JUDGMENT R. Dayal, J. - This is an appeal against the order of Mr. Justice Oak dismissing the Appellant's petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. 2. The Appellant is the tenant of a portion of house No. 83 Johnstonganj, Allahabad, Respondent No. 3 is its owner. An application by Respondent No. 3 to the District Magistrate of Allahabad for permission to sue the Appellant for ejectment was rejected by the Addl. District Magistrate, Allahabad, but was allowed by the Addl. Commr., Allahabad on 19-12-1956. In view of the permission granted the Respondent No. 3 instituted suit No. 165 of 1957 in the court of the Munsif West, Allahabad, Respondent No. 2, for the ejectment of the Appellant. 3. The Appellant however submitted a representation against the order of the Commissioner u/s 7F of the Rent Control and Eviction Act to the State Government on 22-1-1957 through the District Magistrate and submitted another representation directly on 13-2-1957. The State Government was of the opinion that it was not possible to consider the representation which it considered had become infructuous in view of the institution of the civil suit for ejectment by the Respondent No. 3, and conveyed this opinion to the Appellant. The Appellant thereupon filed a writ petition u/Art. 226 of the Constitution praying for the quashing of the order of the Government dated 14-8-1957 and for the issue of a writ of mandamus to the State Government commanding it to dispose of his representation u/s 7F of the UP Rent Control and Eviction Act on its merits. The learned Judge rejected this prayer observing that "Once a suit is filed with the requisite permission, any subsequent cancellation of the permission will not compel the civil court to dismiss a suit properly instituted. In such a case cancellation of a permission subsequent to the filing of the suit will have no practical effect. In such a situation it is futile for a Commisioner or the State Government to cancel the permission". The Appellant appeals against this order. 4. We are of opinion that this appeal must succeed. 5. In such a case cancellation of a permission subsequent to the filing of the suit will have no practical effect. In such a situation it is futile for a Commisioner or the State Government to cancel the permission". The Appellant appeals against this order. 4. We are of opinion that this appeal must succeed. 5. The Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 3 contended that it was within the discretion of the State Government u/s 7F of the Act to call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in S. 3, that it was also within the discretion of the State Government to make any order which appeared to it necessary for the ends of justice, and that therefore the order of of the State Government on the representation of the Appellant would not be a fit subject for scrutiny and could not be quashed by this Court. The contention for the Appellant is not that the discretion exercised by the State Government on a consideration of his representation was bad, but is that the State Government did not exercise any discretion at all as it felt itself bound not to consider the representation in view of the fact that the suit for ejectment had been instituted against the Appellant in pursuance of the permission granted to Respondent No. 3 by the Addl. Commr. to sue the Appellant for ejectment. It is conceded for the Appellant that if the State Government bad considered the representation on its merits, it was not open to him to come to this Court to question the decision or the order passed by the State Government in view of the power given to the State Government to pass any order which it considered necessary for the ends of justice. The order of the State Government is clear, and is to the effect that it was not possible to consider the representation which has become infructuous on account of the institution of the suit. The question, therefore, for determination is whether the State Government was precluded from considering the representation subsequent to the institution of the suit in pursuance of the permission granted. 6. The relevant portions of S. 3 of the Act are: 3. The question, therefore, for determination is whether the State Government was precluded from considering the representation subsequent to the institution of the suit in pursuance of the permission granted. 6. The relevant portions of S. 3 of the Act are: 3. Restrictions on eviction.-(1) Subject to any order passed u/s ub S. 3 no suit shall, without the permission of the district Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) ... (b) ... (c) ... (d) ... (e) ... (f) ... (g) ... (2) Where any application has been made to the District Magistrate for permission to sue a tenant for eviction from any accommodation and the Distt. Magistrate grants or refuses to grant the permission, the party aggrieved by his order may within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated to him apply to the Commissioner to revise the order. (3) The Commissioner shall hear the application made u/s ub S. (2), as far as may be, within six weeks from the date of making it, and he may, if he is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate or as to the regularity of proceedings held before him alter or reverse his order, or make such other order as may be just and proper. (4) The order of the Commissioner u/s ub S. (3) shall subject to any order passed by the State Government u/s 7F be final. 