which title could be acquired by adverse possession. That decision will not therefore help in deciding the question whether once the Indian Limitation Act was made applicable to a particular State, it will have retrospective operation or not. 8. The plea that there was no law of limitation in Manipur before the Indian Limitation Act was extended in 1950 was not set up in the lower Courts or proved. Sec. 3(2) of the Part C States (Laws) Act 1950 states that the law of Limitation was generally in force in Manipur even before the Limitation Act was extended in 1950 to Manipur. 9. The very preamble to the Act "whereas it is expedient to provide rules for acquiring by possession, the ownership of property it is hereby enacted as follows", shows that it was intended to be retrospective in character. 9. The very preamble to the Act "whereas it is expedient to provide rules for acquiring by possession, the ownership of property it is hereby enacted as follows", shows that it was intended to be retrospective in character. Thus if a person had been in possession of property adversely to another for a period of 12 years before the Limitation Act was made applicable to a State, section 28 of the Limitation Act would apply at once and the right of the other person to such property would be clearly extinguished in the face of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, because he would be met with the plea if he brought a suit for possession that he had not been in possession within 12 years of suit or that the defendant in such a suit had acquired title by adverse possession for 12 years. It cannot be argued that Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act would apply only 12 years after the Limitation Act was made applicable. That would lead us to a very absurd situation. 10. I have already pointed out in this very case that the respondent has been in possession of the property asserting his title and he has built a house in the said property on the basis of his title to the property to the full knowledge of the appellant for more than 20 years before the suit was filed. It is clear therefore that the appellants title was extinguished by section 28 of the Limitation Act. There can be no doubt that the Limitation Act when once it was made applicable to a State was retrospective in character and not prospective. This argument of the appellant must fail. 11. It follows therefore that the decisions of the lower Courts are correct. The second appeal fails and it is dismissed with the costs of the respondents. Appeal dismissed.