JUDGMENT V.R. Newaskar, J. This second appeal involves a question regarding construction of Section 4 (g) and (h) of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955. The question arose under the following circumstances: Plaintiff, who is a retired medical practitioner, filed a suit for ejectment, arrears of rent and mesne-profits. Claim for ejectment was based on the grounds that the premises in the occupation of the Defendant were needed by him for opening a dispensary and that there is no other place in the city for that purpose and that the Defendant had enclosed the verandah and thereby occupied a portion in excess of what was rented out to him and had caused obstruction to the ventilation of the house. Besides these grounds which were said to be necessary by reason of Section 4 of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act the Plaintiff averred termination of Defendant's tenancy by notice to quit. The Defendant resisted the suit for ejectment on the ground that the premises in his occupation are residential and that therefore the Plaintiff could not claim his ejectment for enabling to have non-residential accommodation. The allegation as to his having enclosed verandah and thereby having occupied excessive portion and caused obstruction to ventilation was denied. There was no contest raised regarding Plaintiff's other portion of the claim. The trial Court found the second ground for ejectment not established. As regards the first ground he held that the premises in Defendant's possession were residential and as such the Plaintiff has no right under the Act to secure Defendant's ejectment in order to enable him to open a dispensary there which is a non-residential purpose. Consequently Plaintiff's suit for ejectment was dismissed. Decree however was passed in respect of the rest of the claim. On appeal the learned District Judge concurred with the conclusion of the trial Court on both the points pertaining to the claim for ejectment. He held that in the absence of a definition of the term 'non-residential accommodation' in the Act it will have to be taken to bear ordinary meaning. This, according to him, is that an accommodation which is used for residential purpose is residential and that used for non-residential purpose is non-residential. He did not accept the construction sought to be put upon the term on Plaintiff's behalf that non-residential accommodation also includes residential accommodation which can be used for non-residential purpose. This, according to him, is that an accommodation which is used for residential purpose is residential and that used for non-residential purpose is non-residential. He did not accept the construction sought to be put upon the term on Plaintiff's behalf that non-residential accommodation also includes residential accommodation which can be used for non-residential purpose. According to the learned Judge the fact that separate provisions were made in Sections 4(g) and 5(h) regarding residential and non-residential accommodation indicates that the legislation intended to treat them separately and not to allow them to be mixed. Consequently he came to the conclusion that the premises in question, being used as they are, for a residential purpose cannot be available to the Plaintiff for his non-residential purpose. He also found as a fact that there was no enclosing of the verandah with a view to obtain excessive accommodation nor was there any new obstruction to ventilation. The appeal was consequently dismissed. In this second appeal Mr. Chaphekar for the Appellant assailed the decision only on the first of the two grounds of ejectment namely the one relating to the construction of Section 4(h) of the Act. He contended that the meaning assigned by the Court of appeal to the term 'non-residential accommodation' is not correct. According to him that term cannot be made to depend upon the use to which an accommodation in question is actually put irrespective of the nature of accommodation. This, according to the learned Counsel, will introduce personal and accidental element in the definition of a term and is bound to result in confusion and inconsistency. According to him, in order to ascertain the true construction we ought to take into account the prior Act on subject which the present Act repeals. Under the earlier Act a landlord could under Section 4(g) obtain ejectment of a tenant in case he genuinely needed the particular premises for the purpose of his residence and there was no other place in the city or town elsewhere. The present Act is a step forward in reducing the incovenience of a landlord who needed the premises for the purpose of his own business, profession or vocation. In other words for a non-residential purpose. If the need is genuine, according to the learned Counsel, it is immaterial to what use it was being put by the tenant and the landlord ought to have the premises. In other words for a non-residential purpose. If the need is genuine, according to the learned Counsel, it is immaterial to what use it was being put by the tenant and the landlord ought to have the premises. Referring to the circumstances of the case the learned Counsel contended that the Plaintiff is a retired medical man. He is in need of starting his dispensary. He suffers from an ailment which makes it necessary for him to have the premises at the ground-floor. It would therefore be a great hardship if he is not allowed the use of his own premises merely because the Defendant uses the same for the purpose of residence. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant. The material provisions of Section 4(g) and (h) of the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955, are as follows: No suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds: (g) in the case of residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for his own residence or that of any person of his family bona fide, residing or to reside with him and there is no other accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned for such residence; (h) in the case of non-residential accommodation, that the landlord genuinely requires the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business or that of any person of his family bona fide residing or to reside with him and that he or the aforesaid person of his family is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose and if he was in occupation, has for sufficient reasons vacated it after the Act has been extended to that city or town. It appears to me fairly clear from the provision that the Act intends to divide the accommodation into two categories--residential and non-residential and secures to the landlord the accommodation by ejecting the tenant if the landlord's need be of the same category to which particular accommodation can be found by the Court to belong. It appears to me fairly clear from the provision that the Act intends to divide the accommodation into two categories--residential and non-residential and secures to the landlord the accommodation by ejecting the tenant if the landlord's need be of the same category to which particular accommodation can be found by the Court to belong. If the accommodation in question is residential the landlord can secure the ejectment of a tenant occupying the same if he genuinely needs the same for the purpose of residence and there is no place in the city or town so as to satisfy his need. If on the other hand the accommodation is non-residential then he can secure the ejectment of a tenant there from in case his genuine need be for a non-residential purpose and there is no other place in the city or town satisfying that need of his. The Legislature thus having made two categories and allowed to the landlord an accommodation of a particular category if his need was for accommodation falling within that category it will not be open for a landlord to claim ejectment of a tenant from an accommodation falling within the category for a purpose falling within the another category. It is no doubt true that difficulties may arise while considering the question in which particular category given premises fall. The learned District Judge applied the test depending upon the nature of the actual use which the tenant at the time of the action is making of the premises. If he is using the premises for residence then they arc residential. If he is using them for non-residential purpose then they are non-residential. To my mind a more objective test ought to exist for determining whether the particular accommodation is residential or non-residential and should not be made to depend upon the will and need of the tenant. In the final analysis whether a particular accommodation falls in one or the other of the categories is a question of fact depending upon various factors including the constructional features, the situation, amenities available, conveniences provided, the number of rooms, the actual use to which the same is being put and several other factors. In the final analysis whether a particular accommodation falls in one or the other of the categories is a question of fact depending upon various factors including the constructional features, the situation, amenities available, conveniences provided, the number of rooms, the actual use to which the same is being put and several other factors. The Court which is required to consider the question in which category a particular accommodation may fall should determine the question on these considerations and then decide whether the Plaintiff's need is to have the accommodation of the category thus determined. In the present case the premises in question were given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant for the purpose of residence. It is not shown by the Plaintiff, who claimed Defendant's ejectment, that the premises though given and used for residence were non-residential in nature. Both the Courts below held against the Plaintiff on this question. The conclusion to which the lower Courts arrived is reasonable and nothing has been shown to me from the evidence on record that the findings of the Court below are unsupportable in view of the tests indicated above. The appeal therefore is without force and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.