7. The section, as its heading indicates, imposes restrictions on eviction. Suits for ejectment can be filed, without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate, on any of the grounds mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) of subS. (1). If a landlord desires to eject a tenant on any other ground he is restricted from suing unless he obtains the permission of the District Magistrate. The right to institute a suit for ejectment on any other ground with the permission of the District Magistrate is subject to any order passed u/s ub S. (3). Sub S. (3) empowers the Commissioner to hear the application in revision within a certain time and to pass such order as he considers just and proper. The right to institute a suit for ejectment on any other ground with the permission of the District Magistrate is subject to any order passed u/s ub S. (3). Sub S. (3) empowers the Commissioner to hear the application in revision within a certain time and to pass such order as he considers just and proper. This order of the Commissioner itself is again subject to any order passed by the State Government u/s 7F; otherwise it is final. It follows, therefore, that the right to file a suit for ejectment on grounds other than those mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) is ultimately dependent not only on the permission granted by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner but on the ultimate orders of the State Government u/s 7F if any. This means that the permission granted by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner will stand or fail according to the final orders of the State Government, and that the validity of the institution of a suit for ejectment will depend on the nature of the final orders of the Government. If the final order upholds the order or is an order granting permission to sue for ejectment a suit instituted prior to it would be a validly instituted suit, provided that it was instituted after having obtained the permission of the District Magistrate or the Commissioner. If the final order of the Government refuses permission to sue for ejectment, any suit instituted prior to such an order of the State Government will be deemed to be instituted without any valid permission u/s 3 of the Act, and must therefore fail on the preliminary ground of being instituted without the necessary permission. If it were not so the party securing the permission of the District Magistrate or the Commissioner can nullify the effect of the statutory provision by rushing to the court. We do not think that this could have been contemplated by the Legislature. The Legislature contemplated that the institution and further proceedings in any suit for ejectment on grounds other than those mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) would be dependent on the nature of the final order passed by the State Government with respect to the permission for instituting the suit for ejectment. We can see no other reasonable interpretation to the provisions of S. 3 of the Act. 8. (a) to (g) would be dependent on the nature of the final order passed by the State Government with respect to the permission for instituting the suit for ejectment. We can see no other reasonable interpretation to the provisions of S. 3 of the Act. 8. Reference was made at the bar to three cases. They are distinguishable. The first case is Wazir Singh Manra v. Rakkha Devi 1955 ALJ 260. In that case the District Magistrate granted permission to institute a suit for ejectment. The suit was accordingly instituted. The tenant went in revision to the Commissioner. The Commissioner rejected the application on the ground that a civil suit having been filed he did not consider it proper to consider the order of the District Magistrate. It was observed in this case that in the circumstances it could not be said that the Commissioner's order was illegal or he refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. The Commissioner exercised his mind and considered that the fact that a suit had been filed was a good ground for rejecting the application. 9. The impugned order of the State Government in the present case does not show that the state Government considered the application and then rejected it. It shows clearly that the State Government considered that the mere fact of the institution of suit made the representation infructuous The State Government in our opinion, did not exercise the jurisdiction vested in it u/s 7F of the Act. 10. The second case referred to is Jagdish Prasad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh ILR (1924) 52 Cal. 112. The question before us in the present case did not arise in that case. 11. The third case referred to is Dr. Bishambhar Nath Bhalley v. Sri Baldeo Prasad Gupta 1957 AWR (HC) 662. In this case a decree for ejectment had been passed in a suit instituted with the permission of the District Magistrate. The question urged before this Court in second appeal was that having regard to S. 3 of the UP Control of Rent and Eviction Act the suit could not be filed until the revision which had been filed before the Commissioner prior to the institution of the suit had been disposed of Gurtu, J. held that there was no such restriction on the landlord instituting the suit. It does not appear from this judgment what was the Commissioner's order on that revision. Possibly, the Commissioner upheld the District Magistrate's order, and therefore the tenant could simply submit that the institution of the suit during the pendency of the revision before the Commissioner was bad in law. The question before us did not arise in that case. 12. For the reasons we have stated, we are of opinion that the State Government was competent to consider the representation submitted by the Appellant u/s 7F of the Act, and that the permission granted to the Respondent by the Addl. Commr. would be subject to such orders as the State Government passes on the representation. 13. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned Judge, quash the order of the State Government dated 14-8-1957 and order that a direction be issued to the State Government to consider the Appellant's representation u/s 7F of the Act on its merits. We further direct the Respondent No. 3 to pay the costs of the appeal and of the petition dated 14 8-1958.