JUDGMENT H.R. Krishnan, J. 1. This is an appeal directed against the decision of the first appellate court modifying the trial Court's decree in some respects, but still maintaining its decision that, on the one hand, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the price of 52 bales of ginned cotton (Rui) sold by him to the defendants and, on the other, they were entitled to set off the amounts due to them as damages for non-delivery of 2 other quantities of cotton, which the plaintiff had agreed to deliver on particular dates. The questions for decision are, firstly, the effect of the belated substitution by the plaintiffs-appellants of one out of the 5 legal representatives of one of the deceased respondents. Secondly, whether in a case like this where the defendants' claim is for unascertained sums of money, a set off should at all have been allowed; and thirdly, whether, the facts relating to the two breaches pleaded by the defendants-respondents, have been proved. 2. Point No. 1. This can be disposed of very briefly. Chhotmal, one of the four respondents, died on 21-7-1955. By an application dated 20-8-1955, the appellants substituted the four sons of the deceased respondent. In time the new respondents petitioned that their mother was still alive and had not been substituted. Accordingly, a fresh petition was made, but after the 90 days period, for her being impleaded as a respondent. Without going into any lengthy discussion, I note that this case is on all fours with the case reported in A.I.R. 1945 Nag 153, which already has been followed in another case in this Court. Applying the same principles I find nothing wrong in the belated impleading of one of the legal representatives, while the appellant had in time brought on record, all the legal representatives ascertained after diligent inquiry. 3. Paints No. 2 and No. 3. Before entering into the questions of the propriety or otherwise of allowing a set off, and the facts relating to it, it will be convenient to summarise the broad facts of the case. The plaintiff is a dealer in cotton ginned (Rui) as well as unginned (Kapas). 3. Paints No. 2 and No. 3. Before entering into the questions of the propriety or otherwise of allowing a set off, and the facts relating to it, it will be convenient to summarise the broad facts of the case. The plaintiff is a dealer in cotton ginned (Rui) as well as unginned (Kapas). Towards the end of 1949 he agreed to deliver cotton to the defendants according to the following time-table and at the following prices:- (a On 12-9-1949 (Asvina Badi 5 Sambat 2006) there was an agreement 10 deliver before Agahan Sudi 15 Samvat 2006, 31 mani of unginned cotton at the rate of Rs. 142 per mani, (This was not delivered). (b) On 28-11-1949 the plaintiff acting through Deoraj Dalai had contracted to deliver 521 maunds of ginned cotton by Pus Sudi 15 at the price of Rs. 33-14-0 per maundi (This was also not delivered ). The cause of non-delivery in both cases was obviously the rise in prices. (c) On the 15th December 1949 (Pus Badi 10 Samvat 2006) the plaintiff agreed to sell 52 maunds of ginned cotton at Rs. 35 a maund; this quantity was actually delivered. The suit was for the price for the deal (c), while the set-off was in respect of the damages due to the defendant for the failure to deliver goods in accordance with (a) and (b). 4. The plaintiff's claim has been allowed to his satisfaction. In regard to the transaction No. (a) the object in second appeal is only that the lower courts have allowed the defendants Re. 1 more per maund i.e. Rs. 31 in all on this account, and the set off, if allowed, should be for that much less. This is a trifling amount; after all the ascertainment of the price on a particular date is a finding of fact, so nothing more need be said about this detail in regard to set off arising out of (a). 5. In regard to deal No. (b) relating to 521 maunds the special objections are firstly that there was no contract at all; secondly that the trial court has erred in fixing a national price of ginned cotton on the 15th of Pus Sudi. As there was no quotation for that date the trial court should not have awarded any damages. What it has done instead is to calculate a national price. As there was no quotation for that date the trial court should not have awarded any damages. What it has done instead is to calculate a national price. The prices of unginned cotton as well as ginned cotton were quoted for the 14th. For the 15th there was a quotation for unginned cotton; from this the trial court has calculated by a simple rule of three, what the price of ginned cotton would have been, if it had been quoted. The obvious assumption is that on both the dates there was the same proportion between the prices of the two varieties. 6. The general question is whether in a case like this the defendant should have been allowed to plead a set off as defence, and escape the trouble and inconvenience of a cross suit. The plaintiff has argued and very correctly that this set off is not covered by O. 8 R. 6. No doubt, the parties fill in the same character in all these dealings and the suit also is one for the recovery of money. But the defendants' claim is for damages not already ascertained on the date of the suit. But the plaintiff's fallacy lies in the assumption that O. 8 R. 6 is exhaustive, and no set-off can be pleaded outside that rule; actually equitable set off is well recognized by courts in our country. So we have to see, if in addition to the conditions already noted, those for equitable set off are also fulfilled. The test is whether, broadly speaking, the dealings pleaded in the set off, are part of the same transaction as the one for which the suit is brought or whether all of them are so closely inter-related that it will be inequitable to drive the defendant to a separate suit. The aim is to balance the obvious convenience of a set-off to the defendant against the possible confusion of the issues and embarrassment to the plaintiff that may be caused by the introduction in the suit itself matters that may only be remotely connected and may require separate self-contained inquiry. Here the position is simple. The parties have had dealings of the same nature; within 3 months the plaintiff had agreed to deliver 3 quantities of cotton, at different prices on different but near dates. Here the position is simple. The parties have had dealings of the same nature; within 3 months the plaintiff had agreed to deliver 3 quantities of cotton, at different prices on different but near dates. One of the three agreements, as, it happens the latest, was performed while the two earlier ones were not, because the prices were rising. If each offer and acceptance and consequent agreement is treated as an independent transaction, these 3 dealings become three different transactions. On the other hand there is a continuity and there is considerable similarity between the three, so that all the three bargains could be called one transaction; it is only a manner of saying. Whether we call them one or three transactions, there is a close connection and of course considerable similarity, Certainly, it would be very hard on the defendant to be made to pay for one of the lots that was actually delivered, and driven to a separate suit for compensation for the two exactly similar lots that were not delivered. Nor do I find any remoteness of connection or other complication that might embarrass the plaintiff in meeting the claim for damages. Thus I would hold that this is a case in which the lower courts were right in applying the principles of equitable set-off even though the amounts were unascertained. 7. Coming to the merits, for reasons already recorded, nothing need be said about the claim for a reduction of Rs. 31/- in the damages arising out of (a). In regard to (b) there is a denial that there was a contract at all. Actually, the Dalai who entered the contract had come to depose; he was fully authorised, and only deviation was his agreeing to accept Rs. 33-14-0 per maund instead of the Rs. 34/- per maund, mentioned in the written authority but the plaintiff himself had ratified this in a subsequent letter. In the written statement there is only a bare denial, but in the argument here it is said that Chhotmal who was acting for the defendants did not accept the offer because he said that Pus Sudt 15 was too distant a date for him. I do not accept this. Chhotmal himself was examined as D.W. and he stated that he had accepted the offer. I do not accept this. Chhotmal himself was examined as D.W. and he stated that he had accepted the offer. It was not even suggested to him that he had not, and, therefore, there was no completed contract. All things considered, therefore, it is clear that there was a contract to sell at the prices mentioned. 8. The basis for the calculation of damages is the price at which the purchaser could have got the goods on the relevant date. In this case it was the 15 Sudi of Pus. On that date, ginned cotton was not quoted, but unginned cotton was. But the price of both on 14th was known, as well as of Kapas on the 15th. Now, the one is derived from the other, by the simple and unrisky process of ginning, and during short intervals, at any rate, it is reasonble to assume the proportion between their prices, which is the cost of the ginning, continues the same. This is exactly what the lower courts had done. 8. In the result, I find that the plaintiff-appellant succeeds on none of the grounds. Accordingly, I dismiss the second appeal with costs and pleader's fee to the defendant respondents on minimum contested scale. Appeal dismissed